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International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
ISSN 2581-5369 · Open access
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
Open accessArticlesVol. 9 No. VI (2026)pp. 1386–1395

Bleeding Without Remedy: Menstrual Leave and the Male Architecture of Indian Law

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Published 22 November 2026 · pp. 1386–1395 · Vol. 9 No. VI (2026)
Abstract

Menstruation remains a source of stigma at work, and India still has neither a central statute nor a Union policy on menstrual leave. This article approaches the question of menstrual leave from a feminist perspective and makes three arguments. The first is diagnostic: legislative silence is often put down to the arithmetic of private members’ business, but it also reflects a legal order whose default worker and default idea of neutrality are male, the sense in which “law is male”. The second is doctrinal: read together, the Supreme Court’s January 2026 judgment on menstrual health, the Karnataka High Court’s April 2026 decision on menstrual leave, and Articles 42 and 39(e) of the Constitution give the claim to menstrual leave firmer ground than the dignity and health argument usually made under Article 21. The third is practical: the objection that leave will be priced into women’s hiring is serious, the Supreme Court has voiced it, and any defensible scheme has to be designed with it in view, as an entitlement the employee claims, with universal coverage and with a cost that does not fall on the individual hire.

Keywords
Menstrual LeaveLaw Is MaleRight to HealthFeminism
Contents
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Introduction

In December 2025, the Karnataka High Court stayed a government notification that gave women in registered establishments one paid day of menstrual leave a month. By the afternoon the stay was gone. The Advocate General had mentioned the matter and asked the court to reconsider, and the judge recalled the order.1 In April 2026 a different judge of the same court dealt with the notification again. He went further than leaving it in place. He directed the State to implement it strictly across all sectors, organized and unorganized alike, and described menstrual leave as part of a life lived with dignity under Article 21.2

That sequence, a reversal within hours and a constitutional holding within months, describes where the subject stands. Parliament has not legislated and the Union has no policy. The Supreme Court has said three times that the matter belongs to the executive, yet in January 2026 it also held that menstrual health is part of the right to life.3 What exists in practice is a scatter of state orders and two judgments pointing the same way, neither of which requires the Union to grant menstrual leave.

There are three arguments. The first concerns diagnosis. Legislative silence is often put down to the arithmetic of private members’ business; we contend that it also reflects a legal order whose default worker and default idea of neutrality are male, and we test that claim rather than assume it. The second is doctrinal. Read together, the two 2026 decisions, Article 42 and Article 39(e) give the claim to menstrual leave firmer ground than the dignity and health argument usually offered. The third is practical. The objection that leave will be priced into women’s hiring is serious, the Supreme Court has voiced it, and any defensible scheme has to be designed with it in view.

The record: bills, benches and states

A. Parliament and the executive

In 2017 Ninong Ering, then a Lok Sabha member from Arunachal Pradesh, introduced the Menstruation Benefits Bill. It would have given women in establishments registered with the appropriate government paid leave during menstruation, and students from Class VIII upwards leave from school. It also provided two daily rest periods of thirty minutes for up to four days a month.4 At least five further private members’ bills followed between 2018 and 2024, among them proposals by Shashi Tharoor, S. Jothimani, Hibi Eden, Kadiyam Kavya and Shambhavi. None became law.5

The best-documented failure came in Ering’s own state. In March 2022, by then a member of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, he reintroduced the bill there. Some members told the House that menstruation was a “dirty” subject, unfit for discussion in a “holy place”; the bill was withdrawn on 11 March at the Health Minister’s request.6 Four months later the Union told the Lok Sabha that it had no proposal to grant menstrual leave to its employees.7

B. The Supreme Court

In February 2023 a bench led by Chief Justice Chandrachud declined to entertain a petition filed by Advocate Shailendra Mani Tripathi, treated the issue as one of policy, and suggested a representation to the Ministry of Women and Child Development.8 In July 2024 the Court again declined to intervene but asked the Secretary of that Ministry to consult stakeholders at the Union and State levels and to consider whether a model policy would be appropriate. It added that the order would not stop States from acting on their own.9 On 13 March 2026 a bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi disposed of the third petition on similar lines, leaving the competent authority to consider the earlier orders in framing a model policy. In remarks from the bench, the Chief Justice doubted the petitioner’s standing, since no woman had approached the Court, and the judges said that a statutory right to monthly leave could discourage employers from hiring women and damage their careers.10

