Introduction
Marriage happens to be one of the earliest social institutions created by man, perhaps stemming from his desire to ensure the paternity of his children, which required the regulation of sexual relations in the form of an exclusive union of a man and a woman.1 Later, it was romanticized by different religions, some treating it as a contract, as in Islam, and others going as far as calling it a sacrament, as in Christianity and Hinduism.2 Ultimately, marriage was recognized as a legal institution and codified under various legal systems.
As time progressed, people came to realize that marriage was not just about fulfilling religious rites, procreating, and rearing children, but was also about companionship. However, all of this came at a cost. Various economic, social, and psychological factors, such as the increasing cost of living, itinerant lifestyles due to work, the legal hassle and expense of a divorce, taxation, the loss of social security and healthcare benefits in some nations, a lack of faith in the institution of marriage, and legal bars on entering into a marriage, as in the case of same-sex relationships, led many to opt for alternatives to marriage in the form of formal and informal cohabitation.3
Under formal cohabitation, the law requires cohabiting couples to register formally or to execute contracts, or there is legislation governing such cohabitation. In this form of cohabitation, the cohabitants consciously and wilfully submit to a legal regime that confers certain rights and responsibilities in view of their cohabitation, as in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.4
On the other hand, informal cohabitation exists where the law imposes certain rights and liabilities, on the basis of specific criteria such as the duration of cohabitation or the existence of children, on cohabitants who did not expressly choose or wish to enter such a legal regime. Examples can be found in Sweden, New Zealand, and Slovenia.5
A live-in relationship, though not formally defined, loosely refers to a consensual relationship between two adults who voluntarily cohabit without undergoing the customary or legal requirements of a marriage, although the nature of their relationship closely resembles a marriage.6
The emergence of live-in relationships is a fairly recent development in the Indian socio-cultural context, often attributed to urbanization, globalization, and, chiefly, westernization.7 These relationships, while still struggling for social acceptance, have posed several legal dilemmas. These include, but are not limited to, the inheritance, property rights, and legitimacy of children born of such relationships; the property, inheritance, medical, insurance, maintenance, and residential rights of live-in partners; and remedies against violence faced in such relationships.
Furthermore, India has no legislation that deals exclusively with such cohabitation, regulating or protecting the rights of cohabitants against each other or against third parties. The Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand, and later the Gujarat Uniform Civil Code, do, however, require live-in couples to register their relationships, and expressly bar from registration those who are minors, already married or already in a live-in relationship, or within the prohibited degrees of relationship.8
This paper focuses on the judicial response to live-in partners seeking protection against threats to their lives, especially when one or both partners are married to someone else, because the courts lack uniformity in exercising their writ jurisdiction to protect live-in partners in such matters.
Judiciary on live-in relationships
When a man and a woman have cohabited under the same roof for a considerable time as man and wife, and are perceived by the people around them, or by society in general, to be a couple, the judiciary has time and again drawn a presumption in favour of marriage rather than concubinage. Gradually, there has been a shift, not only from a social perspective but also from a judicial standpoint. The Indian judiciary has not only acknowledged the live-in relationship as a social reality but has gone so far as to expand and protect certain legal rights of live-in partners and of children born of such partnerships.
A. Presumption in favour of marriage
In one of the early instances, the Privy Council laid down that where a man and a woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage.9 The Privy Council followed suit in Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan.10
Although the court ought to presume marriage when a man and a woman have continuously lived together as spouses for a significant time, this presumption is not absolute and can be rebutted.11
In Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation,12 the Supreme Court, while dismissing a special leave petition, remarked that although the presumption in favour of marriage where the partners have cohabited for a long spell is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on the party who seeks to challenge it. If a couple who have lived as husband and wife in society for five decades were required to prove the validity of their marriage by eyewitness evidence, few would succeed.
