Introduction
In the global labour market, the gig economy has become a disruptive force that is changing employment patterns and routes to economic growth. Short-term, flexible and freelance work arrangements characterise the gig economy, which is driven by internet platforms that connect independent contractors with clients and companies. In addition to generating new revenue streams, the rise of platforms such as Uber, Upwork and TaskRabbit has disrupted long-standing employment patterns globally, placing strain on legal frameworks and worker rights. The gig economy has grown significantly over the past ten years as more individuals choose flexible work schedules. Globally, the gig economy is growing very fast, and one estimate anticipates that it will become a 1.847 trillion-dollar industry by 2032. Increasing digitalisation improves communication technology and the use of platforms that connect independent contractors with clients.1 According to a NITI Aayog study published in 2022, 77 lakh persons were engaged in the gig economy in 2020–21, and the gig workforce is projected to grow to 2.35 crore by 2029–30.2 These arrangements have lowered certain barriers to entering the workforce and opened up new revenue streams, but they have also complicated the legal relationship between the parties. In its World Employment and Social Outlook 2021, the International Labour Organization (ILO) describes how digital labour platforms are changing the organisation of work and posing problems with regard to social security, working conditions and the distribution of responsibility.3 The main challenge is distinguishing between independent contractors and employees. Conventional labour law often presupposes an identifiable employer, a reasonably stable employment relationship and a recognisable supervisory system. Platform work, by contrast, may function through an agreement under which the platform purports to offer only a technology service that links clients with independent service providers. The platform nonetheless retains the authority to set prices, assign orders, track performance, compute incentives and limit access to future work.
The categorisation of employment influences many things, such as minimum wages, insurance, retirement benefits, compensation for occupational injury and remedies against unjust treatment. The contractual arrangement can also conceal the employment relationship or deny workers the protection they are due.4
The Code on Social Security, 2020, which specifically recognises gig workers and platform workers for the purposes of social security, represents a significant legislative move for India. The Code was brought into force on 21 November 2025. However, being acknowledged as a gig or platform worker does not grant all employment-related rights or automatically create employee status. This paper’s main contention is that employment classification and social security are related but distinct legal issues. The fact that a traditional employment relationship cannot be established does not mean that a worker should be denied basic social protection. Equally, where the actual relationship meets the relevant legal standard, the creation of a distinct platform-worker category should not prevent such workers from receiving employee protection. The study examines India’s legal framework, its constitutional underpinnings, judicial approaches, global trends and the difficulties posed by algorithmic management. In conclusion, it proposes a regulatory system that preserves real options for flexible and independent work while protecting workers in accordance with the actual economic relationship.
Research questions
1. To what extent are gig and platform workers protected against social and economic insecurity under the Indian legal framework?
2. How is employment status to be determined when control is exercised through algorithms rather than conventional supervision?
3. Does separate statutory recognition of platform workers adequately address the gap between employee rights and independent-contractor status?
4. What reforms can ensure social security, fair working conditions and accountability without restricting flexibility?
Objectives
The objectives are to examine the legal status of gig and platform workers in India, to analyse the connection between social security and employment classification, to compare relevant international legal frameworks, and to propose a worker-centred regulatory framework appropriate for the Indian labour market.
Research methodology
The study uses a doctrinal and comparative legal method. It examines Indian legislation, constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, official publications, international labour standards and scholarly works. In order to identify practical guidance for assessing employment status and regulating platform work, the comparative component considers developments in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. The study is qualitative in nature and does not purport to offer novel empirical conclusions on platform workers’ wages or working conditions. Its suggestions are supported by comparative research, legal interpretation and the identification of weaknesses in the current regulatory framework.
