Introduction
Criminal law represents one of the most powerful instruments available to the State. Through criminal legislation, the State identifies conduct considered sufficiently harmful to justify coercive intervention and prescribes sanctions against persons found responsible. At the same time, criminal law creates a direct relationship between governmental power and individual liberty. Arrest, investigation, prosecution, conviction and imprisonment can substantially affect personal freedom, reputation, livelihood and dignity. Consequently, a criminal statute must not only protect society from crime but also establish clear boundaries around the exercise of State power.
For more than a century and a half, the Indian Penal Code, 1860,1 constituted the principal substantive criminal statute in India. Although enacted during the colonial period, the IPC survived independence and became deeply integrated into Indian criminal jurisprudence. Its provisions were repeatedly amended and interpreted by constitutional courts, and several of its concepts became fundamental components of Indian criminal law. Nevertheless, changing social conditions, technological development, organised crime, terrorism, new forms of collective violence and the evolution of constitutional rights generated sustained demands for criminal-law reform.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, was enacted against this background. The statute is expressly intended to consolidate and amend provisions relating to offences and connected matters. It came into force on July 1, 2024, except for section 106(2), thereby replacing the IPC as the principal substantive criminal code.2 The BNS forms part of a wider legislative reform consisting of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, dealing primarily with criminal procedure, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, dealing with evidence.3
The importance of the BNS extends beyond statutory restructuring. Several provisions directly engage constitutional questions. The inclusion of offences relating to organised crime and terrorist acts reflects the State’s legitimate concern with serious threats to public order and national security. The statutory treatment of acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India under section 152 is particularly significant because it operates in an area closely connected with freedom of speech and expression, political activity and democratic dissent.4 The constitutional validity of section 152 has already been challenged before the Supreme Court, demonstrating that the tension between national security and fundamental freedoms is not merely theoretical.5
The central constitutional challenge is therefore one of balance. A democratic State has both the authority and responsibility to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, public order and citizens from serious criminal threats. However, that authority is exercised under a written Constitution that guarantees equality, freedom and personal liberty. National security cannot become a blanket justification for unrestricted criminalisation, while fundamental rights cannot be interpreted in a manner that prevents the State from responding effectively to genuine threats.
This article critically examines that constitutional balance. It focuses particularly on the principles of legality, proportionality, freedom of speech and expression, personal liberty, equality and judicial review. It argues that the long-term legitimacy of the BNS will depend not simply upon the text enacted by Parliament but upon how courts, police authorities and prosecutors interpret and enforce it.
Historical and legislative background
The Indian Penal Code was enacted in 1860 and reflected the nineteenth-century approach to codification of criminal law. Its systematic organisation of offences, general exceptions and punishments provided a relatively stable foundation for criminal adjudication. After independence, however, the constitutional framework fundamentally changed the relationship between the State and the individual. The Constitution introduced enforceable fundamental rights and established judicial review as a central mechanism for controlling governmental power.
The IPC consequently operated within a constitutional environment significantly different from that of its origin. Several provisions were modified by Parliament, while others were substantially shaped through judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court developed doctrines concerning constitutional proportionality, personal liberty, freedom of speech, privacy and procedural fairness. The continuing operation of a nineteenth-century criminal code alongside an evolving constitutional order eventually generated the argument that a comprehensive legislative reconsideration was desirable.
The BNS is the legislative response to this background. It retains a substantial amount of the conceptual architecture of the IPC while introducing or restructuring several offences and punishments. The statute also expressly recognises contemporary concerns such as organised crime and terrorist acts and introduces community service as a punishment for specified offences.
The legislative transition must therefore be understood as both evolutionary and transformative. It is evolutionary because numerous traditional criminal-law concepts continue to exist. It is transformative because Parliament has altered the statutory language, rearranged provisions and introduced specific offences intended to address contemporary threats.
The constitutional evaluation of this transformation requires attention to the principle that criminal legislation must satisfy constitutional limitations regardless of the historical origin of the statute. The fact that a provision is contained in a new criminal code does not immunise it from judicial review.
Research problem and objectives
The principal research problem addressed by this article is whether the BNS successfully reconciles the legitimate requirement of national security with constitutional protection of individual liberty and fundamental rights.
