Introduction
The Arms Act, 1959 was designed as a licensing statute with a penal spine.1 Its regulatory heart lies in Chapters II and III, but the legislation earns its force, or loses it, in Chapter IV (Powers and Procedure, sections 19 to 24B) and Chapter V (Offences and Penalties, sections 25 to 33). These two chapters decide who may be stopped, searched and arrested, what may be seized, how a weapon becomes evidence, and what punishment follows. They are also the chapters most frequently litigated before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, whether on bail, in criminal appeals and revisions, or in petitions to quash.
Two features of the present moment make a fresh examination necessary. First, Parliament has made the penal chapter markedly harsher. The Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019 raised the minimum sentences for unlicensed manufacture and trade, for prohibited arms, and even for simple unlicensed possession; it created new offences for organised crime syndicates, illicit trafficking and celebratory gunfire; and it reduced the number of firearms a person may hold from three to two.2 Second, the volume of prosecutions is rising. National Crime Records Bureau data show that cases registered under the Arms Act across India grew from 68,463 in 2020 to 80,118 in 2022.3 In Punjab specifically, the High Court has recorded that firearms are openly used at weddings and public functions and that licensed weapons are themselves being used to commit crimes, despite a state-wide ban on their public display.4 Information placed before the Court showed that 34,768 arms licences were issued in Punjab between 1 October 2019 and 31 December 2023 alone.5
Yet a harsher statute has not produced a proportionately firmer outcome in court. Appeals and revisions in Arms Act cases regularly end in acquittal, and bail in the ordinary possession case is granted as a matter of course. This paper asks why. Its central claim is that the Act suffers from a mismatch between penal severity and procedural fragility: Parliament has raised the stakes in Chapter V, but the investigative and evidentiary requirements that Chapter IV, the general law of evidence and the Supreme Court’s precedents impose are routinely left unmet at the police station.
A. Research questions
The paper addresses four questions. First, what procedural and evidentiary rules has the Supreme Court laid down for prosecutions under Chapters IV and V? Second, on what considerations does the Punjab and Haryana High Court grant or refuse regular and anticipatory bail in Arms Act cases? Third, on what grounds are convictions set aside or modified in appeal or revision, and what do counsel on each side argue? Fourth, what do these judgments reveal about the gaps in the statute, in police investigation, and in the practices by which members of the public evade the Act?
B. Methodology and scope
The study is doctrinal and case-based. It analyses judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered between 2017 and 2026, read against the leading decisions of the Supreme Court, several of which themselves arose from Punjab and Haryana. Only judgments whose text or reported summary could be verified from an open source were used. The study does not claim statistical representativeness; its purpose is to identify the recurring patterns of reasoning that decide outcomes.
The statutory architecture of Chapters IV and V
A. Powers and procedure: sections 19 to 24B
Chapter IV equips the State with powers of intervention.6 Section 19 empowers a police officer or other authorised officer to demand the production of a licence from any person carrying arms, and to seize the arms where a licence is not produced. Section 20 authorises the arrest of persons conveying arms in suspicious circumstances. Section 21 compels the deposit of arms when possession ceases to be lawful, for instance on the expiry or revocation of a licence. Section 22 permits search and seizure by a Magistrate, and section 23 the search of vessels and vehicles. Section 24 enables seizure and detention under orders of the Central Government. Sections 24A and 24B, inserted in 1983 in the context of disturbed areas, prohibit the possession and carriage of notified arms in such areas.7
Two features of this design matter for the analysis that follows. First, Chapter IV does not prescribe its own detailed search-and-seizure protocol. Section 37 subjects arrests and searches to the general criminal procedure code, now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Consequently, the quality of an Arms Act prosecution depends almost entirely on the general rules of investigation and on the judicially developed rules of proof discussed in Part 3. Second, section 38 makes every offence under the Act cognizable, while section 39 requires the previous sanction of the District Magistrate for the prosecution of any offence under section 3.8 Sanction therefore operates as the only statutory filter between police action and a criminal trial in the ordinary possession case.
B. Offences and penalties: sections 25 to 33 and the 2019 recalibration
Section 25 is the workhorse of Chapter V. It contains a graded scale of offences, each tied to a contravention of a provision in Chapter II. The 2019 Amendment substantially recalibrated that scale.9 The principal changes are shown in Table 1.
| Provision | Conduct | Punishment after 2019 |
|---|---|---|
| s. 25(1) | Unlicensed manufacture, obtaining, procurement, sale, transfer, conversion etc. (contravention of ss. 5, 6, 11) | 7 years to life, and fine (earlier 3 to 7 years) |
| s. 25(1A) | Acquisition, possession or carrying of prohibited arms or ammunition (contravention of s. 7) | 7 to 14 years, and fine; less than 7 years for adequate and special reasons recorded |
| s. 25(1AA) | Manufacture, sale etc. of prohibited arms | 10 years (earlier 7) to life, and fine |
| s. 25(1AB) | Taking a firearm by force from police or armed forces (new) | 10 years to life, and fine |
| s. 25(1B)(a) | Acquisition, possession or carrying of a firearm without licence (contravention of s. 3) | 2 to 5 years and fine (earlier 1 to 3 years) |
| s. 25(6), (7) | Possession, or dealing, by or on behalf of an organised crime syndicate (new) | 10 years to life, and fine |
| s. 25(8) | Involvement in or aiding illicit trafficking (new) | 10 years to life, and fine |
| s. 25(9) | Rash or negligent use, or celebratory gunfire, endangering life (new) | Up to 2 years, or fine up to Rs. 1 lakh, or both |
Table 1: Principal offences under section 25 as amended by the Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019. Source: 2019 Amendment, section 9.