Understanding gig work and the problem of employment classification
In general, gig work refers to work done under short-term, task-based or transitory arrangements as opposed to traditional, ongoing employment. Platform labour is the more specific but related category of work that digital platforms organise or facilitate access to. Not all gig workers use digital platforms to find work, and not all users of digital platforms engage in gig work. There are two main types of platform labour. Transportation, food delivery, domestic services and local logistics are examples of location-based work. The second is work done online, such as software development, graphic design, translation, digital marketing and other services provided remotely. The ILO distinguishes between location-based platforms and online web-based platforms, emphasising the different ways in which these businesses organise work.5
The platform can play a wide range of roles, from managing the whole service relationship to acting as a minimal intermediary. A platform might simply put a client in touch with an independent professional who directly negotiates the terms and the price. Alternatively, it might set the price, assign tasks, set performance requirements, collect payment, monitor behaviour and decide whether the worker can continue to use the application. This variation makes it difficult to establish a single legal classification for all platform workers. A highly skilled freelancer may genuinely run an independent business by negotiating individual contracts with multiple clients. A delivery worker may have far less economic independence if he or she relies on a platform’s pricing structure and automated allocation method. The NITI Aayog study acknowledges that workers with varying skill levels make up India’s gig economy and recommends more systematic identification and enumeration of such workers. Instead of classifying all platform relationships as either employment or self-employment on the basis of a contract alone, the law should acknowledge these distinctions.6
One of the main questions in employment classification is whether the legal status of a worker should be determined by the contract or by the actual conditions of work. Platform agreements typically use terms such as partner, independent service provider or business associate. These terms are used to argue that the platform is not the employer but only a technological infrastructure. Workers can also choose their working hours, refuse work and offer services through other applications. But these features do not necessarily constitute true independence. A worker’s right to refuse a task may be of limited value if continued refusal leads to a decrease in future work opportunities or the inability to meet incentive targets. Likewise, the right to log in and out of an application does not imply that the worker has control over the price or the key conditions of the service. The challenge is especially evident where automated systems assess workers, as is common on platforms. Access to assignments or continued participation may be affected by ratings, acceptance rates, completion times, cancellation records and customer complaints. No traditional supervisor is required, but the platform can exercise managerial authority through software. The ILO’s Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198) urges national authorities to be guided primarily by the facts relating to the performance of work and the remuneration of the worker in deciding whether an employment relationship exists, notwithstanding how the relationship is characterised in any contrary arrangement. It also points to the need to combat contractual arrangements that disguise the actual relationship.7
A sound classification test should therefore focus on the content of the relationship. The relevant factors include the platform’s control over remuneration, the extent of economic dependence, the worker’s freedom to negotiate contractual terms, the ownership and control of customers, the ability to run an independent business and the consequences of declining assignments. No single factor should decide the result. For instance, the fact that a worker owns a vehicle does not mean that the worker is in control of the business. Similarly, working through multiple platforms can suggest independence, but not necessarily.
The key issue is whether the worker runs a real business or is mainly providing his or her own labour in an economic relationship that is substantially under the control and organisation of another. Employment classification affects more than the terminology used in a contract. It determines who bears which financial and legal responsibilities. An employee may have statutory rights to protection, depending on the provisions of the relevant legislation. An independent contractor might instead have to pay for insurance, retirement savings, equipment, maintenance, downtime and other costs. If a worker is economically dependent on a platform but is classified as self-employed, the platform can exercise a high degree of managerial control while passing a high proportion of the cost and risk of the business on to the worker.
This has three significant implications. First, the worker may be exposed to income insecurity, because income is tied to the availability of assignments, the incentive schemes and the pricing of the platform. Second, the worker may face social insecurity owing to the lack of regular income and employer-provided benefits, which can make it difficult to afford health care, retirement provision and protection against occupational injury. Third, the worker may face procedural insecurity, since the suspension or deactivation of an account can deprive him or her of income without the protections that traditional employment typically affords.
These risks do not of themselves create an employment relationship; they show the importance of classification based on the actual working relationship and the need for minimum social protection that does not depend solely on establishing employee status.
Indian legal framework: recognition without full employment equality
A. Constitutional bases of labour protection
The Indian Constitution does not expressly define the term ‘gig worker’, nor does it create a distinct constitutional employment status for platform workers. However, its provisions on equality, dignity, livelihood and social justice offer a valuable benchmark for assessing the position of vulnerable workers.