The issue becomes particularly important when criminal provisions use broad concepts involving sovereignty, unity, integrity, organised crime or terrorism. Such concepts may be legitimate subjects of criminal regulation, but their breadth may create questions regarding the boundary between criminal conduct and constitutionally protected activity.
The article has four principal objectives. First, it examines the constitutional framework governing criminal legislation under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.6 Secondly, it analyses selected BNS provisions that have a direct relationship with national security and serious criminality. Thirdly, it evaluates whether these provisions can satisfy the requirements of legality and proportionality. Finally, it proposes safeguards capable of reconciling effective criminal enforcement with constitutional liberty.
The article asks whether the BNS provides sufficient clarity to distinguish genuine threats to national security from protected expression and lawful democratic activity. It further considers whether judicial interpretation can provide appropriate safeguards where statutory language is potentially broad.
Research methodology and scope
This article adopts a doctrinal legal research methodology. Primary materials include the Constitution of India, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of India and relevant legislative materials. Secondary materials include academic writings, law-reform reports and scholarly commentary on constitutional rights and criminal-law reform.
The research is primarily analytical rather than empirical. It does not attempt to measure the number of prosecutions under individual BNS provisions or statistically evaluate police enforcement. Instead, it examines the legal principles that should govern the interpretation and implementation of the new criminal code.
The scope is deliberately focused on constitutional questions arising from the implementation of selected BNS provisions. Particular attention is given to section 152, organised crime, terrorist acts, group violence, punishment and the relationship between criminalisation and fundamental rights. The article does not provide an exhaustive analysis of every offence contained in the BNS.
Constitutional framework for criminal law
A. Article 14 and equality before law
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Criminal legislation must therefore operate according to intelligible and constitutionally permissible classifications and must not create arbitrary distinctions.
The modern understanding of Article 14 extends beyond formal classification. State action may be invalidated where it is manifestly arbitrary or lacks a rational connection with a legitimate objective.7 Criminal legislation is particularly sensitive in this regard because arbitrary criminalisation can result in serious consequences for liberty.
The BNS should consequently be interpreted so that similarly situated persons are treated consistently and criminal liability is based upon objective statutory elements. Enforcement agencies must avoid selective application based on political, social or ideological considerations.
B. Article 19 and freedom of speech
Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression. This freedom is central to democratic constitutionalism because political criticism, public debate and peaceful disagreement are essential features of representative government.
The right is not absolute. Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on specified grounds, including sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order and incitement to an offence.8 The existence of these grounds, however, does not mean that every restriction claimed to protect national security is automatically constitutional.9
A criminal provision restricting expression must establish a constitutionally permissible connection between the prohibited conduct and the protected interest. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India demonstrates the constitutional importance of precision in speech-related criminal law. The Court invalidated section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 because its vague expressions created uncertainty and permitted excessive interference with protected expression.10
The principle emerging from Shreya Singhal has continuing relevance to BNS provisions affecting expression. Criminal liability should not depend upon undefined or subjective standards that allow enforcement authorities excessive discretion.
C. Article 21 and personal liberty
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Constitutional jurisprudence has transformed Article 21 into a substantive guarantee of fairness, reasonableness and dignity.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow understanding of Article 21 and emphasised that procedures affecting liberty must satisfy constitutional standards of fairness and reasonableness.11 Criminal law, therefore, cannot be evaluated solely by asking whether Parliament has enacted a statute. The substance and operation of the statute must also remain compatible with constitutional guarantees.
The recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India further strengthened the constitutional protection of individual autonomy and dignity.12 Criminal investigation and enforcement must consequently operate within a framework that respects legitimate privacy interests.
Section 152 of the BNS: sovereignty, unity and integrity of India
Section 152 of the BNS constitutes one of the most significant areas of constitutional debate. It punishes whoever, purposely or knowingly, by words, signs, visible representation, electronic communication, use of financial means or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India, or indulges in or commits any such act. Its Explanation provides that comments expressing disapprobation of the measures, or administrative or other action of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting or attempting to excite the activities referred to in the section do not constitute an offence under it.13
The provision is significant because it replaces the IPC’s former sedition framework with different statutory language.14 The legislative shift is important. However, removal of the word “sedition” does not by itself eliminate constitutional questions. The essential issue is whether the new provision sufficiently distinguishes genuine threats to national integrity from legitimate criticism of government or political expression.15
A constitutional democracy must permit criticism of governmental policy. Opposition to the government, advocacy for political reform and criticism of public institutions cannot automatically be equated with threats to national security. The distinction between dissent and criminal conduct is therefore fundamental.
