Introduction
The death penalty is regarded as one of the harshest and oldest forms of punishment in the world, the extreme of the pain that can be inflicted on a person. Capital punishment draws chiefly on the theory of deterrence, though it carries clear traces of the retributive theory of justice as well. In India, as once at the global level, it remains a deeply contested question that engages societal morals, human rights and the debate over whether it should survive at all in the present day. The subject matters because trial courts across the country continue to pass death sentences, many of which are confirmed by the High Courts and the Supreme Court, yet the number of executions actually carried out is minuscule. This limbo between sentencing and execution raises serious questions about the administration of justice and the potential for miscarriages of justice. Understanding the legal and tactical barriers that obstruct enforcement is essential to any comprehensive evaluation of capital punishment in India. Delayed execution is itself a serious problem: it affects the criminal justice system, the victim and the victim’s family, the psychological health of the convict, and the public conscience. Internationally, the death penalty is widely regarded as barbaric and inhuman, and by the end of 2024, 145 countries, more than two-thirds of the countries of the world, had abolished it in law or in practice.1 India’s position is different: it retains capital punishment in a large number of penal provisions, even though its justification today is open to serious debate.
This paper examines the legal barriers present in the Indian judicial system and the tactics used by death row convicts to delay or evade the execution of death warrants. The problem has several sides: slow trials, delays in confirmation by the High Courts and in appeals before the Supreme Court, and the absence of any clearly outlined structure for carrying out death warrants within a prescribed time.
Legal framework governing capital punishment and its execution in India
The death penalty, commonly known as capital punishment, is one of the harshest forms of punishment.2 The idea is neither new nor foreign to India: some of its oldest traces appear in ancient legal texts such as the Manusmriti. From a legal standpoint, however, the modern law took shape under British rule, when colonial legislation provided for the death penalty in several forms.3
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), contains the statutory provisions that govern the death sentence, its review and confirmation, and its execution. Through a series of landmark judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, several doctrines have evolved, the most important being the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine,4 which requires the sentencing court to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances before awarding death; a death sentence passed by a trial court must then be confirmed by the High Court.5
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 provided for the death penalty, as a punishment of last resort, in the following provisions:6 section 121 (waging war against the Government of India); section 132 (abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is committed in consequence); section 194 (giving or fabricating false evidence leading to the conviction and execution of an innocent person); section 195A (threatening a person to give false evidence, where an innocent person is convicted in consequence); section 302 (murder); section 303 (murder by a life convict, struck down in 19837); section 305 (abetment of suicide of a child or an insane or intoxicated person); section 307 (attempt to murder by a life convict, if hurt is caused); section 364A (kidnapping for ransom); section 376A (rape causing death or a persistent vegetative state); section 376AB (rape of a woman under twelve years of age); section 376DB (gang rape of a woman under twelve years of age); section 376E (repeat offenders); and section 396 (dacoity with murder).
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced the Penal Code,8 adds further offences punishable with death, among them murder by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any similar ground, commonly called mob lynching (section 103(2)), organised crime resulting in death (section 111(2)(a)), and a terrorist act resulting in death (section 113(2)(a)).9 Beyond the general penal code, several special statutes prescribe death as their most severe punishment, including the Air Force Act, 1950, the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957, the Arms Act, 1959, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Border Security Force Act, 1968, the Coast Guard Act, 1978, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the Assam Rifles Act, 2006.10
A. Procedure for the execution of death sentences in India
The BNSS provides the basic structure for carrying out a death sentence:
1. Trial and sentencing. A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but a sentence of death so passed is subject to confirmation by the High Court.11 Where the conviction is for an offence punishable with death, the judgment must state the ‘special reasons’ for a sentence of death,12 and the sentence must direct the manner in which it is to be carried out.13
2. Confirmation by the High Court. When a Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence cannot be executed unless the High Court confirms it.14 The High Court may confirm the sentence or pass any other sentence warranted by law, annul the conviction, order a new trial or acquit the accused, and it has wide powers as an appellate court as well.15 Once confirmed, the death sentence becomes executable.
