Introduction
Digital technology has fundamentally altered the manner in which information is created, communicated, preserved and presented before courts. Criminal investigations increasingly depend on CCTV recordings, mobile-phone videos, voice messages, photographs, messaging applications, social-media publications, cloud records and other forms of electronic information. Such material can provide valuable assistance in reconstructing events, identifying suspects and testing the consistency of witness testimony. However, the evidentiary value of digital material depends on whether its origin, integrity and meaning can be established through reliable methods.
Artificial intelligence has made this task more complicated. Deepfake technology can manipulate or synthesise a person’s appearance, voice, facial expressions or movements to create content that appears authentic. Generative systems can also produce artificial conversations, photographs and audiovisual sequences without the depicted event having occurred. Although these technologies have legitimate applications in education, entertainment, accessibility and research, their misuse can create serious problems for criminal investigations and trials.
A fabricated recording may be presented to implicate an innocent person, while genuine evidence may be dismissed by a person who claims that it has been generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence. The latter problem is sometimes described as the “liar’s dividend”: the availability of convincing synthetic media gives individuals an additional means of casting doubt on authentic material. Consequently, the challenge is not simply to identify fabricated evidence. It is also to preserve the reliability of genuine digital evidence while preventing unsupported claims of manipulation from obstructing justice.
Indian law already recognises electronic records as capable of being admitted in judicial proceedings, subject to applicable statutory requirements. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which came into force on 1 July 2024, establishes the present statutory framework for electronic and digital evidence.1 Nevertheless, traditional rules concerning electronic records were developed before contemporary generative artificial intelligence made realistic synthetic audiovisual content widely accessible.
The central issue is therefore whether existing evidentiary principles are sufficient to address the distinctive risks created by AI-generated material. A recording may satisfy formal requirements for submission while still containing fabricated speech, an altered sequence of events or an incorrectly attributed identity. Equally, the existence of sophisticated manipulation technology does not establish that every disputed recording is false.
This paper argues that Indian criminal courts should approach AI-related evidence through a combination of statutory compliance, technical verification, adversarial testing and constitutional safeguards. The objective should be neither automatic acceptance nor automatic rejection of digital evidence, but a reasoned assessment of its reliability in the circumstances of each case.
Research problem
The principal research problem arises from the difference between the legal admissibility of an electronic record and the factual reliability of its contents. The statutory framework determines the conditions under which electronic records may be received as evidence. However, deepfake technology creates additional questions about whether the material genuinely represents the event, whether the person depicted actually participated in it, and whether the recording has been altered in a manner that affects its evidentiary significance.
A certificate accompanying an electronic record may establish compliance with prescribed requirements relating to its production and integrity. It does not necessarily prove that every image, statement or action within that record is genuine. Similarly, a hash value can assist in detecting changes to a particular digital file after the relevant hash was generated, but it cannot independently establish that the file was authentic before that point.
These distinctions create practical difficulties for investigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers, forensic experts and judges. Investigators must preserve the original material and document how it was obtained. Prosecutors must establish the relevance and reliability of the evidence on which they rely. Defence lawyers must have a meaningful opportunity to question technical conclusions. Courts must determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to support the factual findings required by criminal law.
The problem becomes particularly serious where synthetic material is the principal or decisive evidence connecting an accused person to an alleged offence. A mistaken conclusion may result in wrongful implication, while excessive scepticism towards genuine recordings may obstruct accountability.
Research questions
This study addresses five principal questions.
First, to what extent do Sections 39 and 61–63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, address the authenticity and reliability challenges associated with deepfakes and AI-generated evidence?
Second, how should courts distinguish the admissibility of an electronic record from proof that its contents accurately represent an event?
Third, what methods can assist in establishing the origin, integrity and attribution of disputed digital recordings?
Fourth, how can the rights of the accused, the interests of victims and the integrity of criminal investigations be protected when the authenticity of AI-related evidence is contested?
Finally, what procedural, forensic and judicial reforms would improve the treatment of synthetic media in Indian criminal trials?
Objectives of the study
The principal objective is to examine the legal and practical challenges created by deepfakes and AI-generated evidence in Indian criminal proceedings.
The study further seeks to analyse the statutory provisions governing electronic evidence, evaluate the relevance of established judicial precedents, distinguish technical authentication from proof of truth, and identify safeguards capable of reducing the risk of fabricated evidence influencing judicial decisions. It also aims to propose reforms that preserve the right to a fair trial without making legitimate digital evidence unnecessarily difficult to produce.