Three observations follow from Table 1. First, the most commonly charged offence, unlicensed possession under section 25(1B)(a), now carries two to five years.10 This is a real increase, but the maximum remains below seven years, which places the offence within the zone in which the Supreme Court has directed that arrest should not be automatic.11 Second, the minimum of seven years for prohibited arms is softened by a proviso permitting a lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons.12 Third, the new offences in sub-sections (6) to (9) borrow a definition of “organised crime” and “organised crime syndicate” that requires a continuing unlawful activity for pecuniary or other advantage.13 Celebratory gunfire, defined as the practice of using a firearm in public gatherings, religious places, marriage parties or other functions, carries a maximum of only two years or a fine.14
The remaining sections of Chapter V complete the scheme. Section 26 punishes secret contraventions; section 27 punishes the use of arms, with sub-section (3) now providing for life imprisonment or death where the use of prohibited arms results in death;15 section 28 covers the use of firearms or imitation firearms to resist arrest; section 29 penalises knowingly purchasing arms from, or delivering arms to, unlicensed persons; section 30 is a residuary offence for breach of licence conditions; and sections 31 to 33 deal with repeat offences, confiscation and offences by companies. The 2019 Amendment also introduced the concept of “tracing” of firearms and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser into the rule-making power,16 increased the validity of a licence from three to five years,17 and reduced the ceiling on licensed firearms to two.18
The Supreme Court’s foundational rules
The Supreme Court has not issued a single code of guidelines for Arms Act prosecutions. Its rules have instead accumulated case by case. Several of the most important decisions arose from Punjab, and together they supply the standards that the High Court applies in every appeal examined in Part 5.
A. Possession means conscious possession
In Gunwantlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that possession under the Arms Act has two elements: consciousness or knowledge of that possession in the person charged, and, where the accused lacks physical possession, a continuing power or control over the weapon.19 The Court thus accepted constructive possession but rejected liability for mere custody without awareness. In Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (II), a Constitution Bench reaffirmed that “possession” must mean possession with the requisite mental element, that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession.20 Gunwantlal also held that the charge must be read together with the sanction accorded under section 39, an early indication that sanction is substantive rather than a formality.21
B. Proof that the article is a firearm
Because section 2(1)(e) defines a firearm by reference to its capacity to discharge a projectile, the prosecution must prove that the recovered article is capable of firing. The Supreme Court has not insisted on test-firing in every case. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, it upheld a conviction for possession of a double-barrel gun on the testimony of trained police officers that the gun was in working condition, observing that no further test-firing was necessary for such a weapon where the witnesses were not cross-examined on the point.22 Where, however, the weapon is linked to injuries, the Court has been emphatic. In Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, it held that where both the firearm and the crime cartridge are recovered, the opinion of a ballistic expert is of considerable importance, and failure to produce it affects the creditworthiness of the prosecution to a great extent.23 In 2023, in Pritinder Singh @ Lovely v. State of Punjab, the Court reversed a conviction affirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, holding that where the circumstantial evidence was doubtful, the failure to examine the ballistic expert was a glaring defect.24
C. Sealing and the chain of custody
In Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab, a conviction under section 25 of the Arms Act and section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was set aside because the revolver was not sealed at the spot and there was no evidence of its custody between seizure and dispatch to the arms expert.25 The Court relied on its earlier decision in Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, which had treated non-sealing at the spot as a serious infirmity because tampering could not be ruled out.26 These two decisions are the doctrinal source of the High Court’s insistence on unbroken link evidence.
D. Recoveries and disclosure statements
Most Arms Act recoveries rest on a disclosure statement made in police custody. In Krishan v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court set aside a murder conviction affirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, holding that a recovery effected at the instance of the accused, without independent witnesses and more than a month after the incident, could not be treated as reliable evidence; once the recovery was disbelieved, it was a case of no evidence.27 In Govind v. State of Haryana, decided on 14 November 2025, the Court again reversed the High Court.28 The pistol had been recovered from an unlocked iron box accessible to other family members, and no independent witness from the neighbourhood had been joined. The Court held that only so much of a custodial statement as relates “distinctly” to the fact discovered is admissible, and that even an FSL report correlating the pistol with the bullets cannot by itself establish guilt without proof that the recovered pistol was used in the offence.29
E. Sentencing discretion
In State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory death sentence in section 27(3) as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, holding that a law which removes judicial discretion in imposing an irreversible penalty is inconsistent with fairness.30 Parliament’s 2019 substitution of life imprisonment or death in section 27(3) is the legislative response to that judgment.31
F. Bail and compromise
The bail framework applied in Arms Act cases comes from four decisions. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab rejected rigid limits on anticipatory bail.32 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar directed that arrest in offences punishable with up to seven years must satisfy the necessity criteria now found in the BNSS.33 Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI classified offences for bail purposes and reaffirmed that bail is the rule.34 On compromise, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan held that offences under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (now section 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) and the Arms Act are heinous and serious offences against society and ordinarily cannot be quashed under inherent powers merely because the parties have settled.35 That proposition, as Part 5.6 shows, is not applied uniformly.
