Introduction
The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) was enacted with the noble intention of safeguarding children from sexual abuse and exploitation. However, the Act’s blanket approach of criminalizing all sexual activity involving minors under 18 years of age, irrespective of consent, has created significant legal, social and ethical dilemmas. This paper examines the far-reaching impact of the POCSO Act on consensual relationships among adolescents in India, and shows how a law designed to protect children has inadvertently led to the criminalization of normative adolescent behaviour. The POCSO Act defines a ‘child’ as any person below the age of 18 years,1 and so brings all sexual activity with or between individuals under that age within its reach. While this approach aims to protect children from exploitation, it fails to recognize the complex realities of adolescent development, sexual exploration and consensual relationships. The paper argues that the rigid application of the POCSO Act to consensual adolescent relationships has resulted in over-criminalization, gender bias, familial misuse and other unintended consequences that affect the rights and wellbeing of the very individuals the law intends to protect.
Criminalization of teenage relationships
The POCSO Act’s uncompromising stance on the age of consent has effectively criminalized consensual sexual relationships among adolescents. The law creates what Prem Vinod Parwani terms a ‘fixed-age’ rule of consent, under which any sexual interaction with or between minors is criminalized without exception, regardless of the circumstances or the voluntariness of the participants.2 This approach stands in stark contrast to the growing global recognition of adolescents’ evolving capacities and their right to sexual autonomy. The rigidity of the law is particularly evident in its treatment of consent. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), makes sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years rape ‘with or without her consent’, so that a man who has consensual intercourse with a girl of 17 is statutorily guilty of rape.3 Because the POCSO Act defines a ‘child’ as any person below 18, the same rule extends to every form of sexual act the Act penalizes.4 The Act makes no distinction between exploitative sexual abuse and consensual sexual activity between peers, and treats both as equally criminal.
Studies of the Special Courts by the Centre for Child and the Law at the National Law School of India University found that ‘romantic’ cases, in which the victim admitted to a relationship with the accused, made up between 15.6% (Assam) and 21.8% (Karnataka, three districts) of the cases decided in the five States studied.5 This finding is supported by data from the National Family Health Survey-5 (2019–21), which found that 39% of women aged 25 to 49 years had their first sexual intercourse before the age of 18.6 A 2016 Population Council survey of more than 10,400 adolescents aged 15 to 19 in Bihar found that 14.1% of unmarried boys and 6.3% of unmarried girls had had premarital sex.7 These statistics highlight a significant disconnect between the legal framework and social reality. Courts across India have recognized this disconnect. In Vijayalakshmi v. State, the Madras High Court observed that the scheme of the POCSO Act did not intend to bring within its ambit adolescents in consensual romantic relationships, and that punishing an adolescent boy for entering into such a relationship ‘was never the objective of the POCSO Act’.8 Similarly, in R. Parthiban v. State, where a 24-year-old man had had a relationship with a 17-year-old girl whom he married after she attained majority, the Madras High Court quashed the POCSO proceedings, holding that the offences were ‘purely individual/personal in nature’ and that quashing them would not affect any ‘overriding public interest’.9
Criminal implications of adolescent behaviour
The criminalization of consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO Act has led to a problematic over-criminalization of normative adolescent behaviour. This approach runs against the developmental evidence, relied on by the Madras High Court, that ‘adolescent romance is an important developmental marker for adolescents’ self-identity, functioning and capacity for intimacy’.10 Ironically, the Act’s own Preamble requires the law to operate so as ‘to ensure the healthy physical, emotional, intellectual and social development of the child’,11 an objective hindered by criminalizing a developmental necessity. The over-criminalization is borne out by the evidence. A December 2022 policy brief by Enfold Proactive Health Trust, as summarised on the Girls Not Brides research tracker, finds that ‘the blanket criminalisation of sexual activity with minors and the treatment of consensual sexual intercourse with a minor on par with rape, has resulted in a large number of young persons coming under harsh criminal law provisions, which detrimentally impacts their right to dignity, health, life, and privacy, apart from putting an enormous strain on the limited resources in the justice system’.12 Courts have increasingly recognized this issue. In February 2025 the Delhi High Court acquitted a man convicted under the POCSO Act, observing that he was 19 years of age at the time of the incident and the prosecutrix about 17, so that ‘it was a case of adolescent love and the physical relations were established consensually. Therefore, to convict the appellant under the POCSO Act would be a perversity of justice’; the acquittal also rested on the prosecution’s failure to prove her age.13 The Madras High Court has similarly acknowledged the issue. In Sabari v. Inspector of Police it noted, on a report placed before it by the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights, that the majority of POCSO cases arose from relationships between adolescent boys and girls, and held that such a relationship ‘cannot be construed as an unnatural one or alien to between relationship of opposite sexes’.14
