INTRODUCTION
Insider trading refers to the act of trading a company’s securities by a person who possesses confidential price-sensitive information that is not publicly available. One of the key challenges in regulating insider trading has been determining whether certain information is considered generally available to all market participants.1
In a recent development, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has amended Regulation 2(1)(e) of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations2, 2015 (PIT Regulations), through a notification issued on 17 May 2024. This amendment significantly narrows the scope of generally available information (GAI), which could result in unverified market events being classified as Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI).
When viewed alongside the recently amended Regulation 30(11) of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations)3, which addresses the disclosure of market rumors, the changes set off a domino effect. These amendments could negatively impact retail investors by restricting informed trading opportunities. This project seeks to highlight the flaws in these recent amendments and propose alternative solutions that could mitigate the risks SEBI intended to address without infringing upon the rights of retail traders.
In the case concerning insider trading allegations related to Future Retail Ltd. (FRL)4 stock, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) ruled that information reported in the media is no longer unpublished and should be considered generally available. However, with the recent amendment to the SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, “unverified events or information reported in print or electronic media” have now been excluded from the definition of GAI.
The concept of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) is understood as material non-public information in foreign jurisdictions, particularly under U.S., U.K., and E.U. securities laws. The term non-public is broader than unpublished, suggesting that public information is interpreted more expansively in foreign jurisdictions compared to Indian securities law, especially in light of the 2002 regulations. However, the N.K. Sodhi Report5 considered the scope and meaning of these phrases to be functionally similar. By doing so, it expanded the definition of Generally Available Information (GAI) under Indian law, aligning it with foreign jurisdictions by introducing parity of information as a key parameter for determining the public nature of GAI.
The jurisprudence of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), along with recent amendments to the SEC Act, explicitly excludes research based on available public information from being classified as non-public information. This highlights the broader view adopted by the minority opinion in the Chiarella case6. The U.K.’s Market Abuse Regulation7 is already broad in scope and excludes reports based on generally available information, even if such information is accessible upon payment. These regulations demonstrate a clear intent to promote and protect legitimate corporate research and competitive investing in the securities market.
This project also explores the ethical arguments against insider trading. The opposition to insider trading is not necessarily rooted in ensuring that everyone in the market has access to the same information, but rather in promoting equal access without structural inequalities that restrict access at the initial stages. These ethical arguments, therefore, support a balanced viewpoint, suggesting that some degree of competitive edge should be maintained, as it is healthy for the market, based on empirical research regarding public investors.
This project argues that the recent amendment is overly restrictive, disincentivizes investors, and discourages legitimate market research rather than protecting investors’ interests. The study will first explore the intent behind the amendment, followed by an overview of the jurisprudence surrounding the concept of generally available information in insider trading law. Next, it will examine the ethical aspects of insider trading, arguing that a balance between protecting investors’ interests and promoting legitimate market research is essential. The project will then analyze the repercussions of the recent amendment, using comparisons with approaches adopted in jurisdictions like the U.S., U.K., and E.U. Finally, it will propose pragmatic alternatives, advocating for the N.K. Sodhi Committee’s recommendation that information accessible on a non-discriminatory basis be considered generally available, while also ensuring that legitimate research based on public information is included in the scope of GAI, and only material information unpublished by the company or its agents falls under UPSI.
THE INTENT BEHIND THE 2024 AMENDMENT
In the language of the PIT Regulations, insider trading can be understood to be as one undertaken by a ‘connected person’, or any person in possession of UPSI. These are two key terms, each of which is defined by the PIT Regulations, and it is the collective understanding of these terms and their ambit that determines whether someone’s acts constitute insider trading.
To that effect, UPSI is defined as information that is not ‘generally available’, i.e., not available on a non-discriminatory basis. This is where the definition of ‘generally available information’ and the amendment to the same is relevant. The amended definition of generally available information posits that generally available information would not include ‘[an] unverified event or information reported in print or electronic media’. Consequently, any news article published in the media about a company would constitute UPSI if the company has classified the said information as UPSI until and unless it has been verified by the company as per the requirements of Regulation 30(11) of the LODR Regulations.