Bail jurisprudence in the Punjab and Haryana High Court
A. Regular bail: custody, delay and the weakness of the link
In regular bail petitions, the Arms Act charge seldom stands alone; it usually accompanies charges of murder, attempt to murder, robbery or extortion. The High Court’s reasoning in such cases follows a consistent pattern. Three considerations dominate: the period of custody already undergone, the pace of the trial, and any visible weakness in the link between the accused and the weapon.
In Yashbir @ Foji v. State of Haryana, the petitioner was charged with murder and under section 25 for a killing in a court complex.36 Counsel argued that the .315 bore country-made pistol attributed to the co-accused could not have fired the 12-bore pellets and wad recovered from the deceased, as the FSL report itself showed, and that only 13 of 43 prosecution witnesses had been examined in more than three years. The State resisted bail on the ground that the co-accused had been arrested at the spot with a pistol and that supplementary challans had delayed the trial. The Court granted bail, without commenting on the merits, on the basis of long custody and parity with co-accused already released.
Mandeep @ Baccha v. State of Haryana shows the same approach applied to a much stronger prosecution case.37 There, the ballistic report matched the crime bullets with a pistol stated to have been recovered from “accused No. 1”. Defence counsel argued that the report nowhere identified the petitioner as accused No. 1, so the vital link between him and the matching pistol was missing. The State answered that the rough sketches prepared at the time of recovery showed differently shaped pistols and established identity, and added that the petitioner faced more than four other cases. The Court nonetheless granted bail on the ground of more than three years’ incarceration. The lesson for investigators is direct: a ballistic match is only as strong as the documentation linking each parcel to each accused.
The same pattern recurs in more recent orders, and so do its limits. In Aman @ Munshi v. State of Haryana, a dacoity-cum-Arms Act case, the Court accepted that all material witnesses had been examined, that no private witnesses remained, and that the trial would take long to conclude.38 In Saurabh Panwar v. State of Haryana, the petitioner was implicated only through a co-accused’s disclosure, no weapon was recovered from him, and the Court relied on Sibbia’s principle that bail is not to be withheld as punishment.39 By contrast, in Karandeep Singh @ Lambar v. State of Punjab, a third bail petition was dismissed although the petitioner had been in custody since April 2023 and only three of 22 prosecution witnesses had been examined: the FIR also invoked the NDPS Act, he was an accused in two further NDPS cases, one of them carrying an Arms Act charge as well, and the Court treated his record as defeating the conditions of section 37 of that Act.40 Long custody and a slow trial therefore carry the day in the ordinary Arms Act case, but they do not do so automatically where a special statute with its own bail bar applies.
B. Trafficking, organised crime and special statutes
The 2019 offences of trafficking and organised-crime possession frequently travel with the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, whose section 43-D(5) imposes a restrictive bail standard. Pritpal Singh Batra @ Giffy Batra v. State of Punjab is instructive.41 The appellant was charged under sections 25(7) and 25(8) together with UAPA offences after two 9 mm pistols and 25 cartridges were allegedly recovered from his house at his instance. His senior counsel argued that he was not named in the FIR, that he was implicated only by a co-accused’s custodial disclosure and his own, that no call records or proof linking him to the alleged terrorists had surfaced, and that charges had not even been framed for want of UAPA sanction. The State responded that he had supplied a weapon to a co-accused and that the recovered weapons were meant for terrorist activity. A Division Bench found no evidence that the appellant had been lodged in jail with the alleged handlers, no call records, and no proof that those handlers had been declared terrorists. Relying on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,42 it granted bail after more than two years and ten months of custody. The case shows that the heavier 2019 offences do not secure detention where the investigation has not gathered evidence beyond disclosure statements.
C. Anticipatory bail and the firearm-surrender condition
A distinctive feature of the High Court’s anticipatory bail practice is the condition requiring the accused to surrender firearms and the arms licence. In Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, a case arising from a land dispute in which a co-accused had allegedly brandished a pistol, the Court granted anticipatory bail and directed the petitioner to surrender all weapons, ammunition and the licence within fifteen days.43 The Court explained that the restriction rested on a preponderance of probability, was not an intermediate punishment, and could be reversed on acquittal. It grounded the condition in the Supreme Court’s requirement that bail conditions be proportionate and connected to their purpose.44 The same condition appears in other orders of the same Bench.45 This practice addresses a real gap: Chapter IV contains no provision for the interim suspension of a licence when its holder is accused of a violent offence, and the High Court has used bail conditions to fill that gap.
D. What counsel argue: a synthesis
Across these orders, defence arguments fall into a small number of recurring categories:
• False implication arising out of an existing dispute.
• Absence of independent witnesses at the recovery.
• Implication by a co-accused’s disclosure alone.
• Inconsistencies in the FSL or ballistic report.
• Parity with co-accused already on bail.
• Long custody and slow trial.