Research methodology and scope
This research adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology. It examines the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, relevant constitutional provisions and judicial decisions concerning electronic evidence, expert opinion, privacy and fair trial. Secondary sources, including legal commentary and academic writing on synthetic media and digital forensics, provide supplementary context.
The research is primarily concerned with Indian criminal trials. Comparative references to forensic practices are used only to illuminate possible safeguards and do not assume that foreign evidentiary rules automatically apply in India.
The study does not claim to conduct empirical testing of deepfake-detection software or to establish the error rates of particular forensic systems. Its conclusions are legal and analytical rather than the results of laboratory experimentation. This limitation is important because technical capabilities change rapidly and the reliability of a particular detection method must be established through appropriate evidence.
The legal framework governing electronic evidence in India
A. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as the principal legislation governing evidence in proceedings to which it applies.2 Its provisions expressly address electronic and digital records, reflecting the increasingly important role of technology in legal proceedings.
Section 61 recognises the legal effect of electronic or digital records, subject to the statutory framework. Section 62 provides for proof of the contents of electronic records in accordance with Section 63. Section 63 establishes conditions governing the admissibility of specified electronic records and incorporates a certification framework.3
These provisions are essential to the lawful production of digital evidence. However, their application to deepfakes requires careful interpretation. The legal question is not merely whether a file exists in electronic form or whether a certificate accompanies it. The court must also consider the proposition for which the record is tendered and whether its contents can reliably support that proposition.
For example, a properly preserved video may establish that a particular file existed on a device at a particular time. That fact does not necessarily establish that the people depicted were correctly identified, that the recorded speech was genuinely spoken, or that the video was not synthetically generated before being stored on the device.
The distinction is particularly important where a party relies on a video to prove conduct that constitutes the alleged offence. Formal compliance and factual reliability are related but separate questions.
B. Section 63 and the certification of electronic records
Section 63 of the BSA governs the admissibility of specified electronic records and includes requirements concerning the prescribed certificate. The Schedule to the Act prescribes that certificate in two parts: Part A, which identifies the electronic record, describes the device or source from which it was produced and states the hash value of the record, and Part B, a declaration by an expert.4
Certification serves an important purpose. It helps document the circumstances in which an electronic record is produced and supports the examination of its integrity. However, a certificate should not be treated as conclusive proof that the material represents an authentic event.
A file may remain unchanged from the moment it was copied even though it was already manipulated before the copy was created. A recording may also contain synthetic speech or an artificially generated face without displaying obvious signs of alteration. In such circumstances, proving that the file has not changed during a particular stage of handling does not establish that its original contents were truthful.
The Supreme Court’s order of 22 May 2026 in Pune Bar Association v. Union of India is a significant recent development concerning Section 63(4) and its certification framework.5 A three-Judge Bench declined to entertain a challenge to the provision, holding that the requirement of a certificate disclosing the hash value of the record and carrying a declaration by an expert has a clear and rational nexus with the object of the Act and is not manifestly arbitrary. The Court described the hash value as an electronic fingerprint that provides a sure way of identifying and verifying digital data, and it left open the question whether Part B of the certificate may be signed only by an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, while indicating that a person with proven skill in computer science and cyber forensics may also sign it. The decision should be read according to its actual scope; it should not be understood as holding that a certificate or hash value conclusively proves the truth of everything depicted in a recording.
The central lesson for deepfake disputes is that certification and forensic examination perform complementary functions. Neither should be confused with a final determination of whether the alleged event actually occurred.
C. Expert opinion under Section 39
Section 39 of the BSA addresses the relevance of expert opinions on matters requiring specialised knowledge.6 This provision may be important where the authenticity of an electronic record cannot be adequately assessed through ordinary observation.
Digital-forensic experts may examine file structures, metadata, compression patterns, inconsistencies between audio and video, traces of editing and other technical characteristics. Their findings may assist a court in understanding whether a recording displays signs of manipulation or whether competing explanations are technically plausible.
However, an expert’s conclusion is not automatically infallible. The court should examine the expert’s qualifications, the material examined, the methods used, the limitations of those methods and the reasoning connecting the observations to the conclusion.
Where automated detection tools are used, their outputs should not be treated as self-proving. A score produced by software is meaningful only when its significance, limitations and relevance to the disputed file are properly explained. The expert should distinguish observed technical facts from assumptions and should disclose material uncertainty.