The amendment was suggested owing to the SEBI’s growing concern around market rumours and their ability to influence market prices. While amendments to the LODR Regulations and more specifically Regulation 30 of the same were already effectuated in June 2023, the SEBI first discussed parallel changes to the PIT Regulations in its consultation paper dated 28 December 2023.8 Further, in a paper published in March 2024, the SEBI elucidated the intent behind the proposed amendment as to ensure that “an insider cannot quote an unverified event or information reported in media to claim defense that they traded during trading window closure period based on ‘generally available information’.”9
Essentially, there may exist instances when an event or information, which has been classified as UPSI by the listed entity, is in circulation in the market but the listed entity does not confirm, deny or clarify such event or information reported in the media as it does not meet the threshold for disclosure as under Regulation 30(11) of the LODR Regulations. In such scenarios, there would exist an unequivocal information asymmetry between ‘connected persons’ who would know whether such event/information was verified and the ordinary retail (unconnected) traders—whose knowledge of the event/information would have been acquired merely through print/electronic media and consequently, be unverified. As per the erstwhile law, these connected persons (in possession of verified information) could readily trade on the basis of said information and subsequently circumvent the penalties under the PIT Regulations, by arguing that the information was generally available in print/electronic media.
To bridge this gap, the SEBI now specifies that any such information that has not been verified by the company would continue to fall within the ambit of UPSI. Thereby, connected persons who trade on the basis of such information would now face penalties as under Regulation 4(1) (trading when in possession of UPSI). Therefore, while the mischief that the amendment seeks to remedy is apparent, the authors shall now demonstrate how the SEBI’s approach is deeply flawed.
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ISSUE AND PROBLEMS THAT FOLLOW
A. Ignoring the Channel
When holding someone accountable for insider trading, especially when they are not directly linked to the source but are accused of trading on Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI), it is critical to establish how the accused obtained the information and from whom. In cases where SEBI has disregarded this requirement, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) has been highly critical of SEBI’s actions. A notable example is Shruti Vora and Ors. v. SEBI,10 where the question arose whether a WhatsApp message, forwarded as received and containing a company’s quarterly financial results before their official release, could be classified as UPSI. SEBI conceded that despite a detailed investigation, they were unable to identify the original source of the information leak. SAT criticized SEBI for failing to prove a connection between the source of the UPSI and the person accused of possessing it before imposing liability.
Similarly, in Samir C. Arora v. SEBI,11 SAT ruled that SEBI is required to provide concrete evidence proving that the accused had actually received the UPSI from a credible source. However, the recent amendment removes the obligation to investigate any such link or trace how an unrelated person may have accessed the UPSI. Under this new regulation, even if a person alleged to be an insider trades based on information from unverified media reports, they could still be held liable. This development is concerning, as imposing such liability should require a higher standard of proof than is typical in civil cases.
B. Reducing assistance for investors
The concern intensifies when considering that the criteria for defining Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) and the obligations for disclosing such information have already been loosened. SEBI regulations do not explicitly state that UPSI must be based solely on concrete facts. In the Satyam Computer case,12 the Adjudicating Officer (AO) clarified that UPSI includes not only finalized decisions but also any information—such as proposals—that could significantly impact a company’s stock price if disclosed. Similarly, in the K.K. Maheswari case,13 the AO reiterated that price-sensitive information (PSI) encompasses “any information,” not just finalized decisions, but also potential or probable events. Thus, UPSI can cover proposals or even the mere possibility of an event.
According to Schedule A of the 2015 Regulations, companies are required to disclose UPSI promptly once “credible and concrete information” emerges, making it generally available. 14This could imply that information lacking credibility or concreteness—such as tentative or possible events—would not fall under the mandatory disclosure requirement.
This leads to two important consequences:
1. Anyone trading based on market speculation about potential events, no matter how widely circulated the rumors might be, would still be liable for insider trading if the information is only found in unverified media. Such information would not be considered Generally Available Information (GAI) but could still be classified as UPSI.
2. The statutory disclosure requirements obligate companies to disclose only concrete information. Probable events would not be disclosed immediately due to the statutory language. Therefore, even if rumors about such events are widely spread in unverified media, investors would still be prohibited from trading based on them, as this information would be treated as UPSI, not GAI.
Furthermore, the 2015 Regulations fail to specify whether research and analysis derived from publicly available information would qualify as GAI. If the purpose of the recent amendment is to exclude unverified information from the UPSI definition, it could be inferred that unverified research data is also excluded. This would disadvantage lay investors, who often rely on external research to interpret complex financial data.
As a result, these outcomes negatively affect investors, many of whom depend on media speculation or financial research reports to assess a company’s prospects.
