Introduction
By the 1980s the global economy had experienced a significant downturn across most national economies.1 The Nigerian economy took a major hit from the global recession as oil prices collapsed, depressing state revenues and triggering high rates of inflation and political instability.2 In reaction to the crisis, Nigeria embarked in 1986 on structural reforms patterned along guidelines developed by the Bretton Woods institutions, donor agencies, investment banks and financial advisers (international financial institutions). Market-centred policies such as deregulation, privatisation, regulation, liberalisation and rationalisation, encapsulated under the nomenclature of the regulatory state, were implemented.3
The ensuing reforms saw the thinning out of the role of the state in the economic marketplace, the ascendancy of the private sector as the engine of economic growth and development, and the introduction of a new model of governance for the regulation of public utilities providing public goods and services. This ushered in the regulatory state in Nigeria, a structural shift from direct state ownership and economic intervention to arm’s-length market regulation through Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), which were established to superintend key public goods, services and utilities across virtually all of the country’s hard and soft infrastructure.
The underlying assumption was that, with the assimilation of the regulatory state and the state taking a back seat, the private sector would “unleash the power of entrepreneurship and innovation” to propel economic development across the different sectors of the nation’s economy.4 Some four decades after the dawning of the regulatory state and the establishment of IRAs across virtually all the utility sectors of the nation’s economic life, persistent challenges trail their effectiveness. Problems of regulatory and state capture, fragile and limited legal and institutional capacity, corruption, structural incompatibilities and changing policy environments have abounded.
Persistent systemic challenges that are overarchingly contextual to Nigeria’s political economy have militated against the delivery of the touted positive outcomes. Sectors that have been the subject of extensive regulatory state intervention, such as energy, transportation, competition and consumer protection, have seen patchy progress and little improvement. Energy and electricity prices have skyrocketed with no corresponding improvement in the quality and quantity of services. Transportation remains a tortuous utility, marked by a poor road network, an aged and largely non-functioning rail network, and an out-of-reach air transport mode characterised by endemic delays and poor customer service. The maritime sub-sector continues to be challenged by infrastructure and inter-modal deficits, overlapping and fragmented governance, and low indigenous private sector participation amid financing and manpower gaps. The postal sector and inland waterways are archaic and only nominally present.5
There is, therefore, a critical need to understand the pathways and processes by which this foreign transplant was so easily diffused, without ex ante interrogation of its suitability within the institutional and governance fabric of Nigeria and its political economy, and to determine whether the transplant is indeed being rejected.
This paper accordingly seeks to identify the pathways by which the regulatory state gained acceptance, assimilation and diffusion within Nigeria’s governance architecture in so short a time and with no ex ante interrogation, and what facilitated its unchallenged acceptance notwithstanding the state-led economic model Nigeria had pursued since independence. It then examines the political economy realities of the Nigerian polity that clashed with the transplant and have undermined its success and, if organ rejection is ensuing, lays out the viable options for mitigating the effects of the templates already diffused. The study is qualitative and library-based: it systematically identifies and appraises the literature on regulatory diffusion and transplant, an approach suited to the pervasiveness of the diffusion and its multi-disciplinary, cross-cutting nature, and it examines the outcomes in two sectors, electric power and petroleum.
Theoretical framework
The paper draws on Policy Transfer Theory and Modernization Theory to explain the diffusion and assimilation pathways IRAs took into Nigeria.6 Associated respectively with David Dolowitz and Walt Rostow,7 these theories proceed from the assumption that, having advanced economically, developed nations are uniquely positioned to advise and guide developing nations on the best pathway to development, namely replicating, adopting and assimilating the social, technological, political and economic institutional frameworks of developed Western societies. This aligns with the notion of not reinventing the wheel: what works need not be changed or challenged, but merely accepted and implemented. The theories identify two essential pathways by which policy transfer is driven: voluntary, when policymakers actively seek solutions from elsewhere, or coercive, when external actors impose policies.
These theories recognise four essential objects of transfer: policy goals and content, policy instruments, institutional templates, and ideologies or conceptual frameworks. In addition, the theories address the reasons for transfer. These include the search for solutions, the emulation of perceived success stories, and external pressures or requirements. The theories also acknowledge the importance of local contextual limitations and barriers, such as cultural, economic and political ones, which can limit how effective a transferred policy will be.
