VidhiAagaz
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
ISSN 2581-5369 · Open access
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
Open accessArticlesVol. 9 No. VI (2026)pp. 1020–1035

From Rajadharma to Directors' Duties: Indigenous Jurisprudence and Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013

MS
Manish Kumar SahuORCID iDAssistant Professor at Shri Rawatpura Sarkar University, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India
0views0downloads
Published 19 November 2026 · pp. 1020–1035 · Vol. 9 No. VI (2026)
Abstract

Indian corporate governance rests largely on imported architecture: the English law of directors’ duties, Anglo-American agency theory and the independent-director model. Recurring failures, from Satyam to IL&FS, suggest that structural borrowing has not by itself secured ethical conduct. This paper asks whether the Mahabharata and Kautilya’s Arthashastra can serve as a principled interpretive resource for Indian corporate law, focusing on the directors’ duty of good faith towards stakeholders under Section 166(2) of the Companies Act, 2013. Using a doctrinal, comparative and textual-interpretive method, it examines rajadharma (office-holding as trust), the Arthashastra’s systems of accounting control, informant-based vigilance and calibrated enforcement (danda), and the Mahabharata’s account of governance failure in the Dyuta Sabha, Vidura’s counsel, and the Gita’s idea of purposeful action (loka-sangraha). These ideas are mapped onto the statutory provisions on independent directors, vigil mechanisms, related-party transactions, auditors’ duties and corporate social responsibility, and compared with the UK model of enlightened shareholder value and the OECD Principles. The paper argues that Section 166(2) is conceptually closer to a trusteeship model than to shareholder primacy, and that the texts illuminate a recurring gap between legal compliance and ethical responsibility, particularly in the position of gatekeepers who remain silent. It also argues that the texts cannot be treated as sources of enforceable law, and it addresses their hierarchical, authoritarian and contested elements. The paper concludes that indigenous thought is best used as a critical aid to interpretation, director education and the reform of enforcement, and it proposes specific measures to give Section 166(2) practical effect.

Keywords
Corporate GovernanceRajadharmaArthashastraMahabharataDirectors’ Duties
Contents
Full text

Introduction

A. The research problem

In January 2009, the founder-chairman of Satyam Computer Services publicly admitted that the company’s accounts had been falsified over a number of years.1 In 2018, the default of Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) raised serious questions about the oversight exercised by the group’s board, auditors and other gatekeepers.2 Both companies operated, on paper, within the governance architecture that India had adopted since the late 1990s: independent directors, audit committees and detailed disclosure rules. The episodes show that structures do not by themselves produce ethical conduct. They also point to a question that corporate law seldom asks openly: on what moral foundation do directors’ duties rest?

Indian company law offers little help in answering that question from within. Its principles of directors’ duties were inherited from English company law and equity, and its governance model draws on Anglo-American theory.3 The Companies Act, 2013 (the Companies Act) is generally regarded as the first Indian company statute to set out directors’ duties in a dedicated provision.4 Section 166(2) requires a director to act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of the environment. That wording departs from a pure shareholder-primacy model, yet the Act does not explain the philosophy behind the departure.

This paper asks whether two foundational texts of the Indian intellectual tradition, the Mahabharata and Kautilya’s Arthashastra, can supply that philosophy in a form useful to lawyers. Both are, among other things, extended reflections on how those who hold power over the interests of others should behave, how they should be watched, and what follows when they fail.

B. Significance and gap in the literature

The literature on “Indian ethos” in management is considerable, but it is written mainly from a management perspective and tends towards appreciation rather than critique.5 There appears to be comparatively little work that ties these texts to specific statutory duties and tests the connection doctrinally, with attention to where it fails. This paper aims to fill that gap from a legal standpoint. Its contribution is twofold: it identifies the parts of the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations where classical ideas shed light on present problems, and it sets out the limits within which such ideas can responsibly be used.