Case studies and statistics
The statistical evidence of the over-criminalization of adolescent behaviour under the POCSO Act is compelling. Data of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show a steady increase in POCSO cases over the years. In 2021, 149,404 cases of crime against children were registered, of which 53,874 (36.05%) were under the POCSO Act, against 47,221 POCSO cases in 2020 (36.73% of crimes against children) and 47,335 in 2019 (31.94%).15 More strikingly, POCSO cases rose by 94.47% between 2017 and 2022, from 32,608 incidents to 63,414.16 This surge raises the question whether it represents an actual increase in sexual offences against children or greater reporting of cases, including those involving consensual relationships. An analysis of judicial data from Assam, Delhi and Haryana between 2012 and April 2020 found that of the 8,097 cases disposed of, 59.66% ended in acquittal and only 20.97% in conviction.17 The high acquittal rate suggests that many of these cases may involve consensual relationships: in an analysis of 1,715 ‘romantic’ cases decided by Special Courts in Assam, Maharashtra and West Bengal, acquittals were recorded in 93.8%.18 In Ajay Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), the complaint was filed by the father of a seventeen-year-old girl; she told the Delhi High Court that she had married the accused of her own free will and wished to stay with him, and he was granted bail.19 In State v. Kaishar Ali, the girl, who was in a relationship with the accused and had left home with him, deposed that her mother had threatened that the family would have him killed if she spoke in his favour; the High Court dismissed the State’s petition for leave to appeal against his acquittal.20 These cases illustrate how the POCSO Act has become a tool for parents and guardians to control adolescents’ romantic and sexual choices, often with punitive consequences for the young people involved, particularly the male partners.
Disproportionate legal consequences
A. Gender bias in prosecution
The implementation of the POCSO Act has revealed significant gender disparities in how sexual offences involving minors are prosecuted. The Act itself is gender-neutral, and the Delhi High Court has rejected the submission that it is a gender-based law, holding that the ‘POCSO Act is not gender based and is neutral as far as victim children are concerned’.21 Its application, however, often reflects entrenched gender biases in Indian society. In cases of consensual relationships, it is predominantly the male partner who is charged, regardless of whether both partners are minors or how small the age difference between them is. This reinforces stereotypes that portray males as aggressors and females as victims requiring protection, even when the relationship is mutual. Evidence from the Special Courts bears this out: in 89.2% of ‘romantic’ cases the accused was charged with a penetrative offence under section 4 or 6 of the POCSO Act or section 376 of the IPC, so that accused men and boys ‘are inevitably taken into custody’, while adolescent boys are ‘discriminatorily treated as children in conflict with the law’.22 Court records also show how a complaint brought by the family can diverge from the girl’s own account: in 21.8% of ‘romantic’ cases, the girl disputed her family’s claim that she was a minor.23
The burden on male adolescents extends beyond legal consequences to social stigmatization, disruption of education and long-term damage to career prospects. Being labelled a sexual offender, even in the context of a consensual relationship, can have devastating psychological and social consequences for young men; as the Madras High Court put it, an adolescent boy sent to prison in such a case ‘will be persecuted throughout his life’.24 The structure of the offences contributes to the disparity. Rape under section 63 of the BNS can be committed only by a man, and penetrative sexual assault under section 3 of the POCSO Act is drafted largely around male acts of penetration, even though the POCSO Act otherwise uses gender-neutral language.25 Comprehensive data on the gender distribution of POCSO prosecutions in consensual cases is limited, so the bias is difficult to measure precisely, but it can manifest in prosecutorial decisions and judicial reasoning, particularly in borderline cases. The Calcutta High Court judgment later set aside in In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, which advised adolescent girls to control their sexual urges, placed the responsibility for sexual restraint primarily on girls; the Supreme Court held that such observations were ‘entirely irrelevant and unwarranted’.26 Gender-neutral legal frameworks can still produce gendered outcomes, and a balanced approach to consensual adolescent relationships requires both protection of minors from exploitation and avoidance of discriminatory application of the law based on gender stereotypes.