The transportation and dissemination of these policy ideas and templates involve the interplay of multiple individuals, nation-states, multinational organisations and international non-governmental organisations. Included in the list are political actors (elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats and civil servants), pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supranational governmental and non-governmental institutions, and consultants. Their roles range from offering advice to subtle threats (carrot and stick), based upon what they regard as best practices elsewhere, most times paying little attention to the particular context of the borrowing political system and the incompatibilities in the receiving country.8
Literature review
The diffusion and assimilation of foreign ideas, concepts and institutional templates globally has received widespread scholarly attention. Variously referred to as legal transplantation, policy transfer, policy transplant, policy adoption or policy diffusion, the process has been complex and diverse, and mediated by political, legal, historical and social dynamics.
A. Early theories and models
Early scholars of the diffusion of law, concepts and institutions reasoned that concepts, ideas, rules and laws could be easily transported and adapted across state boundaries because of universal commonality, shared human perceptions and shared social and civilisational value systems. This reasoning often aligned with natural law theories and early formalist legal history, which implicitly treated well-crafted legal codes, laws and rules as rooted in objective truths. On that understanding, they argued that ideas, policy frameworks and institutional templates could function seamlessly in any society with little resistance, even in contexts with divergent local cultural or socio-political conditions.
The works of two notable scholars speak to this perspective. Jeremy Bentham believed and argued that well-crafted, rational legal codes possessed universal utility and could be exported across borders and cultures, provided the receiving population was gradually educated to shed its “prejudicial biases”.9 In the same vein, Alan Watson, the legal scholar who coined and popularised the term “legal transplants” in his seminal book Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law,10 argued that the legal transplantation of concepts and institutional templates was socially easy and had historically been the primary driver of legal development. Watson asserted that law operates largely independently of its socio-political context, meaning that a rule need not grow organically from within a society to work effectively within it, and could be transported, parachuted and adapted across state boundaries with little challenge or friction.
These theoretical postulations were, however, countered by notable theorists including Montesquieu, Friedrich Savigny and Otto Kahn-Freund, who may jointly be termed proponents of culture, context and friction. They argue that legal concepts, laws and ideas are country- and society-specific, deeply intertwined with the society concerned, and that moving them across boundaries creates significant challenges and resistance. Montesquieu propounded an anti-transplant theory in his famous work The Spirit of Laws,11 positing that a nation’s laws ought to be carefully tailored to its specific climate, geography, religion and morals, so that it would be “a great chance” if the laws of one nation suited another.
Friedrich Savigny, the founder of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, wrote that law and other guiding concepts and institutional templates are an organic manifestation of a particular nation’s unique spirit, developing naturally like language or customs, and that mechanically transporting them, or artificially transplanting and imposing them from outside, can cause cultural damage.12 Otto Kahn-Freund went as far as using the metaphor of a kidney transplant to argue that a foreign legal rule or concept is susceptible to severe “rejection” by the host political organism; on his view, the success of a transplant depends on how hospitable it is to the local structures of political and economic power.13 Finally, Pierre Legrand14 argued that differences in culture, political economy, historical experience and social perspective could be a major hindrance to policy transfer, and that transplants are often superficially assimilated and adopted but usually lack concrete compatibility, resulting in what he termed “incommensurability.”