The State’s replies are equally standard: recovery at the spot, criminal antecedents, gang links and the gravity of the offence. What decides the outcome is usually not the gravity of the charge but the visible quality of the investigation and the length of the trial. Where custody is long and trial progress is slow, the High Court grants bail even in murder-cum-Arms Act cases and even to petitioners with antecedents.
From conviction to acquittal: grounds in appeals and revisions
A. Conscious possession and territorial validity
Amritpal Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh applies Gunwantlal and Sanjay Dutt to a common licensing scenario.46 The petitioner’s .32 bore revolver was licensed in Punjab but not in Chandigarh. He was apprehended with it and sixteen cartridges at a police naka in Chandigarh while travelling by bus, and was convicted and sentenced to three years. In revision, the High Court noted that he had bought a ticket from Jalandhar to Mohali within Punjab and had fallen asleep, so he had unintentionally crossed into Chandigarh. Holding that mere physical custody of a weapon beyond the territorial limits of the licence, without knowledge or intent, did not amount to conscious possession in violation of the Act, the Court acquitted him. It added that the prosecution had produced no notification or government order proving that the naka lay outside Punjab. The judgment shows that even a straightforward territorial charge fails where the investigation omits basic documentary proof.
B. The working-condition requirement
Two 2025 judgments of Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi illustrate how the requirement that the article be a functional firearm decides cases. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, a revision arising from the recovery of a .315 bore country-made double-barrel pistol in Faridkot in January 2003, the High Court acquitted the accused because the police examination report checked only the trigger mechanism and omitted verification of the firing pin.47 The Court reasoned that test-firing is not mandatory, but the examination must confirm that the weapon can fire, which cannot be inferred if the firing pin is not checked. In Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, decided on 17 July 2025, the Court acquitted the accused in a case pending for 22 years, citing an unexplained delay of more than two months in sending the weapon for examination, failure to test the recovered cartridge, and an armourer’s report that recorded neither test-firing nor firing-pin verification.48 Read with Jarnail Singh,49 these decisions show that the evidentiary threshold is low, but an incomplete examination report cannot meet it.
C. Independent witnesses and the derivative Arms Act charge
The High Court’s treatment of an Arms Act count that accompanies a failed main charge is not uniform. In Rakesh v. State of Haryana, the appellant was acquitted by the trial court of offences under sections 148, 307 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (now sections 191(3), 109 and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), but convicted under section 25.50 He had been arrested more than three months after the occurrence, and the pistol was recovered on a disclosure statement recorded in custody. His counsel argued that the disclosure statement and recovery memo carried no independent witness, and that once the main occurrence was disbelieved, the recovery of the weapon allegedly used in it could not survive. The High Court accepted the argument and acquitted him, describing the matter as a case of no evidence.
In Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, the High Court reached the opposite result where the main charge had likewise collapsed.51 The prosecution alleged that two men fired at a police party of about twelve officers who were checking vehicles on the Yamuna bridge on the Meerut road. The Court found this story highly improbable: no police officer was injured, no one returned fire, no empties were recovered and no independent witness was joined despite a busy road, so it acquitted the appellant under section 307. Applying the principle that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India, the Court nevertheless upheld the section 25 conviction. It relied on the sealed parcel, the seal handed to a fellow officer, the FSL report and the District Magistrate’s sanction proved through his Ahlmad, and reduced the sentence to the period already served. Set side by side, Rakesh and Jaswant Singh show that whether the recovery evidence survives the collapse of the main charge depends on the individual bench’s appraisal of that evidence. The two records are distinguishable: in Rakesh the recovery rested on a custodial disclosure without an independent witness, whereas in Jaswant Singh the weapon was taken from the appellant’s person at the spot, sealed, examined by the FSL and prosecuted on a proved sanction. Neither judgment, however, states when a derivative Arms Act count may stand once the main occurrence is disbelieved. Accused persons have every incentive to litigate the point, and this uncertainty is itself a source of inconsistency.
D. Sanction under section 39
Because section 39 applies only to offences under section 3, sanction is required in the ordinary unlicensed-possession prosecution. In State of Haryana v. Asman, the trial court had of its own motion summoned the District Magistrate of Bhiwani to prove a sanction order in a case involving a .315 bore pistol and eight cartridges.52 The High Court set aside that direction, holding that a sanction order is a public document under section 74(1)(iii) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now section 74(1)(a)(iii) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), that a certified copy is admissible, and that the Reader to the District Magistrate could produce the original record and be cross-examined on the material underlying the sanction. The decision makes proof of sanction easier, but it does not dilute Gunwantlal’s insistence that the charge be confined to the facts sanctioned.53 In Jaswant Singh, too, the sanction was proved through the Ahlmad to the District Magistrate.54
E. Recoveries and forensic reports: reversals by the Supreme Court
The most striking evidence of investigative weakness is the Supreme Court’s repeated reversal of convictions affirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in firearm cases. In Pritinder Singh, the ballistic expert was never examined.55 In Krishan, the recovery at the accused’s instance lacked independent witnesses and came long after the event.56 In Govind, the High Court had relied mainly on the recovery of the pistol, two live cartridges and the FSL report; the Supreme Court found that the recovery was from a place accessible to others, that no independent witness was joined, and that the seal mark alone could not connect the recovered articles to those deposited at the FSL.57 In each case, the forensic report could not cure a weakness that lay earlier, in the manner of recovery and custody.