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INSIDER TRADING
The core challenge in insider trading revolves around determining when specialized, valuable knowledge transforms into an unfair advantage. When does trading based on material non-public information cross the line into fraud? This article defends an “equal access” approach to insider trading ethics, which is often misunderstood in judicial decisions and academic discourse. In landmark cases such as Chiarella and Dirks15, the courts assumed that “equal access” implied all parties in a securities transaction should have equal information—a notion that is both unrealistic and unnecessary. Fairness in securities markets doesn’t require complete equality in access to information, but it does demand that disparities are not so extreme as to create structural disadvantages for some participants. This approach rewards the production of information while safeguarding those who are at a systemic disadvantage.16
A. Equal Access Theory and Contractarian Ethics
The equal access theory advocated here is rooted in contractarian ethics, where fairness is measured by whether individuals consent to the rules under which gains and losses are distributed. Contractarianism focuses on those harmed by a social arrangement, emphasizing their consent as essential in justifying the system. Beneficiaries of any given system are more likely to find it acceptable, while the repeated losers will likely challenge it. The contractarian approach ensures that even those disadvantaged by a rule might have a good reason for agreeing to it if they knew the risks beforehand. Therefore, the fairness of a rule is determined by whether the harmed party would have consented to it in advance, even with the possibility of loss.17
B. Risk and Fairness in Stock Markets
The stock market, much like other social institutions, redistributes wealth and offers opportunities for risk-taking. Empirical studies show that most people prefer some level of risk, along with a safety net, rather than strict equality or extreme inequalities. In experiments conducted by Frolich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey, subjects preferred moderate inequality where individuals had a fair chance for both gains and losses while ensuring no one fell below a certain acceptable level. This suggests that people are willing to take risks, but only within a system that provides basic protections.18
C. Calculating Risk: Shallow vs. Deep Secrets
In a contractarian framework, individuals require a roughly calculable chance of success. They do not need to know the specific contents of a secret but must know that it exists and poses a potential risk. Secrets that can be discovered through effort (shallow secrets) are preferable, as they allow participants to protect themselves from the harm of ignorance. However, deep secrets—those that cannot be uncovered—are unfair and require full disclosure for individuals to safeguard themselves. Insider trading typically involves shallow secrets, but not all shallow secrets are equal. Some are easier for certain individuals to discover than others, and this unequal access creates unfairness.
D. Leveling the Playing Field in Securities Markets
Fairness in the stock market requires that all participants start from a level playing field in terms of access to information. This does not imply that everyone must have identical knowledge; rather, the search costs for acquiring relevant information should not be dramatically skewed in favor of certain parties. Insiders, by nature of their position, will always have an advantage in accessing information. This advantage undermines the consent to the rules governing insider trading since those with less access are unlikely to agree to a system where they are at a significant and permanent disadvantage.19
E. Legal and Ethical Implications of Information Disparities
Courts have historically supported equitable rules in cases involving unfair information disparities. For example, in cases involving insurance contracts or “special confidence” relationships, the party with easier access to critical information is typically required to disclose it. This principle extends to stock markets, where radical inequalities in information access make any resulting agreements questionable. In cases where one party has privileged access to information, existing law in torts and contracts demands disclosure to ensure fairness.
Equal access to information is the ethical foundation upon which insider trading regulations should be built. The problem arises not simply because one party keeps a secret, but because the secret is withheld under conditions where others cannot reasonably discover it. As Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent in Chiarella, the structural imbalance in information access creates the duty to disclose. When one party has privileged access to critical information, it becomes their obligation to share it to ensure fairness in the transaction. This principle is not only grounded in equitable rules about fair dealing but also in contractarian ethics, which emphasize the need for fair consent in all social arrangements. It is this imbalance in information access, rather than the mere presence of unequal knowledge, that calls for regulatory intervention in insider trading.20
THE APPROACH IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS: US AND UK (EU)
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Chiarella played a pivotal role in shaping insider trading law. He argued that allowing parties in an arm’s length business transaction to withhold information—absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship—encourages individuals to leverage their expertise in obtaining and analyzing relevant data. Such a rule incentivizes diligent effort, thorough analysis, and informed forecasting.21
Currently, there are new legislative efforts underway in Congress aimed at defining insider trading, especially to address the effects of the Newman decision. The House bill proposes an amendment to Section 10 of the Exchange Act. It would make it unlawful to trade securities based on information that the person “knows or, considering factors such as financial sophistication, knowledge of and experience in financial matters, position in a company, and amount of assets under management, should know” is material nonpublic information. The term “inside information” in this bill is defined as nonpublic information obtained unlawfully, whether directly or indirectly, from an issuer with an expectation of confidentiality, or in breach of fiduciary duty, or if the information is intended only for legitimate business purposes.