The constitutional challenge to section 152 has already reached the Supreme Court. On August 28, 2025, the Court issued notice specifically concerning the challenge to the vires of section 152 and tagged that petition with an earlier one.16 The earlier proceeding, in which notice was issued on August 8, 2025, seeks a declaration that the provision is ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 21.17 These proceedings demonstrate the continuing constitutional significance of the provision.
The most constitutionally appropriate approach would be to interpret section 152 narrowly. The provision should be applied to conduct satisfying its statutory elements rather than to mere political disagreement, criticism or peaceful advocacy. A requirement of a meaningful connection between the prohibited conduct and the protected national-security interest can reduce the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
National security and individual liberty
National security is a legitimate and compelling governmental objective. The Constitution itself recognises sovereignty and integrity of India and security of the State as legitimate grounds for restricting certain freedoms. The State cannot be expected to remain powerless against terrorism, organised violence, armed rebellion or conduct intended to destroy constitutional government.
However, national security is not a constitutional trump card. Even where the State pursues a legitimate objective, the means adopted must remain within constitutional limits.
The principle of proportionality provides an appropriate framework. The Supreme Court has developed proportionality as a method of examining restrictions upon fundamental rights. In Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court recognised proportionality as a constitutional criterion for evaluating restrictions on rights, articulated in terms of legitimate purpose, rational connection, necessity and balancing.18 That framework has since been refined and applied in later decisions.19
Applied to criminal legislation, the proportionality analysis raises four questions.
First, does the criminal provision pursue a legitimate governmental objective? Protection of sovereignty and national security clearly satisfies this requirement.
Secondly, is criminalisation rationally connected with that objective? The prohibited conduct must have a meaningful relationship with the threat the State seeks to prevent.
Thirdly, is the restriction necessary? Where substantially less restrictive means could achieve the same objective, criminalisation carrying severe penalties may require stronger justification.
Fourthly, is the overall impact proportionate? The seriousness of the restriction on liberty must be balanced against the importance of the public objective.
This approach does not weaken national security. Instead, it strengthens the legitimacy of national-security legislation by ensuring that coercive State power remains constitutionally justified.
Organised crime under the BNS
The BNS expressly criminalises organised crime. Section 111 addresses organised crime involving continuing unlawful activities and other specified circumstances.20 This represents an important development because organised criminal activity often involves networks rather than isolated individual offences.
Organised crime can include continuing criminal enterprises, violence, intimidation, trafficking, extortion and other coordinated forms of unlawful conduct. Traditional offence-by-offence prosecution may not always capture the structural character of such activity. The inclusion of an organised-crime provision therefore responds to a genuine contemporary challenge.21
Nevertheless, organised-crime provisions must be applied carefully. The consequences of being classified as an organised criminal actor may be severe. Investigating agencies must establish every statutory ingredient through admissible evidence. Mere association with individuals suspected of criminal activity should not automatically produce criminal liability.
The constitutional principle of personal culpability is particularly important. Criminal law should punish conduct and legally established participation rather than identity or association alone. Judicial scrutiny of the evidentiary basis of organised-crime prosecutions is therefore essential.
Terrorist acts and constitutional safeguards
Section 113 of the BNS addresses terrorist acts.22 Terrorism presents a serious threat to human life, public security and constitutional order. The State consequently possesses a strong justification for criminalising terrorist conduct.
However, terrorism-related provisions require particular precision. The consequences of a terrorism accusation can be extraordinarily serious, including prolonged criminal proceedings, restrictions on liberty and severe punishment upon conviction. Broad interpretation could also create a risk of conflating violent terrorism with peaceful political activity.
The constitutional principle of legality therefore requires clear identification of the conduct constituting the offence. Courts should ensure that the statutory elements are independently established and should resist interpretations that expand criminal liability beyond the language enacted by Parliament.
The existence of special anti-terror legislation further demonstrates the importance of consistency and clarity.23 Where conduct potentially falls within more than one statutory framework, prosecutors and courts must carefully determine the legal basis of liability and ensure that overlapping provisions do not produce arbitrary or disproportionate outcomes.
Group violence and equal protection
The BNS also responds to serious forms of group violence. The statutory framework addresses murder committed by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on specified identity-related grounds.24
The policy rationale is understandable. Collective violence based upon characteristics such as race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief can threaten both individual security and social cohesion. The criminal law therefore has a legitimate interest in addressing aggravated forms of group violence.
Nevertheless, the prosecution must establish the statutory requirements through evidence. The existence of a group alone should not result in automatic attribution of the most serious criminal liability to every person associated with that group. Individual participation, common intention or other legally relevant elements must be established according to the applicable statutory framework.
This approach protects both victims and accused persons. Strong criminal enforcement and due process are not contradictory objectives. Effective criminal justice requires both.
Community service and the constitutionality of punishment
One of the notable innovations of the BNS is the inclusion of community service among the recognised forms of punishment.25 This development is significant because imprisonment has traditionally occupied a dominant position within criminal sentencing.
Community service may support a reformative approach to punishment.26 For minor offences, unnecessary imprisonment may expose offenders to criminogenic environments and impose social and economic costs without producing meaningful rehabilitation. Properly structured community service can provide accountability while preserving opportunities for rehabilitation.
However, sentencing must remain consistent and proportionate. Courts should consider the nature of the offence, circumstances of the offender, harm caused and statutory limits.27 Community service should not become an arbitrary or humiliating punishment. Its administration should respect dignity and should be implemented according to transparent standards.
The introduction of alternative punishment therefore has the potential to strengthen the constitutional commitment to humane criminal justice, provided it is supported by clear judicial guidelines and administrative mechanisms.
The principle of legality and vagueness
The principle of legality is fundamental to criminal law. Individuals should be able to determine in advance what conduct constitutes an offence and what punishment may follow. Vague criminal provisions create a risk of arbitrary enforcement because individuals and enforcement agencies may lack a sufficiently precise standard.
Although the Indian Constitution does not reproduce the American constitutional doctrine of vagueness in identical terminology, Indian constitutional jurisprudence recognises the importance of clarity, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in legislation affecting fundamental rights.
Shreya Singhal is particularly instructive. The Supreme Court concluded that expressions such as “grossly offensive” and “menacing” lacked a manageable standard and therefore created unconstitutional uncertainty.28 The judgment demonstrates why criminal statutes affecting expression require careful drafting and interpretation.
The BNS should consequently be interpreted in a manner that gives meaningful content to statutory terms without expanding criminal liability through judicial creativity. Where Parliament has deliberately used broad language, courts must nevertheless preserve constitutional boundaries.
Judicial review and the role of courts
Judicial review is central to the constitutional legitimacy of criminal law. Courts do not merely determine whether an accused person has committed an offence. Constitutional courts may also examine whether the statutory provision itself is consistent with fundamental rights.
The judiciary therefore performs a dual role. At the individual level, courts protect accused persons against unlawful conviction and disproportionate punishment. At the constitutional level, courts examine whether legislation unjustifiably restricts fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that this review is not based on judicial hostility towards legislative policy. Parliament has broad authority to determine criminal policy, but that authority is exercised subject to constitutional limitations.
The BNS provides a significant opportunity for the judiciary to develop a coherent constitutional jurisprudence concerning new criminal provisions. Courts may need to determine the meaning of terms such as organised crime, terrorist act, subversive activities and acts endangering sovereignty and integrity.
A restrained but rights-sensitive judicial approach would be desirable. Courts should respect legitimate legislative objectives while insisting upon proof of statutory ingredients and protection against arbitrary enforcement.
Privacy, technology and criminal investigation
Contemporary criminal investigation increasingly depends upon digital information, electronic communications, location data and other forms of technological evidence. Although the BNS is primarily substantive criminal legislation, its implementation occurs within a wider technological environment governed by procedural and evidentiary law.
The constitutional right to privacy is therefore relevant to criminal enforcement. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right associated with dignity, liberty and autonomy.29
The State may legitimately collect information for crime prevention and investigation. However, surveillance and data collection should remain authorised by law and subject to appropriate safeguards. The principles of legality, legitimate purpose, necessity and proportionality are particularly relevant where investigative measures significantly intrude upon private life.
The BNS should consequently not be interpreted in isolation from constitutional privacy jurisprudence. Criminal investigation must remain effective while respecting the constitutional status of individuals.
Critical analysis
The BNS possesses several important strengths. It modernises the statutory architecture of Indian criminal law and introduces provisions directed towards forms of criminality that have acquired increasing significance. Organised crime and terrorism are expressly recognised, while community service introduces an alternative form of punishment.
The replacement of colonial terminology also has symbolic significance. Criminal law should reflect the constitutional identity of independent India rather than merely preserve historical legislative language. Nevertheless, symbolic change cannot substitute for substantive reform.
A major concern is that several new provisions operate in areas where the boundary between criminal conduct and constitutionally protected activity may be contested. Section 152 is the clearest example. The objective of protecting sovereignty and integrity is legitimate, but the application of the provision must not convert peaceful political expression into criminal conduct.
A second concern is the possibility of over-criminalisation. Criminal law should remain an instrument of last resort where conduct causes sufficiently serious harm to justify State punishment. Excessive criminalisation can burden police, prosecutors and courts while diluting the seriousness of genuinely harmful conduct.
A third concern relates to implementation. New statutory language requires extensive training. Police officers must understand the elements of offences, prosecutors must frame legally sustainable charges, and judges must develop consistent interpretations. Without institutional capacity, legislative reform may produce uncertainty rather than efficiency.
A fourth concern is sentencing consistency. The BNS introduces new forms of punishment and modifies punishment structures. Courts should therefore develop coherent sentencing principles so that similarly situated offenders receive reasonably consistent treatment.
A fifth issue is constitutional litigation. The emergence of constitutional challenges to section 152 demonstrates that the transition to the BNS is not simply administrative. The courts will play a significant role in determining the boundaries of new criminal provisions.
Recommendations
First, statutory provisions affecting fundamental freedoms should be interpreted narrowly where their language admits more than one plausible interpretation. A rights-compatible interpretation should be preferred where it remains faithful to the legislative text.
Secondly, enforcement agencies should receive comprehensive training concerning the BNS. Training should include constitutional rights, statutory ingredients, evidentiary requirements and safeguards against arbitrary arrest and prosecution.30
Thirdly, prosecution authorities should establish internal guidelines for national-security and organised-crime cases. Such guidelines should emphasise the need to establish each statutory ingredient independently rather than relying on broad allegations.
Fourthly, courts should develop sentencing guidelines for community service and other alternative punishments. Clear standards would promote consistency and reduce arbitrary sentencing.
Fifthly, Parliament should periodically review the operation of the BNS. Legislative review should consider judicial interpretations, prosecution experience, acquittal patterns, implementation difficulties and unintended consequences.
Sixthly, criminal enforcement should remain subject to constitutional proportionality. The State should demonstrate not merely that an objective is legitimate but also that the means employed are rational, necessary and proportionate.
Finally, constitutional literacy should become an integral part of criminal-law enforcement. Police officers, prosecutors and other officials exercising coercive authority should understand that effective law enforcement and fundamental rights are complementary components of constitutional governance.
Findings
The study reaches several principal findings.
First, the BNS represents significant legislative reform, but it also retains substantial continuity with the IPC. It should therefore be viewed as a combination of continuity and transformation rather than a complete departure from earlier criminal law.
Secondly, national security constitutes a legitimate constitutional objective. However, national-security legislation remains subject to fundamental rights.
Thirdly, section 152 is likely to remain an important constitutional provision because of its connection with freedom of speech and political expression. The pending constitutional challenge demonstrates the importance of judicial clarification.
Fourthly, organised-crime and terrorism provisions provide statutory mechanisms for addressing serious contemporary threats, but their enforcement requires strict attention to statutory elements and individual culpability.
Fifthly, proportionality provides an important constitutional framework for evaluating restrictions on rights. Criminalisation must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the legitimate objective pursued.
Sixthly, community service represents a potentially valuable movement towards reformative sentencing, particularly for less serious offences.
Seventhly, institutional implementation will be as important as statutory design. Without trained police, prosecutors, forensic personnel and judges, legislative reform cannot achieve its full potential.
Conclusion
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, represents a significant stage in the evolution of Indian criminal law. Its replacement of the Indian Penal Code provides an opportunity to modernise substantive criminal law and respond to contemporary challenges. The inclusion of provisions relating to organised crime, terrorism, group violence and community service demonstrates an attempt to adapt criminal law to changing social realities.