A distinction between employees and independent contractors is not per se unconstitutional. Legal treatment may vary depending on the working arrangement. But the differences must have a rational basis and must not allow companies to evade their statutory obligations through the use of a particular contractual designation.
Article 218 guarantees life and personal liberty, and the Supreme Court has interpreted it to encompass aspects of human dignity and livelihood. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, the Court acknowledged the link between livelihood and the right to life, though it did not create a right to employment on a digital platform.9 The judgment nonetheless reinforces the idea that the human consequences of decisions that take away people’s means of subsistence are a right-to-life concern.
Labour welfare is more directly supported by the Directive Principles of State Policy. Under Article 38 the State shall promote social, economic and political justice. Article 39(e) concerns the protection of the health and strength of workers, and Article 41 the State’s duty to make effective provision for work and public assistance within the limits of its economic capacity. Article 42 concerns just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Article 43 calls on the State to endeavour to secure a living wage and conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life.10
These principles are not individually enforceable as fundamental rights. However, they inform legislative policy and the interpretation of the Constitution. Their significance is evident when platform workers are exposed to occupational hazards, irregular income and a lack of social security.
B. The Code on Social Security, 2020
The Code on Social Security, 2020, is India’s major legislative step towards the recognition of gig and platform workers as distinct categories for the purposes of social security. It was enacted to consolidate and update the social security legislation and to extend it to further groups of workers.11 Section 2(35) defines a gig worker as a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside a traditional employer–employee relationship. Section 2(60) defines platform work as a work arrangement outside a traditional employer–employee relationship in which organisations or individuals use an online platform to access other organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide specific services, or such other activities as the Central Government may notify, in exchange for payment. Section 2(61) defines a platform worker as a person engaged in or undertaking platform work.12
These definitions have two important implications. First, they acknowledge that gig work and platform work are legitimate legal concepts even in the absence of a traditional employment relationship. This establishes a legal basis for extending certain forms of social protection to those who may not be covered by conventional employment-based schemes. Second, the definitions separate these categories from the traditional employer–employee relationship. The recognition of a person as a gig or platform worker therefore does not automatically mean that the person is an employee of the platform. A separate assessment may still be necessary to establish whether the actual relationship meets the legal test for employment. Chapter IX of the Code contains the provisions on social security for unorganised workers, gig workers and platform workers. Section 109 covers schemes for unorganised workers and section 114 covers schemes for gig workers and platform workers. Section 114 empowers the Central Government to frame and notify social security schemes for gig and platform workers on matters relating to life and disability cover, accident insurance, health and maternity benefits, old age protection, crèche facilities and any other benefit it may determine.13
The statutory framework also provides for funding from the Central Government, the State Governments, aggregators, the beneficiaries themselves and other permitted sources. Under section 114(4), the Central Government is to notify a rate of contribution for aggregators in the categories listed in the Seventh Schedule of not less than one per cent and not more than two per cent of the aggregator’s annual turnover, excluding central taxes, levies and cess, subject to a ceiling of five per cent of the amount paid or payable by the aggregator to its gig and platform workers. Section 114(5) leaves the date from which the aggregator contribution commences to a separate notification by the Central Government, so the contribution requirement must be read in the light of the Code’s notification and implementation machinery.
This is an important attempt to make platforms contribute to the social costs associated with the work they organise. It also embodies the idea that social security should not be paid for only by those whose income is not guaranteed. The Code was brought into force on 21 November 2025 by notification of the Ministry of Labour and Employment, but this does not mean that all benefits are fully implemented. Specific benefits depend on the schemes, notifications, eligibility criteria, registration procedures, funding arrangements and administration. The e-Shram portal has also been used to register unorganised workers, including gig and platform workers. In a written reply in the Rajya Sabha on 29 January 2026, the Ministry reported that twelve major aggregators had been onboarded through the portal’s aggregator module, launched in December 2024.14 Registration can help to identify workers and facilitate the delivery of benefits, but a database alone does not guarantee insurance coverage, reliable contributions, adequate benefits or effective grievance redressal.