Within the context of globalization, the literature flows largely along three strands: the inclination of the political economy of receiving nations to accept transfers;15 contextual adaptation, in which contemporary writings underline the importance of local context in the reception process;16 and the dynamics of globalization itself, which, even as it has facilitated and accelerated the flow of ideas, concepts and laws across boundaries and nations, has also provoked resistance bordering on economic and political nationalism.17
Global perspectives
The regulatory state emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as governments came to oversee privately owned providers of public goods and services, especially in the critical and ubiquitous utility sectors, through the enabling role of rulemaking, monitoring and corporate oversight rather than through public ownership, management and operation. Pioneering this was the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, under the Interstate Commerce Act of the United States of America (USA), to regulate the privately owned railways: the state confined itself to regulating the marketplace rather than providing the service, and delegated its power of regulation to an agency of the kind now termed an independent regulatory agency.18
This development attracted sustained and fierce argument among political and legal scholars and the discerning public, who argued that the regulatory state and the creation of IRAs strained the constitutional theory of separation of powers to breaking point.19 Apart from the robust public debate that the emergence of the regulatory state generated, the concept and its poster child, the IRA, faced numerous legal challenges, and in a string of cases the Supreme Court of the USA pronounced on the legality and constitutionality of delegation and, by extension, of the establishment of IRAs and the regulatory state.20
The emergence of the regulatory state in Europe has been explained, in seminal research by Thatcher21 followed by other scholars,22 as revolving around two themes, functional and contextual,23 and this categorisation has received scholarly acceptance.24
Under the functional theme, the rise of the regulatory state and the creation of IRAs in much of Europe were driven by several factors. Elected officials often favoured IRAs as a way to deflect blame in case of public backlash following the implementation of difficult but necessary reforms. Additionally, the increasing complexity and technical demands of regulation, particularly due to rapid technological advancement, required specialised expertise that only dedicated expert teams could provide. Furthermore, the sheer volume of information that must be gathered, analysed and refined before sound regulatory decisions can be made is beyond the practical capacity of legislative committees.
Other reasons identified included the desire to curb the “short-termism” that characterises the decisions of legislators, which typically lack enduring commitment given their constant eye on electoral cycles; and the increased regulation by international and supranational bodies such as the European Union, which required member states to domesticate and implement IRAs for uniformity and ease of cross-national regulation.25
The contextual explanations included policy learning and institutional mimetism, which occur where a domino effect sets in: a country pioneers an agency that succeeds, and neighbouring countries copy and domesticate it. An example was the creation of OFTEL in the United Kingdom, which mirrored the Federal Communications Commission of the USA, under what has been termed the “snowball effect.”26 In the spread of IRAs to Central and Eastern Europe, pressure from international financial institutions to institute IRAs as a condition for receiving financial assistance,27 the desire of these countries to join the European Union (EU) and additional pressure from donor agencies help to explain the diffusion.28
Regulation through the back door?
Unlike the USA and Europe, where the regulatory state was extensively interrogated to ascertain its suitability,29 Nigeria saw no such process. The regulatory state came literally through the back door, “little remarked upon and even less understood”.30 Like a thief in the night, it dawned on the administrative landscape of Nigeria unheralded. There was no discussion or interrogation of the concept, its antecedents, its mileage or the outcomes its assimilation would portend, given Nigeria’s political and cultural peculiarities. Even though the value of national-level consultation with the social partners in structural adjustment had been stressed, and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had themselves begun consulting trade unions and civil society, no such consultation was seen through in Nigeria.31
International drivers in the diffusion of the regulatory state
The paper identifies several pathways by which the regulatory state was so seamlessly assimilated and diffused within the governance architecture of Nigeria.
A. Lesson-drawing
Lesson-drawing, also referred to as emulation in policy transfer, is a cognitive process in which policymakers study successful programs or administrative arrangements from other countries, regions or past times to solve domestic problems.32 It exists where “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements or institutions is used across time or space in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions elsewhere.”33 The transporters, carriers, exporters or inducers of policy transfer through lesson-drawing include governments, transnational corporations and non-governmental organisations.34
Rose,35 in a seminal work, identified four types of lesson-drawing in policy transfer: copying, adaptation, inspiration, and hybridisation or synthesis. Copying occurs when a nation enacts a foreign program wholesale without changes, while adaptation refers to a situation in which the receiving nation tweaks and adjusts the program or concept to fit local realities. Inspiration connotes a scenario in which a country uses an external model or concept purely as a spark to craft a completely novel domestic design or model. Hybridisation and synthesis, on the other hand, combine elements, ideas or concepts harvested or gleaned from several different regions to design a new local model or program.