F. Quashing: mens rea and compromise
Quashing petitions reveal two further lines of reasoning. In Bajrang Dass v. State of Haryana, licence holders were prosecuted under sections 25(1B)(a) and 29(b) because photographs on social media showed their driver posing with their licensed weapons.58 The High Court quashed the FIR against the owners, holding that there was no allegation of unlicensed possession, and that the offence under section 29(b) requires delivery of arms to an unauthorised person with the requisite mens rea, which was not alleged.
On compromise, Laxmi Narayan treats Arms Act offences as offences against society.59 Yet in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, a 2022 petition unrelated to the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision of the same name, the High Court quashed an FIR under section 336 of the Indian Penal Code (now section 125 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) and sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, relying on Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh,60 because the dispute was between family members, the compromise was found genuine and the State did not object.61 The result may be justified on its facts, but the case demonstrates that the Arms Act charge can be extinguished by a private settlement, even though the possession of an unlicensed or misused weapon is, in principle, a wrong against the public.
Loopholes through the judicial lens
A. Investigative deficits identified by the courts
The judgments analysed above repeatedly identify the same investigative failures. Table 2 groups them and links each to the decision in which it proved decisive.
| Investigative failure | Legal consequence | Illustrative decisions |
|---|---|---|
| No independent witness joined at recovery, though available | Recovery doubted; Arms Act count may fall with main charge | Rakesh (2017); Krishan (SC 2024); Govind (SC 2025) |
| Weapon not sealed at spot; seal kept within the police party; no custody record | Tampering cannot be ruled out; link evidence broken | Sahib Singh (SC); Amarjit Singh (SC); Govind (SC 2025) |
| Incomplete armourer or FSL examination (no firing-pin check, cartridge not tested) | Article not proved to be a firearm | Jagtar Singh (2025); Gurmail Singh (2025) |
| Delay in sending the weapon for examination | Integrity of recovery doubted | Gurmail Singh (2025) |
| Ballistic expert not examined; parcel-to-accused link undocumented | Major defect; bail granted on missing link | Sukhwant Singh (SC); Pritinder Singh (SC 2023); Mandeep (2024) |
| Reliance on custodial disclosures alone | Inadmissible beyond fact distinctly discovered; bail granted | Govind (SC 2025); Pritpal Singh Batra (2025); Saurabh Panwar (2025) |
| No documentary proof of territorial limits or of the accused’s knowledge | Conscious possession not proved | Amritpal Singh (2025) |
Table 2: Recurring investigative failures and their consequences in court.
These are not technicalities. Each failure concerns a step the investigating officer controls at the moment of recovery. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita now requires search and seizure to be recorded through audio-video electronic means.62 Where this mandate is followed, it can supply the corroboration that the absence of independent witnesses has long denied the prosecution.
B. Gaps in the statute and its administration
The licensing pipeline: In Gurbhej Singh, an anticipatory bail hearing became a wider inquiry. The Court observed that neither the rules for the grant of arms licences nor its own earlier directions in Reet Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab were being strictly enforced.63 It required the Director-General of Police to state whether any protocol or criteria for granting licences existed, how many gun houses had been found to be fake and unlicensed, what steps were being taken against a fake arms licence racket, and how the State ensured that the police verification report under section 13(2) was not manipulated.64 The Court recorded that the information had been supplied only in bits and pieces, and warned that the Director-General would have to join the proceedings by video-conference if a complete affidavit was not filed.65 Press reports from Haryana described, in 2014, the detection of around 3,000 licences, believed to have originated in Nagaland, being used to buy firearms.66 A recent case from Ludhiana involved an FIR, including under section 30 of the Arms Act, against an applicant who allegedly produced a fake dope-test report to obtain a licence.67
Revocation and suspension: The High Court has held that the mere registration of an FIR is not by itself a ground to cancel a licence,68 and that a licensing authority may refuse a licence only on the grounds listed in section 14.69 These holdings protect licence holders from arbitrary action. They also leave a gap during the pendency of a violent-crime case, which the Court has had to fill through bail conditions requiring the surrender of firearms.70
The sanction filter: Section 39 requires sanction only for section 3 offences. The provision protects against frivolous prosecutions, but a sanction granted routinely by the District Magistrate adds delay without real scrutiny. The ease of proving sanction through a Reader or Ahlmad, as in Asman and Jaswant Singh, suggests that sanction is being treated as a documentary step rather than as an independent assessment of the case.
Penal calibration: The most common charge, unlicensed possession, remains below the seven-year threshold, so the Arnesh Kumar regime and BNSS section 35 limit arrest.71 Celebratory gunfire, the conduct the High Court found to be widespread at weddings and public functions, carries a maximum of only two years or a fine.72 At the other end, the new organised-crime and trafficking offences carry ten years to life, but as Pritpal Singh Batra shows, they collapse at the bail stage when the investigation cannot prove the alleged syndicate link.
C. How the law is evaded in practice
The judgments and official materials also show how members of the public exploit these gaps.
• Carrying a licensed weapon across territorial limits, and relying on the difficulty of proving knowledge and the precise boundary, as in Amritpal Singh.