C. Questions and argument

The paper asks four questions: what principles of governance, accountability and ethical leadership emerge from the two texts; how those principles compare with agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories and with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; whether Indian corporate statutes already reflect these values, even if unintentionally; and what the limits and risks are of invoking ancient texts in modern corporate law. The method is doctrinal, comparative and textual-interpretive, and the primary texts are read through standard critical editions and translations, with no claim to philological authority.6

The argument is as follows. Section 166(2) of the Companies Act is philosophically closer to a trusteeship model, in which a director holds office for a defined set of persons beyond the shareholders, than to shareholder primacy. The texts help to explain why that model matters and why it is hard to enforce. They are best used as an interpretive and pedagogical resource, not as a source of binding rules, and they must be read critically, including in their hierarchical and authoritarian aspects.

Conceptual framework: governance theory and the case for indigenous perspectives

A. Three models of the corporation

Three theoretical models dominate discussion of corporate purpose. The first treats the company as the property of its shareholders and managers as their agents. It descends from the observation by Berle and Means that ownership and control had separated in the modern corporation,7 and it received formal statement in agency theory.8 Its legal expression is shareholder primacy, famously stated by an American court that required a company to be run chiefly for the profit of its stockholders.9 The second model, stewardship theory, rejects the assumption that managers are always self-interested and argues that they may act as stewards of the organisation.10 The third, stakeholder theory, holds that managers owe attention to all groups that affect or are affected by the firm.11

Law has responded in different ways. Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 adopts what is often called enlightened shareholder value: directors must promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, having regard to the interests of employees, the community and the environment, among other matters.12 In the United States, the Business Roundtable’s 2019 statement committed its signatories to serving all stakeholders, although the statement is not law.13

B. India’s borrowed architecture

India’s governance reforms followed the pattern of the common-law world. Standards were first articulated by industry bodies and then given regulatory force through a succession of committees: the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee, the Naresh Chandra Committee, the Narayana Murthy Committee and the Uday Kotak Committee.14 The Companies Act then gave the independent director, the audit committee and the vigil mechanism a detailed statutory basis, and the SEBI Listing Regulations added detailed obligations for listed entities.15

A distinctive feature of the Indian setting is that most large companies have controlling promoters. The central agency problem is therefore often between controlling and minority shareholders, and not between dispersed shareholders and professional managers.16 Tools such as the independent director were designed chiefly for the second problem, and their fit with the first remains debated.

C. Why look to indigenous thought?

Turning to ancient texts for a theory of corporate ethics may seem eccentric, but the practice has precedents. Western debates on corporate purpose have long drawn on Aristotelian ethics, Kantian duty and Christian ideas of stewardship, none of which is treated as binding law.17 The point is not that such sources have legal force, but that they supply a vocabulary in which duties can be explained, criticised and taught. India has a comparable heritage. Gandhi’s idea of trusteeship, under which holders of wealth and power are treated as trustees for society, drew on that heritage and is the nearest modern bridge between it and the question of corporate responsibility.18

Two cautions govern what follows. First, the Mahabharata and the Arthashastra are not a single, settled doctrine. They are composite, contested and plural, and any statement of what they “say” is an interpretation. Second, the Constitution of India, and not any ancient text, is the foundation of the legal order. The texts are therefore treated as an interpretive and pedagogical resource whose ideas must be tested against constitutional values and the statutory text.

The Arthashastra: accountability, control and enforcement

A. Rajadharma as office held for others

The Arthashastra, attributed to Kautilya, is a treatise on government, economy and law. Its central image of kingship is office-holding for the benefit of others. A well-known passage in Book 1 states that the king’s happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects and his welfare in theirs, and that what merely pleases the king is not to be counted as good.19 The same book gives considerable attention to the training and self-restraint of the ruler, treating mastery over the senses as a precondition of competent rule.20 The Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata, in its discussion of the duties of kings (rajadharma), similarly presents the king as a protector whose revenue is a form of remuneration for protection, so that a king who collects revenue without providing protection incurs grave fault.21

The parallel with a fiduciary office is evident, but it should not be overstated. These texts give subjects no enforceable claim, and the idea is closer to a moral and political trust than to the trust of equity. What carries over is the structure of the idea: authority is conferred for a purpose beyond the holder’s own interest, and its legitimacy depends on pursuing that purpose. That is also the logic of Section 166(2).

B. Controls that anticipate temptation

What distinguishes Kautilya from a purely moral writer is that he does not rely on virtue alone. Book 2 describes the administrative machinery of the state and the detection of misappropriation. It sets out an accounts office with prescribed records and a system of annual settlement of accounts,22 and a catalogue of the ways in which officials misappropriate revenue, commonly summarised as forty forms of embezzlement. Kautilya observes that just as it is impossible not to taste honey or poison placed on the tongue, an official handling the king’s funds will inevitably taste some of the king’s wealth. He therefore advises close scrutiny of accounts and the periodic transfer of officials.23

The assumption behind these provisions, that persons entrusted with funds will be tempted and that control design must anticipate temptation, is the foundation of modern internal control. Its counterparts in Indian company law include the statement by directors of listed companies on internal financial controls,24 the auditor’s report on the adequacy of such controls,25 the rotation of auditors,26 and the auditor’s duty to report suspected fraud.27

C. Informants and vigilance

Kautilya also places a network of agents (gudhapurushas) within the administration to observe officials and report on them.28 The analogue in company law is the vigil mechanism that listed companies and certain other classes of company must establish so that directors and employees can report genuine concerns, with safeguards against victimisation.29 The difference is important, and Part VI returns to it. Kautilya’s agents are covert instruments of the ruler, whereas a vigil mechanism depends on insiders who speak openly and need legal protection for doing so.

D. Danda: proportionate and credible enforcement

Kautilya treats enforcement (danda) as the foundation of order but warns against both extremes. A ruler who punishes severely is feared, one who punishes mildly is despised, and one who punishes in proportion to the offence is respected.30 Indian corporate penalties are likewise graded by the seriousness of the conduct. Fraud involving at least ten lakh rupees or one per cent of the company’s turnover, whichever is lower, for example, carries imprisonment for six months to ten years and a fine of not less than the amount involved, which may extend to three times that amount, while a smaller fraud that does not involve the public interest attracts a lighter punishment.31 In practice, however, the credibility of enforcement depends less on severity than on the likelihood of detection and consistent action, a point that Kautilya’s emphasis on surveillance recognises.

E. The saptanga theory and systemic thinking

Finally, the Arthashastra describes the state as seven interdependent constituents: the ruler, the ministers, the territory and population, the fortified capital, the treasury, the army and the ally. A weakness in one affects the rest.32 The lesson for governance is systemic. A board with independent directors but a captured audit process, or a regulator with wide powers but poor information, will fail in the same way. Reform that adds one structure without attending to the others repeats the error of treating governance as a set of separate boxes.

The Mahabharata: ethical leadership and the anatomy of governance failure

A. The Dyuta Sabha as a governance case

The Mahabharata is a work of narrative and not of legal prescription, and its value for governance lies in its case studies of failure. The best known is the dice game in the assembly hall (the Dyuta Sabha).33 Yudhishthira, invited by Duryodhana to a game he cannot resist, loses his wealth, his kingdom, his brothers, himself and finally his wife Draupadi to an opponent whose uncle, Shakuni, plays with superior skill and deceit. The presiding king, Dhritarashtra, permits the game although he has been warned against it. When Draupadi, brought into the hall, asks whether a man who had already lost himself could stake her, the senior figures present, Bhishma, Drona and Kripa among them, do not give a clear answer.34

Read as a governance case, the episode contains several recognisable failures. Dhritarashtra’s attachment to his son is a case of promoter dominance, in which the person with ultimate authority will not restrain a relative who has an interest in the outcome. Shakuni’s conduct is fraud that exploits an information asymmetry. Yudhishthira’s staking of his brothers and of Draupadi is, on one reading, a breach of the duty of those who hold authority over the interests of others, since he treats as his own what was not his to risk. Finally, the silence of the elders is a failure of gatekeepers. They had knowledge, standing and the capacity to object, and did not use them.

B. Vidura’s counsel and the independent director

Vidura offers the counter-example. In the Udyoga Parva, Dhritarashtra, anxious on the eve of war, asks Vidura for counsel, and Vidura gives it frankly. Among other things he tells the king that those who speak pleasing words are easy to find, whereas one who will speak, and one who will listen to, what is unpleasant but beneficial is rare.35 His advice is not followed. This is a useful picture of the independent director. Independence is not only a legal status secured by criteria such as the absence of a pecuniary relationship with the company.36 It also depends on whether the body that appointed the adviser will listen. The Companies Act addresses the first aspect by defining independence, prescribing a code of conduct for independent directors, and requiring a proportion of independent directors on the boards of listed companies.37 It cannot supply the second, which is a matter of board culture. Vidura’s position, consulted but unheeded, is the characteristic predicament of the independent director in a promoter-controlled company.

C. The subtlety of dharma and the limits of compliance

In the same scene, Bhishma says that dharma is subtle and that he cannot resolve Draupadi’s question. The subtlety of dharma is a theme of the whole epic, which declines to reduce ethics to rules. For corporate law this has a double significance. On the one hand, it supports the view that compliance with the letter of the law is not the same as ethical conduct, a view built into the open-textured standards of Section 166(2) (“good faith”, “best interests”) and into the Schedule IV code. On the other hand, the episode shows how appeals to complexity can become an excuse, since Bhishma’s admission of subtlety is used to avoid acting. A governance system that relies on standards must therefore pair them with procedures that force decisions, such as recorded board deliberation and recorded dissent.

D. Nishkama karma and loka-sangraha

The Bhagavad Gita, which forms part of the Bhishma Parva, supplies two ideas relevant to corporate purpose. The first is nishkama karma, the injunction to act on one’s duty without attachment to its fruits.38 The second is loka-sangraha, usually translated as the welfare or holding together of the world, which the text offers as a reason why even one with nothing to gain should act.39 Management literature often reads these as encouragement to be purpose-driven and not merely profit-driven. Read carefully, the first idea does not tell managers to ignore consequences but to act from duty and not from greed, and the second ties action to a wider social end.

In the statutory scheme, the closest expression is corporate social responsibility, under which larger companies must spend at least two per cent of their average net profit on specified activities,40 together with sustainability reporting under the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report requirement.41 These provisions require action and disclosure. They cannot require the disposition that nishkama karma describes. That difference between what law can compel and what ethics asks is an honest limit on the use of the Gita in corporate law.

E. Ends and means

The epic is also candid about the cost of results-driven reasoning. The stratagems adopted to defeat Drona, Karna and Duryodhana, including Yudhishthira’s half-truth to Drona,42 are narrated with unease, and the characters themselves debate whether victory justified the means. This is a helpful caution for companies that justify questionable practice by reference to survival or growth, and it parallels the reasoning that often accompanies aggressive accounting. The epic does not endorse that reasoning. It records its price.

Comparative and statutory analysis

A. Mapping classical ideas onto company law

Table 1 sets out the principal correspondences. The mapping is analogical. It identifies shared problems and responses, and it does not claim a historical or doctrinal lineage.

Classical concept and source Governance function Modern counterpart Indian legal anchor
Rajadharma (Arthashastra, Bk. 1; Shanti Parva) Office held for the benefit of others Fiduciary duty; stakeholder orientation Companies Act § 166(1)–(5)
Accounting and anti-embezzlement controls (Arthashastra, Bk. 2) Preventive control; taxonomy of fraud; rotation of officials Internal financial controls; auditor rotation Companies Act §§ 134(5)(e), 139(2), 143
Gudhapurushas (Arthashastra, Bks. 1–2) Detection of wrongdoing within the administration Vigil mechanism; whistleblower policy Companies Act § 177(9)–(10); LODR reg. 22
Danda (Arthashastra, Bk. 1) Proportionate and credible enforcement Graded penalties; regulatory enforcement Companies Act §§ 166(7), 447
Vidura’s counsel (Udyoga Parva) Honest advice to a compromised ruler Independent directors Companies Act § 149; sched. IV
Dyuta Sabha; silence of the elders (Sabha Parva) Capture, conflict of interest, gatekeeper silence Related-party controls; gatekeeper liability Companies Act §§ 149(12), 184, 188, 143(12)
Nishkama karma; loka-sangraha (Bhagavad Gita) Purposive, duty-driven action for a wider social end CSR; sustainability reporting Companies Act § 135; LODR reg. 34(2)(f)
Saptanga (Arthashastra, Bk. 6) Interdependence of institutions Systemic governance reform No single provision

Table 1: Classical Concepts and Their Counterparts in Indian Company Law

B. Section 166(2) as the point of convergence

Section 166 requires a director to act in accordance with the articles of the company; to act in good faith to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and in the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of the environment; to exercise due and reasonable care, skill, diligence and independent judgment; to avoid situations of direct or indirect conflict; and not to achieve or attempt to achieve undue gain.43 A contravention attracts a fine of not less than one lakh rupees, which may extend to five lakh rupees.44 The UK counterpart, by comparison, directs directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members, having regard to a list of other interests.45

The difference in drafting may be significant. Under the UK text, the interests of employees and the community are factors to be considered in the service of the members’ benefit. Under Section 166(2), the interests of employees, the community and the environment appear alongside those of the company and its shareholders as objects of the duty. The Indian text can be read as a restatement of enlightened shareholder value, but it can equally be read as going further, and the better reading takes its plain words seriously. The Supreme Court has noticed the provision, observing in M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India that it requires a director to act in good faith not only in the best interest of the company, its employees, the shareholders and the community but also for the protection of the environment,46 but that observation, made in the course of directions for the protection of endangered birds, does not settle the scope of the provision.

This is where the trusteeship idea does analytical work. If the director’s office is one of trust, the natural question is for whom, and Section 166(2) answers: for a defined set of persons beyond the shareholders. That is closer to rajadharma, in which authority is exercised for the governed, than to a model in which the office exists for the shareholders alone. The enforcement gap, however, is the same one that the ancient texts leave open. The duty is generally understood to be owed to the company, and its enforcement lies in the penal provision of Section 166(7) and, for members, in derivative and oppression remedies.47 Employees and communities have no direct claim.

C. Gatekeepers: independent directors and auditors

The Dyuta Sabha is a story of gatekeepers who did not act, and the Companies Act’s approach to gatekeeper liability is instructive. An independent director is liable only for acts of omission or commission that occurred with her knowledge, attributable through board processes, and with her consent or connivance, or where she did not act diligently.48 The limit reflects a legislative choice not to make non-executive directors insurers of the company’s conduct. Whether silence in the face of known wrongdoing amounts to a want of diligence under this provision is arguable, but the drafting leaves room for the defence that the director neither consented nor connived. The epic sets a stricter standard, in which silence in the face of known wrongdoing is itself a failure.

Auditors face a more direct duty. An auditor who has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being or has been committed by officers or employees must report it in the manner and within the time prescribed.49 This is closer to Kautilya’s model, which assumes that officials in positions of trust must be actively watched and that failures to report are themselves culpable.

D. Conflicts of interest and related-party transactions

Dhritarashtra’s conflict between office and family attachment finds its modern counterpart in the rules on interested directors and related-party transactions. A director must disclose any interest in a contract or arrangement.50 Related-party transactions of the kinds listed in Section 188, unless entered into in the ordinary course of business and at arm’s length, require board approval and, above prescribed thresholds, approval of the shareholders by a resolution on which members who are related parties may not vote.51 These rules answer the problem in the way the epic implies, by removing the interested party from the decision. Their weakness is that they depend on a correct identification of related parties and on honest disclosure, which is where the risk is greatest in promoter-controlled groups.

E. Vigilance and enforcement

Kautilya’s insight that vigilance, and not severity alone, deters wrongdoing is reflected in the vigil mechanism. The mandatory mechanism, however, applies to listed companies and prescribed classes,52 and the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014, is concerned with disclosures about public servants.53 A whistleblower in an unlisted private company therefore has limited statutory protection. The state’s investigative capacity, through the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and SEBI, supplies the detection that Kautilya’s agents were meant to provide, but it acts after the event.54

F. Judicial approach and committee reports

Reported decisions on Section 166 do not appear to have drawn on the texts examined here to interpret it. The Supreme Court’s decision in Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. is instructive for a different reason.55 The case arose out of the removal of the executive chairman of the Tata group’s holding company. In setting aside the appellate tribunal’s order, the Court stressed that the statutory remedies for oppression and mismanagement require conduct that is oppressive in law, and that internal governance arrangements, including the articles of association, are to be respected. The decision illustrates both the importance of governance arrangements in promoter-led groups and judicial reluctance to second-guess board-level decisions. A reading informed by ideas of trust and stewardship would not displace that deference, but it could shape how courts understand the open-textured duty in Section 166(2), particularly in assessing whether directors considered the interests that the provision lists.

G. Trusteeship compared with other models

Three models can now be compared. Shareholder primacy, as in Dodge, makes the shareholders’ interest the end of corporate activity. Enlightened shareholder value, as in Section 172 of the UK Act, keeps shareholders as the end but requires attention to other interests as means. The trusteeship model drawn from the texts treats the office as held for a wider group, of which shareholders are one part. Section 166(2), read on its words, sits closest to the last, although it lacks the institutional apparatus to enforce it. The OECD Principles, which recognise the rights of stakeholders and the board’s role in considering them, point in a similar direction,56 as do the Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ voluntary National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct.57 The convergence matters for the argument of this paper. Indigenous thought is not at odds with international trends, but it offers a distinct and locally resonant justification for them.

Critical limitations

A. Anachronism and textual plurality

The first limitation is that the texts are composite and their dating and authorship are contested. Scholars disagree about when the Arthashastra took its present form and by whom, and some treat it as the product of a long process of composition and not of a single author.58 The Mahabharata is likewise a vast, layered work whose moral world is deliberately unresolved.59 Any claim about what “the” texts require is therefore a selection, and the selection must be defended and not merely assumed.

B. Hierarchy, caste and gender

The texts are products of hierarchical societies. The Arthashastra’s penal provisions in several places vary with the status of the offender and the victim,60 and the Dyuta Sabha itself shows the treatment of a woman as a stakeable possession. These features are incompatible with the equality guarantees of the Constitution. Any use of the texts in modern law must therefore be filtered through constitutional values, and the paper does not suggest that those features be recovered.

C. Authoritarianism and surveillance

Kautilya’s system relies on covert agents, on the entrapment of officials through tests of loyalty and integrity,61 and in places on coercive interrogation.62 Transposed to the company, such methods collide with the right to privacy, which the Supreme Court has recognised as part of the right to life and personal liberty.63 The lesson to be drawn is the importance of vigilance, and not the adoption of covert monitoring of employees, which would raise serious legal and ethical objections of its own.

D. Selective reading and instrumentalisation

Kautilya has often been called the “Indian Machiavelli”, a label that some scholars have qualified by pointing to the text’s concern with the welfare of the governed.64 Both readings can be supported from the text, which is the point: it can be used to justify opposite conclusions. There is also a risk that “Indian values” become a branding exercise. The language of dharma in annual reports, unaccompanied by changes in conduct, would be worse than silence, because it lends moral authority to what remains unchanged. For this reason the argument of this paper is deliberately modest, and its proposals are practical and not rhetorical.

Recommendations

A. Use as an interpretive aid

Courts and regulators may use the ideas of trust and stewardship as persuasive analogies when construing the open-textured words of Section 166(2), but statutory text and constitutional values must control. In particular, the words “the community” and “the protection of environment” should be read as having content and not as ornament.

B. Giving Section 166(2) practical effect

The enforcement gap identified in Part V can be reduced without creating new causes of action for every stakeholder. One approach is to require the directors’ report of larger companies to state how the board has had regard to the interests listed in Section 166(2), on the model of the section 172 statement that UK companies other than small and medium-sized companies must now include in their strategic report.65 A disclosure of this kind makes the duty visible, creates a record against which conduct can be assessed, and supplies regulators with a basis for inquiry.

C. Strengthening gatekeepers

The experience of Vidura suggests that independence requires institutional support and not only formal criteria. Measures worth considering include stronger protection for independent directors and auditors who raise concerns, a clearer statement in Schedule IV that recorded dissent is expected where a director disagrees with a material decision, and an extension of statutory whistleblower protection to employees of unlisted companies above a prescribed size.

D. Director education

The Dyuta Sabha, Vidura’s counsel and the Arthashastra’s taxonomy of embezzlement are effective teaching material, because they present governance failure as a human and not merely a procedural problem. They could be used in the induction of directors and in legal education, alongside the proficiency assessment that applies to persons seeking inclusion in the independent directors’ databank.66 Codes of ethics should be built on questions that directors must answer and not on statements of values.

E. Directions for further research

Empirical work is needed on whether boards that use values-based codes behave differently, and doctrinal work is needed on whether the Indian judiciary has relied on any indigenous sources of jurisprudence in commercial law. Both would test the claims of this paper against evidence and not only against texts.

Conclusion

This paper began with a question about the moral foundation of directors’ duties in Indian company law. The Arthashastra and the Mahabharata offer a coherent, though contested, answer in the idea of office held for others. The Arthashastra contributes a realistic view of temptation, with detailed controls, vigilance and calibrated enforcement. The Mahabharata contributes an account of how governance fails when authority is captured by family interest and when those who know the truth keep silent, together with the Gita’s idea of purposive action.

On the first question, these ideas centre on trust, accountability and the welfare of the governed. On the second, they sit closer to stakeholder and stewardship models than to strict shareholder primacy, and they converge with the OECD Principles. On the third, the Companies Act already reflects many of the same concerns, in Sections 135, 149, 166, 177, 184 and 188, although the legislative drafters did not draw on these sources, and Section 166(2) is the clearest statutory expression of the trusteeship idea. On the fourth, the texts cannot supply enforceable rules, are hierarchical and at points authoritarian, and can be read selectively, so they must be treated as a critical aid to interpretation and education and not as law.

The practical lesson is that Section 166(2) states a demanding standard that the enforcement system does not yet match. Disclosure of how boards consider stakeholder interests, stronger protection for gatekeepers who speak, and serious attention to director education would narrow the gap between the standard and the practice. The ancient texts do not tell Indian company law what to do. They remind it, in the language of a different age, why the question matters.

*****

Footnotes

1. Securities & Exch. Bd. of India, Order in the Matter of Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (July 15, 2014).

2. Union of India v. Infrastructure Leasing & Fin. Servs. Ltd., C.P. No. 3638/MB/2018 (Nat’l Co. L. Trib. Mumbai Oct. 1, 2018) (India) (replacing the board under Companies Act, 2013, §§ 241–242).

3. On the English origins, see Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (corporate personality); Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421 (directors’ duties owed to the company, not to individual shareholders).

4. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18 of 2013, § 166 (India) [hereinafter Companies Act].

5. See, e.g., S.K. Chakraborty, Management by Values: Towards Cultural Congruence (1991); S.K. Chakraborty, Ethics in Management: Vedantic Perspectives (1995).

6. The principal sources used are R.P. Kangle, The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra pt. 2 (2d ed. 1972); Patrick Olivelle, King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra (2013); and, for the Mahabharata, the Critical Edition of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, with the English translation in Bibek Debroy, The Mahabharata (2010–2014). References to the Arthashastra follow the book, chapter and verse numbering of Kangle’s edition, and those to the Mahabharata follow the Critical Edition’s parva, chapter and verse numbering. The Bhagavad Gita, which forms chapters 23 to 40 of the Bhishma Parva in the Critical Edition, is cited by its own chapter and verse, followed by the Critical Edition reference.

7. Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).

8. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).

9. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).

10. Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, 16 Austl. J. Mgmt. 49 (1991).

11. R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984).

12. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (UK).

13. Bus. Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019).

14. Kumar Mangalam Birla Comm., Report of the Committee Appointed by the SEBI on Corporate Governance (2000); Dep’t of Co. Affairs, Report of the Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance (Naresh Chandra Comm.) (2002); Securities & Exch. Bd. of India, Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (N.R. Narayana Murthy Comm.) (2003); Securities & Exch. Bd. of India, Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (Uday Kotak Comm.) (Oct. 5, 2017).