Nevertheless, criminal-law reform must remain constitutionally grounded. The State possesses a legitimate responsibility to protect sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, public order and citizens from serious criminal threats. Yet the same constitutional order protects freedom of speech, equality, privacy, dignity and personal liberty.
The central challenge is therefore not to choose between national security and fundamental rights. The constitutional objective is to protect both. National security is sustainable only when it operates within the rule of law, and individual liberty is meaningful only when the State possesses effective mechanisms to protect people from serious crime.
Section 152 illustrates this constitutional tension particularly clearly. Its objective of protecting national sovereignty and integrity is legitimate, but its implementation must distinguish genuine threats from peaceful democratic dissent. The constitutional proceedings concerning the provision provide an important opportunity for the Supreme Court to establish principles that can guide the interpretation of the BNS more broadly.
The long-term success of the BNS will consequently depend upon constitutional judicial review, careful statutory interpretation, institutional competence and responsible enforcement. Parliament should periodically review the functioning of the legislation, while courts should ensure that criminal liability remains within the boundaries established by constitutional rights.
The BNS should ultimately be judged not merely by its replacement of a colonial-era statute, but by whether it establishes a criminal justice framework that is effective against serious crime, fair to accused persons, responsive to victims and consistent with the constitutional promise of liberty, equality and dignity. The future of Indian criminal law should therefore be one in which national security and fundamental rights are not treated as competing absolutes but as complementary elements of a constitutional democracy.
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Footnotes
1. The Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, India Code (1860).
2. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, No. 45 of 2023, India Code (2023), long title & § 1(2); Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification S.O. 850(E) (Feb. 23, 2024), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, pt. II sec. 3(ii), No. 811 (Feb. 24, 2024) (appointing July 1, 2024, except for § 106(2)); see also Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 358(1) (repealing the Indian Penal Code).
3. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, No. 46 of 2023, India Code (2023); The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, No. 47 of 2023, India Code (2023).
4. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, No. 45 of 2023, § 152, India Code (2023).
5. Abhisar Sharma v. Union of India, W.P. (Crim.) No. 338 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India Aug. 28, 2025) (order issuing notice on the challenge to the vires of § 152), https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/47573/47573_2025_4_26_63701_Order_28-Aug-2025.pdf.
6. India Const. arts. 14, 19, 21.
7. See Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, 211–12; see generally M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th ed. 2018).
8. India Const. art. 19(2).
9. See State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196, 200.
10. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, 80–92; see The Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 66A, India Code (2000).
11. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 281–82.
12. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, 297–99.
13. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 152.
14. See Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 358(1) (repealing the Indian Penal Code, including its § 124A); Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Rajya Sabha, Two Hundred Forty-Sixth Report on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 39, ¶¶ 3.26.1–3.26.3 (Nov. 10, 2023) (on cl. 150 of the Bill, corresponding to § 152 as enacted), https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2023/SC_Report_Bharatiya_Nyaya_Sanhita_2023.pdf [hereinafter Standing Committee Report].
15. Cf. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, 967–68 (confining § 124A of the Indian Penal Code to words having a tendency to incite violence or public disorder, as distinct from criticism of the Government).
16. Abhisar Sharma, supra note 5 (issuing notice only on the challenge to the vires of § 152 and tagging the petition with W.P. (C) No. 720 of 2025).
17. S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 720 of 2025 (Supreme Court of India) (petition challenging § 152 under arts. 14, 19(1)(a) and 21; notice issued Aug. 8, 2025).
18. Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353, 405–06.
19. See K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1, 638–40; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, 677–78.
20. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 111.
21. See Standing Committee Report, supra note 14, at 32, ¶ 3.21.1 (on cl. 109 of the Bill, corresponding to § 111 as enacted).
22. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 113.
23. See Standing Committee Report, supra note 14, at 36, ¶ 3.23.1 (on cl. 111 of the Bill, corresponding to § 113 as enacted, noting that terrorism offences are otherwise dealt with under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967).
24. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 103(2).
25. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita § 4(f).
26. See Standing Committee Report, supra note 14, at 20, ¶¶ 3.4.5–3.4.6.
27. Cf. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, 730–31.
28. Shreya Singhal, (2015) 5 SCC at 86–88.
29. Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC at 297–99.
30. See Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273, 278–79.