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International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
ISSN 2581-5369 · Open access
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
Open accessArticlesVol. 9 No. VI (2026)pp. 565–579

The Right to Have Rights as a Legal Test for the Rohingya in Bangladesh

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Published 16 November 2026 · pp. 565–579 · Vol. 9 No. VI (2026)
Abstract

Hannah Arendt described the condition of the stateless as the loss of a “right to have rights”; the right to belong to a community in which one’s actions and opinions count. This article turns that idea into a legal test and applies it to the Rohingya in Bangladesh. The test has three cumulative thresholds: recognition (being legible to the legal order as a person), standing (being able to bring a claim and have it heard) and agency (being able to act with legal effect). Each threshold is assessed at three levels: what the law says, whether a person can use it, and whether using it changes the outcome. Drawing on doctrinal and documentary analysis of the Constitution, statutes, case law and camp instruments, the article finds that the Rohingya are recognised but unheard. Registration makes them administratively legible but confers no civil legal personality; they appear before the legal system mainly as accused persons rather than as claimants; and their movement, work, association and expression are restricted by executive and camp-level measures. These failures flow not from any statute that denies their rights, but from sub-statutory instruments of doubtful legality under article 31 of the Constitution. The Constitution’s text grounds standing for “any person” in respect of core personal rights, but it cannot by itself restore agency, and standing on paper has not become standing in practice. The article offers a constitutional test of rightlessness that can be applied to stateless populations in other states outside the Refugee Convention.

Keywords
right to have rightsRohingyastatelessnessaccess to justiceHannah Arendt
Contents
Full text

Introduction

A. The problem

Bangladesh hosts about 1.2 million Rohingya, and nearly all of them are known to the state.1 They have been registered, photographed and fingerprinted, and carry cards that identify them to officials and aid agencies alike.2 Yet a Rohingya family whose child has been assaulted in the camps cannot report the crime to the police without the approval of a government camp official,3 and of twenty-six violent crimes documented by Human Rights Watch in 2023, only three led to an arrest.4 Over roughly the same period, the police arrested at least 900 Rohingya.5 The Rohingya are visible to the state when it acts against them, but largely unable to act through it. They are, in short, recognised but unheard.

This condition is well documented. Socio-legal studies record how statelessness, the absence of a refugee law, the scarcity of legal aid and the authority of camp officials keep the Rohingya away from the courts, and how most disputes are settled informally inside the camps.6 What these studies do not ask is whether, as a matter of constitutional law, the Rohingya hold what Hannah Arendt called a “right to have rights”: the right “to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions”.7 One recent study observes that Bangladesh’s judiciary “has not yet directly dealt with” the constitutional rights of the Rohingya.8 And the extensive literature on Arendt’s phrase has theorised rightlessness without turning it into a test that can be applied to a particular constitution.9

B. Thesis and contribution

This article asks whether the Rohingya in Bangladesh hold the right to have rights, understood as recognition, standing and agency, and, if not, where, why and how far the Constitution can close the gap. It argues that the Rohingya are recognised but unheard. Bangladesh makes them administratively legible but withholds effective standing and agency, not through any statute denying their rights, but through executive and camp-level instruments and broad discretion. The Constitution’s text grounds standing for “any person” in respect of core personal rights,10 but it cannot by itself restore agency, and standing on paper has not become standing in practice. The contribution is twofold: a three-threshold legal test built from Arendt’s idea, and, to the authors’ knowledge, its first application to a national constitution and to a stateless population living under it.

The article uses doctrinal legal method.11 It analyses the Constitution, the statutes governing foreigners and civil registration, and decisions of the Supreme Court,12 together with the executive and camp-level instruments that regulate the camps. Where an instrument is not public, the article relies on official summaries and on reports by UN agencies and human rights organisations.13 It distinguishes the groups that the Government and UNHCR themselves distinguish: refugees registered in the early 1990s and people registered since 2017 as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” (FDMN).14

After a review of the existing scholarship (Part 2), Part 3 builds the test and Part 4 applies it. Parts 5 and 6 trace the legal sources of the failures and assess what the Constitution can do, and Part 7 concludes.

Existing scholarship

Hannah Arendt introduced the phrase “the right to have rights” in The Origins of Totalitarianism, in her chapter on the decline of the nation-state, to name the right to belong to a political community in which one’s actions and opinions count.15 Later scholarship has developed the idea in several directions. Benhabib reads it as a right to membership that should not depend on nationality;16 Gündoğdu shows that rightlessness persists even where people formally hold rights, as migrants and asylum seekers find within human rights systems;17 and DeGooyer and others debate whether the phrase names a right, a demand or a political practice.18 In international law, Kesby traces how the right has been anchored in nationality, citizenship, humanity and politics, and shows that each anchor produces exclusions of its own.19 These works loosely anticipate the three thresholds proposed here: recognition, standing and agency. Yet they remain theoretical. They diagnose rightlessness but offer no test that can be applied to a particular legal order.