The Senate bill similarly seeks to amend Section 10(b) to prohibit trading on material nonpublic information that the person knows, or has reason to know, is not publicly available. Moreover, it also prohibits communicating such information when it is reasonably foreseeable that the recipient might use it to trade on that information. Importantly, the Senate bill clarifies that “not publicly available” excludes information independently derived from publicly available sources.22
The article 7 of the EU MAR regulation defines what is inside information and only mentions that material information must be made available to public directly or indirectly. What constitutes non-public information for the purposes of affixing liability to an insider is nowhere defined in the regulation.23
MAR 1.2 on the FCA’s website provides a set of guidance on market abuse under the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) which is the UK version of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament.24 It defines behaviour that constitutes market abuse, outlines general prohibitions, and explains key concepts such as insider trading, market manipulation, and the use of deceptive devices in financial markets. The chapter serves as a resource for financial professionals to comply with MAR and avoid behaviours that could harm market integrity. It reads as:
“The following factors may be taken into account in determining whether or not information has been made public, and are indications that it has (and therefore is not inside information):
(1) whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market or a prescribed auction platform through a regulatory information service or RIS or otherwise in accordance with the rules of that market;
(2) whether the information is contained in records which are open to inspection by the public;
(3) whether the information is otherwise generally available, including through the Internet, or some other publication (including if it is only available on payment of a fee), or is derived from information which has been made public; and
(4) whether the information can be obtained by observation by members of the public without infringing rights or obligations of privacy, property or confidentiality.”
The highlighted portion clearly elucidates the expansive scope of the generally available information. The regulation clearly is in line with the concept of parity of information available on a non-discriminatory basis based on structural equality as emphasized on by justice Burger in the minority opinion of Chiarella case that can be presumed to be the basis of recently proposed bill by the SEC that excludes the research based on available information from the scope of Non-public information.
The following section explains the NK Sodhi report that sought to rely on this expansive meaning of the term generally available information pursuant to which the amendment were done to 2015 regulations. Non incorporation of complete recommendation led to the consequent confusion regarding meaning of GAI that resulted in the consequent present amendment that has again narrowed the scope of GAI by excluding unverified reports in media. This clearly harks back to old 2002 regulations where the unverified information was one which was not declared by the company or its agents, the present amendment though has not reverted completely to the 2002 regulations as the 2002 regulations termed generally available information as only that information that was available on the stock exchange disclosed by the company but the substantial effect of the regulation has greatly limited the scope of GAI.
ANALYSIS OF NK SODHI REPORT
The Sodhi Committee of 2013, established to reform insider trading laws by replacing the 1992 regulations with the 2015 SEBI Regulations, was fully cognizant of the challenges in proving insider trading. Despite this, the Committee did not advocate for narrowing the definition of “Generally Available Information” (GAI) to only include information released directly by the company. The key criterion was that the information should be accessible to the public without discrimination.
The Sodhi Committee’s Report opposed the restrictive view that GAI was limited to information published solely on stock exchange websites. This view was also criticized by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in FCRPL v. SEBI,25 which referred to it as “narrow and restrictive.” Interestingly, the U.S. securities laws, often seen as a model globally, adopt a broader interpretation of public information. According to U.S. insider trading laws, information is considered public if it is widely disseminated and the public has had sufficient time to absorb it. However, recent amendments to Indian regulations codified a more restrictive understanding of GAI,26 with the rationale being to address information asymmetry between insiders with Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) and others relying on unverified media reports.
The Sodhi Committee Report had recommended that whether information is generally available should be determined as a question of fact, using a “reasonable person” standard. While information asymmetry can exist, several factors should be considered, such as whether the insider’s trading patterns align with the non-public information they possess, whether the information in the public domain is specific enough to match what the insider knows, and whether the price-sensitive details were made available in a non-discriminatory way.27
Before these amendments, such factors were regularly considered in legal rulings. For instance, in FCRPL v. SEBI, the SAT concluded that the information about the merger or demerger was sufficiently specific to be deemed generally available. Similarly, in the Bharti Airtel case, the Adjudicating Officer (AO) noted that the accused’s trading pattern did not align with the UPSI they allegedly possessed.28 Additionally, in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. SEBI, the Tribunal acknowledged widespread market rumors and reports, suggesting that the public was reasonably expected to know about the information.29
Both the Bharti Airtel and FCRPL cases acknowledged that information from newspapers and news channels could be considered generally available, provided it was disseminated non-discriminatorily. Even if such media information was unverified, various factors would ensure investor protection—if the information was false or insufficient, it wouldn’t be specific, and insider trading patterns wouldn’t align with it.
