Volume 9, Issue V / 2026

Generative artificial intelligence increasingly mediates not only what institutions decide, but how institutions interpret people. Large language models draft case summaries, student feedback, performance reviews, clinical notes, policy briefs, creative text and administrative explanations. Existing AI governance frameworks appropriately emphasise accuracy, fairness, transparency, accountability and human oversight, yet these categories do not fully capture a distinct humanities problem: a fluent machine-generated interpretation can become institutionally authoritative before the person concerned has meaningfully articulated, contextualised or contested the account. This paper develops a person-centred framework of hermeneutic sovereignty for generative AI. Using an interdisciplinary conceptual methodology, it synthesises philosophical hermeneutics, epistemic injustice, narrative identity, human factors research, empirical studies of generative AI and contemporary governance frameworks. Hermeneutic sovereignty is defined as the situated and relational standing and capacity of persons and communities to participate meaningfully in constructing, contextualising, contesting, pluralising, revising and, where appropriate, refusing interpretations of their own experiences, identities, intentions, reasons and circumstances when those interpretations are mediated by AI. The paper identifies four mechanisms of AI-mediated interpretive foreclosure: interpretive pre-emption, hermeneutic compression, authority laundering and recursive fixation. It then proposes six dimensions for evaluating hermeneutic sovereignty and an Interpretive Foreclosure Test for institutional workflows. The analysis shows that human oversight is insufficient when the human merely approves a machine-framed account. Responsible adoption requires governance of the meaning-making process itself, including human-first elicitation, source-to-summary traceability, visible uncertainty, plural framing, contestability, correction propagation and time-bounded interpretive records. The paper concludes that trustworthy AI must preserve not only a human role in decisions, but a meaningful human standing in the production of the interpretations on which decisions depend.

In line with the global digital transformation trend, economic organisations and State management agencies are increasingly moving data to cloud platforms because of significant advantages such as lower costs, faster deployment and execution, and substantial improvements in employee productivity. In the context of data being stored across multiple countries, the involvement of numerous intermediaries, and the growing risk of cyberattacks, clearly defining the legal obligations and liabilities of actors throughout the cloud computing service supply chain has become an urgent requirement. Based on an assessment of the current legal framework in Vietnam, the author identifies legal gaps concerning the allocation of liability, cross-border data flow governance, and mechanisms for compensation for damage. On that basis, the article proposes solutions for improving the legal framework so as to balance the objectives of digital economic development and the protection of fundamental human rights.

The Secured Transactions in Movable Assets Act 2017 (STMA) of Nigeria is a major reform of the secured-credit architecture of the country. It provides a statutory framework for the creation, perfection, registration, prioritisation and realisation of security interests in movable assets. The reform is significant because it enables borrowers to use tangible and intangible movable property as collateral without necessarily surrendering possession of productive assets. This article examines whether the STMA provides a sufficiently certain legal framework for creditors, borrowers, grantors and competing claimants, with particular emphasis on the relationship between statutory rights and practical enforceability. The study adopted a doctrinal legal research methodology and analysed the statutory provisions of the STMA alongside relevant regulatory materials, authoritative institutional publications and verified scholarly literature. The 2020 documentary report on secured-transactions and credit-reporting reforms is employed as contemporaneous evidence of implementation concerns, particularly those relating to judicial capacity, creditor confidence, enforcement and dispute resolution. The article found that the STMA established a relatively comprehensive statutory architecture, particularly through its rules on security creation, registration, prioritisation and realisation. However, legal certainty is weakened where the statutory regime intersects with other registration systems, including company-charge registration, and where the effectiveness of enforcement depends upon judicial interpretation, institutional capacity and procedural clarity. The article further argued that the emphasis by the Act on registration-based priority creates substantial predictability but also makes the accuracy, accessibility and interoperability of registration systems central to the integrity of the legal framework. The article concluded that the principal challenge is no longer the absence of a statutory basis for movable-asset security but ensuring that the statutory framework operates coherently across institutions and produces predictable enforcement outcomes. It recommended greater institutional coordination, continuing judicial specialisation, clearer procedural mechanisms for dispute resolution, and closer harmonisation between the STMA and related legal regimes.

Buddhist philosophy is rooted in the ethical norms of compassion, non-violence, equality, justice, and the welfare of all sentient beings. Although these values are widely recognised as essential principles of modern democracy and human rights, they were taught by Gautama Buddha more than two thousand five hundred years ago. As the birthplace of the Buddha, Nepal has a distinctive historical and cultural connection with these teachings. This study examines the extent to which Buddhist philosophy is reflected in the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Nepal. The analysis shows that many constitutional rights, among them the rights to life, freedom, equality, justice, education, health, religious freedom, and social justice, are consistent with the ethical principles of Buddhist philosophy.

Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) places organised crime within India’s general penal law and expressly includes cyber-crimes among the forms of conduct capable of falling within that offence. The inclusion is consequential, but it can also mislead. A cyber offence does not become organised crime merely because it is technologically sophisticated, financially large, committed by several persons, or spread across multiple jurisdictions. Section 111 requires a more demanding combination: continuing unlawful activity, an organised crime syndicate, a legally relevant nexus between the accused and that syndicate, specified unlawful means, and a material-benefit objective. This paper examines that threshold through the text of Section 111, the jurisprudence developed under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 and the earliest High Court decisions applying the BNS provision. It argues that Section 111 should be interpreted as an enterprise-oriented offence rather than an aggravated form of ordinary cybercrime. Particular attention is given to recurring phishing and investment-fraud networks, mule-account structures, ransomware groups, decentralised digital syndicates, and the evidentiary problem of attributing membership or knowing participation in online criminal networks. The paper proposes a seven-part judicial framework designed to preserve Section 111 for durable criminal enterprises while preventing its routine use in ordinary multi-accused cyber-fraud prosecutions. Such an approach gives effect to legislative purpose without sacrificing legality, proportionality and individualised criminal responsibility.

Consent is the principal legitimating device of contemporary data-protection law, yet digital interfaces increasingly shape rather than merely record individual choice. This article examines whether consent obtained through dark patterns can satisfy the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) and the constitutional requirement of informational autonomy. It adopts a doctrinal and interdisciplinary methodology, analysing the DPDP Act, the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, Indian constitutional privacy jurisprudence, consumer-protection regulation, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and behavioural scholarship on interface manipulation. The article finds that section 6 of the DPDP Act imposes a demanding cumulative standard requiring voluntariness, purpose specificity, adequate information, freedom from impermissible conditions and unmistakable affirmative conduct but the framework does not expressly identify manipulative design, specify interface-neutrality duties, or create a direct evidentiary presumption against consent collected through prohibited dark patterns. Fragmented enforcement between data-protection and consumer-protection institutions may therefore permit formal compliance while substantive autonomy is impaired. Comparative experience also shows that disclosure and consent alone cannot correct structural power, cognitive overload and dependency on dominant platforms. The article argues that dark patterns materially affecting a data decision should create a rebuttable presumption that consent is invalid. It proposes coordinated enforcement, symmetrical choice architecture, purpose-specific consent, auditable consent records, design-risk assessments and fiduciary-style duties for high-risk data fiduciaries. The conclusion is that Indian data-protection law should retain consent, but reposition it within an accountability framework in which data fiduciaries bear responsibility for proving not merely that a click occurred, but that the digital environment enabled a genuine choice.

The advent of the twenty-first century has precipitated an ontological crisis within the traditional architecture of criminal law. Historically anchored in the foundational pillars of individual moral culpability (mens rea) and strict territorial jurisdiction, contemporary penal jurisprudence is increasingly ill-equipped to address the unprecedented challenges posed by rapid technological advancement and systemic environmental degradation. This article critically examines the shifting paradigms of criminal liability across two distinct frontiers: the internal erosion of human agency and the external expansion of spatial jurisdiction. By analyzing the nascent fields of neuro-criminology and algorithmic predictive policing, the study investigates how structural brain imaging and machine learning are challenging the classical legal presumption of free will, forcing a precarious transition from retributive justice to pre-emptive, biological, and risk-based models of culpability. Concurrently, the paper addresses the dissolution of traditional terrestrial boundaries by evaluating the jurisdictional voids inherent in extra-terrestrial space crimes and the urgent normative imperative to codify planetary ecocide as a strict liability international offense. Adopting a rigorous doctrinal and analytical methodology, this research synthesizes emerging legal theories, international frameworks, and contemporary moral debates surrounding decriminalization and genetic manipulation. The central thesis argues that the existing legal architecture cannot merely be amended; it must be fundamentally reconstructed. The article concludes that securing justice in future decades demands a recalibrated jurisprudential model, one that mandates neuro-algorithmic transparency to safeguard the constitutional presumption of innocence, while simultaneously establishing a robust framework of “Planetary Jurisdiction” to prosecute transnational and extra-terrestrial harms.

Artificial intelligence is entering Indian criminal justice through expanding data infrastructure, analytics and machine-learning tools. Predictive policing promises better deployment of scarce police resources, earlier identification of crime patterns and faster investigation. Its constitutional difficulty, however, is not confined to technical error. Police data are produced by earlier enforcement choices; a model trained on such data may convert unequal visibility into a forecast of unequal risk. Opacity can then prevent an affected person from discovering or contesting the basis of surveillance, intervention, bail or sentencing. This paper uses a doctrinal and comparative method to examine predictive policing under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the emerging Digital Personal Data Protection framework, the United States decision in State v. Loomis, and the European Union's risk-based regulation of artificial intelligence. It argues for a constitutional permission line: place-based analytics may assist non-coercive resource allocation when supported by law, necessity, audited data and public oversight, but a person-based score must never create suspicion, justify coercive police action, or determine a judicial outcome. The paper proposes statutory authorization, algorithmic impact assessment, data-quality and equality audits, meaningful disclosure, contestability, human responsibility, procurement controls, independent supervision and sunset review. These safeguards treat efficiency as a legitimate public objective while preserving the rule that coercive state power must rest on lawful, individualized and reviewable reasons.

The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has significantly transformed the way people acquire knowledge, solve problems, and make decisions in both academic and professional settings. While these technologies improve efficiency and accessibility, their growing use has raised important psychological concerns regarding excessive reliance on AI for cognitive tasks. One emerging issue is AI dependency, where individuals increasingly shift mental effort to AI systems, a process commonly described as cognitive offloading. This study presents a conceptual analysis of how sustained engagement with generative AI may influence human thinking, reasoning, and decision-making. Drawing upon theories from cognitive psychology, distributed cognition, metacognition, and human–AI interaction, the paper examines the psychological mechanisms through which generative AI encourages the transfer of cognitive effort from individuals to intelligent systems. It further explores the potential impact of this shift on critical thinking, independent problem-solving, cognitive autonomy, and the quality of human decision-making. The study also discusses the circumstances under which cognitive offloading can serve as a beneficial strategy for improving efficiency, as well as the conditions in which prolonged dependence on AI may gradually weaken essential cognitive skills. Particular attention is given to factors such as user expertise, task complexity, and patterns of AI use that may shape these outcomes. By integrating insights from existing interdisciplinary literature, this paper develops a comprehensive conceptual framework explaining the relationship between generative AI use, cognitive offloading, and psychological dependency. The study aims to provide a theoretical foundation for future empirical research while offering practical insights for educators, technology developers, and policymakers seeking to encourage responsible AI use, strengthen AI literacy, and preserve human cognitive autonomy in an increasingly AI-driven society.

This paper examines how e-filing and video hearings have altered courtroom advocacy in India and asks when digital procedure advances, rather than weakens, constitutional justice. It adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, drawing on legislation, Supreme Court decisions, the e-Committee's model rules, official policy documents, and comparative scholarship on remote adjudication. The study finds that e-filing can reduce transaction costs, improve document control, and make case management more transparent, while video hearings can preserve continuity and remove geographical barriers. These gains, however, are uneven. Connectivity failures, inaccessible platforms, inadequate lawyer-client communication, diminished control over witnesses, data-security risks, and the loss of some non-verbal interaction can materially affect participation and equality of arms. The paper argues that the binary choice between physical and virtual courts is conceptually mistaken. Its principal contribution is a functional-suitability model: routine, document-centred, and case-management proceedings should ordinarily remain digitally accessible; credibility-sensitive evidence, serious criminal trials, and matters involving vulnerable participants should attract a rebuttable preference for physical hearing. Any departure should be supported by recorded reasons and effective participation safeguards. The paper concludes that technology is constitutionally legitimate not because it is faster, but because it can expand meaningful access without reducing fair hearing guarantees. A rights-sensitive hybrid system, supported by assisted digital access, interoperable filing standards, secure infrastructure, reasoned mode-selection, and continuing professional training, offers the most defensible path for Indian courts.

Patent filing in generative artificial intelligence has moved from a niche activity to one of the fastest-growing segments of the global patent system. The World Intellectual Property Organisation's 2026 update records that published generative-AI patent families rose from roughly 14,000 in 2023 to over 37,800 in 2025, with more than 56,000 families published across 2024 and 2025 combined, a volume exceeding the entire preceding decade. Ownership is concentrated: China accounts for the largest share, SoftBank has become the single largest corporate holder with almost 3,000 families, and a small set of conglomerates dominate the remaining top ranks. This concentration, layered onto an already dense set of overlapping claims on model architectures, training methods and specialised hardware, has revived a long-standing competition-law concern: the patent thicket. The April 2026 launch of the Shared AI License (SAIL) Foundation by Anthropic, IBM, Meta, Microsoft and Genentech, pooling more than 33,000 patent families, is the clearest institutional response to date, but its scope is narrower and its internal distribution of bargaining power more skewed than the coverage it has received suggests. This paper examines whether Indian law is equipped to respond. It reviews the Patents Act 1970 and the Competition Act 2002, situates them against the compulsory-licensing, FRAND and essential-facilities doctrines developed in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and China, and incorporates CCI's October 2025 market study on AI and the Supreme Court's September 2025 order in the Ericsson/Monsanto litigation, which narrowed rather than expanded the Commission's jurisdiction over patent-licensing conduct. The paper argues that India's principal statutory tool against patent aggregation, the compulsory licence under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act, is structurally unsuited to a thicket problem, and that competition-law intervention is now a weaker prospect than earlier commentary assumed. It closes with a set of remedies assessed on their actual, rather than assumed, capacity to work.

Globalization has altered the knowledge, skills, and professional environments for which Indian law schools prepare their students. This article examines whether the resulting transformation has produced a legal-education system that is globally competent without becoming institutionally unequal or intellectually detached from Indian constitutional and social realities. It adopts a qualitative doctrinal method and analyses the Advocates Act, 1961, the Bar Council of India Rules of Legal Education, judicial decisions on professional regulation, higher-education policy, and selected scholarship on globalization, clinical education, and decolonization. The study finds that globalization has widened curricula, encouraged interdisciplinary and experiential teaching, expanded international collaboration, and increased the value of research and digital competence. Yet these gains are distributed unevenly. Resource-rich institutions can translate global exposure into clinics, databases, exchanges, and employment networks, while many affiliated colleges remain constrained by faculty shortages, weak infrastructure, and formal compliance. A second tension arises when global relevance is equated with the transplantation of Western materials rather than the comparative study of Indian problems. The article argues for a layered-convergence model: a nationally enforceable professional floor; differentiated institutional support; locally grounded constitutional, customary, and socio-legal study; and global or technological specialization built above that foundation. It concludes that globalization should be judged not by the number of foreign subjects or partnerships a law school advertises, but by whether global knowledge improves professional competence, public service, research quality, and equal access across the legal-education system.

This article evaluates whether the Bar Council of India (BCI) converts its broad statutory powers into effective safeguards for professional competence, ethical practice, and the quality of legal education. It addresses a recurring gap between the formal design of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the observable capacity of the regulatory system to deliver timely, consistent, and transparent outcomes. The research uses a doctrinal and analytical method. It examines legislation, Bar Council rules, judicial decisions, official committee and Law Commission materials, and selected regulatory practices in the United Kingdom and the United States. The analysis finds that a unified national framework remains valuable, but its credibility is weakened by delayed disciplinary proceedings, uneven sanctions, sparse publication of institutional data, fragmented digital processes, and continuing disparities among law colleges. Comparative analysis also shows that regulatory independence, accessible enforcement records, continuing professional development, and reliable case-management systems can improve accountability without displacing professional autonomy. The article concludes that reform should combine enforceable disposal timelines, reasoned sanction guidelines, public reporting, independent and regular educational audits, stronger clinical and ethics instruction, and a more credible entry-to-practice assessment. These measures would better connect the BCI's legal authority to its public-interest responsibility for the competence and integrity of the Indian Bar.

Material Adverse Change (“MAC”) or Material Adverse Effect (“MAE”) clauses are the principal contractual device by which acquirers allocate the risk of deterioration in a target company's business during the interim period between signing and closing. The reason for this is that a modern-day merger agreement will always include an arbitration clause and so any dispute regarding the assertion, or the refusal, to assert the MAC clause would raise the preliminary issue of jurisdiction: does the arbitral tribunal have the jurisdiction to rule on whether a MAC has taken place, and if yes, the jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction to do so? This paper will discuss the construction of MAC provisions by the Delaware courts, the jurisdiction framework regarding arbitral competence after a disputed termination, and three common issues - emergency or interim relief, statutory or regulatory override, and the arbitrability of fraud - which determine whether a failed deal is solved via efficient arbitral adjudication or via multi-forum fragmentation. Relying on judicial decisions from Delaware, England, and India, the paper will argue that although the principle of separability provides a strong immunity for the arbitration clause from the collapse of the underlying contract, the effective jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is conditional, specific to the facts and fragile at exactly those points where public policy concerns, urgency, and fraud meet.

Despite being carried out in India since 1951, cloud seeding, a weather modification technique that artificially induces rain to increase water supply, has not been thoroughly analysed with respect to its legality. Therefore, the main question this article addresses is whether cloud seeding is a lawful means of ensuring the right to water in India. To find reasonable answers, the legal principles of rightful purpose and rightful conduct are evaluated using doctrinal and normative methods to assess the legality. Additionally, qualitative content analysis is used to examine cloud-seeding operations in India. This article aims to address a research gap by providing a comprehensive legal analysis of previous scholarly work on cloud seeding. While earlier studies mainly focused on technological, environmental, or operational aspects, this article makes an innovative contribution by systematically compiling and analysing historical and current cloud-seeding experiments, with a focus on unresolved legal issues and their implications under Indian law.

Narco-analysis occupies an uneasy position between investigative innovation and constitutional restraint. This article examines whether its use upon suspects in India can be reconciled with the privilege against self-incrimination, personal liberty, privacy, fair-trial guarantees, and medical ethics. It adopts a doctrinal methodology, analysing the Constitution of India, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, leading judicial decisions, and international human-rights and professional standards. The article also evaluates the technique’s scientific premise and the evidentiary distinction between a subject’s responses and independently proved discoveries arising from those responses. It argues that chemical disinhibition does not produce truth: sedation may reduce resistance while simultaneously increasing suggestibility, confusion, compliance, and confabulation. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Selvi v. State of Karnataka and Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar correctly prohibit involuntary testing, exclude the test report as direct evidence, and deny any indefeasible right to demand the procedure. Yet the category of “voluntary” testing remains ethically and constitutionally unstable because custody distorts choice and sedation weakens the continuing capacity to withdraw. The article concludes that investigators should ordinarily prefer reliable, non-invasive methods. If voluntary narco-analysis is retained at all, it must be confined to an exceptional, court-supervised defence request, supported by independent legal advice, medical screening, recorded and continuing consent, strict confidentiality, and corroboration of every derivative fact. These safeguards are necessary but do not transform an unreliable technique into proof.

This article examines whether Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) creates a coherent national response to organized crime or merely transfers the vocabulary of special State legislation into the general penal code. It adopts a doctrinal method, analyzing the text and internal structure of Section 111, its relationship with the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA), relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, constitutional guarantees, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The article finds that Section 111 achieves substantive centralization by defining organized crime, organized crime syndicates, continuing unlawful activity, derivative participation, and proceeds-based liability for the whole country. Yet it leaves procedure comparatively fragmented. Unlike the MCOCA model from which much of its terminology is drawn, the BNS does not itself create a tailored approval, sanction, evidentiary, interception, bail, or trial architecture. This asymmetry increases the risk that an enterprise offence will be used as an aggravated label for ordinary multi-accused crime. The article argues for a strict, element-by-element construction: the prosecution should establish a qualifying course of unlawful activity, a legally identifiable syndicate, a nexus between that enterprise and the accused, the use of specified unlawful means, and a material-benefit objective. It further proposes senior-level charging review, a written predicate-offence matrix, differentiated mens rea for secondary liability, coordinated financial investigation, effective witness protection, and reasoned prosecutorial election where special statutes overlap. These safeguards would preserve the national reach of Section 111 while protecting legality, proportionality, individualized responsibility, and fair procedure.

Blue cities are cities that plan themselves around water rather than against it: rainwater is stored, recycled and reused, streets and parks are given permeable surfaces, wetlands and lakes are protected and restored, and coastal settlements are defended by mangrove belts and flood-resistant construction. Rivers, lakes, drainage, drinking water supply, sewage and storm water are treated as one interconnected system, and nature-based solutions such as rain gardens, bioswales and urban forests are preferred to concrete drains that push water downstream. The concept matters most in the Global South, where Jakarta is sinking through groundwater over-extraction, Mumbai floods every monsoon because of poor drainage and construction on wetlands, and Cape Town came close to running dry during its “Day Zero” crisis. This paper examines why blue cities and consistent green laws are needed, drawing on drought, excess rainfall and flooding, environmental degradation, climate-driven displacement and public health in India and elsewhere in the Global South, and considers how the blue-green infrastructure approach can be implemented, before analysing the experience of Rotterdam, Singapore and Cape Town. It argues that water should be treated as a resource to be planned with, not a threat to be engineered away.

Digital communication has widened women’s access to education, work, commerce and public debate, but it has also enabled persistent and scalable forms of gender-based abuse. This article examines whether Indian law provides a coherent response to cyberstalking, impersonation, doxxing, sextortion, voyeurism, non-consensual dissemination of intimate images and sexually explicit deepfakes. It uses a doctrinal and analytical method, drawing on constitutional provisions, the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, procedural and evidentiary legislation, intermediary rules and leading judicial decisions. The analysis finds that India has numerous applicable provisions, but they are distributed across statutes framed around different legal interests such as privacy, obscenity, stalking, intimidation, cheating and data protection. This fragmentation produces uncertainty in offence selection, reporting, evidence preservation and content removal. The central deficiency is the absence of a comprehensive, consent-centred offence covering the creation, threatened distribution and distribution of authentic, altered or wholly artificial intimate material. The article further finds that legal protection is weakened by underreporting, jurisdictional delay, uneven forensic capacity, dependence on platform-held information and recurrent re-uploading of harmful content. It concludes that effective reform must combine precise substantive law with immediate evidence-preservation protocols, specialised investigative and prosecutorial support, coordinated intermediary action and survivor-centred safeguards. Such an approach would protect privacy and dignity without reviving vague restrictions on lawful online expression.

This paper critically evaluates the adequacy of Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 in addressing the emerging phenomenon of digital arrest scams and advanced forms of personation facilitated by contemporary digital technologies. Digital arrest constitutes a sophisticated social-engineering fraud in which offenders impersonate police officers, judicial authorities, or regulatory officials through video-conferencing platforms, fabricated electronic documents, and increasingly artificial-intelligence-generated voice and video content, thereby inducing victims to transfer substantial sums under threat of imminent arrest or prosecution. The study adopts a doctrinal research methodology supplemented by an interdisciplinary examination of cyber-forensics, electronic evidence rules under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and the organised-crime provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The analysis demonstrates that while Section 66D is technologically neutral and doctrinally capable of covering the core elements of cheating by personation through a communication device, its maximum punishment of three years’ imprisonment and fine of one lakh rupees is disproportionately low when measured against the gravity of organised digital-arrest operations that routinely involve mule-account networks, cross-border elements, and significant psychological and financial harm to victims, particularly senior citizens. The paper further identifies structural gaps relating to the absence of aggravated-personation categories, limited recovery mechanisms for defrauded funds, and persistent challenges of digital attribution and international cooperation. It concludes that Section 66D remains a necessary but insufficient instrument and recommends legislative recalibration through graded punishment structures, explicit recognition of aggravating factors including impersonation of public authorities and use of synthetic media, and the development of coordinated financial-freezing and victim-restoration protocols.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted before climate change became a central concern of international environmental law, and it is not a climate treaty. Its provisions on the protection of the marine environment nevertheless supply a working framework for climate-related marine harm, and the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has strengthened that link by recognizing that anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions can constitute pollution of the marine environment within the meaning of the Convention. This paper examines what accelerating sea-level rise means for that framework. It traces the physical drivers of sea-level change, distinguishing global mean rise from local relative change produced by subsidence, sedimentation, tectonic activity and coastal morphology, and sets out the environmental, economic and human consequences, including displacement from low-lying States and the gap in international protection that leaves climate migrants outside existing refugee law. It then turns to the questions that matter most for the law of the sea: whether retreating coastlines and disappearing reef features unsettle baselines, maritime zones and statehood itself. The paper argues that the decisive distinction is between baselines and established boundaries. Baselines follow physical geography; boundaries fixed by agreement or adjudication do not, and the Bay of Bengal arbitration supports their stability. Reconciling physical change with legal certainty is the central task for maritime governance.

This article examines whether Indian law has genuinely transformed marriage from a status-based institution protected by domestic privacy into a relationship governed by constitutional equality and public accountability. It adopts a doctrinal and analytical method, reading the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 alongside the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and leading constitutional and matrimonial decisions. The article develops an “accountability gap” thesis: Indian law now regulates a wide range of physical, emotional, sexual, and economic harms within domestic relationships, but continues to preserve status privileges where regulation would unsettle the legal meaning of marriage itself. Judicial decisions expanding the concepts of respondent, shared household, and domestic relationship have strengthened access to civil protection. At the same time, safeguards against unnecessary arrest have sometimes been absorbed into a broader misuse narrative that can obscure under-reporting and weak implementation. The clearest contradiction is that sexual abuse is actionable under civil domestic-violence law while forced sexual intercourse by a husband remains excluded from the general rape offence when the wife is an adult. The article argues that this inconsistency cannot be justified by marital privacy, evidentiary difficulty, or the availability of lesser remedies. It concludes that reform should preserve fair procedure while eliminating status-based immunity, strengthening implementation under the 2005 Act, and defining protection by vulnerability and coercive control rather than conformity to an idealized form of marriage.

Digital contracting has made contractual assent almost frictionless. Consumers routinely enter into contractual relationships by clicking 'I Agree' to standard-form terms that may contain extensive provisions concerning liability, dispute resolution, automatic renewal, intellectual property, indemnification and termination. Contract law, however, generally does not require proof that a contracting party actually read or understood every contractual provision before becoming bound. This creates a persistent tension between the formal manifestation of assent and the informational circumstances in which that assent is obtained. This article examines that tension through the concept of the 'assent-comprehension gap', the distance between the legal significance attributed to an affirmative act of acceptance and the extent to which the contracting party could reasonably appreciate the consequences of that act. It argues that the solution lies neither in requiring actual comprehension nor in treating a single click as equally meaningful for every term in a standard-form agreement. Instead, it proposes a graduated model of meaningful assent, under which the procedural conditions surrounding acceptance become increasingly important as the materiality and consequences of a term increase. The article situates this proposal within Indian contract law and consumer protection law, considering the recognition of electronic contracting under the Information Technology Act, 2000. It engages with Robert A. Hillman's analysis of Internet standard-form contracts in India and the broader 'no-reading problem' literature, and draws on comparative clickwrap and browsewrap jurisprudence to illustrate how courts have approached the relationship between notice and affirmative assent. Building on this analysis, the article develops a five-factor framework based on materiality, prominence, complexity, consequence and transactional context, and concludes that this framework can preserve contractual certainty while preventing the act of clicking 'I Agree' from becoming detached from the significance of the obligations it is taken to create.

The rapid digitisation of economic, social and governmental activities has transformed the nature of criminality and created new challenges for contemporary criminal justice systems. India, as one of the world’s largest digital economies, has experienced a substantial expansion of cybercrime, ranging from identity theft, online cheating and cyberstalking to ransomware, financial fraud, deepfakes and other technology-enabled offences. The National Crime Records Bureau’s Crime in India 2024 indicates a significant increase in registered cybercrime cases, demonstrating the growing importance of an effective legal and institutional response. Against this background, this paper examines India’s cybercrime regulatory framework through a doctrinal and comparative legal methodology. It analyses the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and related regulatory mechanisms. Particular attention is given to jurisdiction, electronic evidence, attribution of criminal responsibility, intermediary responsibility, cross-border investigation and emerging technology-enabled offences. The study further compares India’s approach with selected international frameworks, particularly the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the regulatory approaches adopted by the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper argues that India’s principal difficulty is not the complete absence of cybercrime legislation but the fragmentation of applicable legal provisions across substantive, procedural and regulatory instruments. It concludes that an effective response requires greater doctrinal coherence, specialised investigative capacity, improved electronic-evidence procedures, strengthened international cooperation and a technologically neutral legal framework capable of addressing emerging forms of cybercrime without unnecessarily restricting legitimate digital activity.

Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) constitutes a significant legislative intervention in the criminal regulation of sexual intercourse procured through deception or a false promise of marriage made without an intention to fulfil it, where the conduct does not amount to rape. The provision seeks to address a doctrinal gap that emerged under the erstwhile legal framework by recognising deceptive sexual exploitation as a distinct form of criminality. This article examines the evolution of judicial principles concerning false promises of marriage and analyses their statutory incorporation under Section 69. It focuses particularly on the requirements of dishonest intention at the inception of the promise, the causal nexus between deception and sexual consent, and the evidentiary difficulties involved in retrospectively establishing mens rea. The article further evaluates the scope of the expression “deceitful means”, including deception relating to employment, promotion, identity, and marital status, and considers the potential for overbreadth and inconsistent judicial application. It also examines the relationship between Section 69 and the provisions governing consent vitiated by fear or misconception and the statutory definition of rape. Particular attention is given to questions of consent, sexual autonomy, gender equality, privacy, evidentiary uncertainty, potential misuse, and proportionality. The article argues that Section 69 should be interpreted through a precise, culpability-oriented and evidence-based framework, distinguishing deliberate fraudulent inducement from the subsequent failure of a genuine promise. It concludes that effective application of the provision requires a careful balance between protecting sexual autonomy and preventing the unwarranted criminalisation of consensual relationships that subsequently fail.

Carbon markets have become one of the principal market-based responses of international environmental law to climate change, because they allow emission reductions to be priced, traded and counted across borders. The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, particularly Article 6 of the latter, institutionalised carbon trading on a global scale, with the aim of securing cost-effective mitigation while supporting sustainable development. Their implementation, however, has raised persistent legal and regulatory difficulties. Weak transparency, uneven monitoring and verification, the double counting of reductions and the absence of effective enforcement have all diminished their practical value. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in particular has been criticised for inefficiency, poor environmental integrity and inadequate regulatory supervision. A study prepared for the European Commission concluded that eighty-five per cent of the projects it surveyed had a low likelihood of ensuring that reductions were additional and were not over-estimated. This study evaluates the effectiveness of the international legal frameworks governing carbon markets, examines how those frameworks attempt to reconcile economic efficiency with environmental protection, and considers how problems such as phantom credits and over-crediting bear on the legitimacy of carbon markets. It seeks to identify the structural and regulatory shortcomings of the present regime and to argue for greater legal consistency, sharper accountability and stronger enforcement.

This article explores how increasingly accessible, flexible, and easier education has undermined the overall academic culture globally. It highlights several pitfalls of easier education, often masquerading as accessible and flexible education, that have devalued credentials and have had serious ramifications for those who truly are diligent and strive for excellence. It also highlights the illusion of equality thus created and provides directions for balancing accessibility with excellence.

The debate surrounding the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in India raises important questions about equality, secularism, individual rights and the protection of cultural diversity. Although Article 44 of the Constitution directs the State to endeavour towards securing a common civil code for citizens, the idea of uniformity becomes complicated in a country where different communities follow diverse personal laws and customary practices. This study examines the jurisprudential tension between constitutional morality and cultural autonomy under the UCC, with particular reference to Assam and a comparative analysis of Uttarakhand and Gujarat. The main objective of the study is to examine whether constitutional values such as equality, dignity, individual autonomy and non-discrimination can be promoted through a uniform civil framework without unnecessarily restricting legitimate cultural and customary practices. It also seeks to identify the similarities, differences and challenges in the approaches adopted by the three states. The study follows a doctrinal and comparative methodology. It draws upon constitutional provisions, relevant legislation, judicial decisions, government documents and existing academic literature relating to personal laws, secularism, cultural rights and the UCC. The experiences of Uttarakhand and Gujarat are examined comparatively to understand the practical and constitutional issues that may arise while moving towards greater uniformity in civil laws. The study argues that uniformity should not be understood merely as the imposition of identical rules on communities with different social and cultural backgrounds. At the same time, cultural autonomy cannot be used to justify practices that violate fundamental rights or principles of equality and dignity. The paper therefore explores whether constitutional morality can provide a balanced approach by protecting individual rights while respecting legitimate cultural differences. It concludes that a workable UCC should promote equality and justice without disregarding India’s pluralistic constitutional identity.

‘Ecocide’ was first used by Professor Arthur W. Galston in 1970 at the Conference on War and National Responsibility, to describe the effects of ‘Agent Orange’, a defoliant chemical. Some 80 million litres were sprayed over 2.6 million hectares of forest during the Vietnam War, causing utmost devastation to human and ecological life, the consequences of which are still felt by generations in Vietnam shaped by that historical exposure. Unlike Agent Orange, where the impact on human and ecological life was intentional during war and localised, ecocide presents itself in various forms, with tendencies of negligence, multinational effects, occurring during peacetime or standard corporate and State practices. The international legal system glaringly lacks an adequate framework to tackle this widespread destruction. Globally, climate change is already crossing multiple tipping points, which would lead to humanity facing a “potentially catastrophic, irreversible outcome”. International environmental law currently relies on soft law, entailing non-legally binding provisions. Various treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, depend on voluntary member cooperation, and on State responsibility providing reparations and compensation. Moreover, the Rome Statute, the fundamental treaty governing the International Criminal Court, addresses environmental harm merely when it is caused by or during armed conflict, thereby neglecting ecocide and devastation caused by factors such as deforestation, oil spills, hydraulic fracturing, water and soil contamination, and industrial pollution. This study argues that the criminalisation of ecocide is essential for addressing the needs of present and future generations, regardless of the challenges such an action may pose.

In 2010, critiques of India’s online surveillance regime rested on unstable doctrinal ground: privacy was, at best, a contested emanation of Article 21, and the procedural safeguards attached to interception under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 existed without any independent authorisation requirement or a companion statute governing how gathered data could be processed. This article asks whether two intervening developments, the recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and the enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, have actually corrected the specific structural defect that animated the earlier critique, namely the absence of any check on the executive’s own decision to intercept, prior to interception taking place. Tracing the doctrinal arc from Puttaswamy’s proportionality standard through the Pegasus spyware litigation to the DPDP Act’s exemption for state processing, this article argues that the constitutional and statutory landscape has been transformed while the operative architecture of Section 69 itself, an executive order followed only by a post-facto, non-judicial review committee, has remained essentially unchanged since 2009. Drawing a comparison with the judicial pre-authorisation, or “double lock”, mechanism under the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act, 2016, including its own recent narrowing, the article proposes a calibrated form of prior judicial authorisation for Section 69 interception orders as the specific reform needed to close the gap between India’s proportionality doctrine and its surveillance practice.

Discussion of dark patterns in India has largely asked whether any single statute, competition, consumer protection, or data protection law, is doctrinally equipped to capture manipulative interface design. This article argues that a prior, structural question now matters more: once at least three regulators, the Competition Commission of India (prospectively empowered under the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024), the Central Consumer Protection Authority under its 2023 Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, and the Data Protection Board of India under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, each possess an independent and overlapping legal basis to act against the same interface, no mechanism exists to determine which regulator decides first, on what evidentiary basis, or with what effect on the others. Drawing on the Competition Commission’s own experience in the Google Android and Play Store proceedings, where the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal struck down several design-mandating remedies as exceeding the legal basis available under an ex-post finding of abuse of dominance, and on the Consumer Protection Authority’s 2023 Guidelines, which expressly acknowledge but do not resolve their overlap with other laws, this article shows that fragmentation is not a speculative risk but an observable feature of India’s current enforcement landscape. It compares two international responses, the United Kingdom’s fused single-regulator model under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, 2024 and the European Union’s managed-separation model under the Digital Markets Act, and finds that even the EU’s explicit statutory relationship clause has not prevented national authorities from reaching Digital Markets Act-scoped conduct through the backdoor of consumer protection law. The article proposes a notification, primary-characterisation, and shared-evidentiary-registry framework for India, designed to prevent this specific failure mode without requiring the wholesale institutional consolidation that a fully fused model would demand.

India’s rapid transition to digital banking, mobile wallets, payment cards and the Unified Payments Interface has expanded financial inclusion while creating new opportunities for online financial fraud. This paper examines the principal forms of online financial fraud in India and evaluates whether the existing criminal, procedural, evidentiary, regulatory and consumer-protection framework can deliver timely prevention, investigation and victim redress. It adopts a doctrinal and qualitative analytical method, supported by criminological perspectives including routine activity, rational choice, differential association and victimology. The analysis covers phishing, vishing, smishing, UPI fraud, identity theft, account takeover, investment and loan-app scams, digital-arrest schemes and mule-account networks. It finds that India has a broad but fragmented framework. Its effectiveness is reduced by delayed reporting, interstate jurisdictional barriers, uneven electronic-evidence practices, weak coordination among institutions and uncertainty concerning fraudulently induced authorised payments. The paper argues for an authorised push-payment framework, rapid fund interception through 1930 and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, continuous mule-account monitoring, proportionate account-freezing procedures, stronger platform and telecom cooperation, specialised investigation, and meaningful restitution. Effective control requires a coordinated model that treats fraud prevention, digital evidence, institutional accountability and victim protection as parts of one legal system.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognises the inherent right of a state to defend itself, or another state, when force is used against it and retaliation becomes inevitable. It is at that point that the Security Council’s role becomes central: a state must report its exercise of self-defence to the Council, which the Charter intends to be the final arbiter of collective security. Contemporary developments present a tapestry of events that exposes a flaw in the structure of international law itself: the US raids on Iranian nuclear facilities, the 2026 Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the continuing impasse over Gaza and Ukraine, and the emergence of a potential rival “Board of Peace” mechanism. The law might be thought to have become invisible, but it has not. The International Court of Justice’s unanimous advisory opinion on climate obligations and the near-global Pandemic Agreement show that the fracture in compliance with international law appears where matters of great-power consent or veto are involved. Normative, trade and institutional activity remains largely, though not always, resilient to this. Relying on Security Council records, the Article 51 correspondence on Iran, commentary on the Venezuela operation and recent developments in the ICJ, the WHO and energy security, the paper argues that international law survives by selectivity, and that its coercive authority has become a matter of great-power discretion precisely where the Charter intended it to be least discretionary.

Social media has become one of the most powerful forces shaping public opinion and collective action in India today, capable of turning localised grievances into nationwide movements within days. This paper examines that phenomenon through the lens of a recent student-led protest, beginning with an overview of how social media platforms operate, how algorithms determine visibility, and how these mechanisms influence public discourse more broadly. It then traces the trajectory of the protest itself, examining how it escalated from a localised concern into a nationwide movement, and the extent to which paid promotional content and coordinated influencer networks contributed to this rapid amplification. This section also discusses the broader controversy involving Meta during this period, including the temporary removal of an official government video, the parliamentary scrutiny that followed, and the eventual personal apology issued by Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg, an episode that highlighted the significant influence social media platforms wield over political discourse and the accountability questions this raises. The paper then shifts to the legal dimension, finding that while India has a disclosure framework for paid commercial and monetised endorsements under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the CCPA Guidelines, and the ASCI Code, no comparable disclosure requirement exists for paid or coordinated amplification of protest-related content specifically, leaving this category of political communication largely unregulated. Building on this identified gap, the paper puts forward regulatory suggestions intended to address it, while remaining carefully attentive to the constitutional right to protest, ensuring that any proposed measures target deceptive amplification practices without curbing the sanctity and legitimacy of genuine dissent. The paper concludes by consolidating these findings and reflecting on their broader implications for the regulation of digital political communication in India.

The Indian Contract Act, 1872 – the country’s oldest commercial statute and the bedrock of its law of obligations – draws much of its architecture from nineteenth-century English common law. This paper asks whether such a colonial, paper-based framework can adequately govern the realities of twenty-first-century commerce, marked by digital innovation, artificial-intelligence-driven transactions and ubiquitous, micro-level contracting. Taking as its point of departure the Attorney General’s recent call to “give a decent goodbye” to the existing contract law, the paper traces the statute’s colonial genesis, examines how Indian courts have judicially stretched a Victorian text to accommodate telephones, telex and email, and situates the debate within India’s aspiration to become a multi-trillion-dollar economy and a Vikasit Bharat by 2047. It argues that the question is no longer whether the law of contract must change, but whether India needs measured, provision-by-provision reform or a wholesale re-imagination of its contractual code. Drawing on comparative and international instruments – from the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – the paper concludes that contemporary reform of the law of contracts is the need of the hour if India is to sustain its economic ambitions and its aspiration to be a global rule-maker rather than a rule-taker.

Haircuts are an inevitable feature of debt restructuring; every insolvency regime in the world distributes losses among stakeholders when a debtor’s assets fall short of its obligations. But extraordinarily large haircuts raise fundamental questions of creditor protection, economic efficiency, and distributive justice. Under India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the statutory objective is not confined to debt recovery: it is resolution, maximisation of asset value, and revival of viable enterprises, a design in which decision-making authority is vested in the Committee of Creditors, exercising what Indian courts have repeatedly described as “commercial wisdom”. This paper examines whether large haircuts represent efficient loss allocation, failure of credit appraisal, valuation problems, delays in insolvency proceedings, moral hazard, promoter misconduct, or an economically rational discount to liquidation value. It takes the Bank of Baroda/Subhash Chandra controversy as a contemporary case study, while insisting on a rigorous distinction between personal-guarantor liability and the underlying corporate debt. It compares the Indian framework with the United States, United Kingdom, Singapore, Japan, Germany, and the UNCITRAL principles. The paper’s central proposition is that the true cost of an insolvency haircut cannot be measured merely by the percentage of debt written down; it must be assessed by examining who ultimately bears the loss and the consequences transmitted through the banking, credit, investment, employment, and productive sectors of the economy. On aggregate Indian data, the IBC has produced resolutions involving an approximate 67% haircut on admitted claims while simultaneously recovering about 163% of the liquidation value of the resolved enterprises, a paradox that refutes any simple equation of “large haircut” with “failed resolution,” while leaving open the question of whether every large haircut is justified.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India has undergone a remarkable change in its scope, being regarded as the most dynamic and flexible article of Indian constitutional law. It was initially interpreted in a narrow and procedural sense in the landmark case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, where the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 was confined merely to the requirement of a procedure prescribed by law, without much judicial scrutiny into the justice of such procedures. The following phase of development emerged in the well-known case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, where it was stated by the Supreme Court that every procedure that amounts to depriving an individual of life and personal liberty shall invariably be “just, fair, and reasonable.” This paper explores the development of the doctrine of substantive due process under the Indian Constitution. Article 21 has widened through time and includes rights such as livelihood, health, education, environment, privacy, and access to justice, and it provides for consistency between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 21 expands on the basis of human dignity. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Court held that privacy is essential to individual freedom. The paper reviews the role of the judiciary in the process of transformative constitutionalism through purposive interpretation. In the era of technological development, Article 21 has undergone further change in the light of new challenges such as technological surveillance and data protection, addressed through the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Although some reservations about judicial activism persist, Article 21 continues to widen owing to the revolutionary nature of the Constitution.

Every nation’s citizens are legally entitled to human rights. The Indian State is also a signatory to many international human rights documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which declares that no one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Furthermore, the State is required under Articles 14 and 21 to provide equality before the law and a judicial system that upholds justice based on equal opportunity for all. A prisoner is entitled to certain rights listed in Part III of the Constitution because, while in jail, they are still human. Fundamental rights such as the right to bail and the right to know the reasons for an arrest have been guaranteed under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The agenda for prison reform is increasingly centred on the rights of incarcerated individuals. More people are realising that incarceration does not automatically result in the loss of citizenship. With an emphasis on the constitutional and legislative protections of prisoners’ human rights, this article seeks to conduct a thorough examination of the state of prisoners’ rights in India as per the human rights provisions set out in the UDHR. In accordance with statutory law and the recently enacted BNSS, 2023, the study examines various aspects of prisoners’ rights.

To date, the discourse of Hijab remains a focal point of contestation, which has grown into a virtual jungle of distortion, misconception, least understood, most controversial, politically and legally discussed issue. The requirement for Hijab is Pragmatically Legislated within the primary sources of Islamic Law. Thus, it centres on a hard corpus of Quranic and Sunnah text. However, to give feminists much more legitimacy to intrude into Islamic legal text, the Hijab was claimed to signify gender inequality heavily saturated with patriarchal interpretations. Feminists glossed in an Islamic frame of reference tried to foster phoney interpretations and impose certain meanings to the Hijab. They argue that Muslim women are allowed the freedom to choose what they may wear, thus contradicting the pragmatically legislated and mandatory requirements of Hijab upon the Muslim woman. Often casting Hijab as less fundamental or reducing it imperativeness to a matter of choice or fashion. These interpretations have posed myriad challenges and added wider perspectives to the legality of wearing the Hijab by the Muslim women. In fact, these challenges are not mere rhetorics but have important policy implications as they have been used to justify restrictions on the use of the Hijab. Thus, feminist plays a role in the creation of Law and Policy that marginalize the wearing of Hijab. In this regard, the analysis of feminists’ hermeneutics and theoretical articulation of the verses of Hijab are expedient. This paper, therefore, seeks to examine the feminist’s hermeneutical and theoretical frameworks and how these discursive frameworks helped to aggravate the misconceptions surrounding the understanding of the legal basis and intent of Hijab under Islamic law. The findings indicate that Hijab does not signify reclusiveness. Hijab sanctions women participation in public life. The study adopted doctrinal method based on deductive reasoning and critical analysis.

Women’s education is one of the most significant factors contributing to social development in India. Education empowers women by improving their knowledge, skills, decision-making abilities, awareness of rights, and participation in social and economic activities. An educated woman is better equipped to contribute to the welfare of her family and community and to participate effectively in the development of society. Women’s education also has a positive influence on health, family welfare, reduction of poverty, employment opportunities, gender equality, and the education of future generations. This study critically examines the impact of women’s education on social development in India by analysing the constitutional provisions, statutory framework, judicial interpretations, government initiatives, and socio-economic factors relating to women’s education. The study focuses on the role of education in promoting gender equality, women empowerment, economic independence, social awareness, political participation, and overall social progress. It also examines the major barriers that continue to affect women’s access to education, including poverty, gender discrimination, early marriage, social customs, lack of educational facilities, and socio-economic inequality. The study adopts a doctrinal research methodology and relies primarily upon constitutional provisions, statutes, judicial decisions, government reports, books, research articles, journals, and other relevant secondary sources. The research seeks to examine the relationship between women’s educational advancement and social development and to identify the continuing challenges affecting equal educational opportunities for women and girls. The study ultimately highlights that women’s education is not merely an individual right but an essential instrument of social justice, gender equality, empowerment, economic development, and national progress. Effective implementation of educational policies, improvement of educational infrastructure, removal of social and economic barriers, and creation of equal opportunities are necessary to ensure that women can fully participate in and contribute to the social development of India.

Criminal profiling is a popular investigative technique for creating theories about an unidentified criminal based on behavioural traits linked to a crime. These traits might include victim selection, method of operation, signature behaviour, behaviour at the crime site, and offending tendencies. However, there are several phases of interpretation involved in drawing judgments about an offender's personality, motive, or identity from observable behaviour. In addition to examining how cognitive bias and methodological constraints may impact these behavioural inferences' investigative and evidential usefulness, this study focuses on the scientific validity of such conclusions. Using five previously studied criminal cases (Dennis Rader, Richard Ramirez, Alexander Pichushkin, Michael Gargiulo and Kristen Gilbert) as comparative case studies, the study applies a comparative and analytical approach. The cases were designed to study how behavioural observations were transformed into research hypotheses and psychological interpretations rather than to create psychological diagnoses. The study separates behavioural investigative leads from independently verified forensic data and takes into account confirmation bias, anchoring, contextual bias, and tunnel vision. The Indian evidential framework with regard to expert opinion and scientific evidence is also examined in this article. It makes the case that while criminal profiling may be useful for legitimate investigations, especially when it comes to generating ideas and focusing attention, its findings should not often be regarded as independent evidence of identity, purpose, or guilt. The study suggests a Behavioural Evidence Reliability and Verification Framework that calls on researchers to reveal uncertainty, evaluate scientific support, separate observation from inference, take into account alternative explanations, and look for independent verification.

A decade long court battle in Oracle v. Google enunciating the copyright mechanism of controlling software interfaces failed to answer specific questions on software interoperability. The case has sparked a debate on the copyrightability of Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs, throughout the world. The American courts that were meant to settle the dispute have, in turn, converted the dispute into ex post litigation. They have decided on classifying the reuse of functional interfaces as a probable infringement, and condemned interoperability into the “Fair Use Trap.” This imposition places burdens of disproportionality on smaller developers, as interoperability is not only a technical requirement but also a legal one. This article illustrates how the Federal Circuit’s intervention deviated from the Ninth Circuit’s well-established copyright foundations by bringing patent-style reasoning into a field ill-suited for monopoly-based analysis, through a close examination of the procedural trajectory in Oracle v. Google. This article argues that the fair use paradigm is organisationally incompetent to regulate functional aspects which exist as technical standards. The implication of treating APIs as expressive property is that APIs serve an infrastructural purpose in facilitating competition. Therefore, it advocates for the merger doctrine as a superior ex ante solution. The merger doctrine ensures predictability of market, protects competition, and brings software copyright back to its constitutional purpose; promoting technology instead of creating proprietary lock-in.

This article examines the responsibility of digital labour platforms for protecting app-based ride-hailing drivers against accident risks, using the ILO Decent Work in the Platform Economy Convention, 2026 (No. 193) (C193) as a normative benchmark and Vietnam as the principal case study. It employs doctrinal legal analysis, supported by the preparatory materials to C193, secondary empirical evidence on ride-hailing drivers in Vietnam, and a focused comparison with the French model of platform social responsibility. The article argues that C193 does not collapse platform responsibility into employer responsibility. Rather, Article 4 provides a basis for States to allocate complementary responsibilities among public authorities, platforms, platform workers and other relevant actors, while Article 9 preserves the requirement of correct employment-status classification. Vietnam has significantly expanded legal access to occupational accident protection through Decree No. 143/2024/ND-CP on voluntary occupational accident insurance for workers without employment contracts. Yet the current framework remains primarily individualised: participation depends on the worker, State support is limited, and platforms have no general statutory duty to share protection costs or provide work-related data for accident determination. The article proposes a limited shared-responsibility model for genuinely self-employed drivers, centred on platform cost-sharing and data duties, without creating a third employment status or weakening employee rights.

The proliferation of global financial scandals and exposés, including the Panama and Pandora Papers, has highlighted how opaque corporate entities can be exploited to conceal true beneficial ownership and facilitate illicit financial flows. In February 2012, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) adopted Recommendation 24, which calls on countries to ensure that competent authorities have timely access to adequate and accurate information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons. India's legal reforms, set out in Section 90 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Rules, 2018, represent a serious attempt to identify those who exercise control without formal ownership. These reforms, however, face significant implementation barriers owing to inadequate technical infrastructure, poor enforcement coordination and the absence of a single centralised public register of beneficial owners. This paper explores the legal and institutional hindrances that limit effective enforcement, examines the enforcement gap, and highlights issues of overlapping mandates, inadequate enforcement action and weak deterrent penalties. The paper also undertakes a comparative study of the United Kingdom and Singapore, which provide relevant benchmarks in legal architecture, regulatory adaptability and enforcement tools. On the basis of these comparisons, it proposes policy reforms for India: a centralised, tiered-access SBO registry, investment in regulatory technology, and capacity building for enforcement agencies. India needs a strong, technology-enabled and cooperative enforcement ecosystem to enhance accountability and align with global financial transparency standards.

Identity theft has emerged as a significant form of cyber-enabled wrongdoing as personal identity is increasingly represented through electronic credentials, passwords, account identifiers, mobile numbers, financial information and other digital attributes. The expansion of online banking, electronic commerce, social-media platforms, digital identity systems and cloud-based services has increased both the utility of personal information and the opportunities for its unlawful acquisition and misuse. Digital identity theft may facilitate impersonation, financial fraud, unauthorised access, account takeover and the commission of further offences. The legal problem consequently extends beyond the initial acquisition of information and encompasses attribution, electronic evidence, privacy, jurisdiction and victim remedies. This paper examines the Indian legal framework governing identity theft with particular emphasis on section 66C of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and its relationship with section 66D, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. It analyses contemporary techniques including phishing, social engineering, social-media impersonation, financial identity theft, SIM-related compromise, data breaches and AI-assisted impersonation. The study adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology and evaluates the interaction between substantive criminalisation, electronic evidence and constitutional rights. It argues that effective enforcement depends upon reliable attribution, preservation and authentication of digital evidence and a clear distinction between identity misuse, personation and related fraud. The paper proposes strengthened digital-forensic capacity, coordinated investigation, platform cooperation, victim-centred remedies and rights-sensitive regulation. It concludes that India’s response to identity theft must combine technological adaptability with legality, privacy, proportionality and procedural fairness.

The rapid digitisation of economic, social and governmental activity in India has produced a corresponding expansion in the scale, sophistication and transnational character of cybercrime. The replacement of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 marks a significant reconfiguration of substantive criminal law. This paper undertakes a doctrinal examination of the adequacy of the new Sanhita, read together with the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, to address contemporary cyber threats. The research purpose is to evaluate whether the technology-neutral drafting of the Sanhita, the express inclusion of cyber-crimes within the organised-crime provision, and its extraterritorial reach supply a coherent and enforceable framework, or whether structural gaps persist in definition, evidence, jurisdiction and institutional capacity. The methodology is primarily doctrinal, drawing upon statutory text, parliamentary materials, leading Supreme Court authorities on electronic evidence and free speech, and comparative insights from international instruments. The findings indicate that while the Sanhita improves coverage of cyber-enabled fraud, stalking, forgery and syndicate-level activity, it does not create a dedicated cybercrime regime; dual charging with the Information Technology Act continues to generate interpretive friction; evidentiary certification requirements remain a frequent point of failure; and cross-border investigation continues to confront mutual-legal-assistance delays. The paper concludes that the Sanhita constitutes a meaningful incremental advance rather than a comprehensive solution, and that adequacy ultimately depends upon coordinated interpretation, enhanced forensic capacity, clearer guidance on emerging technologies such as deepfakes, and stronger institutional coordination between special cyber legislation and general criminal law.

The rise of social media and online gaming has transformed the social space within which Indian children and adolescents grow, communicate and engage with digital culture. These technologies provide great opportunities for education, creativity, peer interaction and recreation, but they also provide environments in which cyberbullying, exposure to harmful content, online grooming, fraud recruitment, violent behaviour and other forms of offending can occur. This paper offers an integrated legal and socio-psychological analysis of the relationship between social media, online gaming and juvenile crime in India. It examines whether online environments are a direct trigger for juvenile offending or whether they are risk-enhancing factors that interact with family circumstances, peer influence, developmental vulnerability and pre-existing behavioural conditions. The study covers the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with the relevant judicial and institutional developments. Special attention is given to cyberbullying, violent and antisocial content, online radicalisation, financial fraud, grooming and the recruitment of children into technology-facilitated criminal activity. The paper also evaluates the rehabilitative philosophy of Indian juvenile justice and the importance of separating media exposure from individual criminal accountability. It argues that an effective response cannot be based solely on punishment or platform restriction. Instead, it calls for child-appropriate digital design, child-safety measures, specialised investigation, digital-literacy standards, parental engagement, trauma-informed intervention and valid research data. The paper concludes that Indian law must protect children from digital harms while safeguarding their developmental rights, freedom of expression and access to technology, and must respond to children in conflict with law through proportionate, rehabilitative and child-centred mechanisms, supported by evidence-based legal and institutional responses.

The remedy against oppression and mismanagement under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 is often presented as the principal statutory safeguard available to minority shareholders in Indian companies. This paper examines whether the remedy, as it currently operates, is adequate to protect the interests of minority shareholders in closely held and widely held companies alike. Adopting a doctrinal methodology, it traces the statutory framework governing oppression and mismanagement, analyses the judicial evolution of the “just and equitable” standard and the quasi-partnership doctrine, and examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (P) Ltd. as a turning point in the interpretation of directorial removal and corporate democracy. The paper argues that while the statutory right to seek relief is reasonably well defined, its practical adequacy is significantly compromised by the restrictive eligibility threshold under Section 244, by chronic delay before the National Company Law Tribunal, by the absence of a settled definition of “oppression” and of conduct “prejudicial to public interest,” and by the disproportionate litigation costs borne by minority shareholders relative to controlling shareholders. Drawing a limited comparison with the unfair prejudice remedy under Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK), the paper contends that the Indian framework would benefit from a lower or discretionary eligibility threshold, time-bound disposal norms, and clearer statutory or judicial guidance on the content of oppression. It concludes that Sections 241–242 represent a necessary but insufficient response to minority shareholder vulnerability, and that meaningful reform must address the procedural and institutional obstacles that currently stand between the statutory right and an effective remedy.

Promissory estoppel began its life in Indian law as a defensive tool: a way to stop someone from going back on a promise once another party had relied on it. Over the last five decades, though, the doctrine has drifted a long way from that starting point. Courts now describe it as capable of grounding an independent claim, of binding the Government even without a contract, and of doing so on facts that would once have seemed to demand a much narrower response. That drift raises a question the case law has never fully answered: if a promise, standing alone, can now support relief, has estoppel quietly turned into something the law never intended it to be, a mechanism for manufacturing rights that the underlying legal framework does not otherwise recognise? This paper argues that it should not, even where recent decisions read as if it already has. It traces the doctrine from its early public-law appearances through Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills and on to Manuelsons Hotels, and it separates two things that judgments tend to blur together: protecting a claimant’s reliance on a promise, and creating a substantive entitlement the law does not otherwise confer. The paper’s central move is to show that an independent cause of action is not the same thing as an independent legal right: a court can let a promise open the courthouse door without letting it rewrite the statute book. Building on that distinction, and on the limits already recognised in Kasinka Trading and Jit Ram Shiv Kumar, the paper proposes a four-stage test for identifying when estoppel has crossed from reliance protection into rights creation, and closes by arguing that promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, though related, need to stay conceptually separate if either is to do useful work.

Capital punishment is the most irreversible form of State power and therefore demands an unusually reliable legal process. This article examines the Indian death-penalty framework through the connected questions of the “rarest of rare” doctrine, individualised judicial sentencing and presidential clemency under Article 72 of the Constitution. It uses doctrinal and analytical research, examining the Constitution, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, leading Supreme Court decisions, Law Commission reports, international standards and empirical scholarship on death-row prisoners. The analysis finds that Indian law formally treats life imprisonment as the rule and death as the exception, but that the application of broad expressions such as “collective conscience” and “exceptional depravity” has produced avoidable uncertainty. The principal weakness is not the absence of safeguards on paper, but the uneven quality of mitigation investigation and sentencing reasoning. Courts may possess detailed evidence concerning the offence while lacking reliable information about poverty, childhood trauma, mental health, intellectual disability, prison conduct and prospects of reform. Article 72 remains an essential constitutional safety valve, yet delay, incomplete records, inadequate representation and limited transparency can undermine its corrective function. The article argues for a structured mitigation protocol, specialised defence assistance, reasoned appellate scrutiny, complete clemency records and accountable timelines. It concludes that the legitimacy of retention cannot be separated from the fairness, consistency and dignity-protective operation of every stage preceding execution.

The illegal trade in human organs in India represents a serious intersection of organised crime, poverty, medical demand, exploitation, and regulatory failure. This paper examines the black market for human organs through a doctrinal, criminological, and interdisciplinary analysis of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 (“THOTA”), related rules, academic literature, and judicial decisions. It argues that organ trafficking should not be understood merely as an isolated violation of medical regulation. It is a networked form of exploitation involving brokers, vulnerable donors, recipients, medical professionals, hospitals, document facilitators, and administrative authorities. The paper analyses the economic and health consequences experienced by organ sellers, the role of poverty and debt in recruitment, the use of forged relationships and documents, and the involvement of legitimate medical infrastructure in concealing illegal transactions. It further examines six important judicial decisions concerning authorization, altruistic donation, administrative delay, and uniform implementation of transplantation law. The analysis demonstrates that THOTA provides an important statutory foundation but remains weakened by fragmented enforcement, inadequate hospital audits, insufficient victim protection, weak financial investigation, and inconsistent implementation. The paper concludes that effective prevention requires a coordinated framework combining criminal prosecution, medical regulation, financial investigation, donor rehabilitation, public-health reform, and national data-sharing. Protecting genuine altruistic donation must remain a central objective, but formal consent must never be allowed to conceal coercion, deception, or abuse of vulnerability.

Tendering pardon to an accomplice is an exceptional criminal-procedure mechanism through which the State obtains evidence from a person who participated in, or is privy to, an offence. Sections 343 to 345 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, permit a competent Magistrate or court to tender conditional pardon when the person agrees to make a full and true disclosure of the entire transaction and of every person involved. The device is valuable in conspiracy, organised crime, corruption, terrorism, smuggling and complex economic offences, where external evidence may not disclose the internal structure of the crime. It is also inherently dangerous because the approver is a participant who receives a benefit and may minimise his own role or falsely implicate others. This paper critically examines the BNSS framework and the evidentiary position of approver testimony under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. It compares Sections 343 to 345 of the BNSS with Sections 306 to 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and applies the principles developed by the Supreme Court of India. The research adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on legislation, constitutional provisions, judicial decisions and academic materials. It argues that the BNSS preserves the earlier mechanism but does not sufficiently regulate voluntariness, prosecutorial influence, custody, disclosure, informal bargains, breach and corroboration. Approver evidence is admissible but fragile. It should be examined with exceptional caution and ordinarily supported by independent evidence connecting the accused with the material particulars of the offence. The paper recommends a formal voluntariness inquiry, legal assistance, complete disclosure, reasoned orders, custody review, audio-video preservation and a clear corroboration standard. Tendering pardon should remain a judicially supervised truth-securing device and should never become a routine route to conviction.

This article undertakes a doctrinal reassessment of ‘public purpose’ in Indian land acquisition law. It argues that the concept of ‘public purpose’ must function as a meaningful constitutional and statutory limit on State power rather than as an elastic, deferential label. Tracing the jurisprudence from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, it shows how the Supreme Court’s treatment of ‘public purpose’ as flexible and vague enabled broad executive discretion in favour of market-oriented development. The analysis highlights where judicial decisions blurred the statutory distinction between acquisition for a public purpose and acquisition for a company. The article proposes a multi-dimensional framework for interpreting ‘public purpose’ under Article 300A that integrates statutory fit and spirit. By recalibrating ‘public purpose’ along these lines, it argues, the judiciary can preserve the State’s capacity for legitimate development while preventing the concept from degenerating into a legal fiction that legitimises unjust dispossession.

India has opened its space sector to private enterprise without enacting a space statute. Regulatory work is instead carried out by the Indian Space Policy 2023, a Cabinet-approved executive instrument, and by norms issued under it by the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre. By August 2026 that framework had produced 113 authorisations to fifty-two non-governmental entities, so the question whether it possesses the authority it appears to exercise is no longer academic. The article addresses that question through a doctrinal analysis of the Policy and its subordinate norms against the constitutional law of executive power, India’s obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, and the licensing statutes of the United Kingdom and the United States. It finds the framework’s authority illusory in three connected respects. First, executive power organises government but cannot support acts operating to the prejudice of private persons: conditioning a lawful occupation on official permission, revoking that permission, and levying a financial penalty each requires a law, and no law exists. The Policy’s space-resources provision compounds the defect by reproducing the operative words of a United States statute in an instrument incapable of creating property rights. Secondly, the framework addresses absolute and unlimited international liability with a contractual indemnity and discretionary insurance; a contract cannot furnish the Union with recourse that survives an operator’s insolvency, cannot cap the operator’s own exposure, and cannot commit public money above the insured layer. Thirdly, promotion, authorisation, and authoritative interpretation are concentrated in a single department that also owns the principal market participants, with no appeal or dispute forum. These are three faces of a single defect: the absence of a legislative source. The article concludes by identifying the minimum content Indian space legislation must carry, including a provision validating the authorisations already granted.

Mob lynching represents a serious challenge to the rule of law because collective actors replace lawful investigation, adjudication and punishment with immediate private violence. In India’s digitally connected environment the phenomenon has acquired an additional evidentiary dimension through the rapid circulation of rumours, fabricated allegations, manipulated images and emotionally charged messages across social-media platforms and messaging applications. Digital misinformation may accelerate the dissemination and apparent credibility of allegations and facilitate mobilisation before authorities can verify or rebut them. This study examines the relationship between digital misinformation and mob lynching, with particular emphasis on the legal difficulties involved in establishing individual criminal responsibility when online communications contribute to collective violence. It adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, examining the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, constitutional principles and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. It analyses group-based murder, electronic and digital records, and the evidentiary requirements applicable to digitally facilitated offences. Particular attention is given to provenance, authenticity, attribution, mens rea, causation, corroboration and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The study demonstrates that screenshots, forwarded messages, account identifiers, metadata and other digital traces cannot automatically establish authorship, knowledge, intention or causal responsibility. Digital evidence must instead be examined within a reliable forensic and circumstantial framework. The paper proposes a sequential, rights-sensitive evidentiary model requiring proof of provenance, authenticity, attribution, knowledge or intention, causal connection and corroboration. It further emphasises specialised digital investigation, evidence preservation, forensic capacity and judicial scrutiny. At the same time, criminal enforcement must respect constitutional protections relating to life, dignity, speech, privacy, fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The paper concludes that combating digitally facilitated mob violence requires effective State intervention without converting digital association or mere receipt of misinformation into criminal guilt.

The Anthropocene represents a period in which human activities have become a major force influencing the Earth’s ecological systems. Environmental degradation arising from climate change, pollution, deforestation, biodiversity loss and resource depletion does not affect all sections of society equally. Economically disadvantaged communities, including rural, tribal, forest-dependent, agricultural and fishing communities, often experience greater environmental burdens because of their dependence on natural resources and their limited capacity to adapt or to obtain effective remedies. This study examines the relationship between environmental degradation and environmental justice in the Indian context. It analyses the constitutional, statutory and judicial framework governing environmental protection, with particular emphasis on Articles 14, 21, 38, 39(b), 48A and 51A(g), on the major environmental legislation, and on principles such as sustainable development, the precautionary principle, polluter pays, public trust and intergenerational equity. The study further evaluates environmental justice through its distributive, procedural and recognition dimensions. Using a doctrinal and analytical methodology, it examines primary and secondary legal sources in order to assess whether existing Indian environmental law adequately protects economically disadvantaged communities. The study finds that although India has developed a substantial environmental legal framework, significant gaps remain between legal recognition and practical protection. Weak implementation, limited participation, inadequate access to remedies, displacement and loss of livelihood continue to produce environmental injustice. The study concludes that Indian environmental law requires a stronger justice-oriented approach that integrates environmental protection with socio-economic equality, livelihood security, meaningful community participation and recognition of vulnerable communities.

During pandemics, States require vaccines and medicines on a mass scale, at affordable cost and without delay, to combat infectious diseases. Vaccines and medicines, however, are subject to twenty-year patent rights. The patent system under the TRIPS Agreement restricts the production and export of low-cost generic versions of new medicines. Most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) cannot afford expensive patented medicines. They also lack the resources and infrastructure to produce generic medicines and consequently depend heavily on pharmaceutical imports. Yet they are also unable to use compulsory licences to import medicines, because Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement restricts generic-producing nations from exporting to them: it allows those nations to use compulsory licences predominantly for the supply of their own domestic market. Article 31bis, which implements paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, permits export and import under strict and complex conditions, and there has been only one successful use of the system it codifies, Rwanda’s import of HIV medicines from Canada under the 2003 waiver. Moreover, the patent system cannot be viewed in isolation: the patent–trade secret duopoly extends protection beyond the twenty-year patent term. TRIPS flexibilities therefore operate as strategies that maintain the disparities in negotiating power between pharmaceutical companies and LMICs, and thus the status quo. HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 are the two principal pandemics to have occurred since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Drawing on a comparative analysis of these two pandemics, this paper examines a central question: why does reliance solely on the public health-related TRIPS flexibilities not appear to be a sufficient means of ensuring fair and equitable access to medicines in pandemics? It argues that the TRIPS flexibilities are not sufficient to ensure fair and equitable access to medicines, particularly in pandemics, and proposes legal mechanisms to mitigate the adverse consequences arising from the limitations of the TRIPS flexibilities in addressing future pandemics.

Shareholder activism has emerged as one of the most potent forces shaping the landscape of corporate governance throughout the world. What started out as a peripheral concern of corporate law thirty years ago has burgeoned into the primary means through which owners of capital seek to 'discipline management', 'control strategy' and 'challenge the board'. The manifestation, intensity and treatment of activism, however, vary profoundly depending on how corporate ownership is organised, the provisions of a jurisdiction's securities law regime, and whether its courts are prepared to intervene in disputes within corporations. The paper offers a comparative overview of activism and corporate governance in three jurisdictions that embody clearly distinct governance traditions: (i) the United States, with a largely dispersed pattern of ownership and a landscape dominated by hedge funds engaged in aggressive activism; (ii) the United Kingdom, with a maturing, stewardship-centred soft law regime; and (iii) India, an economy of tightly concentrated, promoter-dominated companies in which activism remains nascent. Drawing on legislation, judicial decisions, regulatory reports and the extensive scholarly literature on the subject, the paper seeks to demonstrate that the success of an activist intervention depends less on rights that exist on paper than on the combination of the degree of concentration of shareholdings, the enforcement framework and the robustness of the institutional shareholder base. It concludes with proposals that the Indian system could draw, selectively and with caution, from the other two jurisdictions in order to make shareholder activism a more effective mechanism.

The Gulf is a strategically crucial and environmentally vulnerable semi-enclosed marine system supporting petroleum industries, international shipping, desalination facilities, coastal ecosystems, and urban centers. Alongside chronic industrial and maritime pressures, armed conflict introduces severe risks via direct military operations, targeting of energy infrastructure, drone and missile strikes, hazardous material releases, and disruption of monitoring networks. This review evaluates the potential marine pollution consequences of armed conflict in the region, examining historical precedents, pollution pathways, and institutional governance across the member states of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), with specific attention to GCC national preparedness. It proposes treating conflict-driven pollution as a core regional security priority rather than an isolated environmental management concern. To mitigate these risks, the paper introduces the Gulf Environmental Conflict and Emergency Monitoring System (GECEMS), a five-layer response framework integrating real-time satellite surveillance, autonomous marine sensing, oil-spill modeling, standardized data exchange, and post-incident environmental forensics.

The emergence of international criminal law (ICL) marked a decisive departure from the Westphalian principle of sovereign impunity by locating accountability in individuals rather than States. Rooted in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and institutionalised through the Rome Statute of 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. Its promise of universal accountability has, however, been weakened by geopolitical selectivity. This article critically examines how the prosecutorial decisions, jurisdictional limitations and dependence on United Nations Security Council referrals of the ICC have disproportionately affected African States, while powerful nations and their allies have frequently avoided comparable scrutiny. Employing a qualitative doctrinal and case-based methodology informed by critical legal theory and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), the study analyses structural inequalities within the institutional framework of the Court. It demonstrates how prosecutorial discretion, the uneven application of complementarity, Security Council veto powers and limited transparency in case selection can facilitate strategic impunity for dominant geopolitical actors. The article further examines the proceedings of the Court concerning Kenya and its limited action regarding alleged Western violations in Iraq and Afghanistan, illustrating the asymmetrical administration of international criminal justice. The study argues that such inconsistent enforcement has strengthened perceptions of neo-colonialism and has made international criminal law appear to be a mechanism selectively imposed upon the Global South. This politicisation threatens the credibility, legitimacy, universality and moral authority of the Court. The Court must therefore adopt transparent prosecutorial standards and apply legal principles consistently to all States, irrespective of political power, regional influence or international alliances.

The exponential proliferation of social media platforms in India has democratized digital expression, yet it has simultaneously exposed women to severe forms of gender-based cyber violence. Offences such as cyberstalking, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake generation, doxing, and online harassment severely undermine female autonomy and digital safety. This paper critically analyses the structural efficacy of the existing legal remedies and regulatory frameworks designed to protect women on social media platforms in India. It evaluates statutory provisions under the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Through a socio-legal qualitative analysis, the research assesses the operational challenges faced by victims, including delayed takedowns, jurisdictional bottlenecks, loopholes in intermediary immunity, and policing biases. The findings indicate that while legislative instruments have evolved to recognize new vectors of digital harm, implementation remains significantly constrained by inadequate police capacity, poor algorithmic accountability on the part of platforms, and the social stigma that deters reporting. The paper argues for comprehensive structural reforms, including strict enforcement of intermediary grievance timelines, specialized digital police cells, mandatory content moderation standards, and enhanced digital literacy initiatives, to foster a safer online ecosystem for women.

The Vizag styrene gas leak of 7 May 2020 at LG Polymers India Private Limited is most often characterised as an environmental disaster requiring tribunal-level remediation. That characterisation is accurate but analytically incomplete. This paper advances the position that the Companies Act, 2013 already contains the governance obligations that, had they been operationalised with statutory seriousness, could have materially reduced the probability of the disaster. Sections 166(3), 134(5)(f), 447, 245(1) and 92(3) collectively constitute a preventive accountability framework imposing fiduciary engagement with process safety, verifiable compliance certification, transparent disclosure, and shareholder enforcement mechanisms against prejudicial governance failures. The paper reads each provision with precision and situates it within the judicial principles established in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak), Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India, Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, and A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu. It concludes that corporate sustainability in hazardous industries is enforceable law, present in the existing corporate governance framework and awaiting operationalisation.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in India was institutionalised through the mandatory regime under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, which requires qualifying companies to spend at least two per cent of their average net profits on activities listed in Schedule VII, including environmental sustainability. Despite CSR expenditure reaching approximately ₹35,000 crore annually by FY 2023–24, the extent to which this spending translates into genuine integration between CSR and corporate environmental planning remains contested. This paper critically examines the importance, effectiveness, and governance challenges of CSR participation in corporate environmental planning in India through a mixed-methods design that combines doctrinal analysis of constitutional and statutory environmental jurisprudence with a structured survey of 247 senior corporate professionals from companies covered by Section 135. The study develops and validates the CSR–Environmental Planning Integration Model (CEPIM), a conceptual framework identifying the antecedents, catalysts, inhibitors, and outcomes of integration. Findings show that regulatory compliance remains the dominant driver of CSR environmental activity (41.3 per cent of respondents), that adoption of a certified Environmental Management System is the single strongest predictor of integration depth (mean 4.12 versus 2.41 for firms without one), and that stakeholder consultation frequency correlates strongly with integration quality (r = 0.61, p < 0.001). Measurement deficiency and fraud or greenwashing risk emerge as systemic governance failures that enable decoupling between reported CSR commitments and verified environmental outcomes. The judiciary, through the doctrines of absolute liability, the Polluter Pays and Precautionary Principles, and an expansive reading of Article 21, has supplied a substantive content to corporate environmental obligation that the expenditure-focused statutory regime has not. The paper concludes with legislative, regulatory, and governance recommendations aimed at converting India’s compliance-anchored CSR regime into a strategically embedded instrument of environmental sustainability.

Article 142 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to pass orders necessary to do “complete justice” in any cause or matter pending before it. While conceived as an exceptional and residuary judicial power, its expanding application has generated persistent concerns regarding judicial activism, institutional overreach, and the separation of powers. This paper examines these tensions through the Supreme Court’s September 2026 order in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, concerning the quashing of First Information Reports arising from the Jantar Mantar student protests against alleged irregularities in the NEET-UG 2026 examination. The paper first traces the constitutional and doctrinal development of Article 142, examining its evolution from a residual mechanism for exceptional relief to a broader instrument of judicial intervention. It analyses the tension between Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, which recognised the breadth of Article 142, and Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, which emphasised that the power is supplementary and cannot supplant substantive law. The paper then evaluates the Jantar Mantar order, focusing particularly on its nationwide application, reliance upon executive assurances, interaction with the statutory mechanism governing withdrawal of prosecution, and the Court’s declaration that the order should not be treated as a precedent. The paper argues that the order is defensible from the standpoint of immediate individual justice, particularly in protecting constitutionally protected dissent, yet raises significant institutional concerns. It contends that the structural characteristics of Article 142 create a risk that judicial activism may gradually develop into functional substitution of legislative or executive roles. The paper therefore advocates principled restraint rather than constitutional restriction, proposing that future exercises of Article 142 should demonstrate the inadequacy of ordinary remedies, remain appropriately confined to the controversy before the Court, and avoid converting political or executive commitments into judicially created institutional arrangements.

A woman’s reproductive rights encompass a comprehensive framework of legal and ethical principles that affirm individual autonomy over reproductive decisions. The multifaceted nature of these rights is evident in their inclusion of positive as well as negative entitlements. On one side, reproductive rights secure a woman’s right to conceive or not to conceive, including decisions on birth control methods, such as undergoing sterilization procedures, to prevent pregnancy. This right is recognized as absolute within the ambit of individual liberty and bodily integrity, and may be described as the reproductive or decisional autonomy of the woman, recognized by legislation and the judiciary even where societal perception differs. Indian courts have recognized the procreative freedom of women, emphasizing access to safe medical support for terminating unwanted pregnancies beyond the permissible gestation period and bringing it within the ‘right to life’. The judiciary’s protection of the rights of mothers over the fetus, within the shield of personal liberty, is established through a series of decisions. Changing judicial trends, however, show that the judiciary is now empathetic towards the life inside the mother, especially once it crosses twenty-four weeks of gestation, and recent judicial decisions underscore this changing attitude. The paper examines the judicial approach adopted in India to harmonize the reproductive rights of women without impairing the ‘right to life’ of the unborn.

A tattoo sits in an odd place in the law of evidence. It is a personal mark. The moment a court takes an interest in it, though, it becomes physical evidence like any other exhibit on the record. Indian investigators have used tattoos for decades to identify bodies, corroborate eyewitnesses, and confirm an accused's identity. Yet Indian evidence law has never settled a considered position on when a mark on skin should be allowed to do this work. This paper takes the position that tattoo evidence is not one category. It is three: a marker of identity, a marker of association, and a marker of exploitation on a trafficking survivor's body. Each demands a different evidentiary test and a different degree of judicial caution. Drawing on the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, comparative case law from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the international literature on trafficking-related branding, this paper shows that Indian law currently treats all three uses as interchangeable. It closes with concrete suggestions for a more differentiated framework governing the admission of tattoo evidence at trial.

A foundational principle of company law is that a company is treated as its own legal person, separate from those who manage it. This principle derives from Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd., and it explains why a director may take business risks, sign contracts, and even preside over a company’s failure without necessarily incurring personal liability. Directors and shareholders are shielded by what is commonly called the corporate veil. That veil, however, was never intended to cover everything a director does, and courts and legislatures have over time carved out a set of situations in which it is lifted and the individual behind a decision is held personally responsible. This paper examines those situations in turn: beginning with the general rule of limited liability; then addressing the statutory provisions that impose liability on directors directly (for fraud, tax default, wrongful trading, and similar conduct); the case law on piercing the corporate veil where a company is used as a sham; the liability arising from breach of fiduciary duty or personal negligence; and, finally, the criminal liability attaching to “officers in default” under various statutes. Drawing on cases such as Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v. Horne, Jones v. Lipman, and Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd., together with provisions of the Companies Act 2013, the Companies Act 2006, and the Insolvency Act 1986, this paper argues that none of this liability is automatic: it arises only once a director has stepped outside honest, careful, and authorised conduct.

The decriminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) removed the primary formal instrument through which police targeted sexual minorities in India. What it did not remove was the institutional architecture that had enabled that targeting for over a century and a half. This article examines how Commissionerate police structures in major Indian cities continue to exercise a range of executive powers, including preventive detention, public nuisance regulation, licensing authority, and extern orders, in ways that reproduce the practical effects of criminalisation without engaging its formal language. Drawing on constitutional doctrine, legal sociology, and ethnographic accounts from urban queer communities, the article argues that the persistence of this regulatory harassment reflects a deeper conflict between the transformative potential of constitutional privacy and dignity guarantees and the colonial-era administrative DNA of urban policing in India. The article concludes with a framework for institutional reform oriented toward accountability rather than aspiration.

The widespread emergence of digital technology has greatly changed the nature of freedom of expression by redefining how opinions are generated, disseminated, and contested within the public domain. Although freedom of expression is guaranteed under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the growth of social media platforms and State control practices have created a complex regulatory and constitutional conundrum. This article examines freedom of expression as it operates within Nigeria’s digitally mediated public sphere, assessing whether existing constitutional safeguards remain adequate to address the contemporary challenges posed by digital innovation. It explores the relationship between constitutional speech rights and regulatory measures such as the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act and other policy instruments regulating online expression. Through doctrinal and comparative legal analysis, the article posits that current regulatory approaches, if not properly applied, may decimate democratic engagement and frustrate legitimate expression. It therefore advocates a constitutionally grounded, proportionate, and rights-oriented framework for the regulation of speech, which reconciles the protection of fundamental freedoms with the State’s legitimate interests in security, public order, and the management of harmful online content.

Mental healthcare in India is undergoing a paradigm shift, illustrated by the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, which moves from a custodial to a rights-based approach. The legislation protects people with mental illnesses, safeguarding their autonomy and their dignity and promoting non-discrimination. It also creates significant legal, ethical, and medical quandaries in cases of involuntary treatment, institutional care, and guardianship, disputes that sometimes encompass highly charged clashes among family members, patients, and mental health experts. Within this growing framework, mediation, an integral part of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), emerges as a potentially transformative mechanism for resolving conflicts with sensitivity and equity. Despite ADR’s proven success in civil and family law matters, its integration into the domain of mental health jurisprudence in India remains highly underexplored. This paper analyses the sources and reasons for conflict in India’s mental healthcare systems. It assesses the absence of institutionalised ADR mechanisms in the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, and proposes a rights-based model of therapeutic jurisprudence that combines legal safeguards with clinical realities. It explores the potential for coordinated and structured mediation processes within mental healthcare systems, drawing upon comparative models from jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and proposes a hybrid dispute resolution model in which mediation is embedded as a mandatory pre-adjudication step within the Mental Healthcare Act framework. By adopting a rights-sensitive, therapeutically informed mediation framework, India can move from a fragmented and adversarial system to one that truly embodies dignity, autonomy, and collaborative care.

This study investigates human–AI collaboration and strategic decision-making in UAE government institutions, examining how artificial intelligence is transforming leadership practices, decision processes and human judgement. Although AI is integral to the UAE’s digital government transformation, existing research has focused mainly on technological adoption, organisational performance and digital transformation, leaving limited understanding of how human–AI collaboration reconfigures strategic decision-making and leadership responsibilities. The study addresses this gap by examining the relationship between human judgement and AI-enabled decision support, the effects of collaboration on strategic decision-making and organisational transformation, and emerging leadership challenges in AI-enabled governance. An exploratory qualitative research design was employed, drawing on academic literature, policy documents, official government publications and other documentary sources. The data were analysed thematically, guided by Dynamic Capabilities Theory, to identify patterns related to collaboration, decision-making, leadership transformation and human judgement. Findings show that AI is moving strategic decision-making towards collaborative arrangements in which AI provides analytical capabilities, predictive insights and decision support, while human leaders retain responsibility for contextual interpretation, ethical reasoning and final judgement. The study contributes by extending understanding of AI-enabled leadership through a human–AI collaboration perspective, demonstrating how technological capabilities and human judgement can be integrated within government decision processes. It concludes that effective AI governance requires complementarity rather than leadership displacement. Future research should examine these dynamics through empirical studies involving government leaders and employees across different UAE institutions and comparative public-sector contexts and broader institutional outcomes. The study recommends strengthening AI literacy, leadership capabilities, institutional readiness and responsible governance.

This study examines artificial intelligence and the transformation of government leadership within UAE government institutions, focusing on how the integration of AI is reshaping leadership roles, organisational practices and institutional responsibilities. While artificial intelligence has become an increasingly important component of the UAE's digital government transformation, existing literature has largely concentrated on technological adoption, organisational performance and digital transformation, with comparatively limited attention to how AI is changing the nature and practice of government leadership. This study addresses this gap by examining the changing nature of leadership in AI-enabled government, the relationship between AI, organisational transformation and institutional change, and the emerging leadership challenges associated with AI-driven government transformation in the UAE. An exploratory qualitative research design was adopted, drawing on relevant academic literature, policy documents, official government publications and other documentary sources. The collected materials were subjected to thematic analysis to identify recurring patterns and themes concerning AI-enabled leadership and organisational transformation. The findings indicate that AI is transforming government leadership from predominantly hierarchical and managerial practices towards greater technological awareness, coordination, adaptability and responsible oversight. The study further finds that AI adoption influences organisational routines, structures, professional responsibilities and institutional practices, while creating emerging challenges relating to accountability, trust, ethical responsibility, technological dependence and the changing boundaries of human leadership. Consequently, the study contributes to the understanding of AI-enabled government leadership by demonstrating that effective transformation requires the integration of technological capabilities with human judgement, organisational adaptability and institutional responsibility. The study recommends strengthening leadership capabilities, institutional readiness and responsible governance mechanisms to ensure that AI-driven government transformation remains aligned with accountability, legitimacy and human responsibility.

Law schools in India have played a crucial role in moulding law students and preparing them for the legal profession. The educational framework adopted by an institution is blended with its teaching-learning process and the needs of its target audience. It is an essential requirement that a law student receive adequate practical training before entering the legal profession and addressing the needs of justice in the country. The development of mooting in India can be traced to the Bar Council of India’s organisation of a national moot court competition in 1981, and moot court exercises subsequently became an important component of legal education. The emergence and expansion of National Law Universities further strengthened the emphasis on experiential and clinical legal education. Mooting is an important activity for law students, as it develops skills relating to legal research, drafting, written submissions, oral advocacy, presentation, legal reasoning and analysis. The Bar Council of India’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008 expressly recognise moot court exercises and internship as components of legal education and provide for written submissions and oral advocacy as part of moot court assessment. Legal aid clinics have an important role in providing practical exposure to students while facilitating access to justice for persons who require legal assistance. The constitutional commitment to equal justice and free legal aid is reflected in Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 establishes the statutory framework for providing legal services to eligible persons and for promoting access to justice. The Act also envisages the development of programmes for clinical legal education and the establishment and functioning of legal services clinics in universities, law colleges and other institutions. Legal aid clinics and legal aid cells in law institutions can thus contribute both to student training and to legal assistance for disadvantaged and marginalised sections of society. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) provides mechanisms for resolving disputes outside conventional litigation and includes processes such as arbitration, conciliation and mediation. Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides a statutory framework for referring appropriate disputes to arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, or mediation. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides the principal statutory framework for arbitration and conciliation in India. Lok Adalats operate under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and provide an institutional mechanism for the settlement of disputes. The Mediation Act, 2023 further provides a comprehensive statutory framework relating to mediation in India. The inclusion of ADR in legal education therefore enables students to understand dispute-resolution mechanisms beyond traditional adversarial litigation and to develop skills in negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and mediation. The Bar Council of India’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008 specifically include ADR in the legal curriculum and emphasise negotiation, conciliation and arbitration through practical exercises and case studies.

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), under which consent is legally invalid for anyone below the age of eighteen, represents India’s commitment to a zero-tolerance policy on the sexual abuse of minors. Two regrettable outcomes of this protective framework are the criminalisation of consensual relationships between young people aged 16 to 18 and a shift from protection to prosecution. The Madras High Court identified this jurisprudential dilemma in Sabari v. Inspector of Police and Vijayalakshmi v. State, where the provisions of POCSO were applied to young couples in peer relationships rather than to exploitative scenarios. In the light of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., this over-criminalisation raises important constitutional questions concerning the rights to equality, privacy, dignity and decisional autonomy guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The paper suggests that India maintain the age of consent at 18 while providing a limited close-in-age exception permitting consensual sexual activity between adolescents whose ages differ by no more than three years. Such an exception would align Indian law more closely with comparable jurisdictions such as South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom, and would ensure that peer relationships are not equated with predatory exploitation. Without reducing the age of consent, the Law Commission’s 283rd Report recommended “guided judicial discretion” in sentencing with regard to older adolescents. The proposed model incorporates strong safeguards, including clauses excluding from the exception any relationship based on coercion, force, grooming, manipulation, misuse of authority or a significant power imbalance, so that the exception cannot be used to enable exploitation. The paper concludes that a close-in-age exception would make India’s child protection system more appropriate, adolescent-friendly and constitutionally compliant, while continuing to hold sexual abusers accountable and subject to severe sanctions.

India’s decision to fold its labour statutes into four Codes, operative since late 2025, has been presented as a modernisation of the employment relationship. The present paper examines whether this reform, read alongside the 2016 disability rights statute, protects neurodivergent employees, that is, autistic persons, persons with dyslexia and other learning differences, persons with ADHD and persons with Tourette syndrome. A doctrinal gap analysis was conducted on the enacted texts of the four Codes, the 2016 Act and its Rules, the official disability assessment guidelines and selected rulings of the higher judiciary. Nine stages of working life were coded as explicit, partial or absent for each instrument. The analysis indicates that the four Codes neither use the expression “persons with disabilities” nor refer to reasonable accommodation, and that none of them cross-refers to the 2016 Act. The 2016 Act recognises autism, specific learning disabilities and mental illness, but it omits attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and Tourette syndrome, ties its strongest employment rights to Government establishments and conditions reservation on a forty per cent benchmark that sits uneasily with neurodevelopmental assessment. Courts have partly filled these gaps by extending reasonable accommodation beyond benchmark disability, but judicial relief remains individual and uneven. The paper concludes that the private-sector workplace, where most neurodivergent Indians are likely to work, falls in a regulatory blind spot, and it proposes legislative and organisational measures to close it.

When India raised paid maternity leave from 12 to 26 weeks in 2017 and later folded that entitlement into the Code on Social Security, 2020, the change was widely described as a milestone for working women. The present paper examines whether this entitlement, operative under the Labour Codes since November 2025, protects women’s careers or whether its financing and its silence on the post-leave period reproduce a career penalty in another form. A doctrinal analysis of the maternity chapter of the Code and related provisions of the other Codes was combined with a review of official labour force statistics and of international and Indian evidence on the motherhood penalty. The analysis suggests that the Code preserves the duration of leave, the creche obligation and the protection against dismissal during absence. The benefit nonetheless remains financed by the individual employer outside the insured sector, establishment thresholds and eligibility conditions exclude the majority of working women, the continuation of work from home after leave is left to employer discretion and none of the four Codes provides for paternity leave. Official survey data show women’s labour force participation climbing from about 23 per cent in 2017–18 to about 40 per cent in 2025, yet caring for children is still the reason most often given by women who stay out of the labour force. Indian research also points to weaker employment among women in the main childbearing ages after the extension, alongside continuing concern about bias in recruitment. These findings draw attention to what happens after statutory leave ends: the career cost may emerge beyond week twenty-six. The paper accordingly considers social insurance, shared parental leave and stronger rights governing return to work and subsequent progression.

Industrial disputes are an inevitable feature of the employer–employee relationship, and their timely settlement has a direct bearing on industrial peace, productivity and national economic development. India has, over the decades, put in place statutory dispute-resolution mechanisms (conciliation, adjudication before Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals and, more recently, the consolidated framework of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020), yet a substantial volume of disputes continues to languish for years. Delayed resolution imposes real costs: workers face prolonged financial hardship, employers operate under continuing uncertainty, business operations are disrupted, and public confidence in the labour justice system is gradually eroded. This paper examines why industrial disputes in India take so long to resolve. It studies procedural bottlenecks, the shortage of Labour Courts and Presiding Officers, the tendency of parties to seek repeated adjournments, weak infrastructure, poor implementation of awards once passed, and the limited use of technology in case management. It also assesses how effectively the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 addresses these concerns, and the part played by conciliation officers, Grievance Redressal Committees and adjudicatory tribunals in resolving disputes. Judicial decisions are examined to understand how courts have approached the question of delay and the value they place on timely justice in labour matters. Building on this analysis, the paper suggests practical reform measures: fixed statutory timelines for disposal of references, a stronger and better-resourced conciliation and mediation stage, additional Labour Courts and Tribunal benches, e-filing and virtual hearings, and closer coordination among the various labour authorities. The paper concludes that these reforms, if implemented in earnest, can meaningfully cut down delay, strengthen industrial harmony, protect the interests of both employers and employees, and restore confidence in the labour justice system. A dispute-resolution mechanism that works quickly is not a convenience; it is a precondition for fairness and for sustainable industrial relations.

Gender equality in employment policies has long been a critical issue within public sector organizations in India, particularly in light of judicial interventions addressing discriminatory service conditions. The study critically analyses the implications of the judgment in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) for gender equality in employment, assesses its influence on human resource practices in public sector organizations, and examines the extent to which discriminatory provisions have been eliminated. The methodology is doctrinal and empirical, combining case law analysis with survey-based research using convenience sampling. A total sample of 200 respondents, including employees from various public sector organizations, was considered. The independent variables are gender, age, designation, years of service and type of organization. The dependent variables are awareness of gender equality norms, perceptions of workplace discrimination, opinions on HR policies, experiences of inclusivity, and views on the implementation of judicial precedents. The data were analysed through bar graphs, clustered bar charts and chi-square analysis using SPSS. The key findings reveal that while there has been notable progress in eliminating explicit discriminatory policies since the judgment, implicit biases and structural inequalities continue to persist within HR practices. The study concludes that strengthening gender-sensitive HR frameworks, ensuring strict compliance with judicial mandates, promoting workplace inclusivity, and bridging the gap between legal principles and organizational practice are essential to achieving substantive gender equality in employment.

International environmental law has historically centered on the control and ownership of natural and biogenetic resources. Numerous environmental conventions have addressed this question, prioritizing benefit-sharing mechanisms. Among these, Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) emerged as a key solution, aiming to balance the interests of developed and developing nations while conserving biodiversity. ABS, given effect by the Nagoya Protocol adopted in Nagoya, Japan, in October 2010 by the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), is explored here in the context of sustainable development, with emphasis on the crucial role of equitable resource distribution in achieving long-term environmental, social and economic sustainability. Benefit sharing encompasses mechanisms for distributing the advantages derived from natural resources, knowledge or innovations among stakeholders, especially marginalized communities. The analysis examines the ABS framework of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol and its relationship with other instruments on plant genetic resources, intellectual property and the rights of indigenous peoples. Drawing on India’s framework under the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 and the Kani–Jeevani benefit-sharing arrangement, the paper considers how benefit-sharing frameworks can foster social equity and encourage sustainable practices. It further examines the obstacles to implementing such frameworks, including lack of awareness among local communities, bureaucratic hurdles, inadequate resources for implementation and conflicts between commercial interests and the rights of local communities. The research highlights the critical need to integrate benefit-sharing principles into sustainable development policies and initiatives in order to realize the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It concludes by recommending a collaborative approach that empowers local communities and ensures the equitable and sustainable distribution of benefits derived from natural resource management.

The rapid expansion of the gig economy and platform-based employment has fundamentally transformed the traditional employment landscape by introducing flexible, technology-driven work arrangements. Digital platforms such as ride-hailing, food delivery and freelance marketplaces have created new opportunities for income generation while simultaneously challenging established principles of labour law. One of the most significant issues arising from this transformation is the uncertainty surrounding the determination of the employer–employee relationship. Platform companies frequently classify gig workers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby excluding them from statutory labour protections such as minimum wages, social security benefits, paid leave, workplace safety and protection against unfair dismissal. This classification has generated considerable legal debate regarding the true nature of the relationship between platforms and workers. This paper examines the challenges involved in determining the employer–employee relationship within the gig economy by analysing traditional legal tests, including the control test, the integration test, the economic reality test and the hybrid approach, in the context of digital platform work. It further explores the impact of algorithmic management, economic dependence, contractual ambiguity and technological advancement on employment classification. The study also analyses the Indian legal framework, particularly the Code on Social Security, 2020, along with relevant judicial developments and comparative international approaches. Finally, the paper proposes reforms aimed at creating a balanced legal framework through clearer statutory definitions, enhanced social security measures, regulation of platform governance and recognition of fundamental labour rights. The research concludes that modern labour law must evolve to address the realities of platform-based employment while ensuring fairness, flexibility and adequate protection for gig workers in the digital economy.

Industrial disputes remain one of the most persistent features of the employer-employee relationship in India, continuing to pose serious challenges to industrial harmony and economic progress. Although the law provides a structured framework for resolving such disputes, first through the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and more recently through the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the settlement process frequently remains protracted. Prolonged delay harms the rights and livelihoods of workers, disrupts business operations and slows industrial growth, raising legitimate questions about whether the existing statutory mechanisms, and the recent legislative reforms, are capable of delivering timely justice. This paper examines the statutory framework governing the settlement of industrial disputes in India, traces the evolution of industrial dispute legislation, and identifies the institutional, procedural, administrative, legal, governmental and employer-related factors that contribute to delay in adjudication. It further undertakes a comparative study of the dispute resolution mechanisms in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, and evaluates whether the reforms introduced by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 meaningfully address these longstanding problems. The paper concludes that while the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 represents a significant step towards modernising India’s labour law framework, its capacity to reduce delay depends largely on effective implementation, adequate institutional support and administrative efficiency. Meaningful reform requires more than legislative change: it calls for stronger institutions, better case management, greater use of technology and a sustained commitment to speedy and effective industrial justice.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly used in project management offices (PMOs) to support reporting, scheduling, risk identification, forecasting, and stakeholder communication. In most organisations, however, AI remains a support tool: it analyses information and provides recommendations, while people make the final decisions. Agentic AI may change this arrangement. Rather than only responding to instructions, an agentic system can interpret situations, determine responses, and act with limited human involvement. For PMOs, the question is therefore not simply whether to adopt AI, but how much authority it should be given. This paper develops a Task- and Risk-Based Agentic PMO Autonomy Framework to assess AI autonomy for individual PMO activities. The framework considers three factors: task complexity, the risk of autonomous execution, and the degree of human judgement required. These factors are used to recommend appropriate levels of AI autonomy and human oversight. Secondary data from PM Solutions' State of the PMO 2025 report identify areas where AI is currently involved in PMO work. Ten representative PMO activities, mapped against the PMBOK® process framework, are assessed using a researcher-developed rubric informed by the literature. An exploratory Spearman rank-correlation analysis examines whether greater complexity, risk, and human judgement requirements are associated with lower recommended AI autonomy. Across the ten activities, the results show the expected negative relationship. The study argues that the future PMO is unlikely to be fully human-run or fully autonomous. Instead, it is likely to operate as a hybrid environment in which people, digital systems, and AI agents share responsibility according to each activity's requirements. The practical contribution is to position AI autonomy as an activity-level governance decision rather than a single organisation-wide technology choice. The central question for PMO leaders is therefore not only what AI can do, but what it should be authorised to do.

Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) is increasingly recognised as an important instrument of judicial modernisation and institutional reform. In India, persistent case pendency, procedural delays, linguistic diversity, voluminous judicial records, and limitations in judicial and administrative resources create significant demands upon the justice-delivery system. AI offers potential to enhance judicial efficiency, accessibility, and administrative functioning. The Indian judiciary has initiated several AI-enabled mechanisms, including the Supreme Court Vidhik Anuvaad Software (“SUVAS”), Supreme Court Portal for Assistance in Court Efficiency (“SUPACE”), AI-assisted transcription, National Judicial Data Grid (“NJDG”), e-Filing systems, and other digital judicial platforms. The Supreme Court’s White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and Judiciary further identifies applications in case management, legal research, translation, transcription, document analysis, scheduling, and administrative automation. This research examines the transformative potential of AI within the Indian judicial process and the legal, constitutional, ethical, and institutional safeguards necessary for its responsible implementation. It analyses machine learning, natural language processing, optical character recognition, computer vision, predictive analytics, and generative AI in relation to judicial and administrative functions. The study further explores their potential application in case triage, scheduling, legal research, document management, routine drafting, multilingual services, alternative dispute resolution, and procedural-delay detection. Concurrently, it examines risks concerning algorithmic bias, opacity, AI hallucinations, fabricated legal authorities, privacy, confidentiality, cybersecurity, deepfakes, and excessive technological reliance. The paper argues that AI should function as an assistive and augmentative mechanism rather than an autonomous adjudicatory authority. A rights-based, human-supervised, and institutionally governed framework incorporating secure datasets, verification, auditability, transparency, accountability, and professional training is essential to ensure that technological advancement strengthens the rule of law, judicial independence, procedural fairness, and the integrity of adjudication.

India has consolidated 29 existing central labour laws into four Labour Codes: the Code on Wages, the Industrial Relations Code, the Code on Social Security and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code. These reforms are directed at securing natural justice, equal pay for equal work, protection of workers from weaker sections, industrial peace, better living standards for workers, protection from exploitation, and human rights and dignity, among other aims. The Codes were enacted in 2019 and 2020 and came into effect on 21 November 2025. They accommodate the standards of International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions. India has ratified 40 of 189 ILO standards, which predominantly concern equal remuneration, workers’ livelihood and hours of work; of these 40, 37 Conventions and 1 Protocol are in force. The reach of the four Codes has nonetheless been uneven across the States of India, because each State frames its own rules and regulations according to its own priorities, and the implementation of the Codes remains under discussion between the Centre and the States. Applying the Labour Codes uniformly is challenging because of varied State powers, compliance costs for small firms, and the integration of unorganised, gig and migrant workers into national systems. The four Codes nevertheless mark a historic shift towards a condensed, transparent and comprehensive framework. The Government expects them to be a turning point for efficient future economic growth, supported by effective digital implementation, balanced enforcement and cooperation among all stakeholders.

The principle of non-refoulement is an important part of international refugee protection. In simple terms, it means that a State should not send a person back to a country where that person may be persecuted or face a serious threat to life or freedom. The principle is expressly recognised in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although India has not ratified the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR regards non-refoulement as a principle of customary international law, and on that view the principle may apply to States even when they are not parties to the Convention. India does not at present have a single, comprehensive law dealing specifically with refugees. In the absence of such legislation, matters relating to refugees are generally addressed through laws concerning foreigners, citizenship and national security. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (“CAA”) created a special provision for obtaining Indian citizenship for persons belonging to six specified religious communities, namely Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians, who came from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan and entered India on or before 31 December 2014, subject to the conditions prescribed under the law. The Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024 later laid down the procedure for making applications under the amended citizenship provisions. This paper focuses on the relationship between the CAA and the principle of non-refoulement. The two deal with different legal questions. The CAA is primarily concerned with the acquisition of Indian citizenship, whereas non-refoulement is concerned with protecting individuals from being returned to a place where they may face persecution or serious harm. The CAA is nevertheless significant from the perspective of refugee protection in India because it creates a specific pathway to citizenship for certain groups facing religious persecution, while persons who do not fall within its specified categories are not covered by the same special route. This raises the question whether a citizenship-based mechanism such as the CAA can adequately address the broader need for refugee protection in India. Against this background, the paper also examines the relevance of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the approach adopted by Indian courts towards the protection of non-citizens.

Proxy warfare has become a defining feature of contemporary armed conflict, enabling states to pursue strategic objectives through indirect engagement while evading legal accountability. This article examines how sponsoring states exploit the fragmentation between competing attribution standards under international law to avoid responsibility for violations committed through proxy armed groups. Focusing on the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and alleged Rwandan support for the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebellion, the analysis evaluates the effectiveness of the current legal framework in addressing these evasion strategies. Drawing on United Nations Group of Experts reports, judicial decisions and scholarly commentary, the article demonstrates that the effective control test, requiring proof of specific operational direction, creates an evidentiary burden nearly impossible to meet when states deliberately structure proxy relationships to avoid direct command. Conversely, the overall control test, while more flexible, has been rejected by the International Court of Justice. The article finds that sponsoring states exploit this fragmentation through indirect control, evidentiary burdens, de facto structures and strategic denial, creating an accountability gap that perpetuates violence and impunity in eastern DRC. It concludes by proposing reforms to strengthen attribution and accountability in proxy warfare.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has redefined the legal significance of personal identity. It can create highly realistic synthetic images, videos and digital avatars. The technological capacity to recreate a deceased person's appearance, voice or mannerisms raises a particularly difficult question for Indian law: whether personality or publicity interests can survive the death of the individual. Indian courts have progressively protected personality interests through privacy, publicity, passing off and intellectual-property doctrines, but India has no comprehensive statutory framework governing post-mortem personality rights. The Delhi High Court's 2021 interim order in Krishna Kishore Singh v. Sarla A. Saraogi is particularly significant because it distinguished privacy rights, which terminate with death, from the unresolved possibility that commercially valuable personality interests might survive as property. Recent cases involving AI-generated voices and digital likenesses demonstrate the growing capacity of technology to appropriate personality traits in ways that existing doctrines did not anticipate. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026 have introduced regulatory mechanisms concerning synthetically generated information, but they do not create a specific post-mortem personality right. This article examines the doctrinal foundations of personality rights in India, analyses their post-mortem limitations and considers the implications of generative AI. It argues for a narrowly defined, limited post-mortem personality interest directed against unauthorised commercial exploitation and synthetic identity appropriation.

The recent paradigm shift in India’s criminal jurisprudence to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 marks a watershed moment in the history of human rights in India. However, it also brings to the fore the glaring lacuna created by the absence of gender-neutral laws on the crime of rape. This paper critically analyzes the failure of the Indian legal system to provide substantive legal protection to male and transgender victims of sexual assault. Aligning itself with the conference sub-theme of ‘Vulnerable and Marginalised Groups,’ the paper explores the manner in which the existing legal framework has created a narrow definition of victimhood based on the gender of the victim. Male victims of sexual assault have been largely ignored in the primary legislation on sexual assault, while the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 has been found to provide a much lower level of legal protection to the transgender community. The paper contends that such a rigid, gender-based definition violates the constitutional guarantee of equality and equal protection under Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution. Using a human rights-based approach, it juxtaposes Indian case law with the international human rights principles enunciated in the Yogyakarta Principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The paper finds that the time has come to replace the gender-specific definitions in the laws on rape with gender-neutral definitions. By recognizing the bodily autonomy of male and transgender victims, the Indian legal system will place itself in a position to fulfill its mandate in the field of human rights.

Government digital transformation is an ever-expanding part of modern governance. Governments increasingly implement digital platforms, big-data analytics, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, digital identity systems and integrated information infrastructures. These developments can affect the delivery of public services as well as institutional coordination, citizen–government interaction, policy formulation and decision-making. This paper explores how digital transformation affects the performance of contemporary political systems, particularly in governance and governmental decision-making. It examines the potential of digital technologies to enhance administrative efficiency, institutional responsiveness, transparency, accountability, citizen engagement and evidence-based policy-making, together with the problems of cybersecurity, privacy, digital exclusion, algorithmic bias, institutional capacity and over-reliance on technology. The study is qualitative and analytical: it reviews and synthesizes the academic literature and the reports of international organizations. Digital transformation is not simply the conversion of traditional administrative procedures into electronic processes; it is institutional change in its own right. Current studies suggest that it requires organizational transformation, sound data governance, interoperability, an adequate legal framework, public-sector skills and accountability mechanisms. Mergel, Edelmann and Haug argue that digital transformation is not merely digitization but an organizational change that reshapes processes, services, culture and relations with stakeholders. Evidence from the OECD likewise shows that digital technologies and data can improve how governments respond and deliver services, but that implementation, evaluation, skills and governance remain challenges. The study concludes that digital transformation can improve the performance of the political system, provided that technological innovation is complemented by institutional reform, inclusive access, transparency, data protection, cybersecurity, human control and effective governance arrangements. Digital transformation should therefore be understood as a governance transformation in which technological capabilities are combined with institutional, legal, organizational and societal factors.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined by the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014, as amended in 2021, as “the activities undertaken by a Company in pursuance of its statutory obligation laid down in section 135 of the Act”. In simple terms, Corporate Social Responsibility means that companies have a duty to contribute ethically and positively to society while conducting their business. Corporate Social Responsibility draws on the Triple Bottom Line approach, which measures a company’s success along three dimensions, people, planet and profit, and not by financial gain alone. This article examines Corporate Social Responsibility from a legal perspective, discussing its evolution and how it is treated under Indian law. It also explains the role of law in promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, why companies should engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities, and the challenges faced in implementing and enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility.

The rapid expansion of digital technologies and internet access has transformed communication, education, and social interaction globally. This digital revolution, however, has also exposed children to increasing risks of cyberbullying, online grooming, sextortion, child sexual abuse materials (CSAM), and other forms of technology-facilitated exploitation. In Nigeria, the growing number of young internet users, coupled with limited digital literacy and inadequate online safeguards, has heightened children's vulnerability to cyber-related harms. This paper examines the legal and institutional strategies adopted to combat cyberbullying and child online exploitation in Nigeria, with particular emphasis on enforcement realities. Using a doctrinal and comparative legal research methodology, the study analyzes relevant legal frameworks, including the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, the Child Rights Act 2003, constitutional provisions, and data protection regulations. It further evaluates the roles of key enforcement institutions such as the Nigeria Police Force, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Nigerian Communications Commission, and other agencies. The paper identifies significant enforcement challenges, including inadequate technical capacity, weak inter-agency coordination, low reporting rates, societal stigmatization of victims, judicial limitations, and insufficient international cooperation. Drawing lessons from legal and institutional approaches adopted in the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa, the study highlights best practices that may strengthen Nigeria's response to online child abuse. The paper concludes by recommending comprehensive legal reforms, with specialized enforcement mechanisms, to ensure effective protection of fundamental rights of children in the digital environment and in cyberspace.

Consumer credit has become mobile in ways that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code did not anticipate. Article 9’s choice-of-law rules for perfecting a security interest assume that a debtor has one stable, easily identifiable location, ordinarily the debtor’s principal residence, an assumption that dual-resident, remote-working, and expatriate consumers do not always satisfy. This article examines how UCC §§ 9-301, 9-307, and 9-316 apply to cross-border consumer-credit transactions, such as auto-secured installment credit, against the backdrop of a buy-now-pay-later market that is growing quickly and moving toward longer-term installment structures, and identifies a doctrinal gap: because individual cross-border consumer disputes are too small in dollar value to justify litigation, the choice-of-law problems created by consumer mobility have been absorbed quietly as a cost of doing business rather than resolved through case law or statutory reform. Drawing on recent Federal Reserve research on buy-now-pay-later growth, a bankruptcy decision applying the petition-date freeze rule to a lapsed Article 9 financing statement, and New York’s rollout of the 2022 UCC amendments, the article argues that this gap will not stay latent as cross-border consumer lending scales. It concludes with practical compliance recommendations for lenders and counsel: treating a debtor’s location as a servicing obligation subject to UCC § 9-316’s four-month relocation clock, building a compliance response to § 9-307(c)’s District of Columbia default rule, and monitoring the state-by-state adoption of the 2022 UCC amendments as an early indicator of the friction consumer secured lending is likely to inherit.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in India has changed considerably from the traditional model of corporate charity and the Gandhian trusteeship model. It is now a mandatory, strategic business framework that builds environmental and social benefits into core operations. Rooted in India’s long heritage of business responsibility, CSR underwent a significant transition after the economic liberalization of the 1990s, moving from philanthropy-based methods to a multi-stakeholder model that addresses financial stakeholders, workers and communities. CSR became a formal accountability mechanism on 1 April 2014, when Section 135 of the landmark Companies Act, 2013 came into force, requiring qualifying companies to spend at least 2% of their average net profits on CSR initiatives. Today, CSR goes beyond philanthropic contributions to serve as a crucial strategic instrument that promotes ethical behavior and sustainable environmental practices while aligning company operations with societal expectations. This paper analyzes the current landscape of CSR in India, tracing its development from conventional philanthropy to a mandatory strategic business model, and examines present practices, implementation hurdles and future possibilities. It investigates the regulatory framework governing CSR, including the Companies Act, 2013, the attendant compliance obligations and the mechanisms for enforcement. The paper seeks to contribute to the academic discourse on CSR in India and to inform policymakers, businesses, academia and civil society about the opportunities and challenges in fostering corporate sustainability and social welfare.

The proliferation of artificial intelligence across public and private sectors has positioned algorithmic decision-making at the heart of consequential outcomes, from criminal sentencing and credit scoring to healthcare allocation and employment screening. Yet the opacity of AI systems, combined with fragmented governance structures, has created a significant accountability deficit that threatens the realisation of fundamental human rights. This paper addresses the central research question: to what extent do existing human rights legal frameworks impose enforceable accountability and transparency obligations on states and corporate actors deploying AI systems? Using a doctrinal legal analysis methodology, the paper systematically examines primary legal instruments, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the EU AI Act, and UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, to assess their capacity to govern AI-driven decision-making in rights-sensitive contexts. With special reference to the Indian constitutional framework, anchored in the Supreme Court’s landmark recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017), and to the emerging architecture of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, the paper situates India’s governance challenges within the global accountability debate. The paper identifies critical governance gaps, including the absence of enforceable audit mechanisms, inadequate redress pathways for rights-affected individuals, and the difficulty of attributing legal responsibility across complex AI supply chains. It concludes by proposing a human rights-by-design governance model that embeds accountability and transparency obligations across the full AI lifecycle, offering a principled framework for reconciling technological innovation with fundamental rights protection.

This paper examines the entitlement to legal assistance during police interrogation created by Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in the light of the first authoritative construction placed upon it by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju. The provision permits an arrested person to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, “though not throughout interrogation”, and the Court has now held that this confers a right to meet counsel rather than a right to counsel’s continuous presence, permitting the advocate to remain only within sight of his client. The paper argues that Section 38 is not a reform at all but a verbatim reproduction of Section 41D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, inserted in 2009, and that it codified a concession first framed as a judicial direction in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and later reduced, in an ad hoc direction in a revenue intelligence interrogation, to sight without hearing, thereby displacing the considerably wider position taken in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani without that decision ever having been overruled. Measured against the standard that a procedural guarantee must be practical and effective rather than theoretical or illusory, an advocate who may see but not hear is positioned to detect physical coercion and nothing else, while the protection under Article 20(3) is directed at what the accused is induced to say. The difficulty is compounded by Section 187(2) of the Sanhita, which permits police custody to be sought in parts across the first forty or sixty days, multiplying the occasions at which an inaudible advocate must serve as the sole safeguard. Drawing on European, English and American jurisprudence, the paper proposes that the qualifying clause be amended, that audio-visual recording be made a statutory obligation rather than a judicial condition, and that a consequence in evidence be attached to breach.

Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) supplies the only lawful route by which a prosecution for offences against the administration of justice, chief among them perjury under Sections 193 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, may be set in motion, and it reserves that power to the court alone; no private litigant may invoke it independently. Read alongside the cognizance bar in Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, the provision strips an aggrieved party of any standalone right to prosecute a false statement, a fabricated document, or a perjured affidavit filed in or connected with judicial proceedings, vesting that authority instead in the very court before which the falsehood is alleged to have been made. Since Section 379 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) reproduces Section 340 in near-identical form and has applied from 1 July 2024, both provisions now operate side by side during the transition between the two codes. This article traces the statutory architecture of Section 340 and the twin conditions courts have insisted on before invoking it, a prima facie finding of deliberate, material falsehood coupled with genuine “expediency in the interest of justice”, from Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam in 1971, through the Constitution Bench’s guidance in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah in 2005, to the three-judge resolution of the preliminary-inquiry question in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh in 2022. It then turns to the provision’s growing footprint in matrimonial litigation, particularly maintenance proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, where affidavits on income, employment and assets are routinely contested, and surveys recent authority, including a 2026 Supreme Court ruling distinguishing a merely “wrong” statement from one that is criminally “false”, that together sanctions Section 340 against calculated concealment while cautioning against its use as a tactic for delay or harassment. The article concludes that Section 340 functions, and should continue to function, as a measured safeguard for the integrity of the judicial record: a shield, not a weapon to be unsheathed in every contested matrimonial claim.

The paper explores how the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) of the Constitution of India, despite being non-enforceable or non-justiciable under Article 37, have been gradually elevated and transformed into core constitutional principles through judicial rulings and interpretation, using instruments such as Public Interest Litigation, judicial review and the expansive reading of constitutional provisions, notably Article 21. Through judicial activism these changes have made the Directive Principles the constitutional conscience of human rights, profoundly influencing and broadening the scope of the Fundamental Rights (Part III) in general and the philosophy of the Indian Constitution in particular. The study adopts a doctrinal and analytical method to trace the evolution of the Directive Principles from the early judicial insistence that Fundamental Rights must prevail whenever the two conflict, through the doctrine of harmonious construction and the basic structure doctrine, to the expansive interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution that strikes a harmonious balance between individual liberty and socio-economic welfare. The findings show how the Directive Principles serve the courts as a code of interpretation for reading Fundamental Rights, and how this interpretation has allowed the courts to give substantive content to the “right to life” under Article 21, including livelihood, education, health, environment and legal aid. The paper thus examines the original intent of the framers, the key judicial decisions on the question of superiority between Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles), and the extent and limits of judicial activism in this field, and concludes with recommendations for strengthening the constitutional promise that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles should remain, as the Supreme Court has said, “like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other”.

Performers occupy a distinctive position within the copyright system. They may not be the authors of the underlying literary, dramatic or musical works, yet their skill, interpretation and personality are essential to the communication of creative works to the public. Indian copyright law recognises this contribution through the statutory category of “performer’s right”. This paper examines the significance of performer’s rights under the Copyright Act, 1957, with particular attention to sections 2(q), 2(qq), 38, 38A, 38B and 39. It traces the development of performer protection, considers the changes introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 and the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, and evaluates the relationship between performer’s rights and copyright in underlying works, sound recordings and cinematograph films. The paper also considers Indian judicial treatment, including Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, the Indian Singers Rights Association litigation concerning studio performances, and the Delhi High Court’s 2025 decision in A.R. Rahman v. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar. International developments under the Rome Convention, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the Beijing Treaty provide a comparative framework. The paper argues that the statutory framework has substantially strengthened the legal position of performers, while digital exploitation, contractual bargaining, attribution, remuneration and cross-border uses continue to raise practical questions. The paper concludes with suggestions aimed at improving awareness, contractual transparency, collective management and effective enforcement.

Forensic science plays a significant role in modern criminal investigations by applying scientific methods to the identification, collection, preservation and analysis of evidence. Forensic evidence assists investigating agencies in reconstructing crime scenes, identifying suspects, establishing connections between individuals and criminal activities, and presenting scientific findings before courts of law. Evidence such as DNA profiles, fingerprints, bloodstain patterns and digital records can contribute to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. However, the reliability of forensic evidence depends on proper collection procedures, preservation of evidentiary integrity, scientifically valid examination techniques and impartial interpretation of results. Contamination, inadequate laboratory facilities, incorrect interpretation and weaknesses in maintaining the chain of custody may affect the evidentiary value of forensic findings. In India, forensic evidence must also be evaluated within the framework of applicable criminal procedure and evidence law, particularly the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. This article examines the importance of forensic evidence in criminal investigations, its major forms, its evidentiary value, and the legal and practical challenges associated with its use. It argues that forensic science can strengthen the administration of criminal justice when supported by scientific reliability, procedural safeguards, expert accountability and judicial scrutiny.

The proliferation of predictive analytics and machine-learning systems has transformed decision-making across banking, insurance, healthcare, employment, policing, welfare administration, education and advertising in India. Algorithms no longer merely inform human choices; with increasing frequency they determine outcomes that affect individuals’ rights, livelihoods and opportunities. This transformation has produced what is commonly described as the “black box” problem: decisions are generated through processes that are technically complex, commercially proprietary and cognitively opaque, leaving affected persons unable to understand, contest or seek redress against them. Algorithmic systems trained on historical data further risk reproducing and amplifying existing patterns of discrimination against already disadvantaged groups. India’s existing legal architecture, anchored principally in the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, offers meaningful safeguards for the processing of personal data but does not comprehensively regulate the algorithmic decisions that such data ultimately produces. Constitutional guarantees of equality and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 and of privacy, dignity and personal liberty under Article 21 supply an important normative foundation for extending accountability beyond data governance. This paper undertakes a doctrinal examination of algorithmic accountability in India through the interconnected lenses of privacy, equality, transparency, explainability, human oversight and effective remedy, and identifies significant regulatory gaps in the current framework. It concludes by proposing a rights-based, risk-sensitive and lifecycle-oriented framework for algorithmic accountability grounded in Indian constitutional principles rather than transplanted wholesale from foreign models.

The conflict in the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi presents one of the most complex constitutional challenges to contemporary Indian federalism. At its core lies a fundamental question: does executive authority over the administrative machinery rest with the democratically elected local government, or with the Union acting through its appointed Lieutenant Governor (LG)? Under Article 239AA of the Constitution of India, Delhi’s sui generis, hybrid framework grants legislative powers to an elected assembly while preserving overarching parliamentary supremacy and central control over key domains such as public order, police and land. This structural asymmetry has generated a persistent power struggle, particularly when different political parties control the Union and the Delhi government. The Supreme Court of India sought to resolve this institutional friction through two landmark decisions: the 2018 Constitution Bench judgment, which established that the LG must ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and the 2023 judgment, which expressly extended the elected government’s control to administrative services. By introducing the triple chain of accountability, linking civil servants to ministers, ministers to the legislature and the legislature to the electorate, the Court attempted to operationalise the principles of representative democracy and cooperative federalism. However, an Ordinance promulgated within days of the judgment, and the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2023 that replaced it, effectively neutralised the judgment, re-establishing central dominance over the civil services through the LG and the National Capital Civil Service Authority. The paper critically examines the Delhi services dispute and argues that, while the Supreme Court articulated compelling normative principles, its intervention ultimately failed to resolve the systemic flaw at the heart of Delhi’s governance. The analysis proceeds through four themes: structural failure, adversarial reality, institutional vulnerability and administrative limbo.

The four Labour Codes were introduced to simplify India’s complex labour-law system and to create a unified framework for workers and employers. The Codes on Wages, Industrial Relations, Social Security, and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions consolidate 29 central labour laws in order to modernise regulation and extend protection to India’s workforce, about 90 per cent of which is informally employed and which includes gig workers. The reforms also respond to challenges highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these goals, implementation has been delayed and varies across States. This doctrinal study compares the statutory language of the Codes with the antecedent laws and draws on evidence from the ILO and national think tanks. It identifies the key challenges: delayed notification of state rules, weak Centre–State coordination, limited administrative capacity and few trained officials, inadequate digital infrastructure, and difficulty in registering and covering informal workers. The paper recommends phased, coordinated implementation: timely notification of state rules, clear administrative guidelines, capacity building and investment in labour departments, better digital and offline support for registration and the delivery of benefits, stakeholder consultation, awareness campaigns in regional languages, targeted assistance for small enterprises, stronger Centre–State coordination, effective monitoring and evaluation, and continuous training for labour officials.

Custodial death is among the gravest manifestations of state power exercised without legal restraint, because a person who enters police custody remains under the direct control of public authorities responsible for protecting life, dignity and bodily integrity. In India, constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 21 and 22, statutory safeguards governing arrest and custody, judicial directions, and National Human Rights Commission mechanisms seek to prevent custodial torture, unlawful detention and custodial deaths. Yet recurring allegations of physical violence, coercive interrogation, denial of medical care, fabricated records, delayed reporting and inadequate investigation demonstrate continuing challenges in translating safeguards into effective protection. This paper critically examines custodial deaths and human rights violations occurring in police stations from constitutional, statutory, evidentiary and institutional perspectives. It analyses the preventive safeguards developed through Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh. It also considers the procedural framework under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the evidentiary framework under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and the role of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and NHRC guidelines. The study adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial decisions, official guidelines and secondary literature. It argues that prevention requires more than post-death compensation or disciplinary action. Effective accountability depends upon independent investigation, functioning audio-video surveillance, preservation of digital and medical evidence, prompt magisterial inquiry, access to counsel and medical examination, institutional oversight, protection of complainants and witnesses, and prosecution where criminal liability is established. The paper proposes a rights-sensitive accountability framework integrating transparency, forensic independence, police reform and judicial supervision.

This paper examines the core standards of investor protection in international investment law, namely fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, most-favoured-nation and national treatment, expropriation, and umbrella clauses. Adopting a doctrinal approach, it argues that the content of these standards cannot be derived from treaty drafting alone. Open-textured clauses acquire practical shape through tribunal reasoning, which has prompted states to recalibrate treaty language. Proceeding standard by standard, the paper maps dominant treaty drafting approaches and traces how tribunals have interpreted them across a representative sample of awards selected for doctrinal salience, forum diversity, and the availability of reasoned decisions. It shows that fair and equitable treatment is the principal site of interpretive divergence, that full protection and security has expanded from physical protection towards legal security, and that the procedural reach of most-favoured-nation clauses remains contested, while expropriation and umbrella-clause doctrine test the boundaries between regulation and takings, and between treaty and contract. Overlap among standards emerges as a systemic feature of investor-state dispute settlement: a single measure may be pleaded under several standards, affecting thresholds of breach, standards of review and remedies, and risking double counting. Deference varies, inconsistency often reflects methodological variation more than disagreement over outcomes, and treaty practice is responding through calibrated drafting, closed lists, carve-outs, annexes and procedural filters. The paper concludes that the standards show partial convergence on rule-of-law principles such as legality, non-arbitrariness, due process and non-discrimination, alongside persistent fragmentation.

The judicial system of the Sikh Empire established by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) is a significant historical model of decentralised justice that may inform current judicial reforms in India. This article analyses the features of the judicial system under his rule, its principles and its limitations. The system consisted of panchayats, kardars, nazims, adalats and the Maharaja’s Durbar, with degrees of authority ranging from the lowest to the highest. It rested on legal pluralism, recognising Muslim (Shariat), Hindu and Sikh law as well as local custom. It was also flexible: although corporal punishment was used, the emphasis lay on compensating wrongs rather than punishing them severely. According to the available evidence, the system leaned towards restorative outcomes, making offenders pay fines in place of harsher punishment. In addition, any ordinary person could call on the Maharaja for justice. Nevertheless, the system had several shortcomings, such as the lack of codified law, brutal and summary mutilations, and diverse practices across regions. Its relevance for contemporary reforms in India lies in its capacity to widen access to justice and to empower communities, although issues such as inequality and the absence of rights protection must also be considered.

A historic piece of social welfare legislation, the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 was passed in order to compensate workers who sustain accidents, occupational illnesses, disabilities or fatalities while working. Despite its welfare-oriented goal, many workers still have difficulty obtaining timely and sufficient compensation. The Act’s effective implementation has been significantly undermined by factors such as procedural delays, employee ignorance, employer non-compliance, underreporting of workplace accidents, difficulties in identifying occupational diseases and insufficient enforcement tools. In the unorganised sector, where workers frequently lack access to institutional assistance and legal remedies, these problems are especially severe. By examining the statutory framework, constitutional underpinnings, judicial interpretations and India’s responsibilities under international labour norms, this study critically investigates the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923. In addition to secondary sources such as books, peer-reviewed journals, government reports and academic articles, the study employs a doctrinal research methodology based on the examination of primary sources, such as statutes, constitutional provisions, judicial precedents and international conventions. It also reviews whether the current legislative framework sufficiently meets modern employment realities, such as occupational health concerns and the expanding gig economy, as well as the practical obstacles that keep workers from collecting timely compensation. The study concludes that although the Act upholds the values of social justice and labour welfare, its goals can only be achieved through stricter enforcement, streamlined claim processes, increased institutional accountability, better legal knowledge and legislative changes that guarantee timely and efficient compensation for all qualified employees.

The modern business world is changing rapidly with the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) and predictive analytics. Earlier, businesses depended mainly on past data to understand what had already happened. Today, AI and analytics help organizations predict future situations and make better decisions based on available data. This change has given rise to the idea of “augmented intelligence”, in which AI works together with people to support their decisions instead of replacing them. This paper studies how the use of AI and predictive analytics is affecting businesses and the way managers make decisions. It focuses on the use of AI in daily work, the automation of routine tasks, access to analytical tools and the changing role of human judgment in decision-making. A survey of 35 management professionals (N = 35) was conducted to understand their practical experience of AI and analytics in the workplace. The results show that AI is already being used in many professional roles: about 88.6% of respondents said that their work involves both AI and analytics, and 82.9% said that AI has significantly reduced their workload.

Prenuptial agreements occupy an ambiguous position in Indian law. No specific legislation governs their formation, validity or enforcement, and their status must be determined by reference to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which renders void agreements whose object or consideration is opposed to public policy. Early cases such as Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh and Krishna Aiyar v. Balammal reflect a near-complete judicial refusal to enforce agreements that interfered with cohabitation or conjugal rights, or that facilitated separation, because these were treated as core incidents of marriage that could not be recast by anticipatory bargain. Indian courts have nonetheless been more accommodating towards postnuptial settlements, mediated financial arrangements and transparent financial planning, suggesting that the judicial stance is one of differentiated, rather than absolute, non-recognition. This paper submits that provisions on property division, maintenance and the relinquishment of future rights should be assessed under both contract law and matrimonial law, and that a blanket waiver of maintenance should not take precedence over the court’s statutory oversight. It advances a fairness-based model of limited recognition grounded in free consent, independent legal advice, full financial disclosure and judicial review at the stage of enforcement, and proposes that prenuptial practice, including in NRI and cross-border marriages, be given certainty through incremental judicial recognition and express legislation.

Efficient disclosure methods ensure that investors obtain precise, prompt and thorough information about the financial status, governance framework and operational activities of companies. In India, corporate transparency and disclosure obligations secure accountability through mandatory reporting under the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. These rules promote investor trust by requiring timely financial statements, annual reporting, a governance framework and ESG disclosures. This paper examines the legal provisions governing corporate disclosure in India under the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, and assesses the role of the Securities and Exchange Board of India in promoting transparency and safeguarding investors. It offers an examination of investor protection, corporate responsibility and transparency in the Indian capital markets, analyses the extent to which corporate disclosure practices protect investors' interests and enhance market transparency, and identifies issues and gaps in the existing disclosure system. The research also examines the effects of insufficient disclosure on investor trust.

The underground coal mine fires in the Jharia Coalfield of Dhanbad, Jharkhand, constitute one of India’s longest-running environmental and humanitarian crises. Burning continuously for over a century, these fires have caused extensive environmental degradation, air pollution, land subsidence, destruction of valuable coal reserves, and widespread displacement of local communities. Continuous exposure to toxic gases and particulate matter has resulted in serious public health concerns, including respiratory diseases, cardiovascular disorders, and other chronic illnesses, thereby threatening the fundamental right to life and a healthy environment guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Although several central enactments, including the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, and the Mines Act, 1952, provide a general framework for environmental protection and mining regulation, they do not adequately address the unique challenges posed by underground coal mine fires. This article critically examines the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Union and the State Governments in preventing mine fires, protecting public health, ensuring environmental restoration, and rehabilitating affected communities. It argues that the absence of a comprehensive state-specific legal framework has contributed to fragmented governance and ineffective implementation of existing policies. The article proposes the enactment of a dedicated Jharkhand Underground Coal Mine Fire Prevention, Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection Act, establishing an independent statutory authority for fire prevention, environmental monitoring, scientific risk assessment, rehabilitation, compensation, and inter-agency coordination. Adopting a doctrinal research methodology based on constitutional provisions, statutory analysis, judicial precedents, government reports, and secondary literature, the article concludes that comprehensive state legislation is essential to uphold environmental justice, strengthen environmental governance, protect public health, ensure accountable rehabilitation, and secure the rights of present and future generations.

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has become central to the management of the external borders of the European Union because of its increasingly operational capabilities. The broadening of its remit to improve border security and border management is intended to strengthen security and the control of migration, but it has raised concerns about respect for fundamental rights. This paper explores how far Frontex can be held legally liable for breaches of fundamental rights resulting from its activities. It examines the judicial and institutional procedures for holding Frontex accountable and reviews the current accountability framework. The study follows a doctrinal legal approach grounded in EU primary and secondary law, case law, institutional documents, scholarly work and human-rights reports. The paper finds that significant accountability challenges remain, given the distribution of responsibility between Frontex and the Member States, problems of attribution and causation, the limited availability of judicial remedies and the limited capacity of internal and external oversight mechanisms to secure compliance. The recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the non-contractual liability of Frontex is discussed in particular. The paper concludes with recommendations for legal and institutional reform to improve EU border management, focusing on stronger oversight, access to justice, the sharing of evidence and the effective protection of fundamental rights.

Between December 2024 and July 2026, Indian tribunals and trial courts relied on judicial precedents that did not exist, generated by a large language model and accepted without verification; in one instance, a High Court that itself recognised such a fabrication on revision nonetheless declined to treat it as fatal to the outcome. The pattern culminated in Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd., where the Supreme Court set aside a National Company Law Tribunal order and its confirmation in appeal, both resting on fabricated precedents, and declared that citing AI-generated authorities without verification is professional misconduct. This paper argues that the Supreme Court’s response, while doctrinally significant, has so far declared a duty of verification without defining its content: it does not specify what verification requires, against which sources, how it should be documented, or how responsibility should be apportioned between an Advocate-on-Record, briefing counsel, and the junior associates who typically conduct the underlying research. The paper traces the existing architecture of the advocate’s professional obligations under Sections 35 and 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India’s Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, and shows that this architecture, framed before generative artificial intelligence existed, supplies only generalised duties of diligence and candour rather than a specific, source-anchored protocol. Drawing on the doctrinal lineage from Gummadi Usha Rani v. Sure Mallikarjuna Rao through Pooja Ramesh Singh, on the Supreme Court’s draft Regulations for Use of AI in Courts, 2026, and on comparative practice under Mata v. Avianca, Inc. in the United States, the paper proposes a tiered, source-anchored verification standard, keyed to source authoritativeness, procedural stage, and research-responsibility allocation within a legal team, capable of catching fabricated authorities before a judge relies on them rather than after an entire tier of appeal already has.

This paper addresses a critical gap in the application of proportionality doctrine to state surveillance in Indian constitutional law. The Puttaswamy decisions of the Supreme Court establish that any state invasion of privacy must satisfy the necessity requirement, meaning that the measures employed must constitute the least restrictive means available to achieve the legitimate constitutional objective. Yet Indian courts have generally treated state assertions of investigative necessity as self-evident once the objective is deemed legitimate, whilst dismissing citizens' claims regarding chilling effects as unsubstantiated rhetoric unsupported by empirical proof. This asymmetry reflects not reasoned constitutional judgment but rather a structural inequality in evidentiary access and burden of proof. The foundational problem is institutional. The Indian surveillance framework, operating under Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules 1951 and the newly notified Telecommunications (Procedures and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024, does not require notification of individuals whose communications are intercepted. A person who does not know that they have been surveilled cannot establish that they have been injured, cannot secure standing for a constitutional challenge, and cannot produce evidence of behavioural inhibition or chilling effects. The evidentiary burden is thus distributed impossibly: the state escapes all obligation to demonstrate necessity whilst citizens face a structural impossibility in proving chill. A substantial empirical literature on surveillance chilling effects exists internationally, with foundational work by Jonathon Penney on Wikipedia use, Elizabeth Stoycheff on social media expression, and Moritz Büchi on the mechanisms through which dataveillance triggers inhibition. Yet virtually no empirical research on chilling effects exists within the Indian context, and Indian courts have not developed mechanisms for admitting social science evidence within proportionality adjudication. Drawing on German constitutional jurisprudence and on the European Court of Human Rights' decisions in Klass and Others v. Germany and Roman Zakharov v. Russia, this paper proposes that notification be reconceptualised as an evidentiary precondition of proportionality review, not merely as a remedy. The paper concludes by proposing institutional reforms through which chilling effects might be constituted as justiciable constitutional facts.

Sexual harassment at the workplace is a serious violation of equality, dignity, personal liberty and the right to pursue employment in a safe environment. In India, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, commonly known as the POSH Act, transformed the constitutional principles developed in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan into a statutory framework for prevention, prohibition and redressal. The legislation establishes institutional mechanisms, particularly Internal Committees and Local Committees, prescribes complaint and inquiry procedures, imposes duties upon employers, and provides safeguards concerning confidentiality, interim relief and remedies. This paper critically examines workplace sexual harassment from constitutional, statutory, procedural and institutional perspectives. It traces the development of the legal framework from Vishaka and subsequent judicial decisions to the enactment of the POSH Act. Particular attention is given to the statutory definition of sexual harassment, the meaning of workplace, the constitution and functioning of Internal Committees, complaint procedures, inquiry standards, employer responsibilities, confidentiality, victim protection and available remedies. The study also considers the judicial developments in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India and Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, which emphasised effective implementation and institutional compliance. The research adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial decisions, statutory rules and official materials. It argues that the effectiveness of the POSH framework depends not merely upon constituting committees, but upon their independence, competence, accessibility, procedural fairness and institutional accountability. The paper proposes stronger training, transparent committee functioning, secure complaint mechanisms, timely inquiries, protection against retaliation, periodic audits and meaningful enforcement, so that the statutory promise of a safe and dignified workplace becomes an effective reality for women across Indian workplaces.

The Regulation on Artificial Intelligence, commonly known as the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, entered into force in August 2024 and has since been applying to companies in stages that stretch from February 2025 through December 2027 and beyond. This staggered timetable, compounded by a Digital Omnibus agreement that has already pushed back the deadline for full compliance with the rules governing stand-alone high-risk systems from August 2026 to December 2027, has left many companies uncertain about precisely what is required of them and by when. This article examines the compliance gaps that have opened between the obligations the Act imposes on providers, deployers, importers and distributors of artificial intelligence systems and what companies operating in or serving the European Union have actually implemented. Drawing on the regulatory text itself, recent readiness research indicating that a large majority of enterprises still lack a basic inventory of the artificial intelligence systems they use, and the professional and academic commentary that has followed the Act’s phased rollout, the article traces gaps across five domains, namely the identification and risk classification of artificial intelligence systems, data governance and algorithmic bias, documentation and traceability, human oversight and artificial intelligence literacy, and post-market monitoring. The article concludes with a set of recommendations organized around enterprise-wide risk mapping, contractual allocation of responsibility across the artificial intelligence supply chain, and integrated board-level governance, intended to help companies close the gap between what the Act requires and what most organizations have so far put in place.

The evolution of warfare and international criminality has increasingly moved into cyberspace, where state and non-state actors alike now possess the capability to inflict harm equivalent to that of traditional atrocity crimes: disabling hospital systems, crippling energy grids or destroying civilian infrastructure through purely digital means. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, was drafted in an era of kinetic warfare and did not contemplate cyber conduct explicitly. Yet its framers drafted the instrument’s core provisions, such as individual criminal responsibility, command and superior responsibility and the mental element, in technology-neutral terms capable, in principle, of extending to new means of commission. The Office of the Prosecutor’s December 2025 Policy on Cyber-Enabled Crimes under the Rome Statute is the first formal confirmation by an international prosecuting authority that existing doctrine can be applied to cyberspace, covering conduct ranging from state-directed cyber units to hacktivist collectives and criminal proxies. Despite this doctrinal clarification, international criminal law faces a stark enforcement reality: no individual has yet been convicted by an international tribunal for a cyber-enabled international crime. This gap persists even as both state-sponsored and non-state cyber actors operate with increasing frequency. The paper distinguishes state from non-state cyber actors through the effective control test, the overall control test and the approach of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, and develops a multi-factor approach to cyber attribution built on factors such as institutional or organisational nexus, direction and control, object and target selection, and technical or forensic indicators. It argues that while the Rome Statute’s liability doctrine is formally actor-neutral, its practical application diverges sharply between state and non-state cyber actors, driven by attribution difficulties and the non-membership of major cyber powers. It further examines how national courts, operating through both domestic criminal statutes and universal jurisdiction, are structurally better positioned than the ICC to close this accountability gap for both types of actor.

In a rapidly advancing technological era, there is an urgent need to address how Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be integrated into India’s overloaded courts without forgoing constitutional safeguards. To that end, this article surveys and analyses thirty years of the development of AI in the legal field, empirical research on bias and public confidence, and the regimes of the United States, China and Europe, in order to identify the gaps in explainability, accountability and doctrinal congruence. Anchored in Articles 14 and 21, the doctrine of the separation of powers, and judicial review under Articles 32 and 226, the article presents the ANCHOR (Accountability, Non-delegation, Constitutional conformity, Human Oversight, and Review) Guidelines to govern AI as a co-judge and not a surrogate. ANCHOR requires a risk-based liability framework, mandatory explainability requirements, periodic bias audits and effective human-override procedures. To test the framework, the article sets out a pilot in three diverse courts, with metrics on case resolution rates, judge-AI agreement and litigant confidence. By combining constitutional theory with a clear roadmap for implementation, the work offers a feasible, rights-upholding template for the use of AI in Indian courts.

The rapid expansion of gig and platform-based services in India has created legal challenges for the protection of the workers who provide them. Although platforms treat gig workers as independent contractors, most such workers are economically dependent on a single platform for their livelihood. In practice, platforms exercise significant control over the way work is done, using algorithms to allocate tasks, determine payments, monitor performance through rating systems, and suspend or deactivate accounts without due process. Despite this level of control, the Indian legal framework recognises nothing beyond the binary of a contract of service (employer and employee) and a contract for service (employer and independent contractor), which excludes the realities of platform workers. This paper argues that the current legal framework does not adequately address the employment status of gig workers and identifies five major weaknesses. (1) The Code on Social Security, 2020 introduces the categories of “gig worker” and “platform worker” but does not extend to them the protections available to conventional employees. (2) The traditional judicial tests used to determine employment relationships, such as control, integration and economic dependence, were developed for conventional workplaces and not for algorithmic ones. (3) Workers face serious barriers in proving the extent of platform control because national labour law gives them no right to access the data or to challenge account deactivations. (4) The implementation of the new Labour Codes remains incomplete, limiting their practical effectiveness. (5) Existing workplace harassment legislation does not clearly establish whether platform workers are entitled to its protection. The paper also examines developments in the United Kingdom, California and the European Union to identify possible reforms. Drawing on these comparative approaches, it proposes that platform workers be treated as employees unless the platform can demonstrate genuine independent-contractor status. It further recommends statutory rights to algorithmic transparency, meaningful explanations for automated decisions and accessible review mechanisms, to secure accountability and protection within the platform economy.

Age verification is a long-standing challenge in Indian sports, especially in age-group competitions where fairness and equal opportunity are essential. India currently follows the National Code Against Age Fraud in Sports, which relies mainly on dental and radiological examinations to determine an athlete’s chronological age. However, these methods do not consider variations in biological age, which can differ significantly due to nutrition, training exposure, genetics and socio-economic background. As a result, many young athletes face incorrect classification, unfair exclusion and unequal competition environments. In contrast, several international sports bodies have adopted more scientific and athlete-centred approaches. FIFA employs MRI-based wrist assessment to evaluate bone maturity in U-17 tournaments, while countries in Europe and East Asia integrate skeletal maturity indicators, growth-tracking data and long-term athlete development (LTAD) models. These systems acknowledge that two athletes of the same chronological age may not share the same physiological development, and therefore provide a more accurate and welfare-oriented assessment process. This study uses a comparative legal and policy analysis approach to examine India’s current age-verification framework alongside global best practices. It argues that accurate age assessment is essential not only for competition integrity, a key component of clean sport, but also for athlete safety, as biologically younger athletes may face increased physical and psychological risks when competing against more mature peers. The paper proposes adopting a phased, multi-factor assessment model for India that includes bone maturity tests, growth-monitoring mechanisms and standardised medical guidelines supported by sports science. Such reforms would reduce disputes, improve transparency and promote athlete welfare. The study concludes that modernising India’s age-verification system in line with international standards is vital for strengthening fairness, safeguarding young athletes and advancing the broader goals of clean and safe sport in the country.

Artificial intelligence (AI), long a theme of science fiction, is now reshaping the landscape of medicine, and organ and tissue donation has not been left untouched. This study undertakes an empirical and jurisprudential analysis of the role that AI presently plays in India’s organ and tissue donation system, and of the performance it has shown, drawing on clinical studies, governance instruments and judicial pronouncements. It examines AI applications in five principal domains: the identification of potential deceased donors in intensive care units; intelligent organ and tissue matching and allocation; predictive modelling of graft survival and post-transplant outcomes; public engagement and consent facilitation; and AI-guided machine perfusion technologies. The paper maps these applications onto India’s existing legal framework: the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (renamed the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act on its amendment in 2011), the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000 and India’s AI Governance Guidelines of 2025. It identifies critical legal gaps arising from the absence of AI-specific rules and regulation in the healthcare system, deficiencies in algorithmic accountability under THOTA, and data-sovereignty concerns that arise when clinical transplant data cross institutional and state boundaries. The paper concludes that India’s aspiration to become a global leader in the transplantation of human organs and tissues, reflected in the growth of transplants between 2013 and 2025, can be advanced with the help of AI applications.

Collective bargaining is a fundamental pillar of industrial relations and an essential mechanism for promoting industrial peace, protecting workers’ rights and fostering harmonious employer–employee relationships. Through collective negotiation, employers and employees can resolve workplace disputes, determine fair wages and working conditions, and enhance productivity while minimising industrial conflict. Despite its recognised significance, collective bargaining remains limited in practice in many workplaces, particularly in developing economies such as India. This paper examines the major barriers that hinder the effective functioning of collective bargaining, including weak trade unions, the multiplicity of unions, the lack of union recognition, employer resistance, political interference, inadequate legal enforcement, the growth of informal and gig employment, and changing economic and technological conditions. These challenges weaken the bargaining process and reduce its ability to ensure equitable labour relations and sustainable industrial peace. The study further explores legal provisions, judicial developments, international labour standards and comparative practices from selected countries to assess the effectiveness of different models of collective bargaining. On the basis of this analysis, the paper proposes practical strategies to strengthen collective bargaining, including legal and institutional reforms, recognition of representative trade unions, promotion of good-faith bargaining, capacity building for employers and employees, extension of collective bargaining coverage to informal and gig workers, and greater emphasis on social dialogue and tripartite cooperation. Adopting a doctrinal and analytical methodology, the paper relies on statutes, judicial precedents, academic literature, government reports and International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. It concludes that strengthening collective bargaining is essential not only for protecting labour rights but also for improving productivity, reducing industrial disputes and achieving inclusive and sustainable economic development. Effective collective bargaining remains indispensable for balanced industrial relations and long-term industrial peace in a rapidly evolving world of work.

This paper examines the intersection of gender justice and sustainable development in the global context, with specific reference to the concept of marriage in India. Gender inequality has been a crucial social issue all over the world for centuries. Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG 5) focuses on achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls. SDG 5 aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls, ensuring their equal access to education, healthcare, economic resources and political participation. Gender equality is a crucial aspect of the broader 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and achieving it is therefore vital for sustainable development. It entails a commitment to address the gendered impacts of environmental degradation and to support equitable resource management and the economic empowerment of women, for the benefit of whole communities. Ultimately, integrating gender equity into environmental initiatives produces results that benefit people and the planet, contributing to a more just and sustainable world overall. In India, discriminatory attitudes distinguishing between men and women have existed for generations. The deep-rooted patriarchal family system and customary practices are the major contributors to gender discrimination in India. The institution of marriage, as shaped by patriarchal custom, can operate to deny women the full enjoyment of basic human rights, and girls in many families continue to face discrimination in education, healthcare and equal treatment with boys. Marriage is no doubt essential to family life, but it should not come at the cost of the lives of women, nor should it be a barrier to women’s development. The empowerment of women should begin within the family, enabling them to achieve their full potential and to participate fully in society. The study is primarily theoretical and employs a qualitative methodology. Its objective is to explore the relationship between gender justice and sustainable development by analysing their attributes, viewpoints and interpretations. By integrating the idea of gender justice with that of sustainable development, it seeks to consolidate information that is often scattered or semi-structured. Data are gathered through desk research, descriptive analysis and theoretical observation. The paper underscores the significance of achieving gender justice in the pursuit of sustainable development. It further investigates the correlation between the advancement of sustainable development and the notion of gender justice. Gender justice is not merely a moral imperative but also a catalyst for effective and sustainable development. Gender justice and sustainable development are intrinsically linked; achieving one is crucial to the success of the other. Prioritising women’s rights as human rights calls for collective action, as stewards of the planet, towards a more sustainable, just and equitable world. The paper seeks to enhance existing understanding and stresses the importance of gender justice for achieving effective and sustainable development.

Capital punishment refers to the execution of an offender who has been sentenced to death by a court after conviction for a criminal offence. The debate surrounding capital punishment has existed for centuries, and even in modern law it remains controversial. While some believe that it is a necessary tool to punish heinous crimes and deter potential offenders, others contend that it violates fundamental rights and human rights, since every person, whether a good person or an offender, has a right to live. Capital punishment is a revenge-based punishment that creates a cycle of violence, fails to address the underlying causes of crime and does not contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders. In the Indian context, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 continues to allow the death penalty for certain grave offences. The death penalty rests on two major justifications: the doctrine of the “rarest of rare” case and the theory of deterrence. In developing the doctrine of the “rarest of rare” case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the irreversibility of the death penalty and stated the need for its exceptional and restricted use. It held that the death penalty should be imposed only in “the rarest of rare” cases and indicated certain criteria for imposing it. Despite these criteria and the significance of the doctrine, it has attracted criticism. The theory of deterrence is the other important justification given for capital punishment; to deter is to cause a person to abstain from wrongdoing. The theory aims to prevent future crimes by instilling fear in offenders and potential offenders through severe punishments such as capital punishment. It is essential, however, to examine critically whether capital punishment truly deters crime or whether its deterrent effect is a myth. Capital punishment also raises ethical problems. These include irreversibility, since wrongful convictions cannot be rectified and innocent individuals may be executed, and bias and disproportionality, since marginalised groups, such as the poor, caste minorities, religious minorities, racial minorities and individuals with limited access to legal resources, are disproportionately affected.

The low conviction rate in rape cases has raised numerous questions about the transparency of rape investigation procedures in West Bengal. The pattern by which the police handle a rape case is among the most contested issues in the criminal justice system. This study is accordingly focused on the minute details of the rape investigation procedure as performed by the West Bengal Police. The primary intentions behind rape are also examined through the lens of 110 rape-investigating police personnel. The empirical data were collected from both the Kolkata Police and the West Bengal Police through a specially prepared schedule and in-depth interviews with rape-investigating officers. According to the narratives of the officers, an ambiguity in police performance emerges between law and action during investigation, such as delay in recording the FIR and the deficient role of women police towards victims. Charge sheets in rape cases are nevertheless produced within the stipulated timeframe. A substantial proportion of respondents highlighted that rape is not an isolated crime but is closely associated with murder, kidnapping and dacoity. The inquiry into the hidden factors behind the crime unfolds a significant gendered pattern of perception: male officers point to societal influences, whereas female officers chiefly highlight the individual's involvement in the crime. In sum, female officers emphasise the plausible psychological influences behind the commission of rape, such as sexual perversion and sexual fantasy, whereas male officers cite social grounds such as intoxication, illiteracy and addiction to pornography as motives for rape.

Objective: The main objective of this investigation was to study temperament among children of employed and unemployed mothers. Sample: The sample consisted of 120 children of employed and 120 children of unemployed mothers of Varanasi city, in the age range of 9 to 16 years. Tools: (1) the Multidimensional Personality Inventory for preadolescents (aged 9 to 12 years) and (2) the Multidimensional Personality Inventory for late adolescents (aged 13 to 16 years), developed by the researcher and by Manju Agrawal, were used to collect data. Statistical analysis: The data obtained were analysed using the t-test. Result: The results revealed a significant difference in temperament between children of employed and unemployed mothers.

This paper examines Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (ICTY, Case No. IT-95-17/1; Trial Chamber Judgement of 10 December 1998, Appeals Chamber Judgement of 21 July 2000), which can be regarded as a foundational moment in the development of international criminal law governing wartime sexual violence, torture and military interrogation liability under international humanitarian law (IHL). The case, arising from the conduct of the Croatian Defence Council’s (HVO) specialised unit known as the “Jokers” during the armed conflict in central Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, produced a Trial Chamber judgment of remarkable jurisprudential density. The Tribunal convicted Furundžija of torture as a co-perpetrator and of outrages upon personal dignity, including rape, as an aider and abettor, thereby articulating standards of individual criminal responsibility that would shape the interpretation of the Rome Statute and successive International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisprudence for decades to follow. The thesis advanced is that Furundžija is not merely a sexual-violence case. It is, at its intellectual core, a case about military detention, coercive interrogation, command discipline, the absolute prohibition on torture and the irreducible protection of human dignity in armed conflict. The Chamber’s holding that the prohibition of torture has attained jus cogens status, as an absolute, non-derogable peremptory norm, remains one of the most cited propositions in post-Cold War international criminal jurisprudence.

This article concerns the provisions for the safety and welfare of construction workers under the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (the “OSH Code”) and the Code on Social Security, 2020. It analyses how the law is weighted against workers despite the reforms in the labour laws. It examines the practical aspects of safety and welfare in the construction industry without delving into the often lengthy processes involved in the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The reforms concern themselves only with the procedural aspects of the labour laws and bring nothing substantial to the fore. The article is an impartial attempt at improving labour conditions in general despite the overwhelming power of the State.

Artificial intelligence has moved in a few short years from narrow tools to general-purpose systems that write, reason and act. The people building these systems now speak openly of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and, beyond it, Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). This Article traces that evolution, sets out the present and future threats it poses to human beings, and examines how five Indian statutes (the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) fall short. It proposes specific amendments to each, along with cross-cutting institutional reforms, so that as machines grow more capable, responsibility and control stay with people.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in invention workflows, yet patent systems continue to define inventorship in human terms. The central problem is not whether AI contributes to technical creativity, but whether existing legal doctrines can allocate ownership, responsibility, and evidentiary accountability when inventive processes are distributed across humans and AI systems. Prior scholarship has examined DABUS disputes and personhood debates, but the literature remains fragmented across jurisdictions and often under-specifies operational reform pathways for patent offices and courts. This article addresses that gap through a comparative doctrinal design covering the United States, United Kingdom, European Union/Germany, Australia, South Africa, India, China, and selected emerging jurisdictions. The analysis triangulates statutes, judicial decisions, patent-office guidance, and Scopus-indexed legal scholarship from 2019–2026. The findings show convergence on human-only inventorship, but persistent divergence in disclosure expectations, contribution tests, and evidentiary practices. These divergences produce transparency deficits, cross-border uncertainty, and uneven enforcement risk for multinational portfolios. The article’s original contribution is a six-part harmonized reform model that preserves human-centered inventorship while modernizing AI-contribution disclosure, contribution assessment, evidentiary protocols, interoperability standards, targeted supplementary protection for edge cases, and governance integration. The model is explicitly grounded in an accountability architecture framework that separates legal status from evidentiary governance. This framework offers a practical route to doctrinal stability and policy coherence without requiring full AI legal personhood.

Cyberattacks are often discovered after a delay. A company may first notice an unusual login, a suspicious transaction, an encrypted server, or a customer complaint. At that stage, the organisation may not know whether it has suffered a minor technical fault or a major cyber incident. India’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) Directions of 2022 require service providers, intermediaries, data centres, body corporates, and government organisations to report specified cyber incidents within six hours of noticing them or being brought to notice of them. This paper examines a narrow but important cyber-law issue: the gap between rapid incident reporting and reliable digital forensics. The six-hour rule is intended to make India’s cyber response faster. It allows CERT-In to understand threats, issue warnings, coordinate response, and reduce harm. However, a rushed report may be incomplete or inaccurate, and a rushed response may unintentionally destroy evidence. At the same time, the 180-day log-retention rule may be insufficient for cyber incidents that are discovered months after an attacker first entered a system. The problem becomes more serious where data is stored across cloud services, outsourced vendors, foreign servers, and multiple internal systems. This paper argues that India needs a more structured cyber-incident evidence framework. The law should distinguish between an initial alert and a complete forensic report. It should require preservation of evidence immediately after notice of a suspected incident, standardise the minimum contents of a six-hour report, extend retention for high-risk sectors, clarify the duties of cloud and managed-security vendors, and protect good-faith early reporting from being treated as an admission of legal liability. These reforms would preserve the speed of CERT-In reporting while improving the quality of cyber investigation, victim protection, and criminal prosecution.

This article examines whether the procedural safeguards of the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act can operate effectively in technologically dependent states. Using doctrinal analysis of the Act and comparative public-law materials, it argues that transparency, documentation, logging, human oversight, impact assessment and monitoring presuppose a prior institutional condition: review capacity. Where public authorities depend on external vendors to design, operate, maintain or audit AI systems, legal responsibility may remain with the state while practical control lies elsewhere. The resulting accountability gap is examined through the concept of review dependency and through litigation concerning automated welfare administration and a hypothetical digital-identity example. The article argues that inadequate review capacity may produce a de facto ex parte form of administration, in which affected persons cannot meaningfully answer the technical assessment underlying a decision. Drawing on audi alteram partem, it proposes a risk-calibrated framework of notice, explanation, competent human review, contestability and institutional supervision. Informed, withdrawable consent has a role where participation is genuinely voluntary; mandatory public functions require effective procedural safeguards independent of individual consent. The central conclusion is that adopting EU-style safeguards requires corresponding legal, technical and institutional capacity to make review effective.

In urban governance, the rapid expansion of informal settlements has become the most pressing human rights challenge. Although the right to life is universally recognised as the supreme and non-derogable human right, millions of slum dwellers continue to experience systemic deprivation arising from inadequate housing, insecure land tenure, limited access to healthcare, unsafe drinking water, unhygienic sanitation, environmental degradation and recurrent forced evictions. All these issues raise a pressing question about the enforcement and protection mechanisms of international human rights law, which requires States parties to give proper effect to the right to life, to refrain from arbitrary deprivation, and to take positive measures securing the minimum conditions for a life lived with dignity. This article focuses on protecting slum dwellers’ right to life and examines the scope of State obligations as it relates to international human rights law. Using a qualitative doctrinal and comparative methodology, it analyses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the interpretative jurisprudence of United Nations treaty-monitoring bodies, alongside the doctrines of positive obligations, progressive realisation, minimum core obligations, and procedural safeguards against forced eviction. It further evaluates comparative constitutional jurisprudence from Bangladesh, India, and South Africa to illustrate judicial recognition of the interdependence between the right to life and socio-economic rights. The article argues that the contemporary right to life extends beyond protection against arbitrary killing and imposes enforceable obligations on States to address structural conditions threatening survival and dignity. Those obligations extend to legislative, administrative, judicial and policy responses to housing conditions, environmental hazards and the absence of basic necessities, so that foreseeable threats to life are met. In conclusion, it argues that, for slum dwellers, effective implementation of a rights-based approach founded on the rule of law, equality, accountability and non-discrimination must be ensured, so that the right to life is enjoyed not merely as a right to survive but as a right to live with dignity.

India’s recurring building collapses expose a regulatory paradox: an elaborate body of technical standards coexists with a certification system that cannot reliably demonstrate whether a building was safely designed, constructed, altered and maintained. This article evaluates structural safety certification as a problem of public law and regulatory governance rather than a narrow engineering formality. Using doctrinal analysis of constitutional allocations, municipal legislation, the National Building Code, model bye-laws, disaster-management law, real-estate regulation and leading judicial decisions, it identifies three structural defects. First, regulatory fragmentation disperses authority among the Union, States, urban local bodies, development authorities, fire services, disaster-management institutions and professional actors without establishing an accountable lead regulator or a continuous building-safety record. Secondly, institutional responsibility is diluted by self-certification, conflicted professional appointments, opaque empanelment and weak allocation of duties among owners, promoters, architects, structural engineers and public officials. Thirdly, enforcement remains episodic and approval-centred: scrutiny is strongest at plan sanction and completion, while material substitutions, unauthorised additions, change of use, deterioration and post-occupancy risks frequently escape systematic inspection. The article argues that legal validity should not be confused with structural assurance. A certificate based on fragmented inputs and unverifiable records transfers risk to occupants, purchasers, lenders and municipalities instead of governing it. It proposes a risk-based lifecycle framework built on statutory duty-holders, independent third-party review for higher-risk buildings, stage-linked digital certification, a durable “golden thread” of structural information, periodic assessment triggered by age and risk, public disclosure, protected reporting, calibrated sanctions and clear municipal oversight. It further contends that certification reform should be integrated with RERA disclosures, conveyancing, insurance and property valuation so that safety information affects market decisions before failure occurs. A cooperative federal model can preserve local legislative competence while establishing nationally consistent minimum outcomes, data standards and professional accountability. Such reform would convert certification from a one-time permission ritual into an auditable chain of responsibility, improve the legitimacy of enforcement and give practical content to the constitutional protection of life, shelter and safe urban governance. The article concludes that credible certification must function simultaneously as a technical assurance, a public-law record and an information mechanism for safer urban property markets.

Building failures reveal not merely defective materials or design, but failures of governance: dispersed responsibility, unreliable certification, incomplete information and enforcement that arrives after occupation or disaster. This article compares building safety governance in India and the United Kingdom, while recognising that the United Kingdom contains devolved regimes and using England’s post-Grenfell framework as the principal comparator. Through doctrinal and functional analysis of legislation, technical codes, regulatory institutions, inquiry findings and judicial decisions, it evaluates three linked dimensions: accountability, certification and enforcement across the building lifecycle. India possesses technical knowledge in the National Building Code, model bye-laws, municipal legislation, disaster-management law and real-estate regulation. Yet these instruments operate through uneven State and local incorporation, fragmented agency mandates and dependence on professional self-certification. Responsibility is frequently concentrated at approval and completion, while changes during construction, occupation-stage deterioration and unauthorised alterations escape a continuous assurance system. England’s Building Safety Act 2022 responds to comparable problems by creating a national Building Safety Regulator, statutory duty-holders, gateways for higher-risk buildings, accountable persons during occupation, competence requirements, mandatory occurrence reporting and a digital golden thread of information. Its model nevertheless remains complex, resource-intensive and limited by building classification, transitional disputes and institutional capacity. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland further demonstrate that “United Kingdom regulation” is not uniform. The article argues that the English model should not be transplanted wholesale into India. Its transferable insight is institutional, not merely technical: safety requires an auditable chain connecting named actors, controlled design changes, verified completion information, occupied-building duties and credible sanctions. India should adopt nationally consistent minimum outcomes through cooperative federalism, while States retain legislative authority and municipalities implement risk-sensitive controls. The proposed reforms include a statutory duty-holder framework, independent review of higher-risk projects, interoperable digital building records, periodic and event-triggered assessment, professional competence registers, resident-accessible safety information and performance-based oversight of local authorities. The comparison concludes that certification has public value only when it records verified compliance within a continuing regulatory process. A certificate cannot compensate for weak inspection, divided responsibility or missing evidence. Effective governance must make safety responsibility visible before failure, enforceable during construction and continuous throughout occupation.

This article examines how Indian company law regulates the compulsory removal of minority shareholders and whether the existing safeguards secure a fair exit. It argues that squeeze-outs are legitimate and often commercially useful, but that their fairness depends on the process by which the minority is removed, particularly valuation, disclosure and tribunal oversight. Using a doctrinal method, the article analyses the statutory routes under sections 66, 235 and 236 of the Companies Act, 2013, the associated valuation rules, and the judicial approach in leading decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, including the Supreme Court’s March 2026 ruling on selective capital reduction. It then compares the Indian position with the squeeze-out and sell-out regimes of the United Kingdom and the European Union and with the appraisal remedy under Delaware law. The article finds that Indian law has moved beyond a simple majority-versus-minority model, but that its safeguards are dispersed across different provisions with uneven standards of valuation, disclosure and review, so that the protection a minority receives depends heavily on the route the controlling shareholder chooses. It concludes that India should not prohibit squeeze-outs, but should consolidate minority protection through independent and transparent valuation, meaningful disclosure of valuation methodology, a majority-of-the-minority safeguard, a dedicated valuation-challenge mechanism, stronger sell-out rights and continued substantive judicial scrutiny.

One Nation, One Election (ONOE) is commonly defended as an administrative reform capable of reducing electoral expenditure, limiting recurrent enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, and enabling governments to concentrate on policy. That account, however, treats synchronisation as a problem of calendars while understating its deeper constitutional consequence: a common electoral cycle can survive only if the ordinary relationship between legislative confidence, executive tenure and dissolution is redesigned. This paper examines that redesign through the competing values of stability and accountability. It argues that neither value is constitutionally complete in isolation. Stability without continuing responsibility risks insulating an executive that has lost representative legitimacy; accountability without institutional continuity may allow strategic defections, opportunistic alliances and repeated dissolutions to exhaust democratic government. The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024 addresses premature dissolution by giving a newly elected House only the unexpired portion of the common term. Although this preserves the calendar, it may produce unequal mandates, abbreviated elections and incentives to manipulate the timing of governmental collapse. By contrast, a constructive vote of no confidence can preserve continuity by requiring those who remove a ministry simultaneously to demonstrate an alternative majority. Yet an unqualified constructive-vote model may entrench minority governments, weaken opposition scrutiny and transfer excessive power to party leadership. Drawing upon Indian constitutional text, Supreme Court doctrine, committee proposals and comparative parliamentary practice, this paper develops an accountability-preserving stability model. It proposes a carefully regulated constructive vote, time-bound investiture, transparent floor procedures, rapid adjudication of defection disputes, constrained dissolution, neutral caretaker conventions and federal safeguards. It additionally examines who should bear the democratic costs of governmental failure: representatives unable to construct a majority, constitutional authorities managing a transition, or citizens asked to confer an artificially shortened electoral mandate. The central claim is that ONOE can be constitutionally defensible only if synchronisation remains subordinate to responsible government. Electoral economy cannot become a reason to make governments less removable; nor should every loss of confidence automatically compel an election. The true test of reform is therefore not whether elections occur together, but whether power remains continuously answerable between elections.

The enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 was presented as a break from the Indian Penal Code, including the repeal of Section 124A on sedition. Yet Section 152 of the Sanhita criminalises purposeful or knowing acts that excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, encourage separatist feelings, or endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. This paper examines whether the legislative change amounts to a genuine abolition of sedition or its functional repackaging in constitutional vocabulary. It traces the colonial genealogy of Section 124A, the competing approaches of the Federal Court and the Privy Council, the Constituent Assembly’s rejection of “sedition” as an express restriction on speech, and the Supreme Court’s saving construction in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar. It then analyses the 2022 suspension of Section 124A in S.G. Vombatkere, the recommendations of the Law Commission’s 279th Report, and the architecture of Section 152, including its reference to electronic communication and financial means, its higher alternative punishment, and undefined expressions such as “subversive activities.” The paper evaluates Section 152 under Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 21 through the doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth, proximity, incitement, proportionality and chilling effect. It also studies decisions of various High Courts, together with the pending constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court. The paper argues that Section 152 is not a textual reproduction of sedition: it shifts the protected interest from governmental loyalty to national sovereignty and contains an express mens rea requirement. Nevertheless, unless courts insist upon a direct and proximate nexus with violence, rebellion, secession or a demonstrable threat to national integrity, its broad terminology and process can recreate the constitutional dangers associated with Section 124A. The answer therefore lies less in legislative nomenclature than in constitutional construction, effective safeguards and disciplined enforcement.

Workplace safety is a fundamental aspect of labour rights and sustainable economic development. Despite the existence of comprehensive workplace safety laws, accidents, occupational diseases and unsafe working conditions continue to affect employees across various sectors. This paper examines the major obstacles hindering the effective implementation of workplace safety laws, including inadequate enforcement mechanisms, lack of employer compliance, insufficient employee awareness, limited governmental oversight and resource constraints. It also explores the impact of these challenges on workers’ health, organisational productivity and legal accountability. By analysing existing legal frameworks, judicial decisions, government policies and practical case studies, the paper identifies the gap between legislation and its actual implementation. It further proposes practical solutions such as strengthening inspection systems, enhancing legal awareness through training programmes, adopting digital monitoring technologies, imposing stricter penalties for non-compliance, and encouraging collaboration between employers, employees and regulatory authorities. The paper concludes that effective implementation of workplace safety laws requires a combined approach involving legal reforms, institutional accountability, technological innovation and a culture of workplace safety. Such measures will contribute to safer working environments, improved employee welfare and sustainable industrial growth.

This study explores the relationship between generative artificial intelligence and copyright law in the European Union (EU), focusing on the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) and its interplay with the existing EU copyright acquis. It distinguishes between two questions that are often conflated: whether AI-generated or AI-assisted content deserves copyright protection, and whether the providers and deployers of AI systems that produce such content bear regulatory responsibilities. Applying doctrinal legal research to the AI Act, the study examines the treatment of general-purpose AI models, copyright-compliance policies, training-content summaries, synthetic-content transparency, documentation, institutional supervision and adaptive codes of practice. It also places these obligations alongside the Court of Justice’s originality standard, which has so far been tied to the author’s own intellectual creation expressed through free and creative choices. The study concludes that the EU framework works best in relation to provider accountability, provenance and transparency, but that some important output-side copyright issues remain to be addressed by the existing copyright framework. In that light, it suggests strengthening the links between AI law and copyright law without turning the AI Act into a copyright-specific law.

The obligation to prevent genocide under Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide raises a difficult question of international responsibility: to what extent must a State act when genocide is threatened or committed beyond its own borders? The International Court of Justice’s judgment in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro established that the duty to prevent is a distinct obligation of conduct, governed by a due diligence standard, and triggered once a State knows or should normally have known of a serious risk of genocide. The Court further indicated that this obligation may require a State to use whatever influence it has over actors not under its own authority. Later cases, in particular The Gambia v. Myanmar, reinforced the collective character of the Convention through the doctrine of obligations erga omnes partes, while the pending proceedings in Nicaragua v. Germany have brought fresh attention to what the preventive duty might mean for States that supply military assistance to a State accused of genocide. The analysis examines the scope and the limits of third-State responsibility under Article I. It argues that the duty to prevent is best understood as an extraterritorial, graduated due-diligence obligation whose content should depend on the seriousness of the risk, the State’s actual or constructive knowledge, its capacity to exert influence, and the measures reasonably available to it. At the same time, the existing case law leaves several questions unresolved, including the threshold for a “serious risk”, the degree of influence required before responsibility attaches, the relationship between failure to prevent and complicity, and the role of causation. The paper proposes a four-factor framework, built around knowledge, risk, capacity, and available measures, as a way of giving the preventive obligation clearer content without abandoning the flexibility that has allowed it to apply across very different factual situations.

The right to manage or oversee the exploitation of one’s name, image, likeness or any other aspect of one’s personality is generally known as a personality right. Individual athletes’ rights of publicity also significantly enhance the value of the sports organisations or teams with which they are affiliated. Celebrity opens up opportunities to earn money by promoting brands, creating images or using notoriety as leverage. To prevent their names or likenesses from being exploited by others without their permission, athletes now frequently register them as trademarks; Sachin Tendulkar and David Beckham are among the well-known examples. The goal is to clarify the present legal environment and to offer suggestions for striking a balance between the interests of athletes and OFS operators by examining relevant national and international case law. Furthermore, an examination of international frameworks, especially those of the US and the EU, offers guidance for creating a strong legal framework in India that recognises personality rights. The legal underpinnings and contemporary development of personality rights are examined in this study, with particular attention to their emergence and special uses in the sports sector. The case studies shed light on changing interpretations and safeguards, especially where athletes are involved.

The constitutional history of women’s empowerment in India is marked by a striking tension between legal equality and lived inequality. From the guarantee of equality before law to affirmative measures, political reservation, workplace protection, reproductive autonomy and property rights, the Indian constitutional order has progressively displaced the idea of women as dependants requiring protection with the idea of women as autonomous rights-bearing citizens. Yet formal recognition has not uniformly transformed social power. This paper examines that constitutional gap by tracing the historical movement from nineteenth-century social reform and nationalist participation to post-Constitution legislation and contemporary substantive-equality jurisprudence. It analyses Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21, the Directive Principles, local-government reservations and the evolving judicial rejection of gender stereotypes. Particular attention is paid to decisions concerning sexual harassment, inheritance, intimate choice, reproductive freedom, military service, maternity protection and menstrual dignity. The paper also evaluates recent developments, including the Supreme Court’s 2026 judgments in Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India, Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, Wg. Cdr. Sucheta EDN v. Union of India and Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, which collectively illuminate a constitutional shift from nominal opportunity toward structural and lived equality. Contemporary data, however, reveal a more complicated reality: women’s labour-force participation has improved, but economic participation remains deeply gendered; women constitute nearly half of elected representatives in Panchayati Raj Institutions while remaining substantially underrepresented in Parliament; and violence, unequal care burdens, institutional tokenism and discriminatory social norms continue to limit the practical exercise of constitutional freedoms. The paper argues that the next phase of women’s empowerment cannot be satisfied by enlarging the catalogue of legal rights alone. It requires enforceable institutions, redistribution of unpaid care, economic and property independence, gender-responsive public infrastructure, meaningful political representation, accessible justice and an intersectional understanding of disadvantage. The transition from legal equality to lived equality therefore demands a constitutionalism concerned not merely with whether women possess rights in law, but whether social and institutional conditions enable them to exercise those rights without dependency, stigma, violence, exclusion or disproportionate personal cost. It consequently reframes empowerment as the effective redistribution of social power.

“The power of the algorithm lies not in what it shows, but in what it chooses to hide.” The digital public sphere has transformed from a neutral marketplace of ideas into a carefully curated arena, sculpted by algorithms, platform incentives, and the unpredictable tides of viral trends. As deepfakes, manipulated narratives, and manufactured trending content shape what the public sees and believes, the very bedrock of democratic discourse is put under pressure. In this shifting landscape, constitutional morality must reach beyond the boundaries of the State to confront the rising digital influence. This paper explores how algorithmic governance is reshaping the delicate balance between technology, truth, and constitutional values. It contends that algorithms are far from passive tools; they are powerful gatekeepers that decide who is seen, whose voices echo, and whose are silenced. Trending features can conjure a mirage of public consensus, while deepfakes and synthetic media dissolve the boundary between reality and fiction, threatening the foundations of informed citizenship and the integrity of elections. Taking a comparative lens, the paper explores how India, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Australia are grappling with these digital dilemmas. The paper argues that constitutional morality must evolve to stay relevant in the algorithmic era. As digital platforms tighten their grip as arbiters of public conversation, the necessity to bring algorithmic power under democratic oversight grows ever stronger. Through this comparative analysis, the paper urges the creation of a more unified and principled framework to defend constitutional values in a world where truth can be manufactured and visibility manipulated.

The exponential expansion of digital media has levelled the playing field in terms of access to information and communication around the world. Nevertheless, concerns such as hate speech, misinformation and privacy violations have been magnified by this growth, leading to demands for regulation. This article examines the intricate balance that democratic societies must maintain between regulating digital media and protecting the fundamental right to free expression. In light of the intricacies of the modern digital ecology, it calls for well-rounded frameworks that protect the right to free speech. Through practical suggestions, it stresses the significance of safeguarding free expression in the face of changing regulatory environments, and it brings to light the difficulty of limiting damaging content without resorting to censorship or overreach. A rights-based approach is emphasised through a critical analysis of the role of technology corporations, civil society and lawmakers in establishing regulatory procedures.

A company is deciding whether to acquire another business. An artificial intelligence system examines financial records, market data and compliance risks, and recommends that the deal should proceed. The directors approve it. Months later, the acquisition causes serious loss. The board signed the resolution, but the model shaped the information and the choice. Who was really responsible? This article examines that question through section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013. It argues that directors may use AI, just as they use lawyers, auditors and other advisers, but they must not allow assistance to become substituted judgment. The relevant legal question is not whether the model was perfect. It is whether the directors understood its purpose, considered its limits, questioned important assumptions and retained the practical ability to reject its recommendation. The article distinguishes routine assistance, decision support and decision substitution. It then explains how opacity, automation bias, defective data and fragmented vendor arrangements may weaken accountability. Drawing on Indian company law and comparative principles reflected in the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and Indian financial regulation, the article proposes five safeguards: disclosure of material AI use, board-level competence, governance-level explanation, records and continuing model review, and non-delegable human responsibility. Corporate governance may become algorithmically informed, but it cannot become algorithmically unaccountable.

The prohibition of double jeopardy expresses a limit on the State’s power to prosecute, but Indian law does not contain a single rule against every repeated investigation, trial or sanction. Article 20(2) of the Constitution requires a previous prosecution and punishment for the same offence. Section 337 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, protects a person previously tried and convicted or acquitted by a competent court, and extends in specified circumstances to alternative charges based on the same facts. This doctrinal paper examines the text, historical case law under Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and judicial treatment of offence identity, finality, multiple statutory regimes and repeated proceedings. It argues that constitutional and statutory protection must be analysed in sequence rather than collapsed into a loose appeal to fairness. The constitutional guarantee sets a narrow, entrenched minimum; the procedural statute provides the more useful defence against a successive trial after acquittal. Neither generally converts an administrative penalty, departmental inquiry or a second investigation into a previous criminal trial. At the same time, a formally distinct charge should not permit the State to evade the statutory rule concerning charges available at the first trial. The paper proposes a decision framework that identifies the first adjudicative forum, the disposition, the ingredients of each offence, the facts and charges available in the first trial, the statutory exceptions and the proper remedy. Properly applied, these inquiries preserve lawful prosecution for distinct wrongs while preventing the State from repeatedly exposing an accused person to the burdens of a concluded criminal case.

When the State takes private land, the usual question is how much the owner will be paid. This article asks a wider question: are affected people protected before, during and after the taking, or only paid once the decision is made? The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 moved Indian law in that direction by adding Social Impact Assessment (SIA), public hearings, rehabilitation and resettlement, and a wider idea of the "affected family". These safeguards work only if the right people are found, the land records are reliable and people are truly heard. Using a doctrinal method, the article studies the 2013 Act, the Tamil Nadu Rules of 2017 and Supreme Court decisions under Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitution. It makes three arguments. A land record should be the starting point for finding affected people, not the final word. SIA should shape the decision to acquire, not sit in the file as a formality. A hearing should count only when the authority gives reasons that show it considered what it heard. The article proposes a Tamil Nadu Integrated Acquisition Justice Model that links record verification, field checks, SIA, community verification, reasoned decisions, compensation with rehabilitation, and monitoring after acquisition. It concludes that fair acquisition needs a shift from paying compensation to protecting people.