A second strand is socio-legal. It shows that Rohingya refugees are routinely diverted from the formal courts into camp-based justice run by community leaders (majhis) and government Camp-in-Charge (CiC) officials.20 Studies by Wara, the International Rescue Committee and the Centre for Peace and Justice document the majhis’ hold over dispute resolution, which is male-dominated, unaccountable and open to corruption, and the broad discretion that CiC officials exercise over movement and over whether a complaint reaches the police or a court.21 Sakib and others place this within a patron–client structure of camp governance.22 This literature, however, treats these problems as operational, sociocultural or humanitarian governance deficits.23 It does not ask whether this sub-statutory regime is lawful under article 31 of the Constitution, or whether the Rohingya hold standing and agency rather than mere administrative legibility.24

A third strand concerns refugee protection through South Asian constitutions, and it has mostly been studied as a matter of outcomes in individual cases. Indian scholars trace how, in the absence of a refugee statute, the Supreme Court extended article 21 to non-citizens and High Courts read non-refoulement into it,25 while recent commentary on the Rohingya petitions finds that protective line eroding.26 In Bangladesh, writers note that the liberalised standing rule under article 102 opened the courts to public interest petitioners,27 and argue that articles 31 to 35 reach non-nationals, while identifying outdated statutes, the absence of a refugee law and exposure to detention under the Foreigners Act as obstacles.28 The few favourable orders, such as the 2017 judgment in RMMRU, were obtained by organisations litigating on refugees’ behalf.29 This scholarship studies protection through particular judgments and doctrines; it does not ask whether refugees reach the thresholds that make a judgment possible. Taken together, the three strands leave one question unanswered: whether, as a matter of constitutional law, a stateless population is recognised, heard and able to act.

Turning the right to have rights into a legal test

A. Arendt’s idea

For Arendt, the calamity of the stateless in interwar Europe was not the loss of particular rights but of any community willing and able to guarantee them.30 What they lacked was a “right to have rights”, which she described as the right “to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions”.31 They were deprived, in her account, not of freedom but of action, and not of thought but of opinion.32 She also identified a bitter paradox: the stateless could gain the protection of the law only as offenders against it, so that the surest sign of standing “outside the pale of the law” was that one would benefit by committing a crime.33 Later readers have given the phrase different anchors. Michelman reads it as a right of political inclusion; Kesby traces how international law has tied it to nationality, citizenship, humanity and politics; and Rancière and Schaap treat it as something the rightless enact by making claims.34 These readings share a focus on membership, whether a person counts within a legal order, not how many rights it lists.

B. Three thresholds and three levels

This article proposes that the right to have rights can be operationalised as three thresholds, each a condition of the next. Arendt does not divide the idea in this way; the thresholds draw together three elements of her account, namely the loss of a place in the law, the paradox that the stateless are heard only as offenders, and the loss of the right to action and opinion.35 The first threshold is recognition, being legible to the legal order as a person. International law expresses it as the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law and the right of every child to be registered at birth.36 Recognition in this sense is more than administrative legibility, the state’s capacity to count and track a population. It is civil legal personality: the capacity to have one’s birth, marriage and identity recorded with legal effect.37

The second threshold is standing: being able to bring a claim, as claimant or victim, and to have it heard. Its legal expressions are equality before the courts and the right to an effective remedy.38 Arendt’s paradox shows why standing must be measured from the position of the claimant: appearing in court as an accused is presence before the law, not standing within it.39 The third threshold is agency: being able to act within the legal order in ways that it gives effect to, by moving, working, associating and speaking.40 Each threshold is then assessed at three levels: what the law says (text), whether a person can actually use it (access), and whether using it changes the outcome (consequence).41

C. Why the test is neither nationality nor a checklist

Two shortcuts must be avoided. The first equates the right to have rights with nationality. Nationality is the surest route to it: Bangladesh’s Urdu-speaking camp residents moved from exclusion to the electoral roll once the courts confirmed that they were citizens.42 But nationality is sufficient, not necessary. The Constitution itself extends the protection of law to “every other person for the time being within Bangladesh”,43 and Kesby shows that tying the right to nationality reproduces the very exclusion Arendt described.44 The second shortcut counts rights on paper. Measured that way, the Rohingya would score well, since the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects everyone within a state’s jurisdiction; yet Gündoğdu shows that rightlessness persists among people who formally hold rights.45

The test therefore remains Arendtian only if it measures membership in a legal order in which a person’s claims are heard and actions have legal effect, assessed at the levels of access and consequence as well as text. On this view, nationality satisfies the test, its absence does not automatically fail it, and rights on paper do not by themselves pass it.

Recognised but unheard: applying the test

A. Recognition

At the threshold of recognition, the Rohingya are administratively legible but lack civil legal personality. At the level of text, article 31 protects “every other person for the time being within Bangladesh”, but Bangladesh has no refugee statute, and the Foreigners Act 1946 treats every non-citizen simply as a foreigner.46 The state designates the post-2017 arrivals as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals”, a label that avoids the term “refugee” and keeps repatriation at the centre of policy.47

At the level of access, a joint Government–UNHCR exercise begun in 2018 issued biometric identity cards to more than one million people, recording their place of origin in Myanmar.48 The cards secure access to aid, but they confer no legal status or lawful residence.49 The two populations differ in their starting point but converge in practice. Children of the refugees registered in the early 1990s could have their births registered under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 2004 from 2015,50 but birth registration across Cox’s Bazar was suspended after the 2017 influx and, although later restored for citizens, remains unavailable in the camps.51

At the level of consequence, the cards make the Rohingya traceable for assistance and containment without giving them the legal capacity to contract, hold property or bring civil proceedings in their own name.52 Recognition therefore serves to manage the population rather than to make its members persons before the law.53

B. Standing

The Rohingya appear before Bangladeshi authorities mainly as the objects of criminal process. The Foreigners Act 1946 makes no exception for refugees, and police reportedly arrested around 300 Rohingya under it in 2021, around 130 of them for living outside the camps, before the figure fell to 74 in 2022.54 Registration has not prevented prosecution: UNHCR-registered refugees have been jailed on immigration and criminal charges, and camp officials have handed unregistered residents to the police.55 Rohingya deported from Saudi Arabia have been jailed for passport offences,56 and punishment can outlast the sentence: in RMMRU, a Rohingya man convicted under section 3 of the Act remained in prison after his term had ended until the High Court Division ordered his release.57 Beyond immigration charges, refugees face arbitrary detention, extortion and camp crackdowns such as “Operation Root Out”.58

As claimants, the Rohingya are largely absent. Victims report that they cannot go to the police without the Camp-in-Charge’s approval,59 and they can rarely appear in court or obtain legal aid.60 Disputes pass from a mosque committee to the majhi and then to the Camp-in-Charge, who decides whether a case reaches the police;61 officials, for their part, say that complainants decline to register cases.62 The pattern matches Arendt’s observation that the stateless gain the law’s attention as offenders.63 Peters, drawing on Nancy Fraser, describes this as political misframing: lacking direct standing, refugees cannot bring claims themselves and depend on others to bring them.64 The legal order sees the Rohingya as defendants, not as claimants, so recognition has not produced standing.65

C. Agency

Agency fails at every level. At the level of text, the Constitution reserves to citizens the rights through which a person acts in public life. Movement, assembly, association, speech and the choice of a profession belong to “every citizen”;66 only freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed to all.67 The Rohingya therefore begin with no textual claim to agency.

At the level of access, executive measures have narrowed what little space remains. In September 2019 the telecoms regulator ordered operators to stop selling SIM cards to Rohingya and to cut mobile internet in the camps,68 and the authorities confiscated more than 12,000 SIM cards.69 That month the Home Minister announced that the camps would be fenced so that the Rohingya “do not leave the camp”,70 and construction began that November.71 Checkpoints, the closure of community schools and the destruction of refugee-run shops followed,72 and from December 2020 nearly 20,000 people were relocated to the island of Bhasan Char.73 The Rohingya have no right to work, so those who earn a living do so informally and at risk.74 Because these measures apply across the camps, registered refugees and FDMN stand in the same position.

At the level of consequence, the sources reviewed record no successful court challenge by Rohingya to any of these restrictions. The few favourable orders concern release from detention,75 and the constitutional route to court has, in one assessment, “never been used” by the Rohingya themselves.76 Agency is therefore not merely limited: it is absent in the text, blocked in practice and untested in court.

Delegation, not denial: the legal sources of the restrictions

A. The statutory framework and its delegation

Bangladesh has no refugee statute. Non-citizens, whatever the reason for their presence, are governed mainly by the Foreigners Act 1946, which defines a foreigner simply as a person who is not a citizen of Bangladesh.77 Section 3 empowers the government to regulate, prohibit or restrict the entry, presence and movement of foreigners, including by arrest and detention, and section 14 makes any contravention an offence.78 Section 10 allows exemptions for classes of foreigners and section 12 permits the delegation of these powers, but no published rule anchors camp administration in either provision.79 Nor does any statute expressly deny the Rohingya legal personhood or access to the courts; general statutes such as the Penal Code 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to “any person” within the territory.80

The exclusion is produced instead by delegation. Daily administration rests on a 2017 directive of the Prime Minister’s Office and on government directives, ministerial circulars and verbal instructions issued by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner under the 2013 National Strategy.81 Within this framework, Camp-in-Charge officials, civil servants vested with the powers of executive magistrates, control movement permissions, mobile courts and referrals to the courts, while the majhis, a system first set up by the army in the 1990s and revived during the 2017 influx, dominate informal dispute resolution.82 Bilateral and tripartite memoranda of understanding, including confidential data-sharing agreements and the 2021 memorandum on Bhasan Char, impose further restrictions without parliamentary scrutiny.83 Socio-legal studies document these practices but leave their legal basis largely unexamined.84

B. The constitutional legality of the restrictions

Whether this regime is lawful turns on article 31, which protects “every other person for the time being within Bangladesh” and bars action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property except “in accordance with law”.85 Article 152(1) defines “law” broadly, to include any Act, Ordinance, order, rule, regulation, bye-law, notification or other legal instrument having the force of law in Bangladesh.86 A sub-statutory instrument is therefore not invalid merely because Parliament did not enact it; the question is whether it rests on valid statutory delegation and has the force of law.

Measured against that test, much of the camp regime is doubtful. Orders under section 3 of the Foreigners Act and prosecutions under section 14 rest on statutory authority.87 In RMMRU, moreover, the High Court Division treated executive action concerning refugees as bound by customary international norms such as non-refoulement.88 But the Camp-in-Charge’s control over complaints and over movement beyond the camp fences rests on the 2017 directive of the Prime Minister’s Office and on unpublished circulars, executive orders and verbal directives, not on rules framed under section 12.89 Confidential memoranda and unpublished ministerial instructions also fail the basic rule-of-law requirement of accessibility, leaving refugees unable to know the rules that confine them.90 Because unpublished executive instructions are not “law” within article 152(1), measures that curtail liberty, physical security or access to justice on that basis do not satisfy article 31.91

What the Constitution can and cannot do

This Part asks which of these gaps Bangladesh’s constitutional text can close without treaty accession.92 It can close only some of them. The text grounds standing for core personal rights and reaches agency only through a contested reading of “life”, and it offers no assurance that standing will translate into access or consequence.

A. Standing in the text

Part III of the Constitution is largely addressed to citizens, but a core of it is not. Article 31 extends the protection of law to “every other person for the time being within Bangladesh”; article 32 prohibits deprivation of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law; and articles 34 and 35 prohibit forced labour and regulate trial and punishment in general terms.93 Standing follows from article 102, which admits “any person aggrieved”, a phrase the Appellate Division read in Farooque to include a public interest petitioner.94 RMMRU shows that the text can serve a Rohingya claimant: the High Court Division held that detention beyond sentence breached article 32, treating it as protecting non-citizens, and ordered release into UNHCR custody.95 Article 31 also governs how the state acts, so that even action authorised by law violates it if it is carried out otherwise than in accordance with law.96 This accords with the Human Rights Committee’s view that Covenant rights attach to everyone within a state’s territory, irrespective of nationality or statelessness,97 and with Indian decisions holding that article 21, framed in terms of persons, protects non-citizens.98 For the test, this is the minimum: a legal order in which a non-citizen’s claim can be heard under a rule that does not depend on nationality.99

B. The agency gap

Agency is where the text runs out. Articles 36, 37, 38 and 40, which secure movement, assembly, association and profession, are guaranteed only to “every citizen”,100 and the camp regime restricts each of these freedoms.101 The restrictions derive from the 2017 directive of the Prime Minister’s Office, camp-level control and the Foreigners Act 1946, not from legislation directed at refugees.102 The text alone cannot cure this, because the rights that would give agency content are withheld by their own wording. The only textual route is the livelihood reading of “life”: in Ain o Salish Kendra, the High Court Division read articles 31 and 32 to protect livelihood, following Olga Tellis, while holding the directive principle on shelter unenforceable.103 That reading arose in slum-eviction litigation, and to the authors’ knowledge its extension to a non-citizen’s claim is untested.

Indian practice marks the limit. In Hans Muller the Supreme Court denied foreigners any right to reside and treated the power to expel as unfettered; in Salimullah, while accepting that articles 14 and 21 protect non-citizens, it tied the right not to be deported to article 19(1)(e), which belongs only to citizens,104 although some High Courts now require a hearing before a foreigner’s movement is restricted.105 The Human Rights Committee reviews such restrictions under article 12(3) of the Covenant, but only for aliens lawfully present, a status the Rohingya’s position leaves in doubt.106 Gündoğdu’s warning therefore applies: rights held on paper can leave rightlessness intact.107

C. Text without effect

Standing in the text does not automatically become access. Without documents, legal aid or lawyers, and fearing detention under the Foreigners Act, most Rohingya never reach a court.108 The Legal Aid Services Act 2000 does not mention immigration status, yet the Rohingya are unable to use it in practice,109 and disputes are settled in an informal camp system under the Camp-in-Charge’s control.110 Even successful cases may lack consequence: slum-eviction litigation under the same articles has produced rulings that critics describe as symbolic, because evictions continue.111 Article 33(3) adds a separate gap. The arrest safeguards in clauses (1) and (2) do not apply to an “enemy alien” or to a person held under a preventive-detention law, so a Rohingya detained under such a law would lose them.112 As Zia Uddin Ahmed and Ridwan and Dev argue, the Constitution can ground standing for core rights of life and liberty, but it cannot supply recognition, movement or association; affirmative refugee status and self-reliance require legislation and executive reform.113

Conclusion

This article asked whether the Rohingya in Bangladesh hold the right to have rights. Turning Arendt’s idea into a test of three thresholds, each assessed at the levels of text, access and consequence, it finds that they do not, and that the failure follows a consistent pattern: the Rohingya are recognised but unheard.

At the threshold of recognition, registration and biometric cards make the Rohingya legible to the state without making them persons before the law, their births go largely unregistered, and the cards confer no legal status. At the threshold of standing, the text is met, because articles 31, 32 and 102 extend to any person, but the Rohingya reach the legal system mainly as accused persons; as claimants they depend on camp officials’ permission and on organisations litigating on their behalf. At the threshold of agency, the text itself fails, because the rights of movement, assembly, association, speech and profession belong to citizens, and executive measures have narrowed what remains. Registered refugees fare marginally better than FDMN only in access to recognition; otherwise, the two populations converge.

These failures are produced not by any statute that denies the Rohingya their rights but by delegation: directives, circulars, verbal instructions and confidential agreements, many of which lack a published statutory basis and are therefore doubtful “law” under articles 31 and 152(1). The Constitution can close part of the gap. It already grounds standing for core personal rights and has been used to secure release from unlawful detention. It cannot, by its own text, restore agency, and standing on paper has not become standing in practice.

Two implications follow. First, the constitutional route remains open but under-used: the courts could test the legality of the camp regime under article 31 and require the instruments that govern the camps to be published. Second, closing the agency gap requires legislation, whether a refugee statute or targeted amendment, because rights the Constitution reserves to citizens cannot be read to include non-citizens. The study is desk-based, relies on published reports for evidence of access and consequence, and cannot capture unreported orders. Its test, however, is not confined to Bangladesh. It offers a way to ask of any state outside the Refugee Convention not whether refugees hold rights on paper, but whether the legal order hears them.

*****

Footnotes

1. Joint Gov’t of Bangl. & UNHCR, Rohingya Refugee Population Dashboard (June 2026), https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/123174 (recording 1,200,171 individuals).

2. Hum. Rts. Watch, UN Shared Rohingya Data Without Informed Consent (June 15, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent; see also Joint Gov’t of Bangl. & UNHCR, supra note 1 (noting that new arrivals are “only issued family cards”).

3. Hum. Rts. Watch, Bangladesh: Spiraling Violence Against Rohingya Refugees (July 13, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/13/bangladesh-spiraling-violence-against-rohingya-refugees (reporting that families “could not get the required approval from the camp-in-charge”); Prot. Working Grp., Joint Protection Monitoring Report: Quarter 1 2022 (2022), https://rohingyaresponse.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PWG-Joint-Protection-Monitoring-Report-Q1-2022.pdf; Kaamil Ahmed, For Rohingya Refugees, Patchwork Justice Leaves Crimes Unpunished, New Humanitarian (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/09/17/Bangladesh-Rohingya-justice-system-crimes.

4. Hum. Rts. Watch, Spiraling Violence, supra note 3.

5. Hum. Rts. Watch, Bangladesh: Rampant Police Abuse of Rohingya Refugees (Jan. 17, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/17/bangladesh-rampant-police-abuse-rohingya-refugees (reporting at least 900 arrests since mid-2022).

6. Md. Asadujjaman, Rohingya Communities’ Barrier to Obtain Legal Remedies Through the Judicial System in Bangladesh: Legal Standing and Alternate Pathways, 22 Khulna Univ. Stud. 198 (2025); Emily Krehm & Asif Shahan, Int’l Rescue Comm. & Dev. Rsch. Initiative, Access to Justice for Rohingya and Host Community in Cox’s Bazar (2019), https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/3929/accessingjusticeassessmentexternalfinalsmall.pdf; Faustina Pereira, Jessica Olney & Azizul Hoque, Ctr. for Peace & Just. & Asia Found., Community Perspectives on Access to Civil Justice After Cross-Border Displacement: The Needs of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh (2021), https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/X-Border_Community-Perspectives-on-Access-to-Civil-Justice-after-Cross-Border-Displacement-The-needs-of-Rohingya-Refugees-in-Bangladesh.pdf; Umme Wara, Reconciliation and Justice Mechanism in the Rohingya Camps in Bangladesh, 43 BIISS J. 381 (2022).

7. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 296–97 (new ed. 1973) (1951).

8. Zia Uddin Ahmed, Rohingya and Bangladesh Constitution: Constitutional Obligation to Protect Refugees, 11 & 12 Indian J. Const. L. 281, 283 (2024).

9. Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law 13 (2012); Ayten Gündoğdu, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants (2015); Frank I. Michelman, Parsing “A Right to Have Rights,” 3 Constellations 200, 205 (1996).

10. Bangl. Const. arts. 31, 32, 44(1), 102(1); Refugee & Migratory Movements Rsch. Unit (RMMRU) v. Gov’t of Bangl., Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016 (H.C.D. May 31, 2017) (Bangl.), https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/bansc/2017/122883.

11. Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research, 17 Deakin L. Rev. 83, 101 (2012).

12. Bangl. Const.; The Foreigners Act, 1946 (Bangl.); The Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 (Bangl.); The Control of Entry Act, 1952 (Bangl.); The Births and Deaths Registration Act, 2004 (Bangl.).

13. Hum. Rts. Watch, UN Shared Rohingya Data, supra note 2; UNHCR, Bangladesh: Multi-Year Strategy 2023–2025 (2025), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/Bangladesh%20-%20Strategy%202023%20%E2%80%93%202025_0.pdf.

14. Joint Gov’t of Bangl. & UNHCR, supra note 1.

15. Arendt, supra note 7, at 296–97.

16. Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens 56–58 (2004).

17. Gündoğdu, supra note 9, at 3–5.

18. Stephanie DeGooyer et al., The Right to Have Rights 8–11 (2018).

19. Kesby, supra note 9, chs. 2–5.

20. Wara, Reconciliation and Justice, supra note 6, at 383–85; Prot. Sector Working Grp. Cox’s Bazar, Protection Considerations on the “Majhi System” 1 (June 30, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/protection-sector-working-group-cox-s-bazar-30-june-2018-protection-considerations; Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 203–04.

21. Wara, Reconciliation and Justice, supra note 6, at 390–93; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 26–31; Pereira et al., supra note 6, at 2–3, 6, 8–11; Prot. Sector Working Grp., supra note 20, at 1; Kazi Maruful Islam & Sumaiya Iqbal, Gender-Based Violence Within the Rohingya Community in Bangladesh: Intersectional Experiences of Victimization, 42 Soc. Sci. Rev. 1 (2026); see also Hum. Rts. Watch, Spiraling Violence, supra note 3 (reporting that families could not file police reports without the camp-in-charge’s approval).

22. Nurul Huda Sakib, Nusrat Mahmood & Tasbir Ul Islam, Patron-Client Relationship in the Rohingya Camps: Recent Trends and Impact on Refugee Governance, 10 J. Int’l Humanitarian Action 5 (2025).

23. Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 200–01; Pereira et al., supra note 6, at 3; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 33–34.

24. Bangl. Const. art. 31; cf. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 2 (1998) (on legibility as a project of the state); Arendt, supra note 7, at 286.

25. V. Vijayakumar, Judicial Responses to Refugee Protection in India, 12 Int’l J. Refugee L. 235 (2000); Prabodh Saxena, Creating Legal Space for Refugees in India: The Milestones Crossed and the Roadmap for the Future, 19 Int’l J. Refugee L. 246 (2007); see State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Khudiram Chakma, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 615 (India); Nat’l Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742 (India); Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India, 1999 Cri LJ 919 (Guj HC) (India).

26. Deewanshi Vats, From Haven to Hostility: India’s Changing Immigration Policy on Rohingya Refugees, Jurist (June 2025), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2025/06/from-haven-to-hostility-indias-changing-immigration-policy-on-rohingya-refugees; see Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India, I.A. No. 38048 of 2021 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 793 of 2017 (SC Apr. 8, 2021) (India).

27. Ridwanul Hoque, Judicial Activism in Bangladesh: A Golden Mean Approach (2011); see Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, (1997) 49 DLR (AD) 1 (Bangl.).

28. Manzoor Hasan & Arafat Reza, Evaluating Bangladesh’s Legal Framework for Rohingya Refugees: Gaps and Solutions, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 10, 2025), https://www.ejiltalk.org/evaluating-bangladeshs-legal-framework-for-rohingya-refugees-gaps-and-solutions/; C.R. Abrar, No Justice for Rohingyas?, Daily Star (2016), https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/no-justice-rohingyas-1196506; Zia Uddin Ahmed, supra note 8, at 285–86.

29. M. Sanjeeb Hossain, Bangladesh’s Judicial Encounter with the 1951 Refugee Convention, Forced Migration Rev., July 2021, https://www.fmreview.org/issue67/hossain/; Zia Uddin Ahmed, supra note 8, at 291; see RMMRU, Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016.

30. Arendt, supra note 7, at 295–97.

31. Id. at 296–97.

32. Id. at 296.

33. Arendt, supra note 7, at 286; see also Kesby, supra note 9, at 13.

34. Michelman, supra note 9, at 205; Kesby, supra note 9, chs. 2–5; Jacques Rancière, Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, 103 S. Atl. Q. 297, 306 (2004); Andrew Schaap, Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt, 10 Eur. J. Pol. Theory 22 (2011).

35. Arendt, supra note 7, at 286, 296; Kesby, supra note 9, at 13.

36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 16, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 6 (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Target 16.9 (Sept. 25, 2015).

37. Scott, supra note 24, at 2; Gündoğdu, supra note 9.

38. ICCPR, supra note 36, arts. 2(3), 14(1); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶¶ 10, 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005).

39. Arendt, supra note 7, at 286.

40. Arendt, supra note 7, at 296; Rancière, supra note 34, at 306; Schaap, supra note 34.

41. Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/12/5 (2012); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910).

42. Abid Khan v. Gov’t of Bangl., (2003) 55 DLR (HCD) 318 (Bangl.); Md. Sadaqat Khan (Fakku) v. Chief Election Comm’r, (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 407 (Bangl.).

43. Bangl. Const. art. 31.

44. Kesby, supra note 9, ch. 2; Benhabib, supra note 16, ch. 2.

45. General Comment No. 31, supra note 38, ¶ 10; Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, ¶ 2 (Apr. 11, 1986); Gündoğdu, supra note 9.

46. Bangl. Const. art. 31; The Foreigners Act, 1946, § 2(a) (Bangl.); Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 201, 203.

47. Umme Wara, A Comparative Analysis Between the Rohingyas and Urdu-Speaking Population in Bangladesh: Repatriation or Statelessness?, 7 Frontiers Hum. Dynamics 1603709, 2–3 (2025); Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan & Abu Bakker Siddiq, Rohingya Refugees and Their Crises in Criminal Justice System of Bangladesh, Border Criminologies (Oct. 24, 2025), https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/border-criminologies-blog/blog-post/2025/10/rohingya-refugees-and-their-crises-criminal-justice; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 7.

48. Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 7, 14; M. Sanjeeb Hossain et al., XCEPT & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Why and How We Wrote a Model Law for Refugees in Bangladesh 9 (2025), https://www.xcept-research.org/publication/why-and-how-we-wrote-a-model-law-for-refugees-in-bangladesh/.

49. Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 14; Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 203.

50. The Births and Deaths Registration Act, 2004 (Bangl.); Hum. Rts. Watch, “Are We Not Human?”: Denial of Education for Rohingya Refugee Children in Bangladesh (2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/12/03/are-we-not-human/denial-education-rohingya-refugee-children-bangladesh; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 4, 7; Pereira et al., supra note 6, at 2–3.

51. Samira Manzur & Tasnia Khandaker Prova, XCEPT, Governing at the Margins: A Patchwork of Policies and Practices in the Rohingya Refugee Response in Bangladesh 16, 20 (2020), https://www.xcept-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Bangladesh_Governing-at-the-margins_EN_9Oct.pdf; HC Issues Rule over Failure of Birth Registration Program in Cox’s Bazar, Dhaka Trib. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/192480/hc-issues-rule-over-failure-of-birth-registration; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 4, 7.

52. Wara, Reconciliation and Justice, supra note 6, at 390; Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 203; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 7, 26.

53. Arendt, supra note 7, at 286; Gündoğdu, supra note 9; Scott, supra note 24, at 2.

54. UNHCR RiMAP, Bangladesh: Asylum, https://rimap.unhcr.org/bangladesh/asylum (last visited Nov. 6, 2026); UNHCR RiMAP, Bangladesh: Liberty & Security of Person, https://rimap.unhcr.org/bangladesh/liberty-security-person (last visited Nov. 6, 2026).

55. U.S. Comm. for Refugees & Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2008: Bangladesh (2008), https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20170622080915mp_/http://www.refworld.org/country,,,,MMR,,485f50c2c,0.html; U.S. Comm. for Refugees & Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2007: Bangladesh (2007), https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230607232644oe_/https://www.refworld.org/docid/4696387a7.html.

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58. Hum. Rts. Watch, Rampant Police Abuse, supra note 5; Tariquil Islam, Examining the Present Situation of Rohingya People, 8 J. Enderun 55, 60–61 (2024).

59. Hum. Rts. Watch, Spiraling Violence, supra note 3.

60. Abu Bakker Siddiq & Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, Access to Criminal Justice and the Rohingya Refugees, Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/access-criminal-justice-and-rohingya-refugees-3977266 (last visited Nov. 6, 2026).

61. Kaamil Ahmed, supra note 3; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6.

62. Mohammad Jamil Khan, Refugee Camps in Cox’s Bazar: Rohingyas Tangled up in Crimes, Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/refugee-camps-coxs-bazar-rohingyas-tangled-crimes-1951517 (last visited Nov. 6, 2026).

63. Arendt, supra note 7, at 286.

64. Lauren Peters, Beyond State Lines: Mapping Justice for the Rohingya 29, 42–43 (2026) (Global Honors thesis, University of Washington Tacoma).

65. Shafiur Rahman, Who Rules at the Rohingya Camps, Dhaka Trib. (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/longform/397951/who-rules-at-the-rohingya-camps; Ashraful Azad, Foreigners Act and the Freedom of Movement of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh, 5 Griffith J.L. & Hum. Dignity 183 (2017); Monirul Islam, Justice Denied, Peace Delayed: Legal Aid Challenges for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh (2026) (master’s thesis), https://doria.fi/handle/10024/194648.

66. Bangl. Const. arts. 36–38, 39(2), 40; see also Hussain Muhammad Ershad v. Bangladesh, (2001) 21 BLD (AD) 69 (Bangl.) (interpreting the citizen’s right of movement).

67. Bangl. Const. art. 39(1); Hasan & Reza, supra note 28 (listing the fundamental rights available to non-citizens).

68. Hum. Rts. Watch, Bangladesh: Clampdown on Rohingya Refugees (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/07/bangladesh-clampdown-rohingya-refugees; Fortify Rights, Myanmar/Bangladesh: End Internet Blackouts in Rakhine State, Rohingya Refugee Camps (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-bgd-inv-2019-09-13/.

69. Hum. Rts. Watch, Bangladesh: Internet Ban Risks Rohingya Lives (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/26/bangladesh-internet-ban-risks-rohingya-lives.

70. Refugees Int’l et al., Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh: Restrictions on Communication, Fencing, and COVID-19 (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/advocacy-letters/rohingya-refugee-camps-in-bangladesh-restrictions-on-communication-fencing-and-covid-19/; Bangladesh to Fence Rohingya Camps in Further Crackdown, France 24 (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.france24.com/en/20190926-bangladesh-to-fence-rohingya-camps-in-further-crackdown.

71. Refugees Int’l et al., supra note 70.

72. Hum. Rts. Watch, Bangladesh: Violence, Repression Ahead of General Elections (Jan. 12, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/12/bangladesh-violence-repression-ahead-general-elections; Hum. Rts. Watch, “Are We Not Human?”, supra note 50.

73. Hum. Rts. Watch, “An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea”: Bangladesh’s Relocation of Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char (2021), https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/07/island-jail-middle-sea/bangladeshs-relocation-rohingya-refugees-bhasan-char; U.N. Bangl., United Nations Statement on the Relocation of Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char (Dec. 2, 2020), https://bangladesh.un.org/en/103285-press-statement.

74. Zia Uddin Ahmed, supra note 8, at 289; Bangl. Const. art. 40.

75. Hossain, supra note 29; RMMRU, Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016.

76. Zia Uddin Ahmed, supra note 8, at 291.

77. The Foreigners Act, 1946, § 2(a) (Bangl.); Azad, supra note 65, at 190–91.

78. The Foreigners Act, 1946, §§ 3(2), 14 (Bangl.); Azad, supra note 65, at 191.

79. The Foreigners Act, 1946, §§ 10, 12 (Bangl.); Azad, supra note 65, at 192–93.

80. The Penal Code, 1860 (Bangl.); The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Bangl.); Sejan & Siddiq, Crises in Criminal Justice, supra note 47.

81. UNHCR RiMAP, Bangladesh: Freedom of Movement, https://rimap.unhcr.org/bangladesh/freedom-movement (last visited Nov. 3, 2026); Manzur & Prova, supra note 51, at 6–8; Hossain et al., supra note 48, at 8–9.

82. Wara, Reconciliation and Justice, supra note 6, at 384–85, 390; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, at 14–16, 26–31; Rahman, supra note 65.

83. Maja Janmyr, M. Sanjeeb Hossain & Lewis Turner, Give Refugees Access to the Agreements that Govern Them, Oxford L. Blogs (Apr. 13, 2023), https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/border-criminologies-blog/blog-post/2023/04/give-refugees-access-agreements-govern-them; Manzur & Prova, supra note 51, at 9, 22; Hossain et al., supra note 48, at 9.

84. Wara, Reconciliation and Justice, supra note 6, at 391; Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6, ch. 7; Asadujjaman, supra note 6, at 198.

85. Bangl. Const. art. 31.

86. Id. art. 152(1).

87. The Foreigners Act, 1946, §§ 3, 14 (Bangl.); UNHCR, UNHCR Bangladesh: Legal Protection Factsheet 1 (Mar. 31, 2023).

88. RMMRU, Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016; Hossain et al., supra note 48, at 9.

89. The Foreigners Act, 1946, § 12 (Bangl.); UNHCR RiMAP, Freedom of Movement, supra note 81; Manzur & Prova, supra note 51, at 6, 9; Rahman, supra note 65; Sejan & Siddiq, Crises in Criminal Justice, supra note 47.

90. Janmyr, Hossain & Turner, supra note 83; Manzur & Prova, supra note 51, at 9, 22; Hossain et al., supra note 48, at 9.

91. Bangl. Const. arts. 31, 152(1); Sejan & Siddiq, Crises in Criminal Justice, supra note 47; Rahman, supra note 65.

92. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; UNHCR, Multi-Year Strategy, supra note 13 (noting that Bangladesh is not party to the Convention and has no refugee legislation).

93. Bangl. Const. arts. 31, 32, 34, 35; Hasan & Reza, supra note 28.

94. Farooque, 49 DLR (AD) 1; Bangl. Const. art. 102(1).

95. RMMRU, Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016; Abrar, Anomalous Case, supra note 57; UNHCR RiMAP, RMMRU, supra note 57.

96. Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) v. Bangladesh, Writ Petition No. 5608 of 2017, 20 SCOB [2025] HCD 171, ¶ 22 (Bangl.).

97. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 2(1); General Comment No. 15, supra note 45, ¶ 1; General Comment No. 31, supra note 38, ¶ 10; Abrar, No Justice for Rohingyas?, supra note 28.

98. Nat’l Hum. Rts. Comm’n, (1996) 1 SCC 742 (India); Chairman, Ry. Bd. v. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 SCC 465 (India).

99. Arendt, supra note 7, at 296–97; Kesby, supra note 9; DeGooyer et al., supra note 18.

100. Bangl. Const. arts. 36–38, 40.

101. Young Creative Rohingya, Free Rohingya Coal., Young Creative Rohingya Report (2023), https://freerohingyacoalition.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/YCR-Report.pdf.

102. UNHCR RiMAP, Freedom of Movement, supra note 81; Azad, supra note 65.

103. Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) v. Gov’t of Bangl., (1999) 19 BLD (HCD) 488 (Bangl.); Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 3 SCC 545 (India).

104. Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367 (India); Salimullah, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 793 of 2017.

105. Manju Saud v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No. 1353 of 2024 (Ker HC) (India), reported in Foreigners Must Be Heard Before Passing Order Restricting Their Movement: Kerala High Court, LiveLaw (June 20, 2025), https://www.livelaw.in/amp/high-court/kerala-high-court/kerala-high-court-foreigners-restricting-movement-295409 (last visited Nov. 5, 2026).

106. General Comment No. 15, supra note 45, ¶ 8.

107. Gündoğdu, supra note 9.

108. Krehm & Shahan, supra note 6; Pereira et al., supra note 6.

109. The Legal Aid Services Act, 2000 (Bangl.); Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan & Abu Bakker Siddiq, The Urgent Need for Legal Reform for Rohingya Refugees, Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/the-urgent-need-legal-reform-rohingya-refugees-3956821 (last visited Nov. 6, 2026).

110. Sejan & Siddiq, Crises in Criminal Justice, supra note 47.

111. S.M. Atia Naznin & Shawkat Alam, Judicial Remedies for Forced Slum Evictions in Bangladesh: An Analysis of the Structural Injunction, Asian J.L. & Soc’y (2018); Bangl. Legal Aid & Servs. Tr., Right to Shelter, https://blast.org.bd/?p=3215 (last visited Nov. 5, 2026).

112. Bangl. Const. art. 33(3).

113. Zia Uddin Ahmed, supra note 8, at 285–90, 293; Toushif Ridwan & Sanket Dev, The Legal Status and Protection of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Critical Analysis 10–14, 28–31 (2024) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5399227; Hossain et al., supra note 48.

How to cite

Talha Jubayer et al., The Right to Have Rights as a Legal Test for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 565 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13232.

Cite this article

Talha Jubayer et al., The Right to Have Rights as a Legal Test for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 565 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13232.
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