B. Lack of consideration of consent of female counterparts
The POCSO Act’s fixed-age rule creates a legal fiction whereby the consent of anyone under 18 is irrelevant, effectively silencing young women in legal proceedings about their own sexual choices. This approach, while intended to protect, ironically undermines their agency and autonomy. The law’s rigid stance that minors cannot consent to sexual activity contradicts the reality of adolescent development and decision-making. By dismissing a minor’s consent entirely, the law fails to recognize that adolescents, particularly those nearing adulthood, may have the capacity to make informed decisions about their intimate relationships. This is particularly problematic in cases of consensual relationships. In Praduman v. State (NCT of Delhi), granting bail to a 21-year-old whose relationship with a 17-year-old schoolmate it found to be consensual, the Delhi High Court observed that ‘[c]onsensual sex has been in legal grey area because the consent given by minor cannot be said to be a valid consent in the eyes of law’, and that police were ‘filing POCSO cases at the behest of the family of a girl who object to her friendship and romantic involvement with a young boy’.27 Such legal conundrums reflect the tension between protecting minors from exploitation and respecting their evolving capacities and agency.
The legal treatment of consent under the POCSO Act has created what Parwani calls a ‘grey area’ in judicial interpretation,28 in which courts must either apply the law strictly and criminalize consensual relationships, or find ways around it to avoid unjust outcomes. This ambiguity results in inconsistent judgments and fails to provide clear guidance on how consent in adolescent relationships should be treated.
Social and gendered impact
A. Family pressure and misuse of the law
The POCSO Act has become a tool for familial control over adolescents’ romantic and sexual choices, often reflecting deep-seated social prejudices. Complaints under the Act are frequently initiated not by the minors involved but by parents or guardians who disapprove of the relationship, often for reasons of caste, class or religion. The Enfold analysis found that 80.2% of the complainants in ‘romantic’ cases were parents and relatives of adolescent girls who registered a case after she eloped or her pregnancy was discovered, and that the law places young couples in inter-caste and inter-faith relationships at greater risk of criminalization, becoming a tool to enforce patriarchal norms on the choice of a partner.29
The misuse of the POCSO Act extends beyond romantic relationships. A post on the Record of Law blog identifies family disputes, land and property disputes, financial extortion and political rivalry as common settings for false allegations under the Act: a parent in a custody battle may accuse the other parent of abusing the child, and a party to a property dispute may implicate a minor relative in a fabricated charge to force a settlement.30
The Kerala High Court confronted the problem in Aravind v. State of Kerala. A girl who was a minor when she complained had accused two cousins, who had objected to her relationship with a classmate, of sexual offences; she later told the court that she had lodged the complaints out of anger, and the two young men had by then spent about two months in custody. Granting them bail, the court asked who would be held responsible for such false complaints, given that section 22(2) of the POCSO Act protects a child from punishment for a false complaint, and who would compensate the accused for their ‘wrongful confinement, mental agony, trauma and pain’.31 Such misuse not only harms innocent individuals but also undermines the credibility of genuine cases of child sexual abuse, potentially making it harder for actual victims to receive justice.
B. Patriarchal interpretations and lack of discretion
The implementation of the POCSO Act is often coloured by patriarchal attitudes that view female sexuality as something to be controlled and protected rather than respected as autonomous. These attitudes influence how the law is interpreted and applied, particularly in cases involving adolescent girls. The law’s rigid approach to consent, which deems anyone under 18 incapable of consenting to sexual activity, reflects a paternalistic attitude that denies adolescents agency over their bodies and sexual choices. This is particularly problematic for adolescent girls, whose sexuality is often subject to greater social control and scrutiny than that of their male counterparts. The absence of judicial discretion in POCSO cases exacerbates the problem. While some courts have found ways to mitigate the harshness of the law in cases of consensual relationships, the Act itself provides no formal mechanism for distinguishing between exploitative abuse and mutual, consensual relationships among peers.
The Madras High Court acknowledged this challenge in Sabari, observing that when a girl below 18 years is in a relationship with a boy in or just past his teens, ‘it is always a question mark as to how such relationship could be defined’.32 This legal ambiguity forces courts either to apply the law strictly, potentially resulting in injustice, or to find ways around it, leading to inconsistent jurisprudence. The patriarchal underpinnings of the law are also evident in its focus on sexual ‘purity’ and on protecting girls from sexual activity rather than on preventing exploitation and abuse. This focus can reinforce harmful stereotypes about female sexuality and contribute to a culture of victim-blaming in which girls who engage in consensual sexual activity are seen as having transgressed social norms.
Analysing legal ambiguities under the POCSO Act
A. The close-in-age dilemma
One of the most significant grey areas in the POCSO Act is its failure to recognize close-in-age relationships. Many jurisdictions have adopted ‘close-in-age exemptions’ or ‘Romeo and Juliet clauses’ that decriminalize consensual sexual activity between young people who are close in age, recognizing that such relationships are qualitatively different from exploitative adult-minor relationships. The POCSO Act makes no such distinction. A 17-year-old who engages in consensual sexual activity with a 16-year-old is technically committing an offence under the Act, as is an 18-year-old in a relationship with a 17-year-old. This rigid approach fails to account for the reality of adolescent development and relationships.
The close-in-age dilemma is evident in judicial decisions. Where both parties are close in age and the relationship is consensual, courts have often struggled to apply the law in a manner that feels just. In some cases courts have used their discretion to interpret the law liberally or to reduce sentences, while in others they have strictly applied its letter. This inconsistency creates legal uncertainty and fails to provide clear guidance to adolescents, parents, educators and law enforcement about how consensual relationships between peers will be treated under the law.
B. Contemporary evolving standards
From its inception, the POCSO Act has defined a ‘child’ as any person below 18 years of age, regardless of physical or mental development, as the Supreme Court later confirmed when it refused to read ‘mental age’ into the definition.33 What remains particularly contentious is how the Act applies to consensual relationships involving minors, and the legislative history provides crucial context. The draft Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill, 2010, prepared by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) in November 2010, contained a close-in-age exemption: a consensual sexual act between two persons who were both over 14 years of age and either of the same age or within three years of each other was not to be an offence. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill, 2011, as introduced in the Rajya Sabha, did not carry that exemption forward but contained a proviso recognizing the possibility of consensual sexual activity with a child between sixteen and eighteen years and listing the circumstances, including the child’s lack of capacity to understand the nature of the act, in which such consent would be vitiated. The proviso was withdrawn after the Parliamentary Standing Committee raised the concern that it would shift the focus of the trial to the conduct of the victim.34 This legislative choice of a strict age-based standard over a capacity-based one has shaped subsequent judicial interpretation.