By imposing a blanket exclusion on unverified media information from the definition of GAI, the recent amendment disregards these nuanced factors. As the Sodhi Committee had cautioned, this approach risks holding insiders liable for trading based on information that is, in reality, accessible to the general public via media outlets.
The report also discussed concerns that narrowly defining GAI as information only released on stock exchange websites could create unfair burdens. For example, if a piece of significant news is covered extensively by media outlets, market participants should be able to trade based on that information without being accused of using UPSI, even if the stock exchange hasn’t published the news yet. On the other hand, it warned against using obscure publications to circumvent the regulations by purposively interpreting the regulations.
CONCLUSION
The recent SEBI amendment regarding insider trading regulations focuses on ensuring that all investors have equal access to verified information, effectively narrowing the definition of what constitutes “generally available information” (GAI). This approach moves towards an “equal information” theory, attempting to eliminate market advantages based on unverified media reports. However, this shift brings significant implications for market research and ethical considerations in trading.
Ethical insider trading involves balancing market fairness with the reality that information flows unequally. Investors should be protected from abusive insider trading, but legitimate financial research should also be allowed to thrive. Market participants, including retail and institutional investors, rely on analyzing publicly available information, often from various sources such as news reports and independent analysis, to make calculated decisions. By narrowing the definition of GAI, SEBI may inadvertently stifle legitimate research activities that contribute to market efficiency. Further the ethical aspects read with the empirical analysis of the market sentiment of general public investor clearly indicates that the people prefer to take calculated risk devoid of structural inequality in access to information that grants certain additional benefits to informed investor.
The new U.S. legislative proposals, focusing on excluding research derived from publicly available data from insider trading liability, reflect this approach. They echo Burger’s vision of encouraging fair, competitive markets by distinguishing legitimate analysis from unethical insider trading. This structural equality of information access underpins recent regulatory proposals, ensuring a balance between fostering market research and maintaining ethical standards in trading.
The UK’s approach to insider trading is guided by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), which aims to uphold market integrity by defining insider trading and market manipulation comprehensively. MAR emphasizes the importance of generally available information, detailing the criteria for determining what constitutes public knowledge. This framework allows for information dissemination through various channels, including regulatory services and public inspection records. By fostering transparency and accessibility, UK law aligns with the notion that informed trading based on widely available information is essential for maintaining a fair and equitable marketplace.
The Sodhi Committee’s 2013 report recommended that “generally available information” should not be limited solely to issuer-published data but should also include information that is accessible to the public in a non-discriminatory manner, even if reported in the media. The committee underscored that market research, which draws conclusions from widely available data, should not fall under the umbrella of UPSI (Unpublished Price Sensitive Information). It believed that whether information is “generally available” should be determined on a case-by-case basis, accounting for factors such as the accessibility and specificity of the information, the trading patterns of insiders, and whether others had comparable access to the information.
SEBI’s recent restrictive amendment, however, tightens the scope of GAI by limiting it primarily to officially disclosed or stock exchange-published information. This not only contrasts with the Sodhi Committee’s vision but also diverges from international norms seen in the U.S. and U.K. The rationale for this amendment stems from concerns about information asymmetry—the idea that insiders have access to non-verified media reports and rumors while retail investors do not. By preventing trading on unverified media reports, SEBI aims to create a level playing field, ensuring that only verified information can influence trading decisions.
However, this over-regulation may undermine the ethical aspects of market research. Analysts and traders often rely on insights drawn from various public sources, including media reports, to make informed predictions and take calculated risks. This form of market research is essential to efficient price discovery and market function. If research based on widely available but unverified information is penalized, as the recent amendment suggests, it could deter informed market participation and the use of valuable analytical skills. Market speculation, which naturally involves risk-taking, plays a key role in market efficiency and innovation.
The amendment risks criminalizing legitimate trading based on widely circulated information, even when such information is public in nature, albeit not verified through formal channels like stock exchange announcements. This could lead to adverse consequences, particularly for small or independent traders who rely on a variety of sources to make informed decisions.
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Footnotes
1. Ahana Kaginalkar and Shubh Jaiswal, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Analyzing the SEBI’s Inadvertent Restriction on Informed Trading’ (Indian Review of Corporate and Commercial Laws, 2023) <https://www.irccl.in/post/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-analyzing-the-sebi-s-inadvertent-restriction-on-informed-trading> accessed 6 October 2024.