C. The states

Bihar has allowed women in its government service two days of leave a month since 1992. Kerala has extended menstrual-leave concessions to university students and to industrial training institutes, and Odisha grants female state employees twelve additional days of casual leave a year, in effect one a month.11 Karnataka went furthest. Its 2025 policy gives one paid day a month, up to twelve a year, to women aged eighteen to fifty-two in registered establishments, whether permanent, contract or outsourced, with no medical certificate required and no carry-over.12 The consultation behind it is worth noting. The draft proposal circulated in October 2025 was for six days a year; of seventy-five responses, fifty-six supported it, twenty-six of them from employers, and ten asked for twelve days, which is what the cabinet adopted.13

“The law is male”: a feminist reading of the silence

Feminist legal theory has long held that law’s claim to neutrality conceals a standpoint. Catharine MacKinnon stated the point in its sharpest form: the state is male in the feminist sense, because the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat them.14 Robin West made a related but distinct claim. The jurisprudence taught in law schools, she argued, describes a person who is separate from others, and leaves out the bodily experiences, menstruation and pregnancy among them, through which many women know themselves as connected and contingent.15 MacKinnon’s account in particular has been criticized for treating women’s experience as more uniform than it is.16

Gloria Steinem’s 1978 satire turned the argument into a joke that has outlasted most of the scholarship. If men menstruated, she imagined, the event would be a mark of status, sanitary supplies would be publicly funded, and Congress would endow an institute to relieve the discomfort. Her closing lines state the point: the “power justifications could probably go on forever.”17 The exercise shows that the stigma attached to menstruation is a fact about who bleeds, not about blood.

The Indian record shows three patterns consistent with this reading.

Reproduction is legible; menstruation is not. The law has a language for one female bodily event, maternity, and has legislated for it since 1961. When the Supreme Court extended maternity benefit to women on a municipal muster roll, it said that working women must be treated with dignity and given the facilities to which they are entitled.18 The Karnataka High Court’s own survey of comparative law is instructive here. It records that the earliest menstrual leave, in the Soviet Union of 1922 and 1931, was justified by the need to protect women’s “reproductive and maternal functions”.19 Menstruation became visible to the state when it served reproduction. The modern claim rests instead on the worker’s own dignity, which is probably why it meets more resistance.

The stigma disabled the forum. The Arunachal Assembly could not discuss the subject of the bill before it, because the subject was thought too impure for the House.20 This is not an isolated attitude. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court recorded in 2021 that menstruation is widely treated as ritually unclean and that girls and women face daily restrictions as a result. It entertained the argument that compelled disclosure of menstrual status infringes privacy, and it proposed directions prohibiting exclusion on the basis of that status.21

The unaffected worker is the benchmark. When the bench in March 2026 asked how menstrual leave would draw women into work, the cost to be measured was the leave. It did not ask what the absence of leave costs women who work through pain. Martha Minow called this the dilemma of difference: treat people the same and the norm hides in the comparison; treat them differently and the difference is stamped as deviation.22 Evidence on the cost of not accommodating is not trivial. In the largest survey of its kind, 32,748 Dutch women aged fifteen to forty-five reported an average productivity loss of one third while working or studying through menstrual symptoms, a mean of 8.9 days a year, set against a mean of 1.3 days a year of absence. Only a fifth of those who called in sick said why.23

The theory should not be pressed too far. The same Supreme Court that deferred in 2023 and 2026 delivered Jaya Thakur in January 2026. Karnataka’s policy came from an expert committee, a public consultation in which employers were well represented among the supporters, and a cabinet decision.24 A theory that makes the state simply male cannot explain these facts. We use it more modestly, as an account of defaults: which body the workplace is designed around, which absence counts as a cost, and which subject needs no apology in a legislature. On that account the silence is an inertia that sustained effort can overcome. It is not a conspiracy.

The constitutional case

A. Dignity and health under Article 21

The authorities are familiar. Bandhua Mukti Morcha held that the right to live with human dignity draws its content from the directive principles, including Articles 39(e), 39(f), 41 and 42.25 Consumer Education and Research Centre held that the health and strength of a worker are integral to the right to life, and that the State and industry must act to protect them.26 Puttaswamy placed bodily integrity and decisional autonomy within Article 21.27 What was missing was a holding applying that line to menstruation.