The central problem with the Code is not that it fails to recognise platform workers. Rather, recognition and the establishment of a scheme-based framework do not guarantee the full range of employment rights under other labour legislation, and if social security measures are to improve the actual situation of workers, they must be operational, well funded, accessible and portable.
C. The difference between social security and employee status
The Code’s separation of gig and platform workers from the employer–employee relationship also poses a larger policy question: should social security depend on the ability to establish a traditional employment relationship?
There are strong reasons to answer this question in the negative. Health care, protection against occupational injury and retirement security address basic social risks. Those risks are not eliminated simply because a worker has signed an independent-contractor agreement. A person whom the platform classifies as an independent contractor still faces the same medical costs and loss of income if he or she suffers an accident while delivering food. Social security, however, cannot replace all employment rights at once. Insurance or welfare benefits are not a source of minimum wage protection, paid leave, protection from discriminatory treatment or a remedy for arbitrary dismissal. Those rights address different aspects of the employment relationship.
A worker might therefore require two types of protection: universal or widely available social security, and employment rights where the factual relationship satisfies the legal requirement for employment.
This approach avoids two extremes. The first is to exclude all independent contractors from basic social protection. The second is to presume that the establishment of a welfare scheme allows a platform to define any worker as independent, irrespective of the platform’s actual control.
A balanced approach should allow the worker to contest an incorrect classification, while at the same time ensuring that those who are genuinely independent are not denied basic social protection. This is in line with the ILO’s focus on the effective protection of workers in situations where the existence of an employment relationship is uncertain.15
Platform labour has also been the subject of state-level legislation in India. Rajasthan enacted the Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023, which provides for the registration of platform-based gig workers and aggregators, a welfare board and a welfare fund.16 It illustrates how a state can develop institutions to identify platform workers and organise welfare arrangements within its legislative competence. Karnataka later enacted the Karnataka Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025.17 That Act covers registration, social security, occupational health and safety, transparency in automated monitoring and decision-making systems, dispute resolution, and the creation of a welfare board and fund. It is of particular relevance because it addresses not only welfare funding but also the procedures and technologies that platforms use to manage workers. These efforts demonstrate the need for coordination between the Union and the states. Platform workers may work in different states, switch platforms or work for multiple aggregators. A fragmented system can lead to disparities in registration, contributions, benefits and enforcement.
This issue could be addressed through a common national baseline, with state-level protections tailored to local conditions. The overall goal should be to avoid any loss of protection when a worker switches platforms, moves to another state or moves from platform work to conventional employment.
Judicial perspectives on employment classification
Judicial decisions are important because legislative definitions and contractual terms do not always answer the question of employment status, and courts have to decide how the traditional legal tests apply to work organised through applications, automated systems and multi-party contractual arrangements.
A. Indian jurisprudence: control, economic reality and substance
In India, the courts have taken the following factors into account in deciding whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor: control and supervision, integration into the business, economic dependence and the nature of the relationship. The weight of each factor depends on the statutory context and the type of work.
In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra,18 the Supreme Court identified the existence of a right of control and supervision as the prima facie test for a master–servant relationship. The test is also applicable to platform work, but with caution. Digital platforms can control the system without issuing instructions through a human supervisor.
A platform cannot instruct a driver individually on how to perform every task; however, it can decide which trips are offered, the amount paid, the route recommended, the performance indicators applied and the conditions on which the driver’s account remains active. The form of control has shifted, but its practical consequences can resemble managerial control. In Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd.,19 the Supreme Court discussed the tests for determining whether an employer–employee relationship exists where work is organised through a contractual intermediary. In the context of platform work, these principles call for courts to look at the actual function of the platform in organising and controlling labour. Examples of relevant evidence include the authority to set pay, the power to negotiate with customers, the use of performance-based penalties, limitations on competing work and the power to cancel access to assignments. But the traditional tests should not be applied mechanically. A platform may exercise some control to ensure customer safety or coordinate services without necessarily being an employer. The issue is whether the powers are exercised in a manner that establishes an employment relationship under the relevant legislation.
B. United Kingdom: Uber BV v. Aslam
Uber BV v. Aslam20 is a landmark decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court holding that Uber drivers are statutory “workers” under limb (b) of section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, rather than independent contractors. Uber claimed that it was merely an intermediary between the driver and the passenger. The Court, however, examined the practical relationship and found that Uber exercised several forms of control, including its ability to set fares, dictate contractual terms, monitor performance and restrict the ability of drivers to negotiate with passengers. The Court did not accept that the contractual description of the relationship was determinative. It held that the drivers fell within the statutory definition of a worker for the purposes of the claims before it.
C. United States: the ABC test and Dynamex
The United States offers another example of an attempt to correct employment misclassification. In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018),21 the Supreme Court of California adopted the ABC test for determining employee status under the wage order at issue in the case. The test was later codified in California statute, together with statutory exemptions and other rules.
Under the ABC test, a hiring entity must establish three things in order to classify a worker as an independent contractor:
A. Freedom from control: the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in performing the work, both under the contract and in fact.
B. Work outside the usual course of business: the work performed is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.
C. Independent trade or business: the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation or business of the same nature as the work performed.
The test is important because it places a structured burden on the hiring entity and does not rely exclusively on the terms of the contract. The second element is of particular significance for platform businesses. If a company sells transportation services and its drivers provide transportation services, a court may have to determine whether driving is part of the company’s usual course of business. A company that only provides software for services negotiated separately may be a different case.
The ABC test is not the standard test in all parts of the United States; various federal and state laws apply different standards, and California has enacted statutory exceptions for some occupations and relationships. It should therefore not be presented as a blanket rule for all gig workers across the country. The general lesson for India is that classification rules must be clear enough to guide platforms, workers and courts, and must not allow platforms to evade their legal responsibilities through contractual labels.
D. European Union: the Platform Work Directive
Directive (EU) 2024/2831 on improving working conditions in platform work22 offers another comparative benchmark. It covers the determination of employment status, algorithmic management and the protection of personal data in platform work.
The Directive acknowledges that algorithmic systems can structure work, shape pay and affect the relationship between workers and customers. It requires Member States to provide a rebuttable legal presumption of employment where facts indicating control and direction are found, and to establish procedures for the correct determination of employment status within their national legal systems. The Directive is important because it treats employment classification and algorithmic management as interrelated regulatory questions. It requires platforms to inform workers and their representatives about the automated monitoring and decision-making systems in use and provides for human oversight and review of significant automated decisions, recognising that the allocation and monitoring of work bear directly on the protection of workers.
India can learn from this by mandating a measure of transparency for automated decisions, while adapting the rules to its own constitutional framework, labour market and statutory system.
E. Comparative lessons
The common thread in the comparative material is that the legal classification of a worker should turn on the application of the relevant legislation to the actual working relationship, not on the platform’s contractual classification. The approaches are similar in some respects but differ in significant ways. The United Kingdom distinguishes between employees and a wider category of workers. The ABC test in California establishes a structured presumption in the context of the applicable law. The European Union’s Directive addresses algorithmic management as well as the determination of employment status. In India, the test of control and of the overall relationship has been contextual, and the test to be applied depends on the legislation in question.
India need not adopt any foreign model in its entirety; instead, it may establish a statutory test suited to its own labour market, based on economic reality, the distribution of control and the capacity of the platform to set the essential terms of work. The goal should not be to label all platform workers as employees; it should be to avoid the loss of statutory protection for workers who are employees in substance merely because the relationship is organised through technology.
Social security challenges in the platform economy
A. Income insecurity and lack of predictable income
The lack of regular income is one of the primary challenges faced by platform workers. Earnings may depend on the number of assignments, distance travelled, time spent on an assignment, customer demand and incentive programmes. Payment terms and requirements may also vary from platform to platform. The apparent flexibility of platform work can thus mask economic insecurity. A worker can choose when to work, but cannot control the amount of income earned. A driver who works during a period of low demand may earn significantly less than one who works during peak demand, even if both spend the same amount of time available for work.
Furthermore, the gross earnings displayed may not be the worker’s actual earnings. The worker may be responsible for fuel, vehicle maintenance, insurance, mobile data, equipment and other costs. The effective hourly return may also be lower because of time spent waiting for assignments or travelling to collection points.
The ILO’s 2021 report highlights the need to consider working conditions, remuneration and the allocation of costs and risks in platform work, and the need to extend social security to workers in the gig economy, including in India.23 The NITI Aayog report likewise acknowledges the need for social security measures and improved identification of gig workers in India.24
A meaningful social security system should therefore be accompanied by greater transparency about remuneration and the calculation of work-related expenses.
B. Occupational safety and accident protection
Platform workers are frequently required to work in settings involving road traffic, exposure to weather, time pressure and physical risk. Occupational injuries can disrupt the ability of delivery workers and drivers to work. An accident can also result in medical bills, vehicle repair costs and financial hardship for dependants.
It can be difficult to allocate responsibility when there is no traditional employer. A platform may claim that it bears no responsibility for the worker, even though the worker relies on platform-controlled assignments and incentives for income. Where the organisation of work creates or increases safety risks, it is fair to consider how the platform can help to prevent accidents and protect safety.
Section 114 of the Code on Social Security, 2020, expressly lists accident insurance, life and disability cover, health and maternity benefits and old age protection among the matters on which social security schemes for gig and platform workers may be framed.
A proper structure should make clear provision for accident insurance, access to medical assistance, the reporting of work accidents and compensation where legally required. Platforms should also be required to evaluate the effect of incentive systems and performance targets on safety.
C. Healthcare, maternity and retirement security
Traditional social insurance systems are typically based on employer contributions, employment history and reasonably stable income. Platform workers may work on multiple platforms, combine platform work with other work, or experience fluctuations in activity. These patterns make it hard to apply employer-specific systems without adaptation. A worker can be on one platform for a long time without accruing any significant benefit under a continuous-employment system. Workers who use multiple applications may also have difficulty establishing their overall earnings or identifying which application is responsible for a particular contribution.
Social security should be portable; benefits should not be tied to one platform but should follow the worker. Contributions should be tracked through a system that allows earnings and payments from multiple sources of work to be aggregated, with appropriate privacy and data protection safeguards.
Healthcare and accident insurance address short-term insecurity, and retirement savings address long-term insecurity. Maternity benefits are especially significant because a break from work can mean a loss of income at precisely the moment when it is most needed.
The ILO’s World Social Protection Report 2024–2625 offers a wider perspective on social protection coverage, adequacy and financing, and reinforces the need to treat social protection as a fundamental labour-market issue rather than one confined to workers in traditional employment. These are distinct needs that must be taken into account in a worker-centred system, and not lumped together as a single benefit called social security.
D. Algorithmic management and procedural insecurity
Platform work is often managed through software that assigns tasks, assesses performance, determines payments and limits access to the platform. While these systems can enhance coordination, they also raise issues of transparency and accountability. A worker might receive fewer assignments than expected because of a rating, an automated decision or a change in the platform’s allocation system. In more severe cases, account deactivation can suddenly deprive the worker of his or her main source of income.
The problem is not that all automated decisions are unfair. Rather, the worker might not have the information needed to contest an inappropriate or disproportionate decision. A customer complaint might be mistaken, a delivery record might contain an error, or an automated system might fail to take account of factors outside the worker’s control. Procedural fairness therefore demands explanations, access to relevant records, a reasonable opportunity to respond and review by a person with authority to reconsider the decision. The platform should also disclose the main considerations that affect assignment allocation, incentives and deactivation, while safeguarding legitimate commercial information and the personal data of customers.