3. Appeal to the Supreme Court. The convict may appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134 of the Constitution, including where the High Court certifies under Article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal, and may also seek special leave to appeal under Article 136.16 Review petitions and, in exceptional cases, curative petitions follow.
4. Mercy petition. Under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, the convict may petition the President of India or the Governor of the State for clemency, which may take the form of a pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, or the suspension, remission or commutation of the sentence.17
5. Execution warrant (death warrant). On receiving the High Court’s order confirming the sentence, the Court of Session issues a warrant of execution in Form No. 43 of the Second Schedule to the BNSS.18 The sentence is not executed until the appeal to the Supreme Court has been dismissed and the mercy petition, if any, rejected, and a minimum of fourteen days must separate the convict’s receipt of the communication rejecting the mercy petition from the date fixed for execution.19
6. Final preparations for execution. Capital punishment in India is carried out by hanging: the law provides that “[w]hen any person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.”20
7. Execution. The execution takes place early in the morning. The Superintendent, the Deputy Superintendent, the Senior Jailor and the Chief Medical Officer must be present, and an Executive Magistrate attends and countersigns the warrant. The body remains suspended for half an hour, or until the Chief Medical Officer has certified that life is extinct, before it is taken down, and the death is then formally certified.21
B. Judicial interpretations and precedents
The constitutionality of capital punishment was first challenged in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.,22 on the ground that it violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. A Constitution Bench of five judges unanimously rejected the challenge and dismissed the appeal. It held that the choice between death and life imprisonment was left to the judicial discretion of the court, to be exercised on the facts and circumstances proved at the trial, observing that “[t]he exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused”, and that “the death sentence imposed after trial in accordance with the procedure established by law is not unconstitutional under Article 21.”23 Even the right under Article 21 may thus be curtailed by a procedure established by law, and the death penalty under section 302 of the Penal Code is an instance of such a curtailment. Soon afterwards, in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.,24 the Supreme Court, by a majority, shifted the focus from the crime to the criminal, laying stress on socio-economic factors such as poverty, deprivation and illiteracy that lead people into desperate situations and eventually into crime, and confining the death sentence to cases in which the security of the State and society was at stake. That view did not last: the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh overruled it.25
One of the most important decisions on the death penalty is Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,26 in which a Constitution Bench, by a majority of four to one, upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty for murder and laid down the ‘rarest of rare cases’ standard. The Court held that “for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”27 Bachan Singh was a watershed for the death penalty in India because it defined the judicial role in capital sentencing: death may be imposed only when the alternative punishment is “unquestionably foreclosed”, and the court must record special reasons for it, as section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure required.28
In T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (‘Vatheeswaran’),29 the Court recognised the degrading and dehumanising suffering that a prolonged delay in executing a death sentence inflicts on a death row prisoner. It held that “delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death.”30 The Vatheeswaran limit of two years did not treat judicial delay differently from delay in clemency: the Court counted the whole period from the sentence passed by the trial court, making allowance for the time needed for appeal.31
The two-year rule did not survive. Later in 1983, a bench of three judges in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab32 held that delay alone is not enough to warrant commutation and that no fixed two-year rule could be laid down. In Triveniben, a Constitution Bench overruled Vatheeswaran on this point: no fixed period of delay makes a death sentence inexecutable, only the delay after the sentence has been finally confirmed by the judicial process may be considered, and the Court then examines the nature of that delay in the light of all the circumstances of the case.33 In Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the Court held that undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions, not caused by the convict himself, is by itself a ground on which a death sentence may be commuted to life imprisonment, and it laid down guidelines for the mercy process.34 These decisions, rather than Vatheeswaran, now govern the central question of this paper.