• Allowing employees or associates to handle and display licensed weapons, where liability under section 29(b) depends on proof of mens rea, as in Bajrang Dass.
• Celebratory firing and public display at weddings and functions, which the High Court found to be widespread despite the State’s November 2022 ban.73
• Glorifying weapons on social media and in songs, despite the High Court’s 2019 directions to the police chiefs of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh.74
• Obtaining licences through agents, forged documents and licences issued in other States.
• Settling cases privately and seeking quashing on compromise, as in Gian Singh.
Recommendations
A. For investigation
Four measures follow directly from the decisions examined:
• Every recovery should be recorded on audio-video under BNSS section 105, with the recording forming part of the case file.
• The seal used at the spot should be handed to an independent witness or deposited immediately, and every movement of the case property should be entered in the malkhana register.
• Every recovered weapon should be sent to the FSL within a fixed period, with a report that records the condition of the firing pin and test-fires the weapon and recovered cartridges where possible.
• Where a ballistic match is relied upon, each parcel should be linked expressly to a named accused in the seizure memo, the forwarding letter and the report.
B. For legislation and administration
Parliament or the State should consider three changes. First, the Act should provide for the interim suspension of a licence, after hearing, where its holder is charged with an offence involving use of the weapon; this would place on a statutory footing what the High Court now achieves through bail conditions. Second, the punishment for celebratory gunfire should be reviewed, and the rule-making power for tracing under section 44(2)(f) should be exercised through a published, auditable system linking manufacture, sale and licence data. Third, licensing authorities in Punjab should adopt published criteria for grant and verification, as the High Court has required in Gurbhej Singh.
C. For the courts
Greater consistency would reduce uncertainty. The High Court could settle, through a larger bench if necessary, whether an Arms Act count may survive when the main occurrence is disbelieved, reconciling Rakesh and Jaswant Singh. It could also articulate when, consistently with Laxmi Narayan, an FIR under sections 25 and 27 may be quashed on compromise. Firearm-surrender conditions should be used consistently in bail orders where the accused holds a licence and the allegations involve threats or the use of weapons.
Conclusion
The 2019 Amendment made Chapter V markedly harsher, but the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Supreme Court show that severity alone does not deliver convictions. Outcomes turn instead on the quality of what happens under Chapter IV and the general law of procedure: whether an independent witness was joined, whether the weapon was sealed and its custody recorded, whether the armourer checked the firing pin, whether the ballistic report is tied to a named accused, and whether the recovery rests on more than a custodial disclosure. Where these steps fail, the courts acquit or grant bail. They do so by applying settled law, not out of leniency. The remedy therefore lies less in further increasing punishments than in investigative discipline, licensing integrity and judicial consistency. Until procedure matches penalty, the Arms Act will continue to promise more than it can deliver.
*****
Footnotes
1. The Arms Act, 1959, No. 54, Acts of Parliament, 1959 (India) [hereinafter Arms Act].
2. The Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019, No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 2019 (India) (assented to Dec. 13, 2019), https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/acts_parliament/2019/The%20Arms%20(Amendment)%20Act,%202019.pdf [hereinafter 2019 Amendment].
3. National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Crime in India 2022: Statistics, vol. I, Snapshots (Special & Local Laws) (2023) (India), https://www.ncrb.gov.in/uploads/nationalcrimerecordsbureau/custom/1701607577CrimeinIndia2022Book1.pdf (reporting 68,463 cases under the Arms Act in 2020, 74,482 in 2021 and 80,118 in 2022, the last being 5.8% of all special and local law crimes).
4. Gurbhej Singh @ Bheja v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-17922-2024 (Punj. & Har. H.C. 2024) (Harkesh Manuja, J.) (interim orders) (India); see Aiman J. Chishti, Use of Firearms in Public Functions Widespread in Punjab, No Visible Change Despite Ban: High Court Seeks Response from DGP, LiveLaw (Apr. 18, 2024), https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/punjab-and-haryana-high-court/punjab-haryana-high-court-display-of-firearms-in-public-places-in-punjab-no-visible-change-despite-ban-high-court-seeks-response-from-dgp-on-guidelines-for-granting-license-steps-taken-255404.
5. Punjab and Haryana High Court Calls for Data on Arms Glorification, Action on Social Media Displays, The Tribune (May 4, 2024), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/high-court-calls-for-data-on-arms-glorification-action-on-social-media-displays-in-punjab-617872 (reporting that 34,768 arms licences were issued in Punjab between Oct. 1, 2019 and Dec. 31, 2023).
6. Arms Act §§ 19–24B.
7. Arms Act §§ 24A–24B (inserted by the Arms (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1983 (India)).
8. Arms Act §§ 38–39.
9. 2019 Amendment § 9.
10. 2019 Amendment § 9(v)(a) (substituting, in Arms Act § 25(1B), the words “two years but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine” for “one year but which may extend to three years”).
11. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 (India).
12. 2019 Amendment § 9(ii)(b) (inserting the proviso to Arms Act § 25(1A)).
13. 2019 Amendment § 9(vi) (inserting Arms Act § 25(6)–(9) and the Explanation to sub-sections (6) and (7)).
14. Arms Act § 25(9) & Explanation.
15. 2019 Amendment § 10.
16. 2019 Amendment § 11 (amending Arms Act § 44(2)(f) and inserting an Explanation defining “tracing”).
17. 2019 Amendment § 8(a) (amending Arms Act § 15(1)).
18. 2019 Amendment § 3(i) (amending Arms Act § 3(2)).
19. Gunwantlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1972) 2 SCC 194 (India).
20. Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (II), (1994) 5 SCC 410 (India).
21. Gunwantlal, (1972) 2 SCC 194 (holding, on the second question, that a charge under § 25(1)(a) must be read with the facts for which sanction under § 39 was accorded).
22. Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 321 (India) (decided Nov. 12, 1998).
23. Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 367, ¶ 21 (India).
24. Pritinder Singh @ Lovely v. State of Punjab, 2023 INSC 614, (2023) 7 SCC 727 (India) (decided July 5, 2023).
25. Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 11 SCC 685 (India); AIR 1997 SC 2417 (decided Sept. 13, 1996).
26. Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 217 (India), cited in Sahib Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 685.
27. Krishan v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 60 (India) (decided Jan. 25, 2024), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172840581/, on appeal from Crim. Appeal No. 942-DB of 2007 (Punj. & Har. H.C. May 2, 2011); see Recovery of Weapon at Instance of Accused Cannot Be Accepted as Reliable Evidence, Verdictum (Jan. 27, 2024), https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/krishan-v-state-of-haryana-2024-insc-60-recovery-of-weapon-at-the-instance-of-an-accused-reliable-evidence-1517337.
28. Govind v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 1318 (India); 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2456 (decided Nov. 14, 2025), on appeal from CRA-D-913-DB-2018 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Nov. 8, 2023).
29. Govind, 2025 INSC 1318, ¶¶ 15–17, 23.
30. State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 346 (India).
31. 2019 Amendment § 10.
32. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 (India).
33. Arnesh Kumar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
34. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51 (India).
35. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15.4 (India).
36. Yashbir @ Foji v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-43966-2019 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Oct. 23, 2019) (Arvind Singh Sangwan, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/183295417/.
37. Mandeep @ Baccha v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-26661-2024, 2024:PHHC:124152, ¶¶ 8–13 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Sept. 19, 2024) (Pankaj Jain, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/168905557/.
38. Aman @ Munshi v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-54742-2025 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Nov. 19, 2025) (Yashvir Singh Rathor, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/191310222/.
39. Saurabh Panwar v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-2097-2025, 2025:PHHC:008576 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Jan. 21, 2025) (Sandeep Moudgil, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/34234003/ (quoting Sibbia, (1980) 2 SCC 565, through Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22).
40. Karandeep Singh @ Lambar v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-44123-2025 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Oct. 15, 2025) (Jasjit Singh Bedi, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110984837/ (third bail petition dismissed).
41. Pritpal Singh Batra @ Giffy Batra v. State of Punjab, CRA-D-1568-2024, ¶¶ 2–10, 17 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Nov. 17, 2025) (Deepak Sibal & Lapita Banerji, JJ.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72171574/.
42. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 (India), relied upon in Pritpal Singh Batra, CRA-D-1568-2024, ¶¶ 12, 14.
43. Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-42492-2024, ¶¶ 8–16 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Nov. 29, 2024) (Anoop Chitkara, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25742047/.
44. Mohammed Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 INSC 735 (India), relied upon in Harjinder Singh, CRM-M-42492-2024, ¶ 17.
45. Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, CRA-S-4098-2024, 2025:PHHC:035811 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Mar. 17, 2025) (Anoop Chitkara, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123119645/; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-11672-2024, 2024:PHHC:044369, ¶ 18 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Apr. 2, 2024) (Anoop Chitkara, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102576023/ (both imposing the surrender condition; neither is the revision discussed at note 47 below).
46. Amritpal Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, CRR-2878-2022, 2025:PHHC:126212 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Sept. 15, 2025) (Sanjay Vashisth, J.) (India); see Muhib Makhdoomi, Conviction U/S. 25 Arms Act Unsustainable Without Proof of “Conscious Possession” of Weapon, Verdictum (Sept. 23, 2025), https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/punjab-and-haryana-high-court/amritpal-singh-versus-the-union-territory-of-chandigarh-2025phchc126212-punjab-haryana-high-court-arms-act-1592205.
47. Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, CRR-861-2008, 2025:PHHC:035728 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Mar. 17, 2025) (Jasjit Singh Bedi, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12660778/; see Punjab and Haryana High Court Acquits Man in Arms Act Case Due to Unproven Firearm Functionality, Law Trend (Mar. 18, 2025), https://lawtrend.in/punjab-and-haryana-high-court-acquits-man-in-arms-act-case-due-to-unproven-firearm-functionality/.
48. Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab (Punj. & Har. H.C. July 17, 2025) (Jasjit Singh Bedi, J.) (criminal revision) (India); see Prosecution Failed to Prove Weapon Was in Working Condition: Punjab & Haryana High Court Acquits Man in Arms Act Case After 22 Years, Lawyer E News (July 18, 2025).