2. The SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, No. LAD-NRO/GN/2014-15/21/85 reg 2(1)(e).
3. The SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, No.SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2015-16/013 reg 30(11).
4. Future Corporate Resources Pvt. Ltd. v. SEBI (2023) Appeal No. 81 of 2021 <https://sat.gov.in/english/pdf/E2023_JO202181.PDF> accessed 5 October 2024.
5. SEBI, ‘N.K. Sodhi, Report of the High Level Committee to Review the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992’ (2013) < https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1386758945803.pdf> accessed 6 October 2024.
6. Chiarella v United States (1980) 445 U.S. 222.
7. The Market Abuse Regulation (2014) (EU) No 596/2014.
8. SEBI, ‘Consultation Paper on Amendments to SEBI Regulations with respect to Verification of Market Rumours’ < https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/jul-2024/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-listing-obligations-and-disclosure-requirements-regulations-2015-last-amended-on-july-10-2024-_84817.html> accessed 7 October 2024.
9. SEBI, ‘Facilitating uniform approach in verification of market rumours by equity listed entities – Amendments to SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015 and SEBI (PIT) Regulations, 2015’ < https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/mar-2024/1711018997435_1.pdf> accessed 7 October 2024.
10. Shruti Vora and Ors. v. SEBI (2020) Appeal no. 28 of 2020 < https://sat.gov.in/english/pdf/E2021_JO2020313_25.PDF > accessed 6 October 2024.
11. Samir C. Arora v. SEBI (2005) 59 SCL 96 (SAT).
12. Adjudication order against Shri G. Jayaraman in the matter of Satyam Computer Services Ltd (2012) ADJUDICATION ORDER NO. PG/AO/AB/45/2012 < https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/jul-2012/adjudication-order-against-shri-g-jayaraman-in-the-matter-of-satyam-computer-services-ltd_27259.html > accessed 6 October 2024.
13. Adjudication order against K.K Maheshwari (2010) ADJUDICATION ORDER NO. SKV/SA/AO-01/2010 < https://www.sebi.gov.in/adjorder/kkmaheshwari.pdf > accessed 6 October 2024.
14. The SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, No. LAD-NRO/GN/2014-15/21/85 Sch A.
15. Dirks v SEC (1983) 463 U.S. 646.
16. Kim Lane Scheppele., “”IT’S JUST NOT RIGHT”: THE ETHICS OF INSIDER TRADING” (1993) 56(3) Law and Contemporary Problems < https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62553875.pdf> accessed 7 October 2024.
17. Kim Lane Scheppele & Jeremy Waldron, Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Evaluation (1991) 3 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 195, 199-206.
18. Norman Frolich, Joe A. Oppenheimer & Cheryl Eavey, ‘Laboratory Results on Rawls’s Distributive Justice’ (1987) 17 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 1-22.
19. Kim Lane Scheppele (n 16).
20. Chiarella (n)
21. Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition The Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition’ (2015) 68(3) SMU LAW REVIEW.
22. Ibid.
23. The Market Abuse Regulation (2014) (EU) No 596/2014 art 7.
24. Financial Conduct Regulation, ‘Market Abuse Regulation 1.2’ (FCA UK 2016) < https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook?related-provisions-for-provision=MAR%201.2.12> accessed 8 October 2024.
25. Future Corporate Resources (n 4).
26. SEC GOV, ‘Insider Trading Policy’ (SEC 2015) < https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1164 964/000101968715004168/globalfuture_8k-ex9904.htm> accessed 8 October 2024.
27. SEBI, ‘N.K. Sodhi, Report of the High Level Committee to Review the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992’ (2013) < https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1386758945803.pdf> accessed 6 October 2024.
28. Adjudication Order in respect of Gopal Vittal, Bharti Telecom Ltd., Rohit Krishan Puri and Sunil Bharti Mittal in the matter of Trading by certain entities in the scrip of Bharti Airtel Limited (2020) ADJUDICATION ORDER NO. Order/PM/VC/2020-21/9416-9419 < https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/oct-2020/adjudication-order-in-respect-of-gopal-vittal-bharti-telecom-ltd-rohit-krishan-puri-and-sunil-bharti-mittal-in-the-matter-of-trading-by-certain-entities-in-the-scrip-of-bharti-airtel-limited_47950.html> accessed 7 October 2024
29. Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. SEBI (1998) 3 CompLJ 473 (AAIFR).