E. Gender and unequal access to protection
Platform labour can provide women with opportunities to work and generate income while fulfilling other responsibilities, but flexibility does not mean that structural disadvantages are absent. Women may face safety concerns, lack of access to equipment, discriminatory customer behaviour or additional care responsibilities that affect working hours.
A social security system should therefore take into consideration the differences in workers’ circumstances. It should provide accident protection, maternity benefits, protection against harassment and accessible grievance mechanisms for women.
The law should also not presume that participation in platform work is a sign of economic independence. A worker can be formally self-employed yet remain dependent on a platform for a livelihood and in a position of unequal bargaining power.
F. Access to justice and collective representation
It can be challenging for individual platform workers to contest contractual conditions, payment deductions or account termination. Even where the question affects thousands of workers, the financial value of an individual claim may be too small to justify litigation. Collective representation can help to redress this imbalance. Worker associations and representative organisations can identify shared issues, negotiate with platforms, offer legal support and gather evidence of systematic practices.
The European Union’s Platform Work Directive acknowledges the role of representation in the exercise of rights, including the right of representatives to engage in proceedings on behalf of or in support of platform workers to enforce their rights, in accordance with national law.26 This is a helpful comparative reference for India.
Workers should not fear that raising concerns will lead to fewer assignments or account deactivation. Platforms should have clear grievance procedures, and the law should offer a viable avenue for independent review where internal procedures prove ineffective. Organisation and access to remedies are particularly crucial when platform workers are dispersed across the country and lack a traditional workplace. Digital systems can be used to connect workers, but they should not replace real rights of representation and collective action.
Proposals for a worker-centred regulatory framework
A. Adopt a functional, multi-factor classification test
India needs to define the criteria for employment in platform-based arrangements. The test should take into account the contractual terms as well as the actual conditions of work, the extent of control, economic dependence, the organisation of work and the worker’s real entrepreneurial independence.
Where a platform sets the terms of the work, the law should examine more closely whether the worker is genuinely an independent contractor. In a classification dispute, the platform should be expected to produce the relevant contractual and operational records.
A structured test would improve predictability for businesses and workers alike. It would also minimise the risk of identical working arrangements being treated differently simply because they are described differently in platform contracts.
B. Create a portable social security system
Social security benefits should remain with the worker when he or she changes platform or moves from one type of work to another. A portable system could be integrated with verified worker registration, contribution records and benefit eligibility through an appropriate digital infrastructure.
The e-Shram system offers a possible administrative base, but registration must be linked to effective delivery. Workers should have easy access to information about their benefits, contribution history, eligibility criteria and the means of correcting errors.
C. Introduce fair and transparent contribution-sharing
The funding of social security should reflect the economic relationship between platforms, workers and the State. Platforms that organise labour should share the responsibility of protecting workers against occupational and social risks.
The applicable contribution rules should be made clear, compliance should be ensured, and there should be reliable methods for calculating and collecting contributions under the Code on Social Security, which already provides for aggregator contributions within statutory limits and subject to notification. The funding mechanism should also be reviewed regularly to ensure that it provides sufficient resources without imposing an undue burden on low-income workers.
D. Ensure that workers are not arbitrarily deactivated
A suspended or deactivated worker should be given a clear reason, the relevant information and a fair opportunity to appeal.
In cases of fraud or immediate safety concerns, temporary action may be necessary before a full hearing. But an internal review should be available as soon as possible, and the worker should be able to approach an independent authority if needed. Platforms should keep records of deactivation decisions and should disclose the grounds for deactivation.
E. Regulate algorithmic management proportionately
The law should require platforms to provide information on the main factors that influence remuneration, eligibility for incentives, allocation of assignments, performance evaluation and deactivation. Workers should receive information adequate to understand the significant decisions that affect their work. Platforms need not disclose every line of software code. Rather, the disclosure should enable workers to recognise the criteria applied, challenge incorrect information and understand the decision-making process.
Conclusion
Gig work and platform labour pose a basic challenge to traditional labour law. Digital platforms have opened up new avenues for income generation and service delivery, but they have also made it more difficult to distinguish between employees and independent contractors. Workers may have some flexibility yet remain economically dependent on platforms that set prices, assign work, rate performance and decide who receives more work in future. The Code on Social Security, 2020, is a significant development because it expressly recognises gig and platform workers and lays down a statutory framework for social security schemes. Recognition alone cannot deliver effective protection, because the benefits are available only if the schemes are properly implemented and adequately funded. The experience of the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union shows that the classification of employment need not rely solely on contractual terminology; courts and legislatures can examine the real distribution of control, economic dependence and entrepreneurial independence. India needs a clear and context-specific classification framework that takes account of algorithmic management and the nature of platform-based work. At the same time, social security should not be restricted to those who qualify as employees. Portable benefits, accident protection, health care, maternity support and retirement security are necessary because the livelihood of gig and platform workers depends on irregular or task-based income. Fair contribution-sharing, transparent algorithmic decisions, meaningful grievance procedures and channels for collective representation must support these protections.
In the end, the legal answer to platform labour should not be a bare choice between full employment regulation and freedom of contract, because flexibility and sound worker protection can go hand in hand. The right approach is to acknowledge the differences between platform business models, assign responsibilities according to real control and economic value, and set minimum social safeguards that are not lost when a worker switches platforms.
The issue for India is not only whether gig workers are employees, but how to ensure that the organisation of work through digital technology does not leave workers unprotected. A modern labour framework should acknowledge that technological innovation can alter the nature of work, but it cannot eliminate the need for dignity, social security, fair treatment and access to justice.
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Footnotes
1. Animesh Kumar Sharma & Rahul Sharma, The Gig Economy and the Evolving Nature of Work in India: Employment, Policy, and Platform Realities in the Age of Convenience, 4 J. Digit. Econ. 156 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdec.2025.07.005.
2. NITI Aayog, India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy: Perspectives and Recommendations on the Future of Work (2022).
3. International Labour Organization, World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The Role of Digital Labour Platforms in Transforming the World of Work (2021), https://www.ilo.org/publications/flagship-reports/role-digital-labour-platforms-transforming-world-work.
4. International Labour Organization, Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198), adopted June 15, 2006, ¶ 4(b), https://webapps.ilo.org/static/english/inwork/cb-policy-guide/employmentrelationshiprecommendationno198.pdf.
5. International Labour Organization, supra note 3.
6. NITI Aayog, supra note 2.
7. ILO Recommendation No. 198, supra note 4, ¶¶ 4(b), 9.
8. India Const. art. 21.
9. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) 3 SCC 545 (India).
10. India Const. arts. 14, 21, 38, 39(e), 41–43.
11. The Code on Social Security, No. 36 of 2020, India Code (2020).
12. Id. §§ 2(35), 2(60), 2(61).
13. Id. §§ 109, 114.
14. Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, Social Security for Gig and Platform Workers, Press Release ID 2220307 (Jan. 29, 2026) (written reply in the Rajya Sabha), https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2220307&lang=1®=1.
15. International Labour Organization, supra note 3; ILO Recommendation No. 198, supra note 4, ¶ 5.
16. The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023, Rajasthan Act No. 29 of 2023 (assented to Sept. 12, 2023).
17. The Karnataka Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025, Karnataka Act No. 72 of 2025 (assented to Sept. 11, 2025; deemed in force from May 30, 2025).
18. Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 (India).
19. Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 407 (India).
20. Uber BV v. Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from Eng.).
21. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018); see also Cal. Lab. Code § 2775(b)(1) (codifying the ABC test).
22. Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, 2024 O.J. (L 2831) (Nov. 11, 2024), arts. 5, 9–11, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2831/oj.
23. International Labour Organization, supra note 3.
24. NITI Aayog, supra note 2.
25. International Labour Organization, World Social Protection Report 2024–26: Universal Social Protection for Climate Action and a Just Transition (2024), https://doi.org/10.54394/ZMDK5543.
26. Directive (EU) 2024/2831, supra note 22, art. 19.