Within the Nigerian context, lesson-drawing featured in several ways as a vehicle for the transportation of the regulatory state into Nigeria. First, the World Bank, international financial institutions and international non-governmental organisations leveraged each other’s capabilities and reach to use the mechanism of learning to spread the concept of the regulatory state into Nigeria, through “capacity building” in the form of training, workshops and study tours.36 This was done by forming a common repository of ideas, experiences and knowledge that they pooled and used to disseminate ideas and concepts on the regulatory state.37
Secondly, through offers of grants-in-aid and other unsolicited offers of assistance, international financial institutions approached Nigeria to fund selected projects and reform activities, with the proviso that all key technical personnel and consultants required to implement the grant would come from the donor.38 These consultants were then used as basic transporters and disseminators of the regulatory state concept and other policy ideas, advising governments on the suitability of a one-size-fits-all IRA model of regulatory governance.39
On the third frontier, non-profit organisations and foundations were also primary diffusing agents of the regulatory state in Nigeria. Common ones included well-known foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Soros foundation network operating in the region as the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the Shell Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Nigeria, among others. Many of these foundations espouse the principles and values of democracy and the free market. A common thread linking them is their support for building knowledge-based capacities that espouse market-based principles, through activities such as “research and analysis, technical assistance, education, training, conferences, study tours, pilot and demonstration projects”, in aid of Nigeria’s reform initiatives.40
Fourthly, international universities and educational think tanks offered research and education assistance to local universities in leadership training, teaching, instructing, tutoring and mentoring students, technocrats, policymakers and legislators in Nigeria on the fundamentals of market-driven concepts. Eberhard notes a remarkable increase in regulatory training courses since the market-driven reforms of the 1990s, most of them funded by donor agencies. The curricula invariably included Western “best practice” models and concepts espousing free-market ideas and the regulatory state, with the instructors drawn from the West.41 For example, the Public Utility Research Center at the University of Florida, which received seed money from the World Bank in 1996, runs an International Training Program on Utility Regulation and Strategy that has become a meeting point for training politicians, legislators, policymakers and technocrats in the fundamentals of regulating utilities and in market-driven concepts and the ethos of the regulatory state.42
B. Emulation
Another mode of policy transfer used to move the regulatory state across borders was emulation. It occurs when policymakers who are connected to one another imitate each other’s behaviour and selectively adopt ideas, concepts and standards rather than copying them wholesale.43 It manifests in three strands. The first is adaptation over copying: instead of copying a concept, policy or template without changes, the learning country adopts the knowledge with contextual changes. The second is the best-practice methodology, which adopts a successful model elsewhere as a benchmark while ensuring that the “nuts and bolts” of its implementation are tailored to local needs, resources and political systems. The third is subtle innovation, which makes adjustments and design enhancements to the original concept or template. Theorists44 have argued that the primary motivation for this pathway of policy transfer is the need to be seen to “belong.” Another explanation is that it is better to adopt from other climes than to take the costly and time-consuming option of reinventing the wheel. Emulation relies heavily on convincing domestic elites that foreign ideas represent “best practices” or modern global standards.
In the Nigerian context, this mode of diffusion of the regulatory state manifested in four ways: the trafficking of normative frameworks and ideas, elite cliques, aid and debt leverage, and technical assistance and embedded consultants. In the trafficking of normative frameworks and ideas, global players did not insist on direct compliance with specific laws from the developed world but instead disseminated all-encompassing policy philosophies that domestic actors were encouraged, through subtle pressure and benefits, to emulate.45 Examples included the New Public Management of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, under which institutions like the World Bank and the IMF pushed for the reduction of state-led monopolies and the privatisation of public assets. Nigeria emulated these global market concepts by reshaping its telecommunications, electric power and energy sectors around private-sector-led models. Similar frameworks included the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), standardised blueprints adopted by the United Nations which global actors encouraged Nigeria to align with its domestic planning.
In the elite mode of emulation, global players organise and finance study tours, international conferences and workshops in developed economies that showcase the success stories of those countries, with a view to “selling” the viability and marketability of the templates and ideas to receiving countries. For example, before Nigeria’s National Policy on E-Government Reforms was drafted, international donors sponsored senior Nigerian civil servants to travel to the UK, Canada, India, China and the US to study their digital infrastructure. Benson notes that this exposure convinced local policymakers to buy into and adopt the essence of technologies such as e-passports, machine-readable documents and automated e-payment streams, modifying them to fit the framework of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).46
In the aid and debt leverage variant of emulation, international donors leveraged Nigeria’s historical dependence on foreign financial assistance, debt relief and external loans. To achieve this, policy emulation was frequently embedded in their aid and loan agreements. Local policymakers eagerly executed these agreements with a view to securing financial inflows, seemingly oblivious of the emulation-laden commitments attached to them.47
Finally, in the case of technical assistance and embedded consultants, the Nigerian experience shows that international players, institutions and governments did not merely sell and market ideas and templates at a distance; they directly embedded their experts within Nigerian ministries, departments and agencies, ostensibly to advise, guide and “see to it” that the ideas were properly assimilated and the templates set up according to the playbooks. This included the preparation of international protocols, sectoral policies and development plans.48
C. Colonial mentality
One of the enduring legacies of colonialism is the abiding tendency of former colonies and developing countries to seek external validation and acceptance of their governance paths from their former colonial rulers. Allied to it is the prevalent mentality that anything foreign, particularly from the developed world, be it concepts, templates, products or ideas, is always better than its local counterpart. It encompasses systemic feelings of inferiority among people who have been subjected to colonialism, and the wholesale acceptance, without interrogation, of the culture or doctrines of the coloniser as intrinsically more worthy or superior.49
In the Nigerian context, this mentality is pervasive and represents one of the hangovers of colonialism, which ingrained in the minds of the colonised the feeling that what they had was inferior, be it culture, language, clothing or religion.50 The colonial rulers enforced this control of thought patterns in Nigeria first by denigrating all existing patterns of attitudes, practices and culture as archaic and inferior. They then gradually but steadily inculcated in the local population a deep-rooted inferiority complex, developed through a cultural erasure that made it hard for the colonised to conceptualise and create anything truly indigenous, including indigenous ideas, concepts and models.51 Thus the regulatory state was sold lock, stock and barrel, unchallenged, because it was presented as being of superior pedigree, having come from the West, and was for that reason deemed better than local concepts.
D. Coercive isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism occurs when powerful actors directly shape government policy decisions or alter the outcomes of domestic policy debates by supporting coalitions that favour specific policies. This pathway of diffusion includes both direct and indirect, or soft, forms of coercion. International financial institutions, whose financial resources far exceed those of individual nations, especially those struggling economically, play a significant role in this process. As Henisz et al.52 explain, these organisations often use their financial leverage to pressure or compel countries in need of aid to implement economic reforms that they might otherwise resist. Market-oriented reforms, encapsulated in the regulatory state, have frequently been advanced under the guise of “conditionality”, the requirements attached to financial assistance. According to two IMF economists,53 these conditions are designed to ensure that recipient countries undertake the economic reforms necessary to address macroeconomic and structural imbalances, thereby protecting the lender and increasing the likelihood of repayment.
In seeking to understand how Nigeria transitioned so rapidly from an entrenched statist approach to running the economy to a regulatory state driven by IRAs, coercive isomorphism stands out as a primary entry route. Far from being an organic development, the regulatory state was heavily enforced or incentivised by multiple global actors through coercive isomorphism. The tool of choice in this instance was technical assistance. The nature of this tool and the manner of its deployment are recorded by Nasir El-Rufai in his book The Accidental Public Servant: they include preparing offer letters, replies and draft agreements for and on behalf of subject nations, which merely have to execute them.54
Additionally, coercive isomorphism was at play in Nigeria predominantly through indirect intervention in the internal management of government institutions, in covert but targeted ways, to mould and influence opinion, public thinking and argument in favour of reforms under the regulatory state. These interventions were carried out by global players empowering targeted groups, particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with resources, legitimacy or rhetorical arguments, or prompting other groups to join the pro-reform coalition. It is no wonder that NGOs have proliferated in unprecedented fashion in Nigeria over the past four decades.55
E. Globalisation
Globalization represents the fifth external factor that facilitated the introduction of market reforms and the regulatory state in Nigeria. As the world became increasingly interconnected by the end of the 19th century, the dissemination of market reform concepts and of the regulatory state became inevitable.56 Globalization refers to the increasing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures and populations, driven by cross-border trade, technological advancement, investment flows, migration and information exchange. Its influence on the spread of IRAs is evident in how quickly and uniformly the model was adopted across diverse regions. In nearly every context where market-driven reforms have taken hold, Nigeria included, a familiar sequence has emerged: economic liberalization, comprehensive regulation of economic, environmental and social actors, and the privatization of state-owned utilities, with only minor variations. Consequently, globalization can be seen as a crucial force behind the diffusion of the regulatory state in Nigeria, serving as the conduit for transferring policy ideas and institutional models across borders.
Nigeria’s transition to a regulatory state, which commenced in the 1980s, has fundamentally shifted the government’s role from direct owner, manager, operator and regulator of public goods and services to a private-sector-led economic model in which the government has divested its interests in state-owned enterprises in the commanding heights of the economy. The state has resiled to the diminished role of enabler and regulator. Some four decades on, the next part of the paper reflects on how the regulatory state has fared and addresses the question at the fulcrum of this paper: whether its performance and outcomes are a case of organ rejection. The evidence is limited to two sectors, electric power and petroleum, given their ubiquity and overarching importance to the nation’s economic well-being and survival; the telecommunications sector is noted first, by way of contrast.
Outcomes of the regulatory state: electric power and petroleum
By way of contrast, one sector stands out for a tremendous leap forward in service availability: telecommunications. Before 2001, the state monopoly, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited, exclusively controlled the provision of telephone services. With 120 million people, Nigeria had only some 400,000 to 500,000 working fixed telephone lines. It usually took years and a fortune to acquire a landline, which turned basic telephone access into an elite luxury. From those humble beginnings the sector leapt forward: by 2016 Nigeria had over 150 million connected lines, and by July 2016 the industry had attracted $68 billion in investment, $35 billion of it Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), according to the Nigerian Communications Commission.57 The contribution of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector to Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from less than 1% in 1999 to between 11% and 16% in recent years.58 The telecommunications story, sadly, is an island of success in a sea of patchy and mostly poor results.
Notwithstanding the sale of most of the state’s power assets to the private sector, the performance of the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI) has remained severely constrained, yielding a widely acknowledged implementation gap. While privatisation successfully attracted private sector ownership and management, the indices before and after privatisation have for the most part been unencouraging and dismal.
While total installed generation capacity has grown past 13,000 MW, actual operational generation on the grid rarely exceeds 4,000 MW to 5,000 MW for a country of over 230 million people, and hundreds of megawatts remain “stranded” daily because of transmission bottlenecks, inadequate gas supply to thermal power plants and distribution infrastructure incapable of absorbing the power generated. Statistics provided by the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC), the NESI regulator, and published by the National Bureau of Statistics show that electricity supply fell to 5,612.52 GWh in Q2 2024 from 5,769.52 GWh in the previous quarter and, year on year, by 5.03% from the 5,909.83 GWh reported in Q2 2023.59 A review of the literature shows that the privatisation exercise has had only a marginal positive impact on the overall availability of power. The studies agree that, although there has been steady progress in increasing generation capacity, grid challenges have hampered the delivery of electricity to power homes and industries.60
A review of the data, statistics and literature on the challenges facing the NESI implicates technical, regulatory, institutional and legal drawbacks. A lack of political will for regulatory firmness, a lack of independence or limited autonomy of the regulator, policy somersaults and a lack of credible commitments, regulatory, institutional and legal weaknesses, a weak rule of law regime and the non-approval of cost-reflective tariffs have all conspired to weigh down the progress of the NESI. A close consideration of these challenges indicates that they are directly attributable to the nature and dynamics of the political economy of Nigeria. Table 1 below sets out the challenges that the local realities of Nigeria’s political economy have brought to bear upon the templates transplanted under the regulatory state.
In the petroleum industry, the Petroleum Industry Act, 2021 (PIA) holds sway after more than two decades of effort to reform the sector. The reforms that eventually emerged in the PIA were aligned with the pathways denoted by the regulatory state: the lessening of the role of government in the sector and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector to act as the engine room of the sector. It is instructive to note that the same political economy challenges that served as an albatross for the effective functioning of the NESI were side-stepped in the design of the petroleum industry reforms. The PIA grants a wide berth of discretionary powers to partisan political actors; the sector suffers an inhospitable investment climate as a result of corruption; and roles are not delineated, leading to an overlap of functions and powers. Above all, given the dynamics of the political economy, the regulatory institutions that are designed to be independent of government are in fact not so, as they suffer from perceptible regulatory and state capture, with political actors holding sway.61
| S/N | Design | Baseline | Contextual reality |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Independence | The institutional templates of the developed economies in which the regulatory state emerged require that IRAs be free, by law, to make decisions within their scope of authority without having to obtain prior approval from other officials or agencies of government. They need to be adequately insulated from short-term political pressure to avert state and industry capture.62 | The nature of Nigeria’s political economy has elevated the executive above the other arms of government, and the President, owing to his total control over the state treasury and the security architecture of the country (a legacy of military rule), has demonstrated the capacity to compromise, and has frequently compromised, the independence of IRAs, undermining their credibility and impartial decision-making.63 |
| 2 | Appointment, discipline and security of tenure | Security of tenure for top-tier management is a cornerstone of the modern regulatory state. It prevents officials from being removed from office without “just cause”, insulating them from purely political or arbitrary dismissal.64 | The de facto reality has been that, notwithstanding ironclad provisions in the enabling laws securing the tenure of regulators appointed to head agencies established under the regulatory state reforms, many have been suspended or removed “without cause” in the electric power and petroleum sectors.65 |
| 3 | Ex post adjustment | These models were developed to fit the local realities of developed economies before being implemented. | Because these institutional models are transplanted from developed economies over short periods without deep prior local interrogation, all the adjustment and retooling needed to align them with local realities is done after the fact. This leaves local managers struggling to accommodate them within existing local political and administrative pressures, which throws up implementation gaps and misalignments. The outcomes have therefore been weak domestic frameworks and a lack of localised customisation, and resistance from street-level bureaucrats has become the norm.66 |
| 4 | Legal framework and powers | All the reform templates are ring-fenced by a primary law that fully articulates the agency’s jurisdictional authority, powers, duties and responsibilities. The basic operational and regulatory tools, principles, practices, procedures and policies to be followed should be articulated in law. In addition, the agency has the requisite legal powers to make final decisions within its jurisdictional space without having to obtain the approval of any other agency or authority of government.67 | Nigeria boasts an extensive body of legislation and a robust constitutional framework, yet there is a palpable, widespread culture of non-adherence to laws or selective enforcement, and a weak culture of the rule of law.68 In addition, even though the agencies transplanted under the regulatory state have enabling legislation, it is honoured more in the breach than in the observance, given the culture of impunity that pervades the political economy of Nigeria.69 |
| 5 | Corruption and governance issues | Strong institutional frameworks, transparent governance arrangements and processes, and the effective curtailment of systemic corruption explain the emergence and success of the regulatory state in the global North. Public agencies exist and operate with transparency and accountability, and regulations are enforced predictably and fairly. This, in turn, has fostered market stability and boosted investor confidence.70 | The embedding and thriving of the regulatory state in Nigeria has been weighed down by systemic corruption and severe governance bottlenecks, which transform intended market-remediation structures, policies, processes and frameworks into predatory systems. The touted aim of the regulatory state, enabling ease of doing business, has been bogged down as public and regulatory agencies act more like gatekeepers, barriers to entry and rent-seeking stop-shops.71 |
| 6 | Staffing | A deep pool of neutral, technical experts. | The regulatory state in developing countries, as in the case of Nigeria, often suffers from a critical bottleneck: the inability to recruit, train and retain qualified personnel to staff the institutions set up under the new model. Many of these agencies exist as “empty shells” or struggle with severe capacity constraints arising from a scarce talent pool.72 |
| 7 | Funding | The institutional design of IRAs in the global North requires funding adequate to meet all their responsibilities competently, professionally and in a timely manner, and this design must be reflected in the enabling law. The dedicated funding stream in operation is a percentage of regulated revenues. Funding should not come from the government treasury except in two instances: an initial take-off grant, or where the government requires the agency to undertake a specific project beyond the scope of its normal regulatory functions. This serves as an advance safeguard and insulation against state capture.73 | Even though enabling legislation makes copious provision for funding derived from the regulated entities, the reality in Nigeria has been that, with a few exceptions, agencies established under the regulatory state suffer from insufficient funding and rely heavily on the national treasury. This raises the imminent danger of state capture and compromised independence.74 Funding constraints severely limit the efficiency, enforcement power and independence of regulatory agencies in Nigeria.75 |
| 8 | Credible commitments | The major push that gave the regulatory state its ascendancy in the global North was the credible commitment given by the state to the private sector, enabling it to invest with confidence.76 | Credible commitments are needed, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria, for the private sector to have the comfort and assurance that, when it invests, it will be able to recover its investment with profits. They also serve as an insurance policy against policy and legal somersaults, including expropriation.77 Nigeria has had a history of frequent policy somersaults: the sudden reversal, cancellation or contradiction of government and economic policies, either midway or even before they can be fully implemented or evaluated.78 |
| 9 | Legitimacy and public trust | The regulatory state went through pre-analytical deliberation and public debate before it took root and thrived in the global North.79 | Given the absence of prior deliberation and public debate on the essentials of the regulatory state before its assimilation, there is widespread skepticism of the concept. It thus frequently suffers from a severe lack of social acceptance or structural compatibility, and fails to produce the intended economic or governance transformation.80 |
Table 1: Transplanted models vs local realities. Source: Author.