Jaya Thakur supplied part of it. Justices Pardiwala and Mahadevan held that menstrual hygiene management is inseparable from the right to live with dignity, tied it to the right to health and to bodily autonomy, and read Article 15(3) as a source of positive obligation on the State.28 The case concerned schoolgirls and the provision of pads and toilets. It did not decide a workplace question, and we would not claim that it did. The Karnataka High Court took the next step. It held that a policy on menstrual leave is “intrinsically connected” to the realization of a fundamental right, that the policy rests on Articles 15(3), 39(e) and 42 with executive power under Article 162 as its vehicle, and that menstrual leave is an aspect of the right to live with dignity.29 A single judge’s decision binds the courts below in Karnataka and persuades elsewhere. The Supreme Court’s March 2026 order, which was passed after Jaya Thakur, still treated the matter as one for the Union’s policy.

B. The directive principles and Article 42

Article 42 is the provision most directly on point. It directs the State to secure just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Menstruation is not maternity, but the first limb of the Article is not confined to the second, and a workplace that requires a woman to labour through incapacitating pain, or to disguise it, is open to the charge that its conditions are not humane. Article 39(e) speaks of the health and strength of workers, “men and women”. Article 38 charges the State with minimizing inequalities in income and endeavouring to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. And Article 51A(e) makes it the duty of every citizen to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women, which is a fair description of treating menstruation as too impure to discuss.30 The directive principles are not enforceable by themselves, a point Article 37 makes expressly. But Bandhua Mukti Morcha and Consumer Education and Research Centre show how they are made operative, by reading them into Article 21.

C. Equality: exception or accommodation?

The standard objection is that leave for women alone offends Articles 14 and 15(1). There are two answers, one formal and one conceptual.

The formal answer is Article 15(3), which permits special provisions for women. Jaya Thakur reads the clause as authorizing and, in the setting of menstrual hygiene, requiring positive measures, and it relies on the older reading of the clause as aimed at improving women’s status.31 That answer is sound, but it carries a cost. To treat menstrual leave as a “special provision” is to accept that equality means the male pattern and that anything else is a departure needing justification.

The conceptual answer draws on a distinction that legal scholarship has long made between an exception model and an accommodation model of equality. The first takes the male norm as given and permits departures from it. The second asks why the norm took the shape it did.32 A workplace designed around bodies that do not menstruate is a design choice, and design choices can be reopened. The Karnataka High Court spoke in that second register. It said that equality requires acknowledging difference as a basis for accommodation and not as a ground for discrimination, and that the call for menstrual leave is an assertion of dignity and not a plea for privilege.33

The accommodation model has a limit that the case law supplies. In Anuj Garg the Supreme Court struck down a ban on women working in bars. The ban was defended as protective, but the Court found it rested on stereotypes about what women can and cannot do.34 The same discipline applies here. Menstrual leave survives scrutiny if it answers a need that employees may choose to meet, and fails if it presumes an incapacity and imposes it. The Chief Justice’s remark that such petitions might create “a type of impression in young women that you still have some natural issues” is the Anuj Garg worry applied to this setting, and it deserves an answer rather than dismissal.35 The answer lies in design: the leave must be a claim the employee makes, never a status assigned to her. Two other decisions point to a second design requirement. The Supreme Court struck down the exclusion of women of menstruating age from the Sabarimala temple, and the Gujarat High Court, as noted, took up the argument that menstrual status belongs to the sphere of privacy.36 A scheme that required a woman to prove her menstrual condition to a supervisor or doctor would sit uneasily with both.

The hiring objection

The strongest argument against menstrual leave is empirical, not constitutional. A guaranteed benefit available only to women raises the expected cost of employing them, and employers will respond. The objection is familiar from the economics of any benefit that attaches to one sex. It cannot be waved away, because the Court has now voiced it from the bench and because it names a real risk to the women the policy is meant to help.

Foreign experience is mixed and has to be read carefully. In Japan the share of women taking menstrual leave fell from 26 per cent in 1965 to 0.9 per cent in 2017, and in South Korea it fell more modestly, from 23 per cent in 2013 to 19.7 per cent in 2017.37 One reading treats low take-up as proof that the need is small. A second reading, which fits the Dutch data better, treats it as proof that stigma and competitive pressure suppress claims. The Dutch survey found that most of the productivity loss came from women who stayed at work, and that two-thirds of respondents wished for more flexibility in tasks and hours.38 That survey was recruited through social media and relied on self-report, so it cannot be transposed to India. But it should make us suspicious of any argument that reads need from leave statistics alone.

What the comparative experience does support is a concern with who pays. The Spanish law of 2023 treats incapacitating menstruation caused by a previously diagnosed condition, such as endometriosis, as a special form of temporary incapacity, and places its cost on the social security system from the first day of absence, not on the individual employer, so that the benefit does not become a reason not to hire.39 Spain’s diagnosis condition is not a model for India: it trades the employer’s worry for a clinical gate that raises the privacy and access concerns discussed above. The financing idea, however, is portable. Karnataka’s policy leaves the cost with employers, and the petitions against it, filed by a hotels association and an employer, show where the resistance lies.40

Coverage is the other pressure point. The petitioner in Chandravva was a hotel worker in a small establishment in Belagavi district, who asked the High Court to have the leave her State had granted enforced in hotels and small commercial units.41 Her case is a reminder that a policy confined to registered establishments leaves out the women with the heaviest physical work and the least bargaining power. It also matters that female labour-force participation, on the Government’s figures, rose from 23.3 per cent in 2017–18 to 41.7 per cent in 2023–24.42 As more women enter work, the cost of designing workplaces around the wrong body grows.

Design principles

These conclusions point to four principles for any national framework, and a fifth about what leave cannot do.

Entitlement, not assignment. Leave should be a claim the employee makes on her own declaration, without a certificate. This follows from the privacy reasoning in Puttaswamy and from the Anuj Garg point that the law should not presume incapacity. Karnataka’s no-certificate rule is the model.

Universal coverage. A scheme limited to government employees or registered establishments reproduces the exclusion that Chandravva exposed. Contract, outsourced and unorganized workers should be inside it, which is the direction in which the Karnataka High Court has now pointed the State.

Cost that does not fall on the hiring decision. Whether through social insurance, a pooled fund or tax-financed reimbursement for small employers, the aim is to detach the cost of the leave from the cost of the individual hire. The Spanish financing model is a starting point.

Inclusive terms and real enforcement. The Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, drafted on the recommendation of the Law Commission of Karnataka and, as the High Court records, placed before the State Legislature, speaks of “menstruating persons”, a category that includes transgender persons.43 That is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition of gender identity in NALSA.44 The Law Commission’s own recommendation went further and spoke of non-binary menstruators as well.45 The Bill also penalizes the denial of leave and discrimination against those who take it.46 A right with no remedy is a statement of sympathy.

Leave is one tool among several. The Law Commission of Karnataka recommended remote or hybrid options and attendance thresholds alongside leave, and the Dutch data show demand for flexibility that leave alone does not meet.47 The aim is a workplace that can absorb a recurring bodily fact, and a leave entitlement is one means to that end.

Conclusion

The question this article has tried to answer is why a measure that women’s organizations, state governments, a law commission and, in Karnataka, most responding employers have supported remains without a central statute. Part of the answer is procedural and part is a matter of who the workplace was built for. The two 2026 decisions change the terms of the debate by tying menstrual health to dignity under Article 21, but they leave the Union’s position untouched, and the Supreme Court’s concern about hiring remains unanswered by anything except design.

Applied to the workplace, Steinem’s thought experiment suggests that if men menstruated there would be a policy on menstrual leave, and it exposes why the exception model is the wrong frame. The claim is not that women need an exemption from equality. It is that equality has been defined by bodies that do not bleed, and that the Constitution, read through Articles 21, 39(e) and 42, allows the definition to be revised. The task for Parliament is to do so in a form that women can use without being penalized for using it.

*****

Footnotes

1. Bangalore Hotels Ass’n v. Government of Karnataka, W.P. No. 36659 of 2025 c/w W.P. No. 37122 of 2025 (Kar. HC Dec. 9, 2025) (India) [hereinafter Bangalore Hotels Ass’n]; Karnataka High Court Stays Govt Order to Provide Menstrual Leave in Registered Industrial Establishments, LiveLaw (Dec. 9, 2025), https://www.livelaw.in/amp/high-court/karnataka-high-court/karnataka-high-court-menstrual-leave-notification-stayed-karnataka-government-312702; Hours After Staying Policy on Paid Menstrual Leave for Women, Karnataka High Court Recalls Its Order, Bar & Bench (Dec. 9, 2025), https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/hours-after-staying-policy-on-paid-menstrual-leave-for-women-karnataka-high-court-recalls-its-order; Karnataka HC Recalls Interim Stay on State’s Mandatory Period Leave Policy, South First (Dec. 9, 2025), https://thesouthfirst.com/news/karnataka-hc-orders-interim-stay-on-states-mandatory-period-leave-policy/.

2. Chandravva Hanamant Gokavi v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 109734 of 2025, 2026 SCC OnLine Kar 2479, ¶¶ 11, 22–23 (Kar. HC Apr. 15, 2026) (India) [hereinafter Chandravva].

3. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India, W.P. (C) No. 1000 of 2022, 2026 INSC 97, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 133 (SC Jan. 30, 2026) (India) [hereinafter Jaya Thakur], https://www.scobserver.in/supreme-court-observer-law-reports-scolr/dr-jaya-thakur-v-government-of-india18873/.

4. The Menstruation Benefits Bill, 2017 (Lok Sabha) (India); see Badapbiang T. Dkhar, Menstrual Leave and the Right to Live with Dignity: Why Was the Menstruation Benefit Bill, 2017 Withdrawn from the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly’s 2022 Budget Session?, The Leaflet (Mar. 15, 2022), https://theleaflet.in/explainer/menstrual-leave-and-the-right-to-live-with-dignity-why-was-the-menstruation-benefit-bill-2017-withdrawn-from-the-arunachal-pradesh-legislative-assemblys-2022-budget-session [hereinafter Dkhar] (describing sections 4 and 5 of the Bill).

5. Rina Goyal, Menstrual Leave in India: The Case for a Uniform National Framework, Majmudar & Partners, Legal 500 (Nov. 4, 2026), https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/india/employment-and-hr/menstrual-leave-in-india-the-case-for-a-uniform-national-framework [hereinafter Majmudar & Partners].

6. Dkhar, supra note 4.

7. No Provision in Rules or Proposal to Include Menstrual Leave, The Hindu (July 2022), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-provision-in-rules-or-proposal-to-include-menstrual-leave-union-minister/article65698416.ece; No Proposal to Grant Menstrual Leaves to Government Employees, Says Centre, Scroll.in (July 30, 2022), https://scroll.in/latest/1029395.

8. Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 172 of 2023 (SC Feb. 24, 2023) (India); Supreme Court Refuses to Entertain Plea Seeking Menstrual Leave, Says Matter Falls in Policy Domain, LiveLaw (Feb. 24, 2023), https://www.livelaw.in/amp/top-stories/supreme-court-refuses-to-entertain-plea-seeking-menstrual-leave-says-matter-falls-in-policy-domain-222395.

9. Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 327 of 2024, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1694 (SC July 8, 2024) (India); Supreme Court Asks Union Govt. to Consult All Stakeholders on Model Policy, SCC Times (July 11, 2024), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/07/11/supreme-court-asks-union-govt-consult-all-stakeholders-model-menstrual-leave-policy/.

10. Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Secretary, Ministry of Women & Child Dev., W.P. (C) Diary No. 73736 of 2025 (SC Mar. 13, 2026) (India); Mandatory Menstrual Leave Could Discourage Hiring of Women, Asks Centre to Examine Policy, Onmanorama (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.onmanorama.com/news/india/2026/03/13/supreme-court-menstrual-leave-india.html [hereinafter Onmanorama Report].

11. Majmudar & Partners, supra note 5 (Bihar, Kerala and Odisha); see also Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 7 (Bihar).

12. Harinie Seenivasan & Arjun Paleri, Menstrual Leave in Karnataka: What the Karnataka High Court Judgment Means for Employers, Mondaq (May 12, 2026), https://www.mondaq.com/india/employee-rights-labour-relations/1788282/menstrual-leave-in-karnataka-what-the-karnataka-high-court-judgment-means-for-employers; Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9 (reproducing Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 (Nov. 20, 2025)).

13. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9 (reproducing the recitals of Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 (Nov. 20, 2025)).

14. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 161–62 (1989).

15. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988).

16. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990), https://doi.org/10.2307/1228886.

17. Gloria Steinem, If Men Could Menstruate, Ms., Oct. 1978, reprinted in 6 Women’s Reprod. Health 151 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1080/23293691.2019.1619050.

18. The Maternity Benefit Act, No. 53 of 1961, India Code (1961); Municipal Corp. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224 (India), quoted in Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 19.1.

19. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 17.

20. Dkhar, supra note 4; see also Menstruation a ‘Dirty’ Thing to Talk About in a ‘Holy’ Place Like Assembly, EastMojo (Mar. 12, 2022), https://www.eastmojo.com/arunachal-pradesh/2022/03/12/menstruation-a-dirty-thing-to-talk-about-in-a-holy-place-like-assembly/.

21. Nirjhari Mukul Sinha v. Union of India, R/Writ Petition (PIL) No. 38 of 2020 (Guj. HC Feb. 26, 2021) (India), quoted in Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 10.

22. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1990).

23. Mark E. Schoep et al., Productivity Loss Due to Menstruation-Related Symptoms: A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Survey Among 32,748 Women, 9 BMJ Open e026186 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026186.

24. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9 (reproducing the recitals of Government Order No. LD 466 LET 2023 (Nov. 20, 2025)).

25. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 (India).

26. Consumer Educ. & Rsch. Ctr. v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 42 (India).

27. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).

28. Jaya Thakur, supra note 3, ¶¶ 74, 92–95.

29. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶¶ 11–13; India Const. arts. 15(3), 21, 39(e), 42, 162.

30. India Const. arts. 37, 38, 39(e), 42, 51A(e).

31. Jaya Thakur, supra note 3, ¶¶ 95–96 (discussing State of A.P. v. P.B. Vijaykumar, (1995) 4 SCC 520 (India)).

32. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1279 (1987).

33. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 13.

34. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Ass’n of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1 (India).

35. Onmanorama Report, supra note 10.

36. Indian Young Lawyers Ass’n v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (India); Nirjhari Mukul Sinha, supra note 21.

37. Dkhar, supra note 4.

38. Schoep et al., supra note 23.

39. Ley Orgánica 1/2023, de 28 de febrero, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 2/2010, de 3 de marzo, de salud sexual y reproductiva y de la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo, disp. final tercera (B.O.E. n. 51, Mar. 1, 2023) (Spain), https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2023-5364; Majmudar & Partners, supra note 5 (describing the financing of the leave through social security).

40. Bangalore Hotels Ass’n, supra note 1.

41. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2.1–2.4.

42. Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 3352, Ministry of Labour and Employment (answered Dec. 16, 2024) (India); Press Information Bureau, India’s Workforce Transformation: A Rising Tide of Female Participation (Nov. 2024), https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2024/nov/doc20241118436101.pdf (female labour force participation rate of 23.3% in 2017–18 and 41.7% in 2023–24).

43. Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, cl. 2(c) (India), reproduced in Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9; see also Karnataka Presses Ahead with Menstrual Leave Bill as Policy Faces Legal Hurdles, South First (Dec. 11, 2025), https://thesouthfirst.com/karnataka/karnataka-presses-ahead-with-menstrual-leave-bill-as-policy-faces-legal-hurdles/.

44. National Legal Servs. Auth. v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 (India).

45. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9 (quoting the opinion of the Law Commission of Karnataka).

46. Karnataka Menstrual Leave and Hygiene Bill, 2025, cl. 9 (India), reproduced in Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9.

47. Chandravva, supra note 2, ¶ 9 (quoting the opinion of the Law Commission of Karnataka); Schoep et al., supra note 23.

How to cite

Manthan Sharma & Dr. Aseem Chandra Paliwal, Bleeding Without Remedy: Menstrual Leave and the Male Architecture of Indian Law, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1386 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13284.

Cite this article

Manthan Sharma & Dr. Aseem Chandra Paliwal, Bleeding Without Remedy: Menstrual Leave and the Male Architecture of Indian Law, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1386 (2026), https://doi.org/10.63108/IJLMH.13284.
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