The Act’s primacy over the general criminal law rests on its own text. Section 42A provides that the POCSO Act is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law and that, in case of inconsistency, its provisions have overriding effect, while section 42 requires an offender whose act is an offence under both the Act and the penal code to be punished under whichever provides the greater punishment.35 This leaves little room for the application of more lenient provisions of the general criminal law in prosecutions involving minors in consensual relationships. Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, often cited in this context, decided a different point: the Supreme Court held that the statutory procedure for determining the age of a child in conflict with law should also be the basis for determining the age of a child who is a victim of crime.36 Since age is the decisive fact under the POCSO Act, that ruling governs how the line at 18 is drawn in practice. The landmark judgment in Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) further clarified the scope of protection. Although the case addressed the marital rape exception in the context of child marriage, the Court harmonized the IPC with the POCSO Act by requiring Exception 2 to section 375 of the IPC to be read as: ‘Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.’37 The judgment reinforced the principle that sexual intercourse with a minor, even with apparent consent, is an offence, effectively removing consent as a defence. The judicial response to the Act’s rigid stance on consent has nonetheless been varied, reflecting the tension between strict application of the law and recognition of adolescent realities.
Courts have taken two different approaches to consent, resulting in what Parwani describes as a muddled notion of consent.38 The first approach is, in Parwani’s words, a ‘formalistic one, which applies the fixed-age rule without considering circumstances, capacity, voluntariness or autonomy’; it is reflected in Independent Thought. The second tries to make room, within the Act, for a minor’s capacity to consent. In R. Parthiban, the court gave weight to the fact that the girl, by then the accused’s wife and the mother of their child, supported the quashing of the proceedings, and found no ‘overriding public interest’ in continuing them.39 Similarly, in Vijayalakshmi, the court observed that ‘painting a criminal colour’ to adolescent relationships ‘would only serve counter-productively to understanding biosocial dynamics’.40 These conflicting approaches have created a jurisprudential inconsistency that fails to provide clear guidance on how consent in adolescent relationships should be treated. The inconsistency is problematic for several reasons: it creates legal uncertainty, leads to arbitrary outcomes depending on which approach a particular court adopts, and fails to give adolescents clear information about their legal rights and responsibilities.
Judicial interpretations and recent judgments
A. Supreme Court and High Court observations on consensual minor relationships
High Courts across India have navigated the complex terrain of consensual relationships involving minors, sometimes reaching divergent positions. In G. Raghu Varma v. State of Karnataka (2024), the Karnataka High Court observed that ‘[t]he object of POCSO Act is to protect minors from sexual abuse and not to criminalize the consensual relationship between two adolescents who had consensual sexual intercourse without knowing the consequences’. The court noted that the parties came from ‘the lower socio economic segment having limited access to information and knowledge’, and quashed the proceedings on the ground that continuing them would result in a miscarriage of justice to the young mother and her child.41
The Delhi High Court made similar observations in February 2025, stating that ‘[t]he law should evolve to acknowledge and respect these relations, as long as they are consensual and free from coercion’, and that ‘consensual and respectful adolescent love is a natural part of human development’.42 In stark contrast, another bench of the same court, refusing bail in February 2025, reiterated that consent has no relevance to prosecution under the POCSO Act when the victim is a minor. Justice Sanjeev Narula held: ‘This plea of consensual relationship is legally immaterial. Under the POCSO Act, the age of the victim is the decisive factor, and if the victim is below 18 years of age, the law presumes that she is incapable of giving valid consent.’43 The facts differed, since that case concerned a 26-year-old married neighbour and a girl of 15, but the two rulings show the tension in interpreting the POCSO Act, with different benches of the same High Court taking seemingly contradictory positions.
The Madras High Court took the strict view in Maruthupandi v. State (2021). The appellant, convicted of repeated penetrative sexual assault on a 17-year-old, argued that he too had been a minor when the relationship began and that the couple had since married and compromised. The court held that falling in love ‘is not an offence’, but that ‘any person having sexual intercourse with the minor child is an offence’, refused to act on the compromise and dismissed the appeal.44 Three months earlier, in Vijayalakshmi, another judge of the same court had held that an adolescent boy and girl ‘who are in the grips of their hormones and biological changes and whose decision-making ability is yet to fully develop, should essentially receive the support and guidance of their parents and the society at large’.45
In In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, the Supreme Court in August 2024 set aside the controversial Calcutta High Court judgment which had advised adolescent girls to control their sexual urges and had set aside the conviction of a 25-year-old man for offences against a 14-year-old girl on the footing that their relationship was ‘non-exploitative’. Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan held that, since penetrative intercourse with a girl under 18 is rape with or without her consent, ‘whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant’. The Court criticized the High Court’s observation that the POCSO Act should be amended to decriminalize consensual sexual acts involving adolescents above sixteen years, disapproved of its invention of a category of ‘older adolescents’, and asked: ‘How can an act that is an offence punishable under the POSCO [sic] Act be described as “a romantic relationship”?’46 The Court restored the conviction, but in its sentencing judgment of May 2025 the same Bench, exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the accused ‘will not undergo sentence’, because the victim, by then his wife and the mother of their child, would be ‘the worst sufferer’ if he were jailed. The Court added that the case ‘is not going to be a precedent and should not be a precedent’.47
The need for legal reform
The analysis of the grey areas in the POCSO Act’s treatment of consensual adolescent relationships highlights the urgent need for legal reform. The rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to consent fails to account for the complexity of adolescent development and relationships, resulting in over-criminalization, gender bias and other unintended consequences. Several reforms have been proposed. One is a close-in-age exemption that would decriminalize consensual sexual activity between peers who are close in age, recognizing that such relationships are qualitatively different from exploitative adult-minor relationships and should not attract the same penalties.
Another proposal, advanced by Parwani, is to replace the fixed-age rule with a competence-based standard of consent.48 This approach recognizes that competence to consent is determined not by age alone but by factors including maturity, understanding and the absence of coercion or manipulation, and would allow a more nuanced assessment of adolescent relationships while still protecting minors from exploitation. A third is greater judicial discretion. The Law Commission of India, in its 283rd Report (2023), advised against reducing the age of consent but recommended ‘guided judicial discretion in the matter of sentencing’ in cases where ‘there is tacit approval in fact though not consent in law’ on the part of a child aged between 16 and 18 years.49 Such discretion would allow courts to consider the specific circumstances of each case, including the age difference between the parties, the nature of the relationship and any evidence of coercion or manipulation. The Supreme Court’s 2025 sentencing judgment in In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents shows both the need for discretion and its present limits: the Court could spare the accused imprisonment only through Article 142, a power no other court possesses, and expressly denied the order any value as a precedent.50
These reforms would also bring the POCSO Act more in line with international human rights standards. Section 19 of the Act obliges any person, including a medical practitioner, who knows that an offence under the Act has been committed to report it to the police,51 so that a sexually active adolescent who seeks an abortion or other reproductive healthcare risks setting off a criminal case against her partner. The Center for Reproductive Rights has argued that this mandatory reporting rule deters adolescents from seeking safe and legal abortion, and that it sits uneasily with the position of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women that adolescents should have non-discriminatory access to sexual and reproductive healthcare, and with the call of the Committee on the Rights of the Child for the decriminalization of abortion and for confidential counselling without mandatory parental consent.52 A law that keeps adolescents away from healthcare in the name of protecting them works against its own purpose.
Conclusion
The POCSO Act, while well-intentioned in its aim to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation, has created significant legal, social and ethical dilemmas in its treatment of consensual adolescent relationships. Its strict age-based framework, under which anyone under 18 is a child incapable of consenting to sexual activity, fails to account for the complex realities of adolescent development and has resulted in the criminalization of normative adolescent behaviour, gender-biased prosecution, barriers to sexual and reproductive healthcare, familial misuse of the law and other unintended consequences that often harm the very individuals the law intends to protect.
The judicial interpretation of the Act reveals a legal system grappling with the tension between protecting children from exploitation and acknowledging adolescent autonomy and development. Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) and In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2024) reinforce that consent is legally irrelevant under the POCSO Act and prioritize child protection. Divergent High Court rulings, such as Vijayalakshmi v. State (2021) and G. Raghu Varma v. State of Karnataka (2024), distinguish consensual relationships from exploitative abuse, citing adolescent development. High acquittal rates, the Law Commission’s 2023 recommendation of guided judicial discretion in sentencing, and the Supreme Court’s own resort to Article 142 in 2025 all point to the need for reform that better balances protection with adolescent autonomy. Such reform might include a close-in-age exemption, a competence-based standard for consent and greater judicial discretion in cases involving consensual relationships. It would bring the POCSO Act more in line with international human rights standards and better serve its ultimate goal of protecting children from harm while respecting their dignity, autonomy and rights.
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Footnotes
1. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, No. 32, Acts of Parliament, 2012, § 2(1)(d) (India) [hereinafter POCSO Act].
2. Prem Vinod Parwani, Revisiting Consent under POCSO: From a ‘Fixed-Age’ Rule to a ‘Competence Based’ Standard, 16(2) NUJS L. Rev. 322, 323 (2023), https://nujslawreview.org/2023/12/07/revisiting-consent-under-pocso-from-a-fixed-age-rule-to-a-competence-based-standard.
3. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023, § 63(vi) (India) [hereinafter BNS]; formerly The Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860, § 375, cl. Sixthly (India) (repealed 2024).
4. POCSO Act, supra note 1, §§ 3, 7 (penetrative sexual assault and sexual assault, both defined without reference to consent).
5. Swagata Raha & Shruthi Ramakrishnan, Implication of the POCSO Act in India on Adolescent Sexuality: A Policy Brief 7 (Enfold Proactive Health Trust, UNFPA & UNICEF 2022), https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/documents/1960/POSCO-Act-Policy-Brief_wUlR95W.pdf (reporting the Centre for Child and the Law’s studies on the working of Special Courts under the POCSO Act in Delhi (2016) and in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka and Maharashtra (2017)).
6. International Institute for Population Sciences, National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019–21: India 210 (2021), as cited in Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 7.
7. Swagata Yadavar, India Is Unprepared for Its Gathering Teen Sexual Revolution, IndiaSpend (Jan. 12, 2018), https://indiaspend.com/india-is-unprepared-for-its-gathering-teen-sexual-revolution-23183.
8. Vijayalakshmi v. State, Crl. O.P. No. 232 of 2021, ¶¶ 12, 18 (Mad. HC Jan. 27, 2021) (India).
9. R. Parthiban v. State, Crl. O.P. No. 15421 of 2022, ¶¶ 11–12 (Mad. HC July 7, 2022) (India).
10. Vijayalakshmi, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
11. POCSO Act, supra note 1, pmbl.
12. Girls Not Brides, Implication of the POCSO Act in India on Adolescent Sexuality: A Policy Brief, CRANK Research Tracker (summarizing Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5), https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-research-action-network/crank-research-tracker/implication-of-the-pocso-act-in-india-on-adolescent-sexuality-a-policy-brief/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2026).
13. Shyam Singh v. State, Crl. A. 266/2020, ¶¶ 39, 41 (Del. HC Feb. 20, 2025) (India) (Jasmeet Singh, J.).
14. Sabari v. Inspector of Police, Crl. A. No. 490 of 2018, ¶¶ 26–27 (Mad. HC Apr. 26, 2019) (India); see also Oishika Banerji, Navigating Adolescent Romance vis-à-vis POCSO Act, Manupatra, http://www.manupatracademy.com/legalpost/navigating-adolescent-romance-pocso-act (last visited Nov. 21, 2026).
15. Esha Roy, NCRB Data | Crime Against Kids: A Third Still Under POCSO, Indian Express (Aug. 30, 2022), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/crime-against-kids-a-third-still-under-pocso-8119689/.
16. Shibra Siddiqui, Three Major Takeaways of NCRB Report 2022, NewsClick (Dec. 19, 2023), https://www.newsclick.in/three-major-takeaways-ncrb-report-2022.
17. Bharti Ali & Urmi Chudgar, #Data4Justice: Unpacking Judicial Data to Track Implementation of the POCSO Act in Assam, Delhi & Haryana (2012 to April 2020) 95 (HAQ: Centre for Child Rights & CivicDataLab 2021), https://www.haqcrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/unpacking-judicial-data-to-track-implementation-of-the-pocso-act-in-assam-delhi-and-haryana-full-report.pdf.
18. Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 13.
19. Ajay Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), Bail Appln. 2729/2022 (Del. HC Oct. 20, 2022) (India).
20. State v. Kaishar Ali, Crl. L.P. 188/2018, ¶¶ 7, 15 (Del. HC Aug. 30, 2019) (India).
21. Rakesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), Crl. M.C. 5032/2023, ¶ 14 (Del. HC July 31, 2023) (India).
22. Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 10 & n.34.
23. Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 11.
24. Vijayalakshmi, supra note 8, ¶ 18.
25. BNS, supra note 3, § 63; POCSO Act, supra note 1, § 3.
26. In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 INSC 614, ¶ 18 (India), rev’g CRA (DB) No. 14 of 2023 (Cal. HC Oct. 18, 2023) (India).
27. Praduman v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIRONLINE 2021 DEL 1909, ¶¶ 22, 27 (India).
28. Parwani, supra note 2; see also Praduman, supra note 27, ¶ 22.
29. Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 11.
30. Sudeep Dilip Kothavade, Misuse of the POCSO Act: False Accusations and Legal Ramifications, Record of Law (Nov. 24, 2024), https://recordoflaw.in/misuse-of-the-pocso-act-false-accusations-and-legal-ramifications/.
31. Aravind v. State of Kerala, Bail Appl. No. 5168 of 2024, ¶¶ 2, 9–10 (Ker. HC Aug. 7, 2024) (India); POCSO Act, supra note 1, § 22(2).
32. Sabari, supra note 14, ¶ 27.
33. POCSO Act, supra note 1, § 2(1)(d); Ms. Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133 (India).
34. Raha & Ramakrishnan, supra note 5, at 8 & nn.18–22 (citing the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill, 2011, cl. 3 proviso, and Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, 240th Report on the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill, 2011, ¶¶ 6.6–6.7 (2011)); Law Commission of India, Report No. 283, Age of Consent under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, ¶¶ 8.2–8.3 (2023) [hereinafter Report No. 283].
35. POCSO Act, supra note 1, §§ 42, 42A.
36. Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, ¶ 23 (India).
37. Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800, ¶ 105 (India) (Lokur, J.).
38. Parwani, supra note 2.
39. R. Parthiban, supra note 9, ¶¶ 6–7, 12.
40. Vijayalakshmi, supra note 8, ¶ 16.
41. G. Raghu Varma v. State of Karnataka, Crl. P. No. 13469 of 2023, 2024:KHC:6949, ¶ 7 (Kar. HC Feb. 19, 2024) (India).
42. Shyam Singh, supra note 13, ¶¶ 33–34.
43. Mohd. Rafayat Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi), Bail Appln. 4330/2024, ¶¶ 8, 10 (Del. HC Feb. 3, 2025) (India).
44. Maruthupandi v. State, Crl. A. No. 258 of 2019, ¶¶ 18, 21–22, 27 (Mad. HC Apr. 30, 2021) (India).
45. Vijayalakshmi, supra note 8, ¶ 18.
46. In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, supra note 26, ¶¶ 6, 16–17, 19.
47. In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 INSC 778, ¶¶ 25–27, 31(a) (India).
48. Parwani, supra note 2.
49. Report No. 283, supra note 34, letter of transmittal (Sept. 27, 2023).
50. In re Right to Privacy of Adolescents, supra note 47, ¶ 27.
51. POCSO Act, supra note 1, § 19(1).
52. Center for Reproductive Rights, The POCSO Act & Adolescents’ Access to Abortion in India: Heightened Vulnerabilities, Health Risks, and Impact on Their Rights (Nov. 15, 2022), https://reproductiverights.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/POCSO-Act-Adolescents-Access-to-Abortion-in-India-fact-sheet.pdf (citing Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 20 on the Implementation of the Rights of the Child During Adolescence, ¶¶ 39, 59–60, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/20 (Dec. 6, 2016), and Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 24: Women and Health, ¶ 18 (1999)).