49. Jarnail Singh, AIR 1999 SC 321.
50. Rakesh v. State of Haryana, CRA-562-SB-2005, 2017:PHHC:032190 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Apr. 3, 2017) (Ramendra Jain, J.) (India), https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5906fe864a9326304e9ddfa6 (considering Ashwani Kumar @ Babbi v. State of Punjab, 1999 (1) CLJ (Crl.) 215 (Punj. & Har. H.C.)).
51. Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, CRA-S-2228-SB-2003 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Dec. 9, 2022) (N.S. Shekhawat, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/142964361/.
52. State of Haryana v. Asman, CRM-M-11894-2018, 2022 LiveLaw (PH) 43 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Mar. 16, 2022) (Arvind Singh Sangwan, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127985195/; see Sparsh Upadhyay, Sanction Order for Prosecution a Public Document U/S 74(1)(iii) of Indian Evidence Act: Punjab and Haryana High Court, LiveLaw (Mar. 20, 2022), https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/sanction-order-public-document-us-741iii-indian-evidence-act-punjab-and-haryana-high-court-194541.
53. Gunwantlal, (1972) 2 SCC 194.
54. Jaswant Singh, CRA-S-2228-SB-2003.
55. Pritinder Singh, 2023 INSC 614.
56. Krishan, 2024 INSC 60.
57. Govind, 2025 INSC 1318, ¶¶ 16–17, 23.
58. Bajrang Dass v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-30985-2021 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Mar. 6, 2026) (Surya Partap Singh, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182494100/; see Saksham Vaishya, Arms Act Case Based on Social Media Photos Unsustainable; No Proof of Possession: P&H High Court Quashes FIR, LiveLaw (Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/punjab-and-haryana-high-court/punjab-haryana-high-court-quashes-case-arms-act-congress-politicians-527669.
59. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15.4.
60. Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834 (India), relied upon in Gian Singh, CRM-M-5289-2020.
61. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-5289-2020 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Dec. 23, 2022) (Jagmohan Bansal, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89932629/ (also relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, and Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688).
62. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023, § 105 (India).
63. Reet Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, CWP-6213-2016, 2019 (5) RCR (Civil) 580 (Punj. & Har. H.C. July 22, 2019) (Rajiv Sharma & Harinder Singh Sidhu, JJ.) (India), as noticed in Gurbhej Singh, CRM-M-17922-2024.
64. Gurbhej Singh @ Bheja v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-17922-2024 (Punj. & Har. H.C. May 7, 2024) (India) (interim order); see Aiman J. Chishti, Submit Details of Songs Banned for Promoting Glorification of Weapons in Punjab: High Court to DGP, LiveLaw (May 9, 2024), https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/punjab-and-haryana-high-court/punjab-haryana-high-court-dgp-punjab-submit-details-of-songs-banned-for-promoting-glorification-of-weapons-257508.
65. Arms Glorification: Furnish Comprehensive Data, or Join Proceedings Through VC, High Court Tells Punjab DGP, The Tribune (May 15, 2024), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/arms-glorification-furnish-comprehensive-data-or-join-proceedings-through-vc-high-court-tells-punjab-dgp-621482.
66. 3,000 ‘Fake’ Arms Licences in Haryana, The Tribune (May 7, 2014), https://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140507/main5.htm.
67. Mahesh Sharma, Model Code Brings Reprieve for Officials but Rush for Arms Licence Unlikely to Abate, The Tribune (May 30, 2025), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/ludhiana/model-code-brings-reprieve-for-officials-but-rush-for-arms-licence-unlikely-to-abate/.
68. Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, CWP-5724-2021 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Aug. 3, 2021) (India), as relied upon in Suhail Singh Brar v. State of Punjab, CWP-17733-2021 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.legitquest.com/case/suhail-singh-brar-v-state-of-punjab-and-anr/21AD87.
69. Manpreet Singh v. State of Punjab, CWP-32495-2019, 2022 LiveLaw (PH) 101 (Punj. & Har. H.C. Apr. 29, 2022) (Jaishree Thakur, J.) (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190780714/; see Drishti Yadav, Licensing Authority Can Refuse to Grant Arms Licence Only on the Grounds Enumerated in Section 14, LiveLaw (May 11, 2022), https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/punjab-and-haryana-high-court-justice-jaishree-thakur-section-14-of-arms-licence-act-arms-licence-licencing-authority-198796.
70. Harjinder Singh, CRM-M-42492-2024, ¶ 16.
71. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, § 35 (corresponding to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §§ 41, 41A).
72. Arms Act § 25(9).
73. Madhusree Goswami, Guns, Songs, and Punjab: Will Govt’s Restrictions on Weapons Do the Trick?, The Quint (Nov. 15, 2022), https://www.thequint.com/explainers/punjab-imposes-ban-on-songs-promoting-gun-culture-violence-public-display-of-firearms (reporting the Government of Punjab’s directions of Nov. 13, 2022).
74. Reet Mohinder Singh, CWP-6213-2016 (directing the Directors-General of Police of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh to ensure that no songs glorifying liquor, drugs and violence are played even at live shows, and directing that no person carry a firearm to a fair, religious or marriage procession or other public assemblage, or within the precincts of an educational institution); see Akshita Saxena, P&H HC Bans Songs Glorifying Violence in Public Events, LiveLaw (July 28, 2019), https://livelaw.in/news-updates/p-h-hc-bans-songs-glorifying-violence-in-public-events-146757.