15. Securities & Exch. Bd. of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 [hereinafter LODR].

16. See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 335 (2009); Umakanth Varottil, Evolution and Effectiveness of Independent Directors in Indian Corporate Governance, 6 Hastings Bus. L.J. 281 (2010).

17. See, e.g., Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (1992) (an Aristotelian account); Norman E. Bowie, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective (1999).

18. M.K. Gandhi, Trusteeship (R.K. Prabhu comp., 1960).

19. Arthashastra 1.19.34, supra note 6.

20. Arthashastra 1.6–1.7, supra note 6.

21. Mahabharata 12.56–12.72 (Rajadharmanushasana Parva), supra note 6.

22. Arthashastra 2.7, supra note 6.

23. Arthashastra 2.8–2.9 (catalogue of embezzlement, the honey-and-poison observation at 2.9.32, and transfer of officials), supra note 6.

24. Companies Act § 134(5)(e).

25. Companies Act § 143(3)(i).

26. Companies Act § 139(2).

27. Companies Act § 143(12).

28. Arthashastra 1.11–1.12, 2.9, supra note 6.

29. Companies Act § 177(9)–(10); LODR, supra note 15, reg. 22.

30. Arthashastra 1.4, supra note 6.

31. Companies Act § 447.

32. Arthashastra 6.1, supra note 6.

33. Mahabharata 2.43–2.72, supra note 6.

34. Mahabharata 2.60, supra note 6.

35. Mahabharata 5.33–5.40 (the Vidura Niti), esp. 5.37.14, supra note 6.

36. Companies Act § 149(6).

37. Companies Act § 149(4), (8) & sched. IV.

38. Bhagavad Gita 2.47 (Mahabharata 6.24.47), supra note 6.

39. Bhagavad Gita 3.20, 3.25 (Mahabharata 6.25.20, 6.25.25), supra note 6.

40. Companies Act § 135(1), (5).

41. LODR, supra note 15, reg. 34(2)(f); Securities & Exch. Bd. of India, Circular No. SEBI/HO/CFD/CMD-2/P/CIR/2021/562 (May 10, 2021).

42. Mahabharata 7.164–7.165, supra note 6.

43. Companies Act § 166(1)–(5).

44. Companies Act § 166(7).

45. Companies Act 2006, supra note 12, § 172(1).

46. M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 326 (India).

47. Companies Act §§ 241–242 (remedies available on the application of members and, in prescribed cases, the Central Government).

48. Companies Act § 149(12).

49. Companies Act § 143(12).

50. Companies Act § 184.

51. Companies Act § 188.

52. Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014, r. 7 (India).

53. Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014, No. 17 of 2014 (India).

54. Companies Act § 211 (Serious Fraud Investigation Office).

55. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd. v. Cyrus Invs. Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 449 (India).

56. G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD Publishing 2023).

57. Ministry of Corp. Affairs, Gov’t of India, National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct (2019).

58. See generally Olivelle, supra note 6; Thomas R. Trautmann, Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text (1971).

59. See generally Moral Dilemmas in the Mahabharata (Bimal Krishna Matilal ed., 1989); Alf Hiltebeitel, Rethinking the Mahabharata (2001).

60. Arthashastra bks. 3–4, passim, supra note 6.

61. Arthashastra 1.10, supra note 6.

62. Arthashastra 4.8, supra note 6.

63. K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).

64. See Roger Boesche, The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra (2002).

65. Companies Act 2006, supra note 12, § 414CZA (UK) (inserted by The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, S.I. 2018/860, reg. 4).

66. Companies Act § 150; Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014, r. 6(4) (India).

How to cite

Manish Kumar Sahu, From Rajadharma to Directors' Duties: Indigenous Jurisprudence and Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1020 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13270.

Cite this article

Manish Kumar Sahu, From Rajadharma to Directors' Duties: Indigenous Jurisprudence and Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1020 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13270.
Chat with us