Deepfakes and the challenge of authenticity
Authenticity concerns whether a piece of evidence is what the party presenting it claims it to be. In a deepfake dispute, this may involve determining whether a recording is an unaltered capture of an actual event, a modified version of genuine material or an entirely synthetic creation.
Deepfakes can be produced through different technical methods. Some systems replace a person’s face, others imitate a voice, and some generate an audiovisual sequence from text, images or other inputs. A recording may also combine authentic footage with synthetic elements. Consequently, there is no single indicator that conclusively identifies every fabricated recording.
Metadata can assist in establishing a file’s history, but it may be missing, incomplete or altered. A lack of metadata does not automatically establish manipulation, just as the presence of apparently ordinary metadata does not prove authenticity. Similarly, visible glitches or unusual audio patterns may justify further examination but cannot always establish that a recording is fabricated.
A sound authentication process should therefore consider the complete circumstances surrounding the evidence. Relevant factors may include the original recording device, the person who created or obtained the file, the method of extraction, the sequence of transfers, the availability of earlier copies, the consistency of timestamps and the relationship between the file and independent evidence.
Where the original device or source file is available, examination of that material may provide stronger foundations for analysis than reliance on a repeatedly forwarded or compressed copy. Nevertheless, the absence of an original source should not automatically result in rejection in every case. The court must assess the explanation for its absence and the reliability of the alternative evidence under the applicable law.
The appropriate approach is therefore contextual authentication. A court should identify the precise claim being made about a recording and examine whether the available evidence adequately supports that claim.
Attribution and the identification of persons
Authenticity and attribution are closely related but distinct. Even if a recording is genuine, it does not necessarily establish the identity of the person responsible for the conduct depicted.
A video may accurately capture a person speaking while leaving unresolved whether that person is the accused. A voice recording may contain genuine speech but be incorrectly attributed to a particular individual. An authentic file may also have been uploaded, edited or circulated by someone other than the person shown in it.
Deepfake technology complicates attribution because a person’s face or voice may be reproduced without that person’s participation. A recording that appears to show an accused person making a statement cannot, by appearance alone, conclusively establish that the accused actually made it.
Attribution should be assessed alongside independent evidence where available. Such evidence may include witness testimony, reliable records concerning the source of the recording, relevant device evidence, surrounding communications and other circumstances consistent or inconsistent with the alleged event.
Investigators should avoid treating the apparent identity within a video as a substitute for proof of identity. They should also distinguish between the person depicted, the person who created the file, the person who transmitted it and the person who allegedly committed the offence. These may be different individuals.
The court’s task is to determine which factual propositions are supported by the evidence, rather than treating the existence of a recording as proof of every link in the prosecution’s theory.
Chain of custody and digital forensics
Chain of custody refers to the documented history of the collection, handling, transfer, storage and examination of evidence. In digital investigations, reliable documentation helps establish whether the material examined by an expert corresponds to the material obtained during the investigation.
Investigators should document the source of a recording, the circumstances in which it was obtained, the devices or systems involved, the methods used to preserve it and the persons who handled it. Where appropriate, forensic copies and cryptographic hash values can help demonstrate that a file has remained unchanged since a documented stage of preservation.
However, a hash value has a limited function. It can help establish that two digital files are identical or that a file has changed since a particular reference value was recorded. It cannot establish whether the original recording was genuine, whether the depicted event occurred or whether a person shown in the recording was correctly identified.
Digital-forensic examination should also be proportionate to the importance of the disputed evidence. If a recording is peripheral to the case, extensive technical investigation may not always be necessary. If it is the sole or decisive evidence connecting an accused person to a serious offence, a more rigorous examination may be justified.
The objective is to preserve the integrity of the evidence while maintaining a clear distinction between what the forensic process establishes and what remains a matter for judicial determination.
Constitutional dimensions of deepfake evidence
A. Article 21 and the right to a fair trial
Article 21 of the Constitution protects life and personal liberty and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to encompass important requirements of fair procedure.7 A criminal trial that relies on unreliable or fabricated evidence raises serious concerns about the protection of personal liberty.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphasised the constitutional significance of fair, just and reasonable procedure.8 The principle is relevant to the assessment of evidence because criminal liability should not be determined through a process that denies an accused person a meaningful opportunity to contest the material relied upon against them.
Where a disputed recording is central to the prosecution case, the defence should have a reasonable opportunity, subject to lawful restrictions, to examine the material, challenge its authenticity and question the conclusions of relevant experts. Such safeguards do not create an automatic entitlement to reject electronic evidence. They help ensure that the court reaches its decision through a fair and reasoned process.