Recommendations
The regulatory state in Nigeria has performed poorly as a result of several inter-related challenges, including weak institutional capacity, high compliance costs, political economy challenges, political capture, corruption and severe resource constraints. Mitigating the effects of an inefficient regulatory state presents a complex challenge, especially when neither the erstwhile traditional models nor the transplanted concepts have produced the desired outcomes. The paper sets out below some viable recommendations that move beyond conventional approaches.
The overarching recommendation is for policymakers to take to heart the truth that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. The recommendations here must be locally driven, iterative and adaptive. Attaining the expected outcomes depends largely on understanding Nigeria’s political economy, embedding that understanding in every aspect of the regulatory state, and evolving practical, incremental improvements rather than adopting foreign models wholesale. “Political economy” is employed here as a shorthand that incorporates the vices of corruption, the inordinate use of discretion for personal benefit, clientelism, patronage and nepotism.
A. Transparency and minimised discretion
A majority of the challenges militating against the entrenchment of the regulatory state in Nigeria revolve around the “Nigerian factor”, that is, the political economy of Nigeria. Systems, templates and rules that work in developed countries struggle to succeed in Nigeria given the entrenched tendency towards a lack of transparency, clientelism and corruption. There should be an intentional elimination of discretion in favour of predictability across the board, by cutting off points of contact in all regulatory systems, policy templates, rules and regulations and replacing them with automated systems.
1. Move away from waiting-on-approval thresholds to deemed-approval methods in which silence means consent, by strictly implementing statutory timeframes under which, if a regulatory agency fails to review or respond to a permit, application or request within a specified window, it is deemed granted by law.
2. Implement post-entry surveillance in place of the present elongated pre-approval processes and screenings, by instituting simple self-declaration registration at the point of entry for low-risk sectors and deploying regulatory resources towards targeted, risk-based audits after the fact, once businesses are already operating.
3. Create single-window clearance systems to streamline business permits and compliance, reducing opportunities for discretion, corruption and delay.
4. Migrate online the processes that are mostly conducted across the counter but need not be, to minimise face-to-face interactions, which often breed inefficiency and rent-seeking, and so entrench automated decision-making.
5. Put in place regulations that are unambiguous and leave little room for arbitrary or discretionary interpretation by officials.
6. Institute robust whistleblower and bounty programs that incentivise citizens and competitors to report non-compliance by granting informants a percentage of the resulting regulatory fines.
B. Regulatory capacity and local ownership
Regulatory and managerial capacity and local ownership should be built by investing in capacity building among local staff, so as to strengthen the skills and expertise of the regulators and line managers running the institutional transplants, learning from international best practices but focusing on local contexts.
Conclusion
The foregoing has critically examined the transplanted concept of the regulatory state and the phenomenon of “organ rejection syndrome”, in which externally introduced regulatory institutions, modeled on international best practices, have been shown to be ineffective and misaligned with local political, economic and social dynamics. Drawing on qualitative analyses of two ubiquitous sectors, electric power and petroleum, set against the contrasting case of telecommunications, the study has examined how structural realities such as weak institutional capacity, corruption, entrenched informal practices, regulatory capture and systemic rent-seeking have served to truncate the celebrated positive outcomes the regulatory state was meant to bring. Thus, even though the adoption of the regulatory state has been promoted as a pathway to modernization, economic development and improved governance, the evidence reviewed shows that this transplant has seen superficial implementation and is showing signs of organ rejection. The challenge has been the assimilation of foreign models without mainstreaming them into local contexts. The paper lays heavy emphasis on the need to implement recommendations that are locally driven, iterative and adaptive, tackling the twin challenges of corruption and political economy dynamics by inserting a transparently driven regime into the regulatory state.
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Footnotes
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