Introduction
Collective bargaining is an indispensable form of social engagement whereby employers and employees work together to solve problems, make decisions and take responsibility.1 It encompasses all agreements reached between employers and employees collectively, through representatives rather than individually. Collective bargaining is the process, and its by-product is the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). It therefore provides an avenue for entrenching industrial peace, democracy and harmony in society.2 In Nigeria, collective bargaining is governed by several labour statutes and international labour conventions which provide for the negotiation and enforcement of CBAs between trade unions and employers on matters ranging from salary adjustments and allowances to working conditions and general welfare packages.
However, despite the undisputed importance of collective bargaining between employer and employee, its enforceability in practice continues to be a challenge in Nigeria.3 Reports and anecdotal evidence suggest a recurring pattern of non-implementation, partial implementation or delayed implementation of agreed terms.4 CBAs entered into between government workers’ unions and the government, at both state and federal levels, are hardly enforced and implemented. While CBAs are intended to foster industrial harmony, their frequent breach has made strikes an ‘endemic’ feature of the Nigerian labour landscape across critical sectors such as education, healthcare, the civil service and aviation. In the education sector, for example, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) has embarked on more than fifteen strikes since 1999, largely because of the government’s failure to honour the 2009 FGN-ASUU Agreement and subsequent Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), at an estimated loss of about N1.5 trillion to the economy.5 In September 2025, ASUU issued a 14-day ultimatum, to be followed by a two-week warning strike, over these long-standing breaches, a dispute that led to the signing of a new collective bargaining agreement on January 14, 2026.6 In the health sector, the Nigerian Association of Resident Doctors (NARD) announced the resumption of its strike on January 12, 2026, under the slogan “No Implementation, No Going Back”, over the government’s failure to fulfil a 19-point MoU signed in late 2025.7 Similarly, the Joint Health Sector Unions (JOHESU) suspended an indefinite nationwide strike on February 5, 2026, after 84 days.8 The strike crippled laboratory, pharmacy, diagnostic and other non-physician services across Nigeria’s 73 federal health institutions, and the government adopted counter-measures such as the ‘No work, no pay’ principle to force workers back to duty.
Nigeria, as a developing economy, needs industrial peace and harmony for its rapid economic and socio-political development.9 No economy can develop or sustain its development in an atmosphere of industrial unrest.10 The persistent non-implementation of collective agreements in the Nigerian public sector is a significant challenge to effective industrial relations, employee morale and, ultimately, the quality of public service delivery. While the existence of these agreements signifies some commitment to negotiate terms of employment, their frequent disregard undermines the principles of collective bargaining and creates an environment of distrust and potential conflict. A comprehensive investigation is needed to identify the specific factors contributing to these problems.
This study therefore conducts a socio-legal examination of the non-enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria. By analysing the legal provisions, the judicial decisions on the enforcement of CBAs and the socio-political factors that contribute to the problem, it seeks to uncover the root causes of non-compliance with CBAs and to propose solutions for strengthening their enforcement. It addresses two questions. First, what are the legal and institutional challenges contributing to the non-enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria? Secondly, what legal, structural and policy reforms are needed to improve the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria?
Past studies on the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria have predominantly been either doctrinal or approached from non-legal viewpoints.11 This study offers an analysis from a legal perspective that incorporates relevant socio-political factors and empirical evidence through combined doctrinal and qualitative methods. It seeks to contribute to both scholarship and the practical understanding of the barriers to CBA enforceability in Nigeria, as perceived by practitioners and experts in labour and industrial law. Its qualitative methodology permits an examination of the law in action and highlights the need for a multi-faceted strategy to overcome the obstacles to the implementation of CBAs in the Nigerian public sector.12
The study begins with a review of the literature and lays its theoretical foundation. This is followed by a description of the research methodology and a discussion of the findings in the context of the existing literature. It concludes with recommendations.
Literature review
A. Meaning and nature of collective bargaining
Collective bargaining, a term coined in 1891 by Beatrice Webb, refers to the process of negotiation between employers and workers acting together, aimed at mutual agreement.13 While Webb did not define it precisely, later scholars such as Flanders described it as a systematic social activity for resolving conflicts, viewing ‘bargaining’ as a rule-making process rather than a mere economic exchange.14 Other definitions, including those of Rose and Yoder, emphasise that it involves representatives negotiating terms of employment on behalf of their employee members.15 The process typically begins with forming a bargaining organisation, followed by setting out demands, negotiating and, ultimately, drafting a collective agreement that all parties accept as satisfactory.16
B. Historical background of collective bargaining structures
Collective bargaining originated in the industrial revolution of the 18th and early 19th centuries, beginning in the UK and spreading to Western Europe, North America and beyond.17 Windmuller highlights how changes in workplace processes moved labour from manual work to mechanised systems.18 Employers initially resisted unionisation and preferred individual contracts.19 The economic depression of the early 1930s, however, exposed the weaknesses of unregulated markets and led policymakers to endorse collective bargaining, as in the National Labor Relations Act 1935 in the USA, which protected workers’ rights to unionise and to negotiate collectively.20 By the mid-1930s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) had acknowledged the growing significance of collective bargaining in setting working conditions,21 and Galic and Raonic note its expansion into developing nations in the 1960s and 1970s.22 In Nigeria, collective bargaining emerged in the early 20th century under public sector influence and was formalised through the Trade Unions Ordinance 1938.23 Key milestones included labour activity from 1912 to the 1930s, the establishment of the Nigerian Railway Workers Union in 1931 and the introduction of the Whitley Council in the 1940s.24 The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), formed in 1978, centralised collective bargaining, which now operates under the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.25
C. The enforceability problem of collective bargaining agreements in Nigeria
The legal status and enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria has long been a subject of judicial and academic debate. According to Green, the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria remains debatable despite the effort that goes into negotiating them.26 Describing it as a ‘conundrum’, Green asks why Nigerian labour stakeholders persist in collective negotiations whose outcome is not enforceable in the courts. Okene similarly emphasises the implementation challenge facing CBAs in Nigeria.27 Arthur-Jolasinmi and Abusomwan note that enforcement suffers from bottlenecks despite the mutual and voluntary nature of CBAs, and argue that their enforceability must be re-evaluated in the light of new trends in 21st-century industrial relations in Nigeria.28
At the heart of this debate are the legal and institutional bottlenecks that affect the enforceability of CBAs in the courts and in practice. Emudainohwo notes that the decisions of the courts have continued to render CBAs unenforceable.29 Adebayo and Toyosi likewise observe that Nigerian courts persistently apply the common law rule that such agreements are unenforceable in the absence of privity.30 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc,31 as the Court of Appeal had earlier done in Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Edet, where Uwaifo JCA held that collective agreements, except where adopted as part of the terms of employment, “are not intended to give or capable of giving individual employees a right to litigate” over their breach, nor to supplant or supplement the employees’ contracts of service.32
Beyond the legal obstacles, the enforceability of CBAs also suffers from other bottlenecks, according to Ugbomhe and Osagie.33 While the literature agrees that the enforceability of CBAs remains problematic, there is little in-depth socio-legal analysis of the area. The previous works of Emudainohwo,34 Adebayo and Toyosi,35 Arthur-Jolasinmi and Abusomwan36 and several others on the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria were purely doctrinal (library-based legal research) and did not use qualitative methods. This study addresses that gap, and bridges the gap between the law in the books and its practice in society, through interviews with relevant stakeholders.