B. Presumption of innocence and the burden of proof
The presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt are fundamental features of criminal justice. A realistic-looking recording should not displace these principles.
If the prosecution relies on a purported video confession, the court must examine whether the recording is genuine, whether the speaker is correctly identified and whether the statement is legally admissible for the purpose for which it is offered. It must also consider the other requirements governing proof of the alleged offence.
Conversely, a bare assertion that a recording is AI-generated should not automatically defeat otherwise reliable evidence. The court should evaluate the basis of the objection, the available technical material and the evidence as a whole, while preserving the prosecution’s burden of proof.
The proper approach is neither to require the accused to prove that every recording is fake nor to presume that every disputed recording is genuine. The prosecution must establish its case in accordance with the applicable law.
C. Article 14 and consistent evidentiary standards
Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.9 In the context of digital evidence, consistent and reasoned procedures are important to avoid arbitrary differences in the treatment of similar material.
Courts should not accept or reject evidence merely because it originates from a particular technology or because one party has greater access to technical resources. The significance of expert examination should be determined by the circumstances of the case, the nature of the dispute and the evidentiary purpose of the recording.
A reasoned approach can also reduce the risk that parties with limited resources are unfairly disadvantaged when challenging complex digital material.
Relevant judicial precedents
A. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer
In Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, the Supreme Court clarified the statutory requirements for admitting secondary electronic evidence under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.10 The judgment established the importance of complying with the special requirements governing electronic records.
Although the BSA now governs the relevant subject matter, the reasoning in Anvar remains important when understanding the historical development of Indian electronic-evidence law. Its central relevance to the present study is that digital evidence must be assessed within a legally defined framework rather than admitted solely because it appears convincing.
However, compliance with an admissibility requirement should not be mistaken for conclusive proof of the truth of a recording’s contents.
B. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of the certificate requirement under Section 65B for the relevant categories of secondary electronic evidence and clarified the relationship between that requirement and earlier decisions.11
The case illustrates the importance of statutory compliance in the admission of electronic records. For deepfake disputes, the wider lesson is that a court must distinguish the legal conditions for receiving a file from the subsequent evaluation of its authenticity and evidentiary weight.
C. Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh
In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court considered the significance of electronic evidence in criminal adjudication and discussed the importance of available scientific and electronic material.12
The case demonstrates the evidentiary value that electronic records may have in reconstructing events. In contemporary investigations, however, the usefulness of such material must be accompanied by careful consideration of its origin, preservation and reliability.
D. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India
In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right under the broader guarantees of the Constitution.13
Privacy is relevant to deepfake investigations because forensic examination may involve personal devices, communications, biometric information and intimate digital material. Investigative access should comply with applicable law and respect constitutional protections. The need to investigate suspected manipulation does not remove the obligation to consider the privacy interests of individuals whose data is examined.
Taken together, these authorities provide important foundations for analysing electronic evidence, procedural fairness and privacy. They do not, however, establish a single comprehensive judicial test specifically designed for every form of AI-generated evidence.
The Information Technology Act, 2000, and related legal concerns
The Information Technology Act, 2000, provides part of the statutory framework relevant to electronic records and certain forms of technology-related misconduct. Depending on the facts, provisions concerning identity theft, cheating by personation using computer resources, privacy violations and other offences may become relevant to conduct involving synthetic media.
For example, Section 66C addresses identity theft, while Section 66D addresses cheating by personation using a computer resource.14 Their application depends on whether the statutory elements are established; the creation or circulation of a deepfake does not automatically satisfy either provision.
Other laws may apply depending on the content, purpose, conduct and harm involved. A manipulated recording used to deceive a victim, falsely implicate an individual or violate a person’s rights must be examined according to the elements of the relevant offence and any applicable procedural requirements.
It is important to avoid assuming that every harmful deepfake constitutes the same legal wrong. A fabricated video used for financial deception presents different legal questions from synthetic content circulated to damage a person’s reputation or material created as part of a criminal conspiracy.
The legal response should therefore remain offence-specific and evidence-based. Technical evidence of manipulation may establish how a file was created or altered, but criminal liability must still be determined under the provisions applicable to the alleged conduct.
Challenges in the present legal framework
Several difficulties remain in applying existing evidentiary principles to synthetic media.
First, technical detection is not infallible. Different systems may produce different assessments of the same file, and a detector’s performance may vary depending on the type of manipulation, compression, recording quality and methods used to create the content. A court should therefore avoid treating a software-generated probability as a definitive finding without adequate explanation.