B. Legitimacy of children conceived during long-term cohabitation
The Supreme Court took a forward-looking view in S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan, holding that where a man and a woman have lived together as husband and wife for long years, a presumption of marriage arises in law, so that a child born of that cohabitation is to be treated as legitimate.13
C. Maintenance on the presumption of marriage
Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed whether a woman is entitled to maintenance on the presumption of marriage where a man and a woman have cohabited for a long spell without undergoing the legal requirements of a valid marriage.14
Keeping in mind the social objective of maintenance, the Court took the view that where two people have lived as spouses without undergoing the legal requirements of a valid marriage, the woman should be entitled to maintenance, since the man cannot be allowed to enjoy the advantages of a de facto marriage without undertaking its duties and obligations.15 Sitting as a Bench of two Judges, however, the Court requested that the questions be referred to a larger Bench.16
D. Impact of a subsisting marriage on the presumption in favour of marriage
In S.P.S. Balasubramanyam,17 one of the contentions advanced by counsel for the respondent against the presumption of marriage was that the woman was already married, and her husband alive, when she began to cohabit with another man; their relationship was therefore adulterous, and the law does not recognize such a relationship as valid. The Court declined to express any opinion on whether an adulterous beginning to the relationship of a man and a woman who later cohabited as husband and wife was sufficient to destroy the presumption in favour of marriage, since the plea had not been raised in the written statement and no court below had recorded a finding on it.18
In another case, a man and a woman who had a child from an earlier marriage, both working as labourers, began to cohabit and, according to the evidence, had five children together. When the presumption of marriage between them was later challenged, the First Appellate Court rejected it on the erroneous belief that the woman’s earlier marriage was subsisting, and her husband alive, when she began cohabiting with the other man. The Supreme Court found that her husband had died before she moved in, and restored the decree of the trial court.19
E. Judicial acknowledgement of live-in relationships
As for the judicial acknowledgement of the live-in relationship as such, it was the Allahabad High Court which, in 2001, said in unequivocal terms: “In our opinion, a man and a woman, even without getting married can live together if they wish. This may be regarded immoral by society but it is not illegal. There is a difference between law and morality.”20
F. Freedom to live with anyone and protection against harassment
The Supreme Court, while upholding a person’s right to marry a person of their choice, and expressing concern over the growing instances of violence and honour killings against couples entering or wishing to enter into inter-caste and inter-religious marriages, has observed that once a person attains majority, he or she is free to marry, or to live with, anyone he or she likes. The Court further directed the administration and the police to protect such couples against harassment.21
G. Relationship in the nature of marriage and live-in relationships
In India, the concept of the live-in relationship ultimately also gained statutory backing through section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which gives an expansive definition of the term “domestic relationship”, one aspect of which is a relationship in the nature of marriage between two persons who live, or have at any point of time lived, together in a shared household.22 A woman in such a live-in relationship is thus eligible to avail herself of the remedies available under the Act.23
The expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” is not, however, defined in the Act, and the Supreme Court therefore took it upon itself to interpret it.24 The Court compared it to a common law marriage, a kind of informal or de facto marriage recognized in some countries even though no legally recognized marriage ceremony is performed, no civil marriage contract is entered into, and the marriage is not registered in a civil registry.25
The Court further pointed out that, as Parliament used the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not “live-in relationship”, not all live-in relationships fall within it,26 but only those that satisfy the following requirements:
1. The couple must act like, and appear to be, husband and wife in the eyes of society.
2. They must be of marriageable age.
3. They must be unmarried and otherwise legally competent to marry.
4. They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to society as husband and wife for a considerable period.
5. They must have lived together in a shared household, and not merely spent weekends together or had a one-night stand.27
A relationship in which a man keeps a woman whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purposes or as a servant does not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage.28
In a later decision, the Court also set out non-exhaustive guidelines to determine whether a live-in relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”, namely:
1. The length of the relationship
2. Cohabitation in a shared household
3. Pooling of resources and financial interdependence, such as joint bank accounts or jointly acquired assets
4. The division and management of household chores (where these are carried on mostly by the woman, this leans in favour of a relationship in the nature of marriage)
5. The existence not only of sexual relations but also of affection, emotional support, companionship, intimacy, and care between the heterosexual couple
6. The existence of a child born of the relationship
7. Acting as a couple in the eyes of the public, and the conduct of the parties.29
The Supreme Court has, however, held that a polygamous, bigamous, or adulterous relationship, such as one knowingly entered into with a married person, cannot be termed a relationship in the nature of marriage.30
In deciding whether a live-in relationship is in the nature of marriage, the relationship must be evaluated as a whole, and not on the strength of any one dimension of it. Once it is shown to fall within the meaning of a relationship in the nature of marriage, the live-in partner can avail herself of the remedies under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which go beyond maintenance and include a right to a shared household.31
Highlighting the individual’s right of choice, the Supreme Court has observed that two adults have the right to live together even outside marriage, adding that the live-in relationship has to a certain extent been recognized by the legislature itself.32
H. Social response to live-in relationships
The judiciary has repeatedly acknowledged the changing social dynamics, including the fact that live-in relationships are no longer a decadent concept of western import, as some allege,33 but a lived reality for many in contemporary Indian society.
Yet, when it comes to social acceptance, live-in relationships still have a long way to go. Their brief history in India is marked by social stigma, moral policing, public and media outrage, and, overall, a sense of taboo, as the matter of S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal shows.34
In that case, numerous criminal complaints were filed against a well-known actress alleging offences including defamation, obscenity, indecent representation of women, and incitement. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the acceptance of premarital sex and live-in relationships is viewed by some as an attack on the centrality of marriage, while recognizing that there are individuals and groups who do not hold that view. The Court further remarked that morality and criminality are not co-extensive; that notions of social morality are inherently subjective; that an unpopular opinion ought to be tolerated, or contested through open dialogue; and that the criminal law cannot be used to interfere unduly with the freedom of speech and expression or with the domain of personal autonomy.35
Live-in couples with existing marriages seeking protection against threats to life
The discussion above shows that, although the courts do not regard live-in relationships as an offence, such relationships are seen as a threat to the social institution of marriage and are perceived by many as immoral, especially when one or both partners are married, the spouse is living, and the marriage has not been dissolved.
These couples are not only susceptible to social ridicule but also face real threats to their lives and aggression from those related to them. When they approach the police for safety, their pleas often go unheeded, as the following cases show, until they are left with no option but to knock on the doors of the judiciary.
In one such instance, a live-in couple approached the Allahabad High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the woman’s father, the State, and the police not to harass them or take any coercive action against them. The woman was married and, during the subsistence of her marriage, had begun living with another man as man and wife. Her father disapproved and allegedly threatened to kill them, on one occasion in the presence of police officials.36
The Court framed the following two questions:
1. Whether protection can be granted to live-in partners when one of them is the lawfully wedded spouse of another and has not obtained a divorce?
2. Whether protection can be granted to live-in partners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when their cohabitation may constitute the offence of bigamy?37
The Court answered both in the negative, for the following reasons:
1. For a writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must have a legal right that subsists on the date of the petition, and the respondent, being the State or a public authority, must be under a corresponding legal duty imposed by law.38 The petitioners had established no such legal right.39
2. Since one of the partners was married when the cohabitation began, and the marriage was subsisting, the relationship did not fall within the definition of a relationship in the nature of marriage and might constitute the offence of bigamy.40
3. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued contrary to law or to defeat a statutory provision, including a penal provision. Granting mandamus to protect the couple would, in essence, shield them against the commission of the offence of bigamy.41
In a similar case, a live-in couple sought a writ of mandamus against the woman’s husband, to whom she was still legally married although a divorce petition was pending between them, alleging that he had threatened them and that they feared for their safety.42 The Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition on the same reasoning, but additionally remarked:
1. Two adults, in exercise of their right to personal liberty, are free to enter into a live-in relationship consensually, but this freedom is subject to the statutory right of another. A spouse has the statutory right to enjoy the marital companionship of the other spouse, which cannot be curtailed in the name of personal liberty, and the court cannot grant protection that would take away that legal right.
2. The law does not permit a married person to enter into a live-in relationship with another without first obtaining a decree of divorce from a competent court.43
3. A married person should not approach the court for the protection of an illicit relationship, but should first get separated from their spouse in accordance with the law applicable to them.44
The Court also recalled an earlier observation of the High Court: “Live-in relationship cannot be granted at the cost of the social fabric of this country. Directing the police to grant protection to them may indirectly give our assent to such illicit relations.”45
The Allahabad High Court followed suit in Anju v. State of U.P.,46 where live-in partners, both already married to others, sought a writ of mandamus for protection against a threat to their lives. The Court refused, disposing of the petition with the observation that if the partners were subjected to violence, they could approach the Superintendent of Police, who was expected to do the needful in accordance with law.
Five days after that decision, however, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court took a different view in Anamika v. State of U.P.,47 where two adults in a live-in relationship, one of whom was already married, sought protection against threats to their lives and apprehended an honour killing. They had already approached the police, but no action had been taken. The Court, pointing out that it is the duty of the police to protect two adults living together, stayed the couple’s arrest in a case registered under section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (kidnapping, abducting, or inducing a woman to compel her marriage), restrained the woman’s family from causing any harm to the couple, and made the Superintendent of Police personally responsible for their safety, pending further hearing.
When it was contended that it is an offence for a married man to stay with another woman, the Court rightly observed:
“There is no offence of the kind where a married man, staying with an adult in a live-in relationship, by consent of the other person, can be prosecuted for any offence, whatsoever. Morality and law have to be kept apart. If there is no offence under the law made out, social opinions and morality will not guide the action of the Court for protecting the rights of citizens.”48
This forward-looking stance nonetheless leaves the core legal issues unresolved, such as:
1. Whether a person’s statutory right to enjoy the company of his or her spouse supersedes a live-in partner’s fundamental right to life and freedom to live consensually with anyone?
2. Since there is no uniformity in the exercise of writ jurisdiction where live-in couples, one or both of whom are married to someone else, seek protection against threats to their lives, should a court refuse to protect a person’s life because that person’s lifestyle choice may result in a civil wrong (adultery) or an intentional tort (interfering in another’s marriage with the intention of separating the spouses)?
3. Lastly, in adjudicating such matters, does the court need to distinguish between social morality and constitutional morality, or between morality and criminality?
Discussion
Undoubtedly, marriage as a social institution has been cardinal to human civilization, and in Hinduism it is considered a sacrosanct union between a man and a woman.49 It serves various practical purposes, among them ensuring the paternity of children and providing for their rearing.50 It is therefore natural for an unconventional and foreign concept such as the live-in relationship, which is perceived to threaten the institution of marriage, to be met with scepticism and hostility.
Many argue, however, that the live-in relationship began in the modern world as a step towards marriage: it helps couples gauge their compatibility before committing to each other legally through marriage, in theory significantly reducing the risk of future marital discord leading to separation or divorce.51
Critics, on the other hand, point out that a significant number of live-in relationships do not result in marriage.52 In the long run, such relationships give rise to social and legal dilemmas, such as the status and rights of children born of them, insurance and medical rights, and the property and maintenance rights of live-in partners when the relationship ends.
Apart from the registration requirements of the Uttarakhand and Gujarat codes, no Indian law deals expressly with, or officially recognizes, the live-in relationship. The judiciary has proactively acknowledged the existence of such relationships, despite their lack of broad public support, and has extended certain rights to live-in couples, but these are far from adequate or exhaustive to protect or regulate those who choose to enter into live-in relationships.
In Lata Singh v. State of U.P.53 and Shakti Vahini v. Union of India,54 the Supreme Court, expressing grave concern over the increasing instances of honour killings and of violence against couples whose relationships their families or communities regard as inappropriate, directed the police and the administration to take concrete and stern action against the perpetrators and to ensure promptly the safety and well-being of such couples.
Yet, as discussed above, the police and the administration often fail to protect such couples, or allegedly take no action even after being informed of threats to their lives.
More concerning is the situation of live-in couples, for whom the law has devised no specific protective mechanism. If one or both partners are already married to someone else, even the courts frequently deny them protection, as a series of decisions of the Allahabad High Court shows, until Anamika,55 where the Division Bench took a different stance.
It is submitted that when a court decides whether to grant protection to a live-in couple, especially when one or both partners are married to someone else, it ought also to take the following considerations into account.
A. Relationship in the nature of marriage not to be a qualification for live-in couples seeking protection under writ jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has provided extensive guidelines to determine whether a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”, and has distinguished a domestic relationship knowingly entered into with a married person from one between two unmarried persons.56 Not every live-in relationship qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage. But the purpose of introducing that qualification was only to extend the remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to an aggrieved person in a relationship in the nature of marriage, the legislature having chosen that expression instead of “live-in relationship”. The objective was to widen the scope of the Act.
Thus, whether or not a live-in relationship qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage should have no bearing where the live-in partners seek, through writ jurisdiction, protection of their lives, which is a fundamental right.
B. A married person entering into a live-in relationship does not commit the offence of bigamy
Section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 makes it an offence for a person who has a living husband or wife to marry again where the second marriage is void because it takes place during the life of that spouse, and prescribes a higher punishment where the earlier marriage is concealed from the person subsequently married.57
The key element of the offence of bigamy is thus the solemnization of a second marriage while the first marriage is legally valid and subsisting.
In dismissing writ petitions by live-in couples seeking protection against threats to their lives, where one or both partners are married, the courts have often reasoned that granting protection would, in essence, protect the couple against the commission of the offence of bigamy.58
This reasoning seems technically flawed: living together consensually, that is, a live-in relationship, is not the same as solemnizing a second marriage, and so no offence of bigamy is committed.
C. The statutory right to the company of one’s spouse should not come at the expense of that spouse’s life, safety, and well-being
The Court has rightly pointed out that a spouse has the statutory right to enjoy the company of the other spouse and cannot be deprived of that right, and that the freedom of one person ends where the statutory right of another begins.59
The right to life and personal liberty is one of the cardinal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India and is fundamental to every human being.60 It is also a human right, conferred upon a person simply by virtue of being human.61
Human relations are complicated. When a person’s husband or wife enters into a live-in relationship with another, that person and their relatives, moved by a sense of betrayal, anger, injustice, and social disgrace, at times resort to violence intended to harm the live-in couple, in extreme cases killing them.62 For a person to enjoy the company of his or her spouse, that spouse must first be alive, safe, and well.
When a person in desperation knocks on the door of the judiciary seeking protection of life and limb, irrespective of that person’s lifestyle choice (that is, to enter into a live-in relationship with one person while married to another), the court ought primarily to ensure the protection of that person’s life, instead of denying protection on the apprehension that it might infringe another’s statutory right to the company of their spouse.
D. Constitutional morality to take precedence over social morality, and the need to distinguish morality from criminality
Social morality consists of society’s ever-changing views of what is right and what is wrong, what is acceptable and what is not. Its notions shift from time to time, and what seems natural and moral to one person may not seem appropriate to another.63
Constitutional morality, on the other hand, is derived from the Constitution itself, which contains the collective goals and aspirations that the people of a nation have set for themselves and the principles that will guide them in achieving those objectives. These constitutional values and the vision of the citizenry can be inferred from the Preamble, Parts III and IV, and certain other provisions.64
Constitutional morality goes beyond the literal text adopted by the framers of the Constitution, embracing and upholding its spirit and striving to create a diverse and inclusive society. Any attempt to impose a uniform, standardized philosophy upon all members of society goes against the ethos of constitutional morality. For freedom of choice to prevail in the truest sense, an unconventional attitude or belief that is not in agreement with majoritarian sentiment must be given space to exist, if not to expand.65
A restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 cannot validly be justified on the ground that the act in question attracts public disapproval and is not in consonance with social morality.66 No one should have to live in fear merely for having exercised the right of choice.
When a couple chooses a live-in relationship instead of marriage, the choice may attract social disapproval, but when they seek protection of their lives, which is a fundamental right, that protection should not be denied to them on the ground of social morality.
The courts are bound to uphold constitutional morality over social morality, whether or not it accords with the majoritarian view. Social morality cannot be used to deny even a single individual their fundamental rights.67 Constitutional morality does not come naturally to the ordinary citizen; it needs to be fostered, learnt, and ingrained.68
Even when two unmarried, divorced, or widowed persons choose to enter into a live-in relationship, they are more often than not scrutinized through the lens of social morality. Where one or both of them are already married to another, the discussion unsurprisingly becomes a far more nuanced one, involving both morality and criminality.
Morality and criminality do not always coincide; an act that seems immoral may not be a crime. The argument that a society’s existence and stability depend on a common morality, without which it might disintegrate, so that the law should punish every immoral act, is compelling but not entirely correct. Laws should indeed be morally relevant in order to be effective, but in a democracy the majority’s view of what is moral and acceptable cannot, in the name of maintaining unity and harmony, be imposed on those who hold the opposite view and are in the minority.69
Entering into a live-in relationship while legally married to another may be considered immoral, but it is not a crime under the present criminal law, particularly after the decriminalization of adultery.70 At most, it is a civil wrong.
In deciding whether to grant protection to such couples against threats to their lives, the courts ought to be mindful that morality and law cover different ground. That something is wrong or immoral does not make it a crime. Courts can punish only what the law defines as a crime, and not what is considered a sin.71
E. Availability of civil remedies to the aggrieved spouse when a married person enters into a live-in relationship
A person who, while legally married, consensually enters into a live-in relationship with another does not commit an offence, but may commit a matrimonial wrong for which their spouse can hold them legally accountable. Depending on the personal law that governs them, the remedies available to the spouse include the following:
1. Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a decree of divorce on the ground that the other spouse has had voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than their spouse, or, depending on the nature and duration of the live-in relationship, on the ground of cruelty or desertion; a decree of judicial separation on any of those grounds; and, where the other spouse has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the petitioner’s society, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.72
2. Where the aggrieved spouse is a woman married under Muslim law, a decree dissolving the marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, on the ground that the husband has failed without reasonable cause to perform his marital obligations for three years (section 2(iv)), or that he treats her with cruelty by habitually assaulting her or making her life miserable by cruelty of conduct, even if that conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment (section 2(viii)(a)).73
3. Under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, a decree of divorce on the ground that the defendant has since the marriage committed adultery or fornication; a decree of judicial separation on any ground on which divorce could be sought; and, where the spouse has deserted the plaintiff or without lawful cause ceased to cohabit with the plaintiff, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.74
4. Under the Divorce Act, 1869, dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery; judicial separation on the ground of adultery, cruelty, or desertion for two years or more; and, where the spouse has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the petitioner’s society, restitution of conjugal rights.75
5. Under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, divorce on the ground that the respondent has had voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than their spouse; judicial separation on any ground on which divorce could be sought; and, where the spouse has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the petitioner’s society, restitution of conjugal rights.76
In addition, the court dealing with any such proceeding is empowered to grant maintenance pending the proceeding and the expenses of the proceeding,77 permanent alimony and maintenance,78 and orders on the custody and maintenance of minor children,79 and to dispose of property presented at or about the time of the marriage which belongs jointly to the spouses.80
Furthermore, the aggrieved spouse may have a civil remedy against the live-in partner of their spouse who, despite knowing of the spouse’s marital status, chose to enter into a live-in relationship with them.
The Supreme Court has observed that such a live-in partner commits an intentional tort, alienation of affection, by knowingly and intentionally alienating a person from their spouse and children, resulting in the loss of the marital relationship, companionship, assistance, and consortium.81
The purpose of treating alienation of affection as an intentional tort is to preserve marital harmony by deterring wrongful interference by a stranger to the marriage, and thereby to save the institution of marriage. The action is compensatory in nature. Although it cannot protect the marriage itself, it compensates those who have been harmed and holds the third person legally accountable, marriage being a significant social institution that needs to be preserved.82
For such an action to succeed, however, the loss of the marital relationship, companionship, or consortium is not by itself enough: there must be clear evidence of active participation, initiation, or encouragement on the part of the third person, whose wrongful and intentional acts were calculated to entice the affection of one spouse away from the other. A person is not liable for merely being the passive object of affection, and it is not necessary to prove an adulterous relationship; continued overtures or a liaison that injures the marriage may suffice.83
The extent to which Indian courts recognize the tort is, however, limited. In Pinakin, the Supreme Court described the law on alienation of affection in India as “still in its nascent stage”,84 and its observations in that case and in Indra Sarma were made in a criminal appeal and in a case under the Domestic Violence Act respectively, not in a suit for damages. In 2025, the Delhi High Court noted that Indian legislation does not expressly recognize the tort and that no Indian court appeared to have granted relief in a civil suit seeking damages solely on that basis; it held, at the stage of issuing summons, that such a suit may be maintainable before the civil court, and issued summons, leaving the extent of any relief to be decided at trial.85 In a suit tried to judgment in 2026, a District Judge in Delhi dismissed a wife’s claim for damages against her husband’s partner, holding that she had failed to prove that there was genuine affection in her marriage before the defendant entered the couple’s lives, and that a consensual relationship between two adults, even one that leads to the birth of a child, does not by itself establish the tort.86
Conclusion
Although the number of people choosing live-in relationships is not remotely comparable to the number of marriages solemnized, there is a need to fill the legal vacuum in regulating and protecting such relationships and in determining the legal rights of live-in partners and of children born of such relationships.
The legislature needs to acknowledge such relationships expressly, and to define and limit the legal rights and liabilities of live-in partners. At the same time, it can be argued that this would defeat the very purpose for which many consciously choose a live-in relationship instead of entering the legal regime of marriage, and one may ask whether it is even desirable for the State to enter the domain of individual autonomy and freedom of choice by imposing duties and liabilities upon unwilling citizens.87
However, when such private decisions or lifestyle choices inevitably affect the rights of others, such as the children born of these relationships or the lawfully wedded spouses of the live-in partners, or when live-in couples need protection against threats to their lives, the answer becomes more nuanced.
The three questions raised by the divergent decisions of the Allahabad High Court can now be answered. First, a spouse’s statutory right to the company of the other spouse does not supersede the fundamental right to life: that right can be vindicated through the matrimonial and civil remedies discussed above, and a spouse can enjoy the other’s company only if the other is alive and safe. Second, a court should not refuse to protect a person’s life because that person’s choice may amount to a civil wrong or an intentional tort; living with another while married is not bigamy and, since the decriminalization of adultery, is no offence, so the wronged spouse’s remedy lies in a civil or matrimonial court and not in the denial of protection. Third, the courts must distinguish between social morality and constitutional morality, and between morality and criminality, and must decide such petitions on the basis of constitutional morality and of the criminal law as it stands.
When live-in couples seek protection against threats to their lives, whether one or both of them already have a spouse or both are single, the courts should grant them protection, as preserving a person’s right to life should take precedence over social or moral considerations.
At present, there are no fixed guidelines for courts deciding writ petitions filed by live-in couples, one or both of whom are married to someone else, against threats to their lives, and this has resulted in a lack of uniformity across courts in exercising their writ jurisdiction in such matters. It is therefore proposed that courts deciding such petitions be guided by the following:
1. Whether the relationship is a relationship in the nature of marriage should not be a threshold for protection; that test serves only to determine relief under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
2. That one or both partners are married to someone else should not by itself bar protection, since cohabitation without a second marriage does not constitute bigamy under section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and adultery is no longer an offence.
3. Where the couple seek protection against a threat to their lives, the court should direct the police to protect them, in line with the directions of the Supreme Court in Lata Singh and Shakti Vahini, particularly where the police have not acted on an earlier complaint.
4. An order of protection should be confined to the safety of life and limb; it does not affect the rights of the other spouse, who remains free to pursue the matrimonial and civil remedies available under the applicable law.
5. Social disapproval of the relationship should not weigh in the decision; the court should be guided by constitutional morality and by what the law defines as an offence.
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Footnotes
1. Paras Diwan & Peeyushi Diwan, Modern Hindu Law 62–63 (24th ed. 2019).
2. Id. at 63.
3. Amanpal Kaur, Live-in-Relationship: A Socio-Legal Analysis 11–14 (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, Guru Nanak Dev University) (Shodhganga), http://hdl.handle.net/10603/368250.
4. Jens M. Scherpe, The Legal Status of Cohabitants – Requirements for Legal Recognition, in 10 Common Core and Better Law in European Family Law 283, 284–85 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., Intersentia 2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406677.
5. Id. at 284, 287.
6. Vasunthra U.S., Unveiling Cohabitation: Exploring the Dynamics, Evolution, and Cultural Significance of Live-in Relationships, 6 Int’l J.L. Mgmt. & Human., no. 6, 2023, at 1448, 1449, https://ijlmh.com/paper/unveiling-cohabitation-exploring-the-dynamics-evolution-and-cultural-significance-of-live-in-relationships/.
7. Id.
8. The Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024 (Uttarakhand Act No. 3 of 2024), §§ 378, 380; The Gujarat Uniform Civil Code, 2026, §§ 384, 386; see Vivek Verma, Gujarat Uniform Civil Code, 2026: Gujarat Introduces Uniform Framework for Marriage, Divorce, Succession and Live-in Relationships, SCC Times (Nov. 5, 2026), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2026/11/05/gujarat-uniform-civil-code-2026-marriage-succession-live-in-relationships/ (reporting Presidential assent on Sept. 17, 2026 and notification of the Code on Oct. 1, 2026).
9. A. Dinohamy v. W.L. Balahamy, AIR 1927 PC 185 (appeal taken from Ceylon).
10. Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1929 PC 135 (India).
11. Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, AIR 1952 SC 231 (India).
12. Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1978) 3 SCC 527 (India).
13. S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan, (1994) 1 SCC 460, ¶ 4 (India).
14. Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141, ¶ 11 (India).
15. Id. ¶ 26.
16. Id. ¶¶ 33, 45–46.
17. S.P.S. Balasubramanyam, (1994) 1 SCC 460, ¶ 5 (India).
18. Id.
19. Tulsa v. Durghatiya, (2008) 4 SCC 520, ¶¶ 4–8, 15–16 (India).
20. Payal Sharma v. Superintendent, Nari Niketan, AIR 2001 All 254, ¶ 1 (Katju & R.B. Misra, JJ.) (India).
21. Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, ¶¶ 14, 17 (India).
22. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, § 2(f).
23. Chanmuniya, (2011) 1 SCC 141, ¶ 42 (India).
24. D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, ¶ 19 (India).
25. Id. ¶ 30.
26. Id. ¶ 33.
27. Id. ¶ 31.
28. Id. ¶ 32.
29. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, ¶ 56 (India).
30. Id. ¶¶ 57–59.
31. Id. ¶ 55; Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796, ¶ 3 (India).
32. Nandakumar v. State of Kerala, (2018) 16 SCC 602 (India).
33. Sanskar Krishnan & Ishita Srivastava, Social and Cultural Implications of Live-in Relationships in India, 6 Int’l J. Multidisciplinary Rsch., no. 3, 2024, at 1, 3, https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i03.20396.
34. S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 (India).
35. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50.
36. Asha Devi v. State of U.P., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18743 of 2020, ¶¶ 1–6 (All. Dec. 1, 2020) (India).
37. Id. ¶ 9.
38. Director of Settlement, Andhra Pradesh v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638, ¶ 17 (India).
39. Asha Devi, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18743 of 2020, ¶ 18 (India).
40. Id. ¶ 16.
41. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21(iv)–(v).
42. Sonam v. State of U.P., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 36027 of 2025, 2025:AHC:196882, ¶¶ 3–6 (All. Nov. 7, 2025) (India).
43. Id. ¶ 12.
44. Id. ¶ 13.
45. Id. ¶ 13 (Vivek Kumar Singh, J.) (discussing Aneeta v. State of U.P., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14443 of 2021 (All. July 29, 2021) (India)).
46. Anju v. State of U.P., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 10593 of 2026, ¶¶ 10–11 (All. Mar. 20, 2026) (India).
47. Anamika v. State of U.P., Crim. Misc. Writ Petition No. 3799 of 2026, at 1–2 (All. Mar. 25, 2026) (Div. Bench) (interim order) (India), https://www.verdictum.in/pdf_upload/crlpa379920-1774777.pdf.
48. Id. at 1–2 (Munir & Saxena, JJ.).
49. Diwan & Diwan, supra note 1, at 65.
50. See id. at 62–63.
51. Vasunthra, supra note 6, at 1449.
52. Scott M. Stanley, Galena Kline Rhoades & Howard J. Markman, Sliding Versus Deciding: Inertia and the Premarital Cohabitation Effect, 55 Fam. Rels. 499, 500 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3729.2006.00418.x.
53. Lata Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 475, ¶ 17 (India).
54. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192 (India).
55. Anamika, Crim. Misc. Writ Petition No. 3799 of 2026, at 1–2.
56. Indra Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, ¶ 38 (India).
57. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 82.
58. Anju, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 10593 of 2026, ¶ 9 (India).
59. Id. ¶ 6.
60. India Const. art. 21.
61. S.K. Kapoor, Human Rights Under International Law and Indian Law 1 (3d ed. 2005).
62. Karnataka Honour Killing: Married Woman Murdered by Family for Eloping with Another Man, Moneycontrol (Apr. 15, 2026), https://www.moneycontrol.com/city/karnataka-honour-killing-married-woman-murdered-by-family-for-eloping-with-another-man-article-13889187.html; Live-In Relationship Leads to Double Murder, Times of India (June 26, 2018), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/rajkot/live-in-relationship-leads-to-double-murder/articleshow/64738731.cms; UP Woman Working with Gurgaon MNC Strangled and Set on Fire by Father, Brother over Live-In Relationship, Economic Times (June 10, 2025, 11:54 AM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/new-updates/up-woman-working-with-gurgaon-mnc-strangled-and-set-on-fire-by-father-brother-over-live-in-relationship/articleshow/121745813.cms.
63. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94, ¶ 79 (Del. July 2, 2009) (India), rev’d sub nom. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1 (India), overruled by Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (India).
64. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, ¶¶ 332, 490–91 (India).
65. Id. ¶¶ 111, 116–17.
66. Naz Foundation, 2010 Cri LJ 94, ¶ 79 (India).
67. Navtej Singh Johar, (2018) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 253(v) (India).
68. Id. ¶ 493.
69. Navtej Singh Johar, (2018) 10 SCC 1, ¶¶ 485–86 (India).
70. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39 (India).
71. Navtej Singh Johar, (2018) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 334 (India).
72. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, §§ 9, 10, 13(1)(i), (ia), (ib).
73. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, § 2(iv), (viii)(a).
74. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, §§ 32(d), 34, 36.
75. The Divorce Act, 1869, §§ 10(1)(i), 22, 32.
76. The Special Marriage Act, 1954, §§ 22, 23(1)(a), 27(1)(a).
77. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 24; The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 36; The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 39; The Divorce Act, 1869, § 36.
78. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 25; The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 37; The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 40; The Divorce Act, 1869, § 37.
79. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 26; The Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 38; The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 49; The Divorce Act, 1869, §§ 41–44.
80. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 27; The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 42.
81. Indra Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, ¶ 66 (India).
82. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 10 SCC 48, ¶¶ 13–14 (India).
83. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.
84. Id. ¶ 13.
85. Shelly Mahajan v. Bhanushree Bahl, CS(OS) 602/2025, ¶¶ 19, 31, 39, 46, 78–80 (Del. Sept. 15, 2025) (India).
86. Pooja Sharma Bajaj v. Abheepsa Gupta, CS DJ No. 158/2024, ¶¶ 96, 98 (Dist. J., South-East Dist., Saket Courts, Delhi, Aug. 20, 2026) (India).
87. Scherpe, supra note 4, at 288.