Theoretical framework
This study integrates two theories to examine the socio-legal factors that have militated against the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria: the theory of Industrial Democracy and the Marxian theory of class struggle. This dual-theory approach provides a lens for examining why CBAs in Nigeria remain legally and practically unenforceable despite their importance in labour relations.
Industrial Democracy theory posits that employees should have the right to participate in the decision-making processes of their workplace.37 It views the industrial setting as a mini-polity in which democratic principles such as representation, negotiation and collectivity apply to balance the inherent power asymmetry between employers and employees. The term was first used in the 1850s by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who advocated management chosen by workers and challenged the hierarchical structures of capitalism.38 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, however, introduced it into the vocabulary of the social sciences at the end of the 19th century with their joint work Industrial Democracy in 1897.39 Marxian theory, on the other hand, provides a structural analysis of the ongoing conflict between capital (the bourgeoisie) and labour (the proletariat).40
While Industrial Democracy offers a normative ideal for the workplace, Marxian theory explains the practical struggle and conflict between capital and labour. Within this framework, collective bargaining is the ‘life wire’ of industrial democracy.41 It transforms the workplace from an authoritarian structure into a participatory one by institutionalising the right of workers to negotiate terms of employment through unions. In Marxian terms, however, capital (the employer) continues to disarm the employees’ primary weapon of collective struggle by undermining the applicability and enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria. Integrating the two theories thus explains the ‘unenforceability conundrum’ in Nigerian public sector labour relations and highlights the class struggle that persists between the government as provider of capital and workers as providers of labour.
Previous studies have generally used industrial democracy as the basis for collective bargaining in the workplace,42 and the Marxian theory of class struggle has been used to explain conflicts between employer and employee.43 However, few studies have applied the two theories together to examine the connection between the social and legal issues affecting the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria.
Methodology
The study combined doctrinal legal research with qualitative research methods to explore the application of CBAs in the Nigerian public sector, focusing on their non-enforceability. This approach facilitated a comprehensive understanding by contrasting stakeholder experiences with the existing legal literature.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted from September 2025 to January 11, 2026, with 15 participants, mostly in person at their offices; two were conducted online via Google Meet.44 The interview questions were pre-tested for clarity and relevance.45 Participants were selected through purposive sampling and comprised government officials, public sector labour union executives, public employees, labour law practitioners and academics.46 They were selected for their expertise in labour law, their prior involvement in CBAs and their interest in the subject, ensuring a diverse range of experience for data triangulation in conjunction with the doctrinal method.
Table 1 presents the profiles of the participants.
| S/N | Pseudonym (participant) | Profile | Date of interview | Duration of interview (minutes) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | P1 | Executive member of a university-based staff union | September 25, 2025 | 70 |
| 2 | P2 | Executive member of a health-based staff union | September 27, 2025 | 75 |
| 3 | P3 | Executive member of a polytechnic-based staff union | September 26, 2025 | 60 |
| 4 | P4 | Unionist | September 6, 2025 | 50 |
| 5 | P5 | Unionist | October 3, 2025 | 45 |
| 6 | P6 | Federal Government employee | September 15, 2025 | 30 |
| 7 | P7 | State Government employee | September 15, 2025 | 31 |
| 8 | P8 | Senior officer, Federal Labour Ministry | November 11, 2025 | 65 |
| 9 | P9 | Senior officer, Federal Labour Ministry | November 11, 2025 | 55 |
| 10 | P10 | Senior officer, a State Civil Service Commission | December 6, 2025 | 48 |
| 11 | P11 | Legal practitioner with expertise in labour-related matters | January 11, 2026 | 50 |
| 12 | P12 | Legal practitioner with expertise in labour-related matters | December 14, 2025 | 50 |
| 13 | P14 | Associate Professor of Law | January 7, 2026 | 70 |
| 14 | P15 | Senior Lecturer | January 10, 2026 | 65 |
Table 1: Profiles of the participants (Source: authors’ own compilation)
Following Hennink and Kaiser’s guidelines, the sample size was appropriate, with data saturation achieved after fifteen interviews.47 Data from primary and secondary legal sources underwent content analysis for systematic interpretation.48 Following Braun and Clarke, a six-phase thematic analysis was conducted, beginning with the transcription of interviews for data familiarisation and the generation of inductive codes aligned with the research questions.49 Through iterating and merging redundant codes, five key themes emerged. The analysis was facilitated by ATLAS.ti software. The study maintained rigour by adhering to Lincoln and Guba’s trustworthiness criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.50 Credibility was ensured through triangulation and interviews with diverse participants; transferability was addressed through detailed descriptions of context; and dependability was documented thoroughly.51 The ethical guidelines of the Research Ethics Committee of the Nigeria Police Academy were followed, ensuring confidentiality, and verbatim participant quotations were retained for authenticity.
Findings
The study produced several findings that address its two research questions, drawn from the themes of the interviews and the relevant literature. The first research question sought to identify and examine the legal and institutional challenges that militate against the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria.
A. Findings related to the legal challenges hindering CBA enforceability in Nigeria
The specific legal challenges are as follows.
i. The historical recognition of collective bargaining agreements as gentlemen’s agreements
This study found that Nigerian courts continue to hold the common law position that a breach of a CBA does not give rise to a cause of action, as the parties are deemed to lack ‘the intention to create legal relations’. At common law, CBAs are traditionally viewed as binding in honour only, not in law. Unlike a formal contract, a gentleman’s agreement rests on honour and mutual trust rather than legal obligation. Historically, courts have regarded CBAs as agreements between trade unions and employers concluded without the intention to create a legally binding contract. The law generally presumes, in commercial agreements, that the parties intend to create legal relations, but this presumption can be rebutted. The foundational UK case of Ford Motor Co. Ltd v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers52 entrenched the position that such agreements are not intended to be legally binding. The interviews of P12 and P14 provide context:
The UK case of Ford v Amalgamated historically shaped the minds of the courts and parties that CBAs are not enforceable in court. Based on that, subsequent courts decisions in Nigeria followed the reasoning of the UK Court. (P12)
The Supreme Court of Nigeria decisions in for example Osoh & Ors V Unity Bank PLC53 and BPE v Dangote PLC54 held that CBA are not generally enforceable on their own right. (P14)
These quotations confirm the position in the literature that the historical recognition of CBAs as gentlemen’s agreements has impaired their enforceability in Nigeria through the older precedents of the superior courts. In the words of most participants in this study, entering into a CBA feels like entering into a worthless agreement. However, the study found that in recent times the courts, especially the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), which ranks below the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, have consistently held that CBAs are legally binding agreements, despite the stance of those appellate courts. This creates uncertainty and further entrenches the notion that CBAs are nothing more than a paper tiger that cannot be implemented in practice.
ii. The hurdle of incorporation of CBAs and privity of contract
Nigeria, as a common law jurisdiction, has consistently upheld the doctrine of privity of contract, under which a person who is not a party to a contract cannot enforce it; applied to collective agreements, the doctrine has meant that the courts will not enforce them at the instance of individual employees.55 At common law, a collective agreement is generally not enforceable unless its terms have been incorporated into the contracts of employment. In BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc,56 the Supreme Court held that collective agreements are not legally enforceable unless they are expressly incorporated into the contract of employment.57 A crucial consequence of privity is that employees, who are beneficiaries of a collective agreement but not parties to it, cannot sue on it.58 This was highlighted in Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc,59 where the Supreme Court declined to enforce the documents relied on by the employees, treating them as gentlemen’s agreements devoid of sanction. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this stance in Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares,60 holding that collective agreements must be incorporated into the terms of employment to be enforced. Despite this traditional view of CBAs as gentlemen’s agreements, the Constitution (Third Alteration) Act 2010, which inserted section 254C into the 1999 Constitution, has given the NICN jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of CBAs.61 This creates a tension with the Supreme Court’s traditional position. Relying on section 254C(1) and (2) of the Constitution, the NICN holds that it has jurisdiction to enforce CBAs even when they are not incorporated into individual contracts.62 This was acknowledged in PENGASSAN v. MRS Oil Nigeria Plc,63 where the court recognised the enforceability of CBAs in the light of the constitutional amendment.
iii. Conflicting judicial precedents on the enforceability of CBAs in Nigerian courts
The enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria remains a point of significant judicial tension. A major legal challenge is the inconsistency and uncertainty arising from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the NICN on the enforceability of CBAs. The study found that the conflicting decisions turn mainly on three issues: first, whether CBAs are enforceable contracts by nature or merely gentlemen’s agreements; secondly, whether a CBA between an employer and employee unions must be incorporated into the individual contracts of employment to be enforceable; and lastly, whether an individual employee who is not a party to a CBA entered into between the employer and the unions can claim its benefits. These issues are discussed under the two preceding headings.
The case law has been conflicting across the courts. The Court of Appeal in Edet64 treated CBAs as binding in honour only, giving an individual employee no standing to sue unless the terms are incorporated into that employee’s contract of employment. The Supreme Court reinforced the rules of privity in Osoh,65 and in 2020 it maintained its position in BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc that an unincorporated collective agreement is not legally enforceable.66
However, the NICN, as the specialised industrial court in Nigeria, has held in several decisions, such as Aghata N. Onuorah v. Access Bank Plc67 and Valentine Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc,68 that CBAs are directly justiciable and enforceable by the NICN without individual incorporation into employees’ letters of appointment. The NICN has reasoned that, in applying international best practice and preserving the right to collective bargaining, it has become expedient to bypass the rigid common law principle of privity of contract.
In the interviews conducted for this study, all participants with a legal background confirmed that the enforceability of CBAs in Nigerian courts is problematic. Some of their reactions follow:
Enforcement of CBAs in our courts is difficult due to many legal impediments. (P5)
The case law history on the enforceability of CBAs continues to be unclear and uncertain. The law appears still to be unsettled despite the array of court judgments. (P12)
Which judgment do we follow since we have conflicting precedents? (P14)
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court (section 230) is the final appellate court, and its decisions bind all other courts, including the Court of Appeal. The NICN, first established in 1976, has had exclusive jurisdiction over labour and industrial relations matters, including the interpretation and application of collective agreements under section 254C(1)(j)(i), since the Third Alteration Act 2010.
The conflicting judgments have, to a large extent, watered down the binding effect of the courts’ decisions for lack of clarity and unanimity. The elementary principle of stare decisis requires a court to stand by and apply earlier decisions where the case at hand is similar to the earlier case. Arguably, the direction taken by the NICN departs from the principle of judicial precedent, since its decisions cannot legally overrule or vacate earlier appellate judgments. Kenen, however, argues that the NICN distinguishes those appellate decisions, which concerned causes of action arising before the Third Alteration Act 2010, and relies instead on the jurisdiction that the Act conferred on it.69
These conflicting precedents also create legal uncertainty, since parties to CBAs cannot reliably predict legal outcomes. They encourage forum shopping, in which parties manoeuvre to have their cases heard in the courts whose decisions favour their position. Ultimately, the sanctity of CBAs continues to be undermined, which potentially fuels industrial disharmony in Nigeria.
B. Findings related to the institutional challenges hindering CBA enforceability in Nigeria
The study found several structural, systemic and organisational obstacles that continue to hinder the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria. They are as follows.
i. Good faith in the collective bargaining process
The lack of bargaining in good faith is one of the major challenges that have continued to stall the enforceability of collective agreements in Nigeria.70 Effective collective bargaining requires sincere and honest participation by all stakeholders in the negotiation.71 The obligation to act in good faith extends to all employment relationships, such as those between employer and employee, a union and its members, a union and other employee groups within a workplace, and a union and other members of the workforce.72 Under ILO standards, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) regards negotiating with sincerity and fairness as a duty to be observed by all parties to the bargaining process.73 The CFA has urged both parties to engage in sincere and constructive negotiations, with a commitment to reaching a mutually beneficial conclusion.74
The key components of good faith bargaining include active participation, information sharing, an intention to agree and standards of behaviour that show honesty, respect and openness and avoid deceit or hidden motives. According to O’Neill, an employer breaches the good faith requirement when it refuses to sign the agreement reached, grants unilateral wage increases during negotiations, refuses to examine the employees’ proposals, fails to meet the union within a reasonable time, deliberately delays the negotiations or is unwilling to negotiate actively, or does not give its negotiators sufficient authority to reach an agreement.75 The list is not exhaustive.
The study found an acute deficiency of good faith, and mutual suspicion between government and trade unions in collective bargaining, in three major areas. First, good faith is breached by the government’s persistent failure to implement agreements. A primary issue is the government’s tendency to renege on negotiated terms, creating a climate of mistrust. A classic example is the Federal Government’s prolonged failure to honour its agreements with ASUU on funding, welfare and other issues, leading to recurring strikes. The following quotations illustrate this challenge:
Lack of good faith is what is killing the implementation of agreements in Nigeria. Government in most cases signs agreements with labour unions without the intention of abiding by it. (P1)
We do not trust the government at all due to our past experiences. During the Nigerian Association of Resident Doctors (NARD) nationwide strike which commenced on January 12, 2026, the slogan we adopted was ‘no implementation, no going back’. (P2)
Secondly, there is general evidence of bad faith in negotiations between the unions and the government. The government in most cases approaches collective bargaining with a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude, without a genuine desire to reach a compromise. This attitude is known as Boulwarism.76 In Nigeria, it usually manifests when the government unilaterally sets a figure or policy and refuses to change its position, regardless of the evidence or counter-proposals presented by the unions.77 Collective bargaining is thus often treated as a mere formality. As one participant described the situation:
The Federal Government unilateral removed the fuel subsidy without due consultation with labour and the presentation of the removal as a fait accompli (a decided matter). Likewise, the Federal Government and State Governments negotiators during the Minimum wage negotiations insisted that they could not go above the ceiling of N 60,000.
However, there is evidence that labour unions in Nigeria also display bad faith in collective bargaining.78 In such circumstances, unions use strike action as a strategy to force the government to agree to their demands, and they have been accused of adopting an uncompromising stance in negotiations. The following quotation represents this finding:
Labour unions also share some blames. They continue to threaten government with strikes which forces government to sign unrealistic promises. (P8)
The uncompromising stance of labour unions in many negotiations is related to persistent allegations of corruption, bribery and betrayal of workers’ interests during negotiations with governments.79 These allegations hold that labour leaders often put personal or financial interests first in calling off strikes and accepting unfavourable agreements, as the following quotations reflect:
The allegations of bribery during negotiations are rife in Nigeria. For example, how can you explain the inaction of labour unions when government unilaterally announced the removal of fuel subsidy in 2023? Also, governments at all levels have refused to settle the 7 months minimum wage award palliative of N35,000 to workers despite repeated promises and there is no outrage from labour unions. (P4)
We are aware of such allegations from people. These allegations are simply planted as a strategy of dividing and weakening the unions and the trusts with their members. (P3)
It is beyond the scope of this study to ascertain the truth of such claims. They do, however, indicate that bad faith in collective bargaining is attributed to both the government and the labour unions. The implication is that negotiations leading to the signing of CBAs in Nigeria are not entered into freely, with an open mind and good intent, which remains a significant obstacle to enforceability.
ii. Conflict of interest occasioned by ministerial oversight of CBAs
The study found a pronounced conflict of interest between the government’s role as a negotiating employer in CBAs and its statutory and regulatory role in general labour matters in Nigeria.80 The conflict is most prominent in public sector CBAs, to which government representatives and trade unions are parties. In most public sector negotiations culminating in CBAs, the negotiating parties include officials of the Federal Ministry of Labour, which is tasked with developing and executing the nation’s labour administration and industrial relations policies and with ensuring Nigeria’s compliance with international obligations such as the ratified ILO Conventions.81
The most conflicting role is that of the Minister of Labour under section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 (TDA).82 Section 3 requires at least three copies of any collective agreement for the settlement of a trade dispute to be deposited with the Minister within fourteen days of its execution. On receipt, the Minister may make an order that all or any of the provisions of the agreement shall be binding on the employers and workers to whom they relate.
The Minister of Labour’s oversight of CBAs therefore creates a conflict of interest in public sector CBAs and continues to undermine honest and fair negotiation and execution.83 Participants argued that the role of the Minister and his officials as negotiating members undermines the fairness of the process:
During negotiations, the Minister of Labour is very powerful because of the powers he exercises under the Trade Dispute Act 2004. (P12)
As a lawyer, the role of the Minister is no doubt conflicting and confusing as a regulator and party in government workers negotiation since the agreement at the end of the day is submitted to him for approval. (P12)
The use of the word ‘shall’ by section 3 of the Trade Dispute Act 2004 indicates that any alteration to a CBA by the Minister is binding to all parties since the word shall connotes a compulsory obligation in legal drafting according to several decisions of Nigerian courts. (P14)
The conduct of the Minister of Labour matters a lot. During the 2021/2022 Academic Staff Union of Universities negotiations with the FG under the former Buhari administration, the then Labour Minister . . . undermined and stalled the negotiation process and consistently boasted about his statutory powers under the law. (P1)
On the other hand, the Minister’s role may be defended as necessary to protect the public interest and public confidence in labour administration in Nigeria. In relation to CBAs, the Ministry serves as a repository and point of validation for these agreements, and on this view the Minister’s role under section 3 of the TDA is justified by the public interest and the impartiality expected of a public officer. P8 and P9 noted that the Minister’s role in CBAs is not accidental, given the Minister’s position as chief conciliator in labour disputes. As the participants pointed out, sections 8(1) and 33 of the TDA empower the Minister to appoint a fit person as conciliator to settle a trade dispute and to refer a dispute to a board of inquiry.
The views on both sides raise fundamental questions about the powers given to the Minister of Labour to interfere with collective agreements voluntarily concluded by the parties, which could whittle down the efficacy of CBAs. The view of P15 summarises the stakeholders’ concerns:
From my understanding, the legislation granting authority to the minister to determine the enforceability of a collective agreement lacks guidelines for the minister’s exercise of this power. Additionally, there is no provision for a party who is dissatisfied with the minister’s decision to seek remedy. Therefore, when exercising this crucial authority, the Minister is granted unrestricted and subjective discretion to decide the outcome of a collective agreement. In instances, this unbridled use of judgment is prone to misuse. The excessive exercise of discretion, as demonstrated by various instances, is prone to being misused. (P15)
iii. Proliferation and multiplicity of trade unions
The study found that the growth in the number of trade unions in Nigeria complicates labour relations and makes collective bargaining difficult. Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees freedom of association, enabling individuals to form and join political parties, trade unions and other associations for the protection of their interests. Nigeria is also bound by international instruments, including the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which uphold workers’ right to unionise without interference. Nigerian courts, as in Anigboro v. Sea Trucks (Nigeria) Ltd,84 have reinforced the importance of protecting workers’ rights to form and manage their unions free from employer influence.
Before the 1978 restructuring, Nigeria had over 1,000 unions, which were reorganised into 42 industrial unions.85 Falana recounts that military regimes suppressed trade unions: the Buhari regime proscribed the Nigerian Medical Association in 1985 over a strike for better salaries and hospital conditions, and the Abacha regime claimed to proscribe ASUU in 1994.86 Following the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, which introduced the ‘voluntarism’ clause, union membership became voluntary, multiple federations could be registered and union officers had to be elected, enabling various unions to coexist in the same workplace.
The democratisation of union formation in Nigeria has thus led to multiple unions in the health, tertiary education, and oil and gas sectors, among others. P5 noted that in the public health sector, for example, about six unions and associations operate:
Historically, the Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) was the largest and umbrella body of workers. However, it is now competing with other unions for specialized cadres within the sector such as the National Association of Nigeria Nurses and Midwives, Nigerian Union of Allied health Professionals representing Pharmacists, Physiotherapists and Laboratory scientists and the Joint Health Sector Unions (JOHESU) acting as a coalition to specifically challenge the perceived dominance of doctors in bargaining. Still, within the sector, you have the Resident Doctors Associations and the Umbrella Nigerian Medical Association (NMA). (P5)
The Nigerian tertiary education sector likewise has several unions, with separate unions for academic staff, non-academic staff, technologists and senior staff.
While the existence of multiple unions reflects the right to freedom of association in Nigeria, the literature is unanimous that it continues to weaken collective bargaining and industrial harmony.87 The views of participants in this study support this position: the multiplicity of trade unions has resulted in weakened collective bargaining, inter-union conflict and rivalry, fragmentation, administrative complexity and incessant industrial action. The participants observed:
It is very difficult negotiating with unions due to their sheer number in most of the sectors. As a Ministry, we just concluded the recent January 2026 Federal Government -ASUU collective bargaining agreement for Lecturers in Nigerian Universities midwifed by the Yayale Ahmed Committee for improved remuneration. However, we still need to negotiate with 2 more unions within the University which has led to fragmented negotiations. (P9)
Every cadre of staff is interested to form its own distinct union in all the sectors which creates confusion and complexity in negotiations. (P10)
Similarly, P2 stated that there is a great deal of rivalry and unhealthy competition among unions within the same sector:
Once you reach an agreement with the union of doctors for example, other unions within the health sectors also come with similar demands and expectations without considering peculiarities. In most cases, the unions even trade insults on each other in a bid to exert dominance. (P2)
Organised labour has also accused the Federal Government of attempting to weaken the mainstream labour movement by supporting the creation of splinter unions as a strategy for dividing workers’ collective bargaining power.88 ASUU, for example, has accused the Federal Government of seeking to break its position as the only union for lecturers in Nigerian universities by registering alternative bodies such as the Congress of Nigerian University Academics (CONUA) and the National Association of Medical and Dental Academics (NAMDA).89 The Federal Government, through the Labour Ministry, has consistently maintained that their registration accords with its policy of liberalising and democratising the labour space in Nigeria.
The evidence from participants thus supports the position that the multiplicity of trade unions in Nigeria continues to undermine the enforceability of CBAs, despite the advantages of entrenching freedom of association.
iv. Implementation and budgetary constraints
The study found that the absence of timely and realistic legal and budgetary projections continues to affect the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria.90 Agreements are signed to end immediate crises such as strikes without realistic budgetary provision for their implementation, leaving a gap between bargaining and the practical capacity to implement the CBA.
Participants stressed that this challenge arises because bargaining is concluded without holistic consideration of revenue and budgetary parameters by both the government representatives and the labour unions. CBAs with financial implications are thus concluded without these considerations, either through institutional weakness or simply as an immediate measure to end an industrial action.91 In addition, some provisions agreed upon require legislative intervention by the National Assembly or the State Houses of Assembly, and implementation stalls on that legislative hurdle. Participants highlighted these challenges:
It is very common for government to come to negotiation table without a realistic and truthful consideration of budgetary concerns. (P5)
You sign an agreement with government and implementation becomes a big problem due to lack of cash backing. In some cases, government completely ignores to include the cost implication of the CBAs in even the subsequent National budget which creates implementation challenge. For example, government is still yet to complete the payment of the N35,000 Minimum Wage Award for workers with three month outstanding as at December 2025. (P3)
Some CBAs are concluded without legal consideration for need for amendment of certain laws by the legislature. The very recent January 2026 ASUU agreement with government is an example because it is my view that the Nigerian [pension legislation] will have to be amended to reflect the provision that Professors will continue to receive their salaries as pension when they retire. (P11)
These responses confirm that the failure to consider legal and budgetary parameters continues to hamper the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria. The study notes, however, that the government has since stated that all CBA negotiations will include legal representatives from the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation to address these gaps.
Conclusion
The study has established that CBAs are robustly negotiated in the Nigerian public sector, yet their enforceability and functionality are acutely hampered by legal and institutional challenges. Through a socio-legal lens, it has shown that the problem of enforceability is rooted in the disconnection between the legal framework and the lived experience of the labour unions and government actors involved. On both sides, CBAs largely serve as a means of quelling industrial unrest in Nigeria without a genuine commitment to implementation. Importantly, the attitude of the Nigerian courts, as interpreters and final arbiters in industrial disputes, continues to create confusion and a lack of clarity about the enforceability of CBAs.
CBAs between the government as employer and the labour unions have thus largely remained a paper tiger. This state of affairs aligns with the theories of Industrial Democracy and Marxian class struggle adopted in this study. In theory, CBAs remain the ideal labour law mechanism, grounded in industrial democracy, for settling disputes between workers and their employers. In practice, the benefits derivable from CBAs are unenforceable because of the tensions and mutual contradictions between the parties, exemplified by the Marxian class struggle.
To achieve fruitful and enforceable CBAs in Nigeria, the study submits that there must be cooperation and harmony between the parties to CBAs and the courts, to balance the struggles between the actors. Reform will require a combination of legislative, policy and attitudinal measures. The study therefore makes the following recommendations.
A. Legislative reform
The study recommends a holistic and deliberate process of amending, or creating new provisions in, the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and other Nigerian labour legislation, to ensure an effective CBA environment in which CBAs are no longer treated as gentlemen’s agreements but as legally binding contracts, in the following areas.
i. Recognition of the right to collective bargaining as a fundamental right
The study proposes the introduction of fair labour rights as a fundamental right under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. This recognition would, among other labour practices, elevate the right of workers and their employers to enter into CBAs to the status of a constitutional right, with all the privileges attached to it. The study argues that such recognition would change the mindset of both workers and the government employer on the importance of CBAs in labour relations.
ii. Codification of the enforceability of CBAs under the Trade Disputes Act 2004
The study recommends legislative reform that would codify explicitly that a CBA is a valid, standing contract for all employees covered by the union. This would abolish the common law position on the non-justiciability of CBAs and make them legally enforceable. Codification ensures that the law is known with certainty and serves as a signpost for all parties.92
iii. Negotiation standards and procedural policy to instil good faith
To prevent bad faith in collective bargaining, Nigeria needs to codify basic negotiation standards in the Trade Disputes Act 2004 and to provide procedural direction through policy. These standards should provide, among other things, for sending empowered representatives to the negotiating table, mandatory and objective disclosure of information, timelines to minimise delay, meticulous documentation and clear timelines for implementation. Such structural and procedural reforms would go a long way towards instilling a culture of good faith in negotiations between government and labour unions.
iv. Repeal of ministerial approval under the Trade Disputes Act 2004
The study recommends the repeal of section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, under which CBAs are deposited with the Minister of Labour, who may by order make them binding. Removing this power would make agreements enforceable immediately upon signature by the parties. It would also reduce the apparent conflict of interest in Nigerian public sector CBAs, to which the Minister is always a party.
v. Regulation of the duplication of labour unions in Nigeria
The government should strengthen the regulatory bodies responsible for the registration and supervision of trade unions in Nigeria, which would reduce the proliferation of unions. To curb that proliferation, section 12 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, as amended by the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, should be amended to regulate the multiplicity of unions and associations and to check the cyclical and unhealthy competition among them, for effective CBAs. The principle of one union in one industry or sector should be maintained, through either policy or legislation. There should be a balanced but strict control mechanism for the registration of workers’ unions in Nigeria’s public sector that does not infringe the right to freedom of association.
B. Judicial certainty and a progressive approach to the enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria
The study recommends a progressive judicial approach to the validity and enforceability of CBAs in Nigeria that removes the conflict between the Supreme Court’s older, restrictive view and the progressive stance of the NICN. The courts urgently need to depart from the common law notion that CBAs are unenforceable. To that end, the Supreme Court, as the apex court, should revisit its decision in BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc93 and pronounce that CBAs are enforceable whether or not their terms have been incorporated into a particular contract of service, in line with international best practice and the spirit of section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as inserted by the Third Alteration Act 2010. Revisiting that decision would clear up the confusion and make it easier for the lower courts to apply the principle in future collective bargaining cases.
Acknowledgement
This study was supported and funded by the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund), Nigeria, under the Institution-Based Research (IBR) intervention, Reference No. TETF/DR&D/CE/NP/WUDIL/IBR/2025/VOL.1.
*****
Footnotes
1. Ugbomhe O. Ugbomhe & Osagie N.G., Collective Bargaining in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Hopes, 7 Journal of Human Resources Management and Labor Studies 20 (2019), https://doi.org/10.15640/jhrmls.v7n1a3.
2. Neil W. Chamberlain, The Nature and Scope of Collective Bargaining, 58 Quarterly Journal of Economics 359 (1944).
3. Adanwo G. Omodu, Challenges of Collective Bargaining in Nigeria: Lesson from South Africa, 9 International Journal of Innovative Legal & Political Studies 12 (2021).
4. Omodu, supra note 3.
5. Ekene C. Chukwudi & Samuel S. Idowu, ASUU Strike and the Nigerian Governments: Implications on Students and Society in a Changing World, 12 South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics 294 (2021), https://doi.org/10.9734/sajsse/2021/v12i430336.
6. Joseph Erunke, ASUU Issues 14-Day Ultimatum to FG, Threatens Strike over Unmet Demands, Vanguard (Sept. 29, 2025), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/09/asuu-issues-14-day-ultimatum-to-fg-threatens-strike-over-unmet-demands/amp/.
7. Musa Adekunle, Resident Doctors to Resume Nationwide Strike January 12, The Guardian (Nigeria) (Jan. 3, 2026), https://guardian.ng/features/health/resident-doctors-to-resume-nationwide-strike-january-12.
8. Jesupemi Are, JOHESU Suspends Nationwide Strike After 84 Days, TheCable (Feb. 6, 2026), https://www.thecable.ng/johesu-suspends-nationwide-strike-after-84-days.
9. Olukayode Longe, Industrial Relations and Industrial Harmony: Connecting the Constructs for Goals Accomplishment in Nigerian Workplace, 25 Nigerian Journal of Management Science 147 (2024).
10. Longe, supra note 9.
11. David D. Go’ar & Magdalyne Dura, Fostering Reforms in the Enforcement of Collective Agreements in Nigeria, 7 International Review of Law and Jurisprudence 20 (2025).
12. Matthew Mitchell, Analyzing the Law Qualitatively, 23 Qualitative Research Journal 102 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-04-2022-0061.
13. Frank Burchill, Collective Bargaining, in Frank Burchill, Labour Relations (Palgrave 1997), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14497-6_6.
14. Peter Ackers, Collective Bargaining as Industrial Democracy: Hugh Clegg and the Political Foundations of British Industrial Relations Pluralism, 45 British Journal of Industrial Relations 77 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2007.00603.x.
15. E.D. Rose, Employment Relations 6 (3d ed., Pearson Education 2007); Dale Yoder, Labor Economics and Industrial Relations 8 (South-Western Publishing 1958).
16. John E. Opute & Ali B. Mahmoud, What Sort of Collective Bargaining Is Emerging in Nigeria?, 52 Personnel Review 166 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1108/PR-12-2020-0872.
17. Bruce E. Kaufman, The Global Evolution of Industrial Relations: Events, Ideas and the IIRA (International Labour Office 2004).
18. John P. Windmuller et al., Collective Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies: A Reappraisal (International Labour Office 1987).
19. Vernon H. Jensen, Notes on the Beginnings of Collective Bargaining, 9 ILR Review 225 (1956).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Borislav Galic & Rajko Raonic, Historical Development of Collective Bargaining, 21 Kultura Polisa 43 (2024).
23. Id.
24. Olusola I. Fajana & Tunde S. Elegbede, A Critique of Collective Bargaining Policy in Nigeria from Colonial Era Till Date, 3 LASU Journal of Employment Relations & Human Resource Management 29 (2022), https://doi.org/10.36108/ljerhrm/2202.03.0130.
25. Id.
26. Promise Green, Collective Agreements and the Enforceability Conundrum in Nigeria, 19 UNIZIK Law Journal 159 (2023).
27. O.V.C. Okene, Labour Law in Nigeria: The Law of Work 219 (3d ed., Claxton & Derrick 2012).
28. Mary Arthur-Jolasinmi & Jacob Abusomwan, New Trends in Enforcement of Collective Agreement in the 21st Century Industrial Relations in Nigeria, 2 African Journal of Legal Research 1 (2024).
29. Emuobo Emudainohwo, Towards the Enforceability of Collective Agreements in Nigerian Law, 9 E-Journal of International and Comparative Labour Studies 54 (2020), https://ejcls.adapt.it/index.php/ejcls_adapt/article/view/844.
30. Josephine Adejoke Adebayo & Ajibade Toluwalase Toyosi, Collective Bargaining and Collective Agreement in Nigeria: Bindingness and Enforceability, 8 Journal of Commercial and Property Law 68 (2021), https://journals.unizik.edu.ng/jcpl/article/view/810.
31. BPE v. Dangote Cement Plc (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1717) 322 (SC).
32. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 (CA).
33. Ugbomhe & Osagie, supra note 1.
34. Emudainohwo, supra note 29.
35. Adebayo & Toyosi, supra note 30.
36. Arthur-Jolasinmi & Abusomwan, supra note 28.
37. Michael Poole, Theories of Industrial Democracy: The Emerging Synthesis, 30 Sociological Review 181 (1982), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1982.tb00753.x.
38. Erland Waldenström, Industrial Democracy in Theory and Practice, 116 Journal of the Royal Society of Arts (1968), https://www.jstor.org/stable/41371861.
39. Id.
40. L.H. Schmidt, A Marxist Theory of Class Struggle, 20 Acta Sociologica (1977) (reviewing Étienne Balibar, Cinq études du matérialisme historique and Sur la dictature du prolétariat), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194206.
41. O.V.C. Okene & E.N.A. Okere, Workers’ Participation at the Workplace: Between Collective Bargaining and Industrial Democracy Practice in Nigeria, 9 DELSU Law Review 47 (2023).
42. Walther Müller-Jentsch, Industrial Democracy: Historical Development and Current Challenges, 19 Management Revue 260 (2008), https://doi.org/10.5771/0935-9915-2008-4-260.
43. Douglas E. Booth, Collective Action, Marx’s Class Theory, and the Union Movement, 12 Journal of Economic Issues 163 (1978), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4224670.
44. William C. Adams, Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews, in Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation (K.E. Newcomer, H.P. Hatry & J.S. Wholey eds., 4th ed. 2015), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119171386.ch19.
45. Sunil Bhalla, Nurhidayah Bahar & Kanagi Kanapathy, Pre-testing Semi-Structured Interview Questions Using Expert Review and Cognitive Interview Methods, 7 International Journal of Business and Management 11 (2023), https://doi.org/10.26666/rmp.ijbm.2023.5.2.
46. L.A. Palinkas et al., Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research, 42 Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research 533 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-013-0528-y.
47. M. Hennink & B.N. Kaiser, Sample Sizes for Saturation in Qualitative Research: A Systematic Review of Empirical Tests, 292 Social Science & Medicine 114523 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114523.
48. Mitchell Nicmanis, Reflexive Content Analysis: An Approach to Qualitative Data Analysis, Reduction, and Description, 23 International Journal of Qualitative Methods (2024), https://doi.org/10.1177/16094069241236603.
49. V. Braun & V. Clarke, Thematic Analysis, in 2 APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology: Research Designs: Quantitative, Qualitative, Neuropsychological, and Biological 57 (H. Cooper ed., 2012), https://doi.org/10.1037/13620-004.
50. Oko C. Enworo, Application of Guba and Lincoln’s Parallel Criteria to Assess Trustworthiness of Qualitative Research on Indigenous Social Protection Systems, 23 Qualitative Research Journal 372 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-08-2022-0116.