Second, the source material may be unavailable. Social-media platforms and messaging applications may alter the technical characteristics of files during transmission. Investigators may receive compressed copies rather than the original recording, making some forms of examination more difficult.
Third, expertise and resources are unevenly distributed. The ability to obtain a detailed forensic examination may vary between investigating agencies and litigants. Procedural safeguards should account for the practical need to make reliable technical evidence available where it is important to the fair resolution of a case.
Fourth, technical findings may be difficult to understand. A report that uses specialised terminology without explaining the method, assumptions and limitations may not provide a sufficient basis for judicial evaluation. Expert evidence should be presented in a manner that enables the court and the parties to understand the reasoning behind the conclusion.
Finally, the growing availability of synthetic media may encourage strategic allegations of fabrication. If unsupported claims of AI manipulation are routinely treated as sufficient to discredit genuine evidence, the justice system may become less capable of determining disputed facts. Courts must therefore assess objections carefully without shifting the prosecution’s burden of proof.
Critical analysis and findings
The analysis indicates that the central weakness in dealing with deepfakes is not necessarily the complete absence of rules governing electronic evidence. Rather, it is the danger of treating legal admissibility, technical integrity and factual truth as though they were identical.
The BSA’s framework for electronic records provides a statutory basis for their production and examination. The recognition of expert opinion also allows courts to consider specialised technical assistance. These are important foundations, but neither certification nor expert testimony should be regarded as automatically conclusive.
The first finding is that authenticity must be assessed in relation to the precise claim made about the evidence. A court may be satisfied that a file has remained unchanged since collection while remaining uncertain whether the file was manipulated before collection.
The second finding is that attribution requires independent reasoning. The apparent presence of a person in a recording does not, by itself, establish that the person created, transmitted or participated in the alleged event.
The third finding is that forensic tools should assist rather than replace judicial evaluation. An expert’s opinion must be assessed for its scientific basis, transparency, limitations and consistency with the remaining evidence.
The fourth finding is that fair-trial safeguards are especially important where digital material is decisive. Meaningful disclosure of relevant technical findings, a reasonable opportunity to challenge expert conclusions and careful judicial reasoning can reduce the risk of error.
The fifth finding is that both false acceptance and false rejection are serious concerns. An approach that assumes all digital recordings are genuine risks wrongful conviction; an approach that assumes all disputed recordings are unreliable risks allowing genuine evidence to be disregarded without sufficient justification.
The appropriate response is therefore a balanced evidentiary approach in which the reliability of digital material is assessed through legal rules, technical examination and the circumstances of the individual case.
Recommendations
A. Develop clear guidance for disputed synthetic media
Judicial and investigative guidance should distinguish between the formal admissibility of an electronic record, the integrity of the file, the authenticity of the depicted event and the identification of the persons involved. These questions should not be collapsed into a single determination.
B. Preserve original material and document its history
Investigating agencies should preserve available original files and devices in accordance with applicable law and forensic practice. The collection process, transfers, examination steps and relevant hash values should be documented so that the history of the material can be assessed.
C. Require reasoned expert analysis
Where specialist examination is necessary, expert reports should explain the material examined, the methods employed, the relevant observations, the limitations of the analysis and the basis for the conclusion. Automated outputs should not substitute for an intelligible explanation.
D. Ensure meaningful defence opportunities
Where disputed digital material is important to the prosecution case, the defence should receive a fair opportunity, consistent with law and legitimate confidentiality restrictions, to examine relevant evidence and challenge the conclusions relied upon. The court should consider whether further examination is necessary to resolve a material dispute.
E. Adopt a proportionate, risk-sensitive approach
Not every electronic record requires the same level of forensic scrutiny. The need for specialist analysis should depend on the significance of the evidence, the nature of the authenticity dispute, the available source material and the consequences of an erroneous finding.
Where a recording is the sole or decisive evidence of a disputed fact, stronger scrutiny may be appropriate. Where the recording is merely corroborative and supported by reliable independent evidence, the necessary examination may be different.
F. Improve technical capacity and training
Investigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judicial officers should receive suitable training in the limitations of synthetic-media detection, digital preservation, metadata, hash values and expert testimony. Such training would help prevent technical terminology from being mistaken for proof.
G. Protect privacy during forensic examination
The examination of digital devices should be confined to lawful and relevant purposes, subject to applicable procedural and constitutional safeguards. The need to establish whether a recording is genuine should not become a justification for unrestricted access to unrelated personal information.