In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab,35 a bench of three judges applied and elaborated the Bachan Singh standard, identifying five categories of circumstances that a court must consider in deciding whether a murder falls within the ‘rarest of rare’ class: the manner of its commission, its motive, the anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, its magnitude, and the personality of the victim. In Mithu v. State of Punjab,36 a Constitution Bench declared section 303 of the Penal Code,37 which made death the mandatory punishment for murder committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life, unconstitutional and void as violative of Articles 14 and 21; the judgment confirmed that a mandatory death sentence, which denies the court its sentencing discretion, cannot stand. In Deena v. Union of India,38 the Court held that execution by hanging, the method prescribed by law, is not unconstitutional and does not violate Article 21. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka,39 the Court recognised imprisonment for life without remission, or for a fixed term well beyond fourteen years, as an alternative to the death penalty in cases where the crime is grave but does not warrant capital punishment.
Legal and tactical barriers to enforcement
The death penalty, or the fear of it, appears to have little effect on crime, because it is widely known that investigations are often shoddy, evidence is of poor quality, trials are slow and legal loopholes are many, so that it takes a very long time even to convict an accused and bring him to the gallows.40 Even after the Delhi gang rape of December 2012, which shocked the whole country and led to stringent new laws through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, crime against women and children has continued to rise: the National Crime Records Bureau recorded 4,45,256 cases of crime against women in 2022, an increase of 4.0 per cent over 2021, and 1,62,449 cases of crime against children, an increase of 8.7 per cent.41 Convicts know that the chance of actually facing the gallows is slight. Nor does the problem end with conviction: the period between the sentence of death and its execution can stretch on almost indefinitely.42 The execution of death warrants in India is hindered by a complex legal framework and by procedural remedies that are open to tactical use:
1. Judicial delays. The Indian judicial system carries one of the heaviest backlogs of cases anywhere. According to the Union Law Minister’s written reply in the Lok Sabha in July 2024, 84,045 cases were then pending in the Supreme Court and 60,11,678 in the High Courts, while the district and subordinate courts were the largest contributors, with 4,53,51,913 pending cases. Weak investigation and unreliable evidence prolong trials, many of which end without conviction, and capital cases await disposal along with the rest. The Minister attributed the pendency to several factors, among them the availability of physical infrastructure and supporting court staff, the complexity of the facts involved, the nature of the evidence, and the cooperation of stakeholders such as the bar, investigating agencies, witnesses and litigants.43
2. Appeals. A person sentenced to death by a Court of Session may appeal to the High Court under section 415 of the BNSS.44 The High Court may examine the facts of the case and call for the record of evidence, and its decision may in turn be appealed to the Supreme Court.
3. Appeal to the Supreme Court. A convict under sentence of death may appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134 of the Constitution, including where the High Court certifies under Article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal, or may seek special leave to appeal under Article 136.45 The Supreme Court examines the whole case, including the decisions of the trial court and the High Court, before ruling, although the grant of special leave rests in its discretion.
4. Review petitions. Under Article 137 of the Constitution, a convict may seek review of the Supreme Court’s judgment confirming the death sentence, which is then reconsidered by the same bench or, where that is not possible, by another bench of the Court.46 A review petition must be filed within thirty days of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.47 If the review petition is dismissed, the convict may still file a curative petition, the final judicial resort against a miscarriage of justice.
5. Curative petitions. The curative petition is not provided for in the Constitution or in any statute. The Supreme Court devised it in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,48 in the exercise of its inherent powers, as a remedy of last resort after the dismissal of a review petition, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriages of justice; it is now governed by the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.49 The thirty-day limit prescribed by the Rules applies to review petitions. Since the trial court in passing judgment, the High Court in confirming it and the Supreme Court in appeal under Article 134 or 136 have all applied their judicial minds before a death sentence becomes final, the chance of a miscarriage of justice is already small, and it may be argued that the curative petition hands death row convicts one more instrument with which to delay the execution of the death warrant.
6. Mercy petitions and executive delay. Under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, the convict may seek clemency from the President of India or the Governor of the State. No time is fixed for deciding mercy petitions, and this can lead to prolonged delays, leaving death row convicts in mental agony, some of them developing psychiatric disorders while they wait for the gallows.50 Even section 472 of the BNSS, which now sets time limits for filing a mercy petition and for the Central Government’s recommendation, prescribes no period within which the President or the Governor must decide it.51
A. Discrepancies and arbitrariness in capital sentencing
Another legal barrier to the death penalty and its execution is the inconsistency among the judicial pronouncements of courts across the country.52 The Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that the ‘rarest of rare’ standard laid down in Bachan Singh has been applied inconsistently. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (‘Bariyar’), it observed: “There is no uniformity of precedents, to say the least. In most cases, the death penalty has been affirmed or refused to be affirmed by us, without laying down any legal principle.”53 The Court relied on Swamy Shraddananda (2), in which it had noted that the question of the death penalty is not free from the subjective element and that the confirmation of a death sentence or its commutation “depends a good deal on the personal predilection of the judges constituting the bench”.54 It also referred to the joint report of Amnesty International India and the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Lethal Lottery, as showing that not much had changed after Bachan Singh.55
B. Medical and ill-health applications
If a convict’s mental health deteriorates, or if he is found to be physically unfit, the execution may be delayed. The Supreme Court has held that insanity or mental illness is a relevant supervening circumstance that may justify commuting a death sentence, and that a convict duly certified to be insane is protected by Article 21 and cannot be executed without further clarification from the competent authority about his mental condition.56 It is sometimes said that this ground is misused: death row prisoners file repeated medical applications pleading ill health which, on examination, are found to be frivolous and to be no more than a tactic to delay execution and gain time.57
Such applications may rest on physical illness, anxiety, mental distress, or the psychological toll that the sentence itself takes on the convict. Once the Supreme Court has finally confirmed the death sentence, a convict may wait for years to hear from the Governor and the President of India on his mercy petition.58 Death row convicts are often moved into solitary confinement as soon as the trial court sentences them, and some face multiple execution warrants. Together these circumstances produce physical and psychological conditions that come close to torture.59 The experience endured by a prisoner on death row is known as the ‘death row phenomenon’: every passing moment holds out a prospect of hope, which in turn produces a constant mental struggle over whether he will live or die.
C. Capital punishment in India after 2000: an analysis
The exact number of executions in India since independence is unknown, because no central authority maintains execution records. Data compiled by Project 39A at National Law University, Delhi, record at least 720 executions since 1947, nearly half of them in Uttar Pradesh; an official of the project cautioned that the true figure could be much higher, since the government keeps no proper records of executions.60 At the end of 2023, 561 prisoners were under sentence of death, the largest death row population in nineteen years, close to the previous peak of 563 recorded by the National Crime Records Bureau for 2004. The Times of India, reporting Project 39A’s annual figures, attributed the rise to the low rate at which appellate courts dispose of capital cases (303 cases involving 488 prisoners were pending before the High Courts at the end of 2023) and to the readiness of trial courts to award the death penalty.61 Yet only eight executions have taken place since 2000. The following twenty-first-century cases, each with a long interval between sentence and execution (the ‘limbo period’), illustrate the pattern of delay:
1. Dhananjoy Chatterjee (1990 Kolkata rape and murder case).62 Dhananjoy Chatterjee, a security guard, was convicted of the rape and murder of a schoolgirl in the Kolkata apartment building he had been deputed to guard. The offence was committed on 5 March 1990, and the trial court sentenced him to death on 12 August 1991. The Calcutta High Court confirmed the sentence, and in January 1994 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, holding that the case fell within the ‘rarest of rare’ category, the breach of trust by a security guard being a weighty consideration; his review petition was rejected later that month. His mercy petition to the Governor of West Bengal was also rejected. His execution, first scheduled for 25 June 2004, was stayed while further proceedings were pursued, including a mercy petition to President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. The President rejected the petition on 4 August 2004, and Chatterjee was executed on 14 August 2004. The limbo period between his sentence and his execution was thus about thirteen years.
2. Mohammad Afzal Guru (2001 Parliament attack).63 Afzal Guru was convicted in connection with the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. The Special Court under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 sentenced him to death on 18 December 2002; the Delhi High Court upheld the conviction and sentence in October 2003, and the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence on 4 August 2005. His review petition was dismissed in September 2005, and a mercy petition filed by his wife in October 2006 was finally rejected by the President on 3 February 2013. He was executed in Tihar Jail on 9 February 2013, about ten years and two months after he was sentenced.
3. Yakub Memon (1993 Bombay bombings).64 Yakub Memon was sentenced to death by the TADA Court on 27 July 2007 in the case arising from the 1993 Bombay bombings, and the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence on 21 March 2013. Review and curative petitions followed, along with mercy petitions to the Governor and the President. Several last-minute pleas were heard immediately before the scheduled execution, and the Supreme Court rejected the final challenge in the early hours preceding it. He was executed in Nagpur Central Jail on 30 July 2015, about eight years after he was sentenced.
4. Ajmal Kasab (26/11 attacks).65 Ajmal Kasab was convicted by the Special Court on 3 May 2010, and sentenced to death on 6 May 2010, for his part in the Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008. The Bombay High Court upheld the sentence on 21 February 2011, and the Supreme Court confirmed it on 29 August 2012. The President rejected his mercy petition on 5 November 2012, and he was executed in Yerawada Jail, Pune, on 21 November 2012. His limbo period, about two and a half years, was notably shorter than in the other post-2000 executions.
5. Mukesh, Pawan, Vinay and Akshay (2012 Delhi gang rape and murder).66 The four adult convicts, Mukesh, Pawan, Vinay and Akshay, were sentenced to death in September 2013 for the gang rape and murder of a young woman in Delhi on 16 December 2012. The Delhi High Court upheld the sentences in March 2014, and the Supreme Court confirmed them in May 2017. Review, curative and mercy proceedings were then pursued by each convict separately. Several death warrants were issued, fixing execution for 22 January, 1 February and 3 March 2020, but execution was deferred each time until the pending proceedings were completed. The four convicts were finally executed in Tihar Jail on 20 March 2020, about six and a half years after they were sentenced.
These cases show a wide gap between the final judgment and the actual execution of death warrants in India, a gap that is difficult to reconcile with basic human rights and with the internationally accepted standards that govern the death penalty.
D. Recent judicial decisions, trends and guidelines
In recent years the Supreme Court has delivered several judgments that clarify the position of the death penalty in India. In Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka,67 it emphasised detailed reasoning and procedural fairness: finding that the courts below had not treated the accused’s young age and lack of criminal antecedents as mitigating circumstances, and that the State had shown no material that he could not be reformed, it commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life without remission for thirty years. In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh,68 the Court laid down practical guidelines to ensure that mitigating circumstances are collected and evaluated at the trial stage, before a death sentence is imposed:
1. Psychological evaluation. For an offence carrying capital punishment, the State must produce before the Sessions Court, at the appropriate stage, material disclosing a psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused, preferably collected beforehand, so that the court has evidence close in time to the accused’s frame of mind when the offence was committed.
2. Socio-economic and family background. The State must also collect, in a time-bound manner, information on the accused’s age, early and present family background, education, socio-economic background, criminal antecedents, income and employment, and any history of unstable social behaviour or mental or psychological ailment, and this information must be available to the trial court at the sentencing stage.
3. Opportunity to present mitigating evidence. The accused must be given the same opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal and to establish all mitigating circumstances.
4. Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial court must elicit this information from both the accused and the State and consider the mitigating circumstances at the trial stage itself, so that the brutality of the crime does not lead it into a purely retributive response.
5. Jail conduct and probation reports. A report on the accused’s conduct and behaviour in jail, the work done and the activities undertaken must be called for from the jail authorities, such as the probation and welfare officer and the superintendent of the jail, together with a fresh psychiatric and psychological report where the appeal is heard long after the conviction.
More recently, in Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police,69 the Supreme Court, reviewing its own earlier judgment, commuted a death sentence because no inquiry had been made into the possibility of the convict’s reformation. Although the crime was grave, the Court noted that “[n]either the trial court, nor the appellate courts have looked into any factors to conclusively state that the petitioner cannot be reformed or rehabilitated”, and that the courts had “reiterated the gruesome nature of crime to award the death penalty”.70
In State of Maharashtra v. Renuka Shinde,71 decided on 13 April 2023, a bench of Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar partly allowed the State’s appeals against a Bombay High Court judgment that had commuted two death sentences to life imprisonment because of the delay in deciding the convicts’ mercy petitions. The High Court had found that the mercy petitions took seven years, ten months and fifteen days to be decided.72 The Supreme Court directed all States and appropriate authorities to decide mercy petitions against death sentences at the earliest, so that convicts do not gain the benefit of the delay and “so that even the accused can also know his fate and even justice is also done to the victim”, and it modified the sentence to imprisonment for the remainder of the convicts’ natural lives without premature release.73
A significant shift came in 2025 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India.74 Although the Court had affirmed Dupare’s death sentence in 2017, it held that Article 32 empowers it, in capital cases, to reopen the sentencing stage where the Manoj safeguards were not followed, since carrying out a death sentence before those safeguards are fully applied would be contrary to Articles 14 and 21. It left the finding of guilt untouched, set the death sentence aside and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing on sentence in conformity with Manoj, while cautioning that this exceptional remedy cannot become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters.75 In 2025, moreover, the Supreme Court acquitted ten persons sentenced to death and, for the third consecutive year, confirmed no death sentence.76
Most recently, in Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India,77 the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest petition filed in 2017 that sought to replace execution by hanging, said to involve prolonged pain and suffering, with a less painful method. The Court declined to revisit Deena or to refer the question to a larger bench, but clarified that its judgment does not preclude the Union Government from setting up an expert body to examine whether an alternative method of execution would better minimise pain while preserving human dignity.
Conclusion
The Indian experience of capital punishment reveals a fundamental paradox. The death penalty has been retained as the most severe form of punishment, principally on the grounds of deterrence, retribution and the protection of society. Its effectiveness, however, is undermined by the long gap between sentencing and execution caused by appeals, review and curative petitions, mercy proceedings, judicial intervention and administrative delay. A punishment intended to be certain and decisive thus becomes uncertain and prolonged, weakening its intended deterrent function.
Parliament has introduced a significant procedural safeguard in section 472 of the BNSS, which prescribes a structured procedure for mercy petitions in death sentence cases.78 The condemned prisoner, or his legal heir or another relative, may file a mercy petition before the President under Article 72 or the Governor under Article 161 within thirty days of being informed by the jail superintendent of the dismissal of the appeal, review or special leave petition by the Supreme Court, or of the confirmation of the sentence by the High Court once the time for approaching the Supreme Court has expired. A petition may first be made to the Governor and, on its rejection, to the President within sixty days. The Central Government must seek the State Government’s comments and make its recommendation to the President within sixty days of receiving those comments and the records of the case, and the President’s order must be communicated to the Home Department of the State Government and to the prison authorities within forty-eight hours.
Death row prisoners nevertheless still wait a long time through trials, appeals and executive clemency, enduring severe distress, terror and anxiety while the date of execution remains uncertain. The uncertainty also burdens the families of victims, for whom repeated proceedings prolong the trauma of seeking justice. Protracted execution timelines may, at the level of society, weaken confidence in the criminal justice system.
The delay data examined in this paper therefore suggest that capital punishment has not produced the deterrent effect expected of it in practice, an inference consistent with the Law Commission of India’s conclusion that the death penalty does not serve the penological goal of deterrence any more than life imprisonment.79 India should seriously reconsider capital punishment and move towards more humane and effective alternatives, such as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or a policy of consecutive sentencing.
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Footnotes
1. Amnesty International, Death Sentences and Executions 2024 (2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/8976/2025/en/; see also Press Release, Amnesty International, Global Recorded Executions Hit Their Highest Figure Since 2015 (Apr. 8, 2025), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/04/global-recorded-executions-hit-their-highest-figure-since-2015/ (“At the end of 2024, 113 countries were fully abolitionist and 145 in total had abolished the death penalty in law or practice.”).
2. See generally Anusha Arif, Contours of Justice: Human Rights and Constitutionality of Capital Punishment in India, Social Policy Research Foundation (Feb. 8, 2024), https://sprf.in/constitutionality-of-capital-punishment-in-india/.
3. See S.B. Sinha, To Kill or Not to Kill: The Unending Conundrum, 24(1) Nat’l L. Sch. India Rev. (2012), https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol24/iss1/11.
4. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, ¶ 209 (India).
5. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023, §§ 22(2), 407(1) (India) [hereinafter BNSS].
6. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, §§ 121, 132, 194, 195A, 302, 303, 305, 307, 364A, 376A, 376AB, 376DB, 376E, 396 (India) (repealed 2024).
7. Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473 (India).
8. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India) [hereinafter BNS].
9. BNS, supra note 8, §§ 103(2), 111(2)(a), 113(2)(a).
10. The mandatory death sentence in section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 was declared void in State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 346 (India); the Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019, No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 2019, § 10 (India), now makes the offence punishable with imprisonment for life or death.
11. BNSS, supra note 5, § 22(2).
12. BNSS, supra note 5, § 393(3); see The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, § 354(3) (India) (repealed 2024).
13. BNSS, supra note 5, § 393(5).
14. BNSS, supra note 5, § 407(1).
15. BNSS, supra note 5, §§ 409, 427.
16. India Const. arts. 134, 134A, 136.
17. India Const. arts. 72, 161.
18. BNSS, supra note 5, §§ 453–454, sch. II, form 43.
19. Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 (India) (guideline 7, “Minimum 14 days notice for execution”); Ministry of Home Affairs, Model Prison Manual paras. 12.70, 12.74 (2016).
20. BNSS, supra note 5, § 393(5).
21. Ministry of Home Affairs, Model Prison Manual, supra note 19, paras. 12.85, 12.95, 12.102.
22. Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20 (India).
23. Id.
24. Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 646 (India).
25. Bachan Singh, supra note 4; see Law Commission of India, Report No. 262: The Death Penalty ¶ 2.4.10 (2015), https://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/files/reports/262.pdf.
26. Bachan Singh, supra note 4.
27. Id. ¶ 209.
28. Id.; The Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 12, § 354(3).
29. T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCC 68 (India).
30. Id.
31. Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 678 (India) (describing the two-year rule as running from the judgment of the trial court); see Vatheeswaran, supra note 29.
32. Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 344 (India).
33. Triveniben, supra note 31.
34. Shatrughan Chauhan, supra note 19.
35. Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 (India).
36. Mithu, supra note 7.
37. The Indian Penal Code, supra note 6, § 303.
38. Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645 (India).
39. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (India).
40. See Amnesty International India & People’s Union for Civil Liberties (Tamil Nadu & Puducherry), Lethal Lottery: The Death Penalty in India: A Study of Supreme Court Judgments in Death Penalty Cases 1950–2006 (2008), https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/asa200072008eng.pdf.
41. National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2022: Statistics vol. 1, tbls. 3A.1, 4A.1 (2023), https://www.ncrb.gov.in/uploads/nationalcrimerecordsbureau/custom/1701607577CrimeinIndia2022Book1.pdf.
42. Sinha, supra note 3.
43. Press Trust of India, Over 5 Crore Cases Pending in Courts; Max 1.18 Crore Pending in UP’s Lower Courts, Indian Express (July 26, 2024), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/over-5-crore-cases-pending-up-lower-courts-9477413/ (reporting the Law Minister’s written reply in the Lok Sabha).
44. BNSS, supra note 5, § 415(2).
45. India Const. arts. 134, 134A, 136.
46. India Const. art. 137.
47. Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Order XLVII, r. 2 (India).
48. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 (India).
49. Supreme Court Rules, supra note 47, Order XLVIII.
50. Law Commission of India, supra note 25, ch. VI, at 200–11.
51. BNSS, supra note 5, § 472(1)–(5).
52. See Anup Surendranath & Maulshree Pathak, Legislative Expansion and Judicial Confusion: Uncertain Trajectories of the Death Penalty in India, 11(3) Int’l J. for Crime, Just. & Soc. Democracy 67, 67–78 (2022), https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2477; Anup Surendranath, Neetika Vishwanath & Preeti Pratishruti Dash, The Enduring Gaps and Errors in Capital Sentencing in India, 32(1) Nat’l L. Sch. India Rev. (2020), https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol32/iss1/3.
53. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 (India) (pt. 3(D), “Differing opinion in other cases”).
54. Id. (quoting Swamy Shraddananda (2), supra note 39, ¶ 33).
55. Id.; Amnesty International India & People’s Union for Civil Liberties, supra note 40.
56. Shatrughan Chauhan, supra note 19; see also Shruti Iyer, Prof. Bhullar’s Death Penalty: Executing the Mentally Ill, Centre for Law & Policy Research (Sept. 18, 2013), https://clpr.org.in/blog/prof-bhullars-death-penalty-executing-the-mentally-ill/.
57. See generally S. Muralidhar, Hang Them Now, Hang Them Not: India’s Travails with the Death Penalty, 40 J. Indian L. Inst. 143, 143–73 (1998).
58. Shatrughan Chauhan, supra note 19 (“Keeping a convict in suspense while consideration of his mercy petition by the President for many years is certainly an agony for him/her.”).
59. Prison Insider, India: Detention Conditions of People Sentenced to Death: How Is Daily Life While Waiting for Death? (Jan. 18, 2022), https://www.prison-insider.com/en/articles/inde-conditions-de-detention-des-condamnes-a-mort; Law Commission of India, supra note 25, ¶¶ 6.7.1–6.7.2, at 200.
60. Press Trust of India, At Least 720 Executions in India Since 1947, Millennium Post (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.millenniumpost.in/nation/at-least-720-executions-in-india-since-1947-406024.
61. Highest Death Row Population in India: 561 Prisoners, Times of India (Feb. 10, 2024), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/highest-death-row-population-in-india-561-prisoners/articleshow/107567100.cms (reporting Project 39A, Death Penalty in India: Annual Statistics Report 2023 (2024)).
62. Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220 (India); Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., (2004) 9 SCC 751 (India).
63. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 (India).
64. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 (India).
65. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 (India).
66. Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 (India).
67. Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801 (India).
68. Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 353 (India).
69. Sundar @ Sundarrajan v. State by Inspector of Police, Review Pet. (Crl.) Nos. 159–160 of 2013, 2023 INSC 264 (Mar. 21, 2023) (India).
70. Id. ¶ 79.
71. State of Maharashtra v. Renuka Shinde, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 305 (Apr. 13, 2023) (India).
72. Renuka v. Union of India, Crim. Writ Pet. No. 3103 of 2014 (Bom. HC Jan. 18, 2022) (India).
73. Renuka Shinde, supra note 71; Abhimanyu Hazarika, Decide Mercy Pleas at the Earliest; Death Row Convicts Taking Advantage of Delay: Supreme Court in Seema Gavit, Renuka Shinde Case, Bar & Bench (Apr. 14, 2023), https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/decide-mercy-pleas-at-earliest-death-row-convicts-taking-advantage-delay-supreme-court-seema-gavit-renuka-shinde.
74. Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043 (India).
75. Id. ¶¶ 25, 29, 31–34.
76. Khadija Khan, Trial Courts Handed 128 Death Sentences in 2025, Highest Female Convictions Since 2016, Says Report, ThePrint (Feb. 8, 2026), https://theprint.in/judiciary/trial-courts-handed-128-death-penalties-in-2025-third-straight-year-sc-didnt-confirm-any-death-sentence/2849296.
77. Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No. 145 of 2017, 2026 INSC 873 (Aug. 18, 2026) (India).
78. BNSS, supra note 5, § 472.
79. Law Commission of India, supra note 25, ¶ 7.1.1, at 213.
