India’s federal structure is continually challenged by persistent interstate river water disputes, intersecting constitutional governance, political dynamics, and ecological imperatives. While constitutional provisions such as Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act (1956) establish adjudicatory frameworks, implementation is frequently hindered by political resistance, procedural delays, and insufficient enforcement. This paper examines constitutional and institutional mechanisms governing interstate water allocation through case analyses of the Cauvery, Krishna, and Sutlej-Yamuna Link disputes. Each case study highlights systemic tensions: judicial enforcement versus political resolve, equity in allocation versus historical entitlements, and cooperative versus adversarial federal dynamics. The Cauvery conflict demonstrates judicial intervention in enforcing tribunal rulings; the Krishna dispute reflects challenges from state reorganization and competing claims; and the SYL stalemate reveals judicial limitations amid entrenched political opposition. Through constitutional, statutory, and judicial analysis, the study argues that India’s federal architecture, though institutionally sound, risks erosion without political consensus and timely compliance. It emphasizes the necessity of adaptive, participatory governance models for transboundary river management in evolving socio-ecological contexts. The paper concludes that resolution of interstate water disputes necessitates not only legal adjudication but also political maturity, ecological consideration, and institutional reforms to reinforce cooperative federal governance.