51. Andrew K. Shenton, Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects, 22 Education for Information 63 (2004), https://doi.org/10.3233/EFI-2004-22201.
52. Ford Motor Co. Ltd v. Amalgamated Union of Engineering & Foundry Workers [1969] 1 WLR 339 (QB) (Eng.).
53. Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1 (SC).
54. BPE, supra note 31.
55. Victor Obinna Chukwuma, The Enforceability of Unincorporated Collective Agreements in Nigeria, 4 UNILAG Law Review 254 (2021).
56. BPE, supra note 31.
57. Chukwuma, supra note 55, at 256.
58. Id.
59. Osoh, supra note 53, at 31 C–D.
60. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 (CA).
61. O.D. Ejere & D.A. Akhabue, Legal Implications of the Constitution (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 on the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court, 7 Journal of Research & Method in Education 60 (2017).
62. Id.
63. Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) v. MRS Oil Nigeria Plc, Suit No. NICN/LA/595/2012 (NICN May 6, 2020).
64. Edet, supra note 32.
65. Osoh, supra note 53.
66. BPE, supra note 31.
67. Aghata N. Onuorah v. Access Bank Plc (2015) 55 NLLR (Pt. 186) 17 (NICN).
68. Valentine Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014 (NICN July 12, 2016).
69. E.A. Kenen, Collective Agreements and Their Legal Status in Nigeria: The Current Trends, 10 Benue State University Law Journal 30, 41–42 (2021).
70. M.J.D. Akpan, Nature of Collective Agreements in Nigeria: A Panoramic Analysis of Inherent Implementation Challenges, 5 Global Journal of Politics and Law Research 10 (2017).
71. Id.
72. Alan K. Simpson, The Concept of Good Faith Bargaining under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 12 Wyoming Law Journal 136 (1958), https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol12/iss2/13.
73. Robinson M. Olulu & Sylvester A.F. Udeorah, The Principle of Collective Bargaining in Nigeria and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Standards, 2 International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science 63 (2018).
74. Id.
75. Emmett P. O’Neill, The Good Faith Requirement in Collective Bargaining, 21 Montana Law Review 202 (1959).
76. Note, Boulwareism and Good Faith Collective Bargaining, 63 Michigan Law Review 1473 (1965), https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss8/10.
77. ASUU Strike: Okpara Varsity Lecturers Reject Unilateral Salary Increase, Ikenga Online (Aug. 26, 2022), https://ikengaonline.com/asuu-strike-okpara-varsity-lecturers-reject-unilateral-salary-increase/.
78. Johnbosco Agbakwuru, FG Promises to Address ‘Soft Threats’ by Labour Unions, Vanguard (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/11/fg-promises-to-address-soft-threats-by-labour-unions/amp/.
79. Doyin Adebusuyi, Ekiti: Workers, Labour Officials Bicker over Alleged Govt Bribe, Daily Trust (June 26, 2016), https://dailytrust.com/ekiti-workers-labour-officials-bicker-over-alleged-govt-bribe/6.
80. Charles I.G. Agwor, The Power of the Minister of Labour and Employment to Resolve Dispute in Nigeria Under the Trade Dispute Act: A Legal Appraisal, 10 Rivers State University Journal of Public Law 202 (2023).
81. Id.
82. Trade Disputes Act, Cap. T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, § 3; see also David Eyongndi, The Role of the Minister of Labour and Productivity in the Settlement of Trade Disputes in Nigeria: A Necessary Intervention or an Unnecessary Intrusion (Academia.edu).
83. Rabiu Isa, Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff & Ani Munirah Muhammad, Towards an Enforceable Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Nigerian Public Sector, 30 Educational Administration: Theory and Practice 3339 (2024), https://doi.org/10.53555/kuey.v30i1.3232.
84. Anigboro v. Sea Trucks (Nigeria) Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 35 (CA); see also Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Suit No. NIC/LA/15/2011 (NIC Feb. 21, 2012) (holding that management may not interfere in a union’s internal affairs).
85. Nigeria Labour Congress, History of NLC, https://www.nlcng.org/nlc-history/.
86. Femi Falana, How Proscription of Trade Unions Was Fought under Military and Civilian Regimes in Nigeria, Vanguard (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/10/how-proscription-of-trade-unions-was-fought-under-military-and-civilian-regimes-in-nigeria/; see also Femi Falana, How Proscription of Trade Unions Was Fought under Military and Civilian Regimes in Nigeria, Sahara Reporters (Oct. 8, 2025), https://saharareporters.com/2025/10/08/how-proscription-trade-unions-was-fought-under-military-and-civilian-regimes-nigeria.
87. Rabiu Isa, Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff & Ani Munirah Muhammad, Proliferation of Trade Unions in Nigeria: Implication on the Collective Bargaining Process in Nigeria’s Public Sector, 57 Journal of Tianjin University Science and Technology 217 (2024), https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13744378.
88. Iyabo Lawal et al., Strike: FG Weakens ASUU, Registers Rival Union, The Guardian (Nigeria) (Oct. 5, 2022), https://guardian.ng/news/strike-fg-weakens-asuu-registers-rival-union/.
89. FG Created CONUA to Weaken ASUU’s Negotiating Power, Ex-NLC President Claims, TheCable (Jan. 6, 2026), https://www.thecable.ng/fg-created-conua-to-weaken-asuus-negotiating-power-ex-nlc-president-claims/.
90. Agu S. Maduka & Stanley Obiorah, Limits of Collective Bargaining in the Nigerian Public Service, 3 Niger Delta Journal of Gender, Peace & Conflict Studies 113 (2023), https://nigerdeltajournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/7.-Limits-of-Collective-Bargaining-in-the-Nigerian-Public-Service.pdf.
91. For example, by March 2026 the implementation of the agreement signed between ASUU and the Federal Government in January 2026 was facing delays in many federal universities because of budgetary constraints. See Owede Agbajileke, Fresh Strike Looms over Delay in Implementation of FG-ASUU Renegotiated Pact, The Guardian (Nigeria) (Mar. 12, 2026), https://guardian.ng/news/fresh-strike-looms-over-delay-in-implementation-of-fg-asuu-renegotiated-pact/.
92. James L. Brierly, The Codification of International Law, 47 Michigan Law Review 2 (1948).
93. BPE, supra note 31.