H. Avoid automatic presumptions about AI
The law should not presume that an AI-related recording is genuine merely because it appears realistic, nor presume that it is fabricated simply because manipulation is technically possible. The court should decide the issue on the basis of the evidence, the applicable legal standards and the reasoning placed on record.
Conclusion
Deepfakes and AI-generated evidence present a significant challenge to Indian criminal justice because they weaken the traditional assumption that a convincing visual or auditory recording necessarily reflects an actual event. The growing sophistication of synthetic media makes it increasingly important to distinguish the appearance of authenticity from evidence capable of establishing authenticity.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, provides a framework for the treatment of electronic and digital records. Sections 39 and 61–63, read in their proper statutory context, offer important foundations for expert examination and electronic-evidence admissibility. Judicial precedents developed under the former Indian Evidence Act continue to assist in understanding the principles governing electronic evidence, subject to the current legislation.
Nevertheless, the formal admission of a file does not settle every question about its truth. Certification may support compliance and integrity; hash values may help identify changes to a file; and forensic analysis may reveal indications of manipulation. Each has a defined evidentiary function, and none should be treated as an automatic substitute for proof of the alleged event or the identity of the person involved.
A fair criminal trial requires careful consideration of both the dangers of fabricated evidence and the dangers of unsupported claims that genuine evidence has been fabricated. Courts must preserve the prosecution’s burden of proof, provide a meaningful opportunity to contest important evidence and give reasoned consideration to relevant expert findings.
Ultimately, the appropriate legal response is not to abandon digital evidence but to evaluate it more intelligently. Clear forensic procedures, transparent expert analysis, proportionate scrutiny and effective procedural safeguards can help Indian courts respond to technological change while protecting individual liberty and the integrity of criminal adjudication.
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Footnotes
1. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, No. 47 of 2023, India Code (2023) [hereinafter BSA]. The Act was brought into force on July 1, 2024, by Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 849(E) of Feb. 23, 2024, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, pt. II, § 3(ii).
2. The Indian Evidence Act, No. 1 of 1872, India Code (1872), repealed by the BSA with effect from July 1, 2024.
3. BSA §§ 61–63. Section 61 provides that an electronic or digital record shall not be denied admissibility on the ground that it is such a record and shall, subject to Section 63, have the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as any other document; Section 62 provides that the contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with Section 63; Section 63 (headed “Admissibility of electronic records”) is the successor to Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
4. BSA § 63(4) & Schedule. The certificate is to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities, and by an expert; Part A of the Schedule records, among other things, the device or digital-record source and the hash value of the record (with the algorithm used), and Part B is the expert’s declaration.
5. Pune Bar Ass’n v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 599 of 2026, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1297 (India) (order of May 22, 2026, Surya Kant, C.J., Bagchi & Pancholi, JJ.), paras 4, 7. The Court observed that challenges to the admissibility and probative value of electronic records “are further accentuated with the advent of artificial intelligence and deepfake technology” (para 3); held that the hash-value and expert-certification requirements have a clear and rational nexus with the object of the Act and do not suffer from manifest arbitrariness (para 4); declared that the Madras High Court’s view in R. v. B., 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6084, that Part B must be signed by an Examiner of Electronic Evidence notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, is not binding precedent; and, declining to issue notice, left that question of law open (para 7).
6. BSA § 39. Sub-section (1) makes relevant the opinions of persons specially skilled in foreign law, science or art, or any other field, or in the identity of handwriting or finger impressions; sub-section (2) treats the opinion of an Examiner of Electronic Evidence referred to in The Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, India Code (2000), § 79A, as expert opinion on information transmitted or stored in any computer resource or other electronic or digital form.
7. India Const. art. 21.
8. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India).
9. India Const. art. 14.
10. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 (India) (holding that secondary evidence of an electronic record is admissible only on compliance with Indian Evidence Act § 65B, including the certificate under § 65B(4)).
11. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 (India) (three-Judge Bench reaffirming Anvar and holding the certificate under Indian Evidence Act § 65B(4) a condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary electronic evidence).
12. Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178 (India). Its observations on Section 65B were subsequently held to be per incuriam in Arjun Panditrao, (2020) 7 SCC 1; the decision is cited here for its treatment of the evidentiary value of electronic material, not for the conditions of admissibility.
13. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India) (nine-Judge Bench).
14. Information Technology Act §§ 66C (punishment for identity theft), 66D (punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource).