Illusion of Choice: Data Accumulation, Market Power, and the Limits of Competition Law

Digital markets rely on the large-scale collection and processing of consumer data, with regulatory frameworks premised on the assumption that individual consent operates as a meaningful safeguard against misuse. At the same time, competition law continues to assess market power through traditional indicators of dominance, pricing, and market structure. This paper argues that the reliance on consent-based governance creates a regulatory blind spot in addressing the persistence of market power in data-driven markets. Consent, while formally satisfying data-protection requirements, frequently operates under conditions of informational asymmetry, limited alternatives, and behavioural influence; individual choice functions more as a legal formality than a genuine constraint on data accumulation. Through a comparative analysis of the European Union, the United States, Australia and India, the paper examines why consent fails as a mechanism of competitive discipline and proposes a recalibration of competition law that recognises the limits of consent and strengthens market-level safeguards.