VidhiAagaz
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
ISSN 2581-5369 · Open access
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
Open accessArticlesVol. 8 No. I (2025)pp. 1598–1614

Access to Essential Medicines: Challenges and Solutions within Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement

KR
K. Ankita RaoResearch Assistant DPIIT-IPR Chair at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai, India
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Published 28 February 2025 · pp. 1598–1614 · Vol. 8 No. I (2025)
Abstract

In this era where health crises are increasingly prominent throughout the world, Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement emerges as a beacon of hope for equitable access to essential pharmaceuticals especially for under developed and developing countries. This article examines in detail, Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement which facilitates the export of pharmaceutical products from countries having manufacturing capacities to those lacking such capability, particularly in the context of public health emergencies such as COVID-19 pandemic. The article also focusses on the shortcomings of the provision which is further illustrated by Bolivia’s challenges in importing vaccines during the pandemic. The article discusses the ambiguity and flexibility that is inherent in Article 31bis, which may lead to inconsistencies and disputed among member states regarding its interpretation and application. In order to address these issues, the article proposes several solutions including encouragement of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and the development of scientific infrastructure in developing nations. Further, the article calls for a reconsideration of data exclusivity regulations to better align with the goals of expanding access to essential medicines. Finally, the article emphasizes on the need for international cooperation and adaptability in order to enhance the effectiveness of Article 31bis, thereby ensuring equitable access to vital medicines while balancing the rights of holders of intellectual property.

Keywords
Article 31bisTRIPs Agreement. Public healthdeveloping countriesintellectual property
Contents
Full text

Introduction

The significance of equal access to pharmaceuticals has been a source of concern and discussion in the field of global health. A framework for intellectual property protection was developed by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement, a cornerstone of international trade law, and it covers patents for pharmaceutical items. A one-size-fits-all approach to intellectual property rights could, however, have unfavorable effects, particularly when it comes to public health.2

The TRIPS Agreement was amended with Article 31bis in order to allay these worries. This clause, sometimes known as the “Paragraph 6 System,” was designed to give nations with little pharmaceutical manufacturing capability access to patented medications that are crucial for the public’s health, especially during emergencies. The goal of Article 31bis was to create a compromise between the need to guarantee inexpensive access to life-saving medications and the preservation of intellectual property rights.

As with any international legal system, Article 31bis has encountered a number of difficulties and shortfalls in its implementation. This study delves into the nuances and implications of Article 31bis, highlighting the issues with this clause, potential fixes that have been suggested to address these problems, and the provision’s applicability in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’s unprecedented threat to global health.3

This research article contributes to the current discussion about access to vital medications, intellectual property rights, and global health governance by looking at the difficulties, remedies, and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Article 31bis. It emphasizes the necessity of striking a balance between the protection of intellectual property and the pressing need to protect the public’s health and guarantee access to cheap, life-saving medications.

The Compulsory Licensing System under the TRIPS Agreement

Prior to the amendment in TRIPs in 2017, the entire compulsory licensing system was present only under Article 31 read with Article 30 to the TRIPs Agreement.4 In fact, Article 31 may be seen as the first international framework on compulsory licensing of patents. It was a path-breaking set-up in the patent law system, considering that the system was previously unharmonized.5 If looked at from a socio-political perspective, it was a significant development in the conflict between developing and developed nations that had stalled the Paris Convention’s progress and persisted throughout the Uruguay Round.6

The basic tenets enshrined under the compulsory licensing system under Article 31 are enumerated herein.

1.  Firstly, under Article 30, there are limited exceptions provided to the exclusive rights that are granted to the patentee.7 Under Article 30, members are provided with an opportunity to provide for exceptions to the exclusive rights of the patentee if the triple test criteria. The exceptions must “not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent”, should “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent holder and must “take into account the legitimate interests of the third parties.”

2.  Secondly, under the system, each application for the C.L. must be considered on merits.8 What this provision prevents is a blanket grant of C.L. by member countries and not reasonable terms and conditions that may be imposed by the member countries.

3.  Thirdly, the prospective C.L. holder must have made efforts to obtain the license from the patent holder itself and that within reasonable time limit, such efforts did not come to fruition.9 Exceptions to this general rule are situations of national emergency and extreme urgency. Members are at their liberty to decide what would constitute a situation of national emergency and extreme urgency for their country.10

4.  Fourthly, the scope and duration of the C.L. must be specified in order to bind the licensee legally.11

5.  Fifthly, the C.L.s granted under this system must be non-exclusive12 in nature and must not be subjected to assignment.13

6.  Sixthly, the authorization of C.L. must be done “predominantly for the supply in the domestic market.”14 The world used in this article is ‘predominantly’, therefore exports under this provision are not completely barred. However, TRIPs provides no clarity as to what quantity or upto what extent are exports allowed under this particular provision. However, some kind of restriction may be presumed from the use of the word ‘predominantly’ and therefore such restriction is not unequivocal.15

7.  Seventhly, an adequate remuneration must be provided to the patent holders in case a C.L. is granted under this system based on the economic value of the authorization in question.16

8.  Eighthly, TRIPs does not leave the power of such authorization boundless. It subjects such an authorization17 as well as the remuneration granted under the system to the patent holder18 to judicial review by a higher authority.

9.  Ninthly, two provisions under Article 31 provide for granting C.L. in order to solve the problem of anti-competitive practices19 and permission for exploitation of patent which requires an infringement of another patent.20

Since its inception, Article 31 has been subject to various criticisms. Many scholars and commentators across the globe have argues that the provisions takes away the autonomy of the nations to issue C.L. in the light of their public policy objectives.21 However, what also needs to be taken into consideration is that this provision provides for sufficient flexibility to the member nations.22 While the provisions do not limit the nature of products/processes that may be subjected to such a license, it also does not curtail any grounds which the members wish to impose for the grant of such a license.23 Moreover, the conditions that the C.L.s are subjected to under this provisions are also termed very broadly in order to accommodate the needs of the member nations and left the determination of those terms to the fine sense of judgement of the member nations. What Article 31 has done in essence is provided for a minimum standard for the grant of C.L. in the member states.

(A) Exceptions to the obligations under Article 31: Article 31bis

Article 31bis is a result of the first and the only amendment made to the TRIPs agreement so far.24 In order to understand what this amendment entails of, we first need to understand why there was a need felt to bring in this amendment in the first place.

Impact of TRIPS on Members Lacking Manufacturing Capacity

One of the most important controversy surrounding TRIPs since its very inception was the view that it was forcing the developing and least developed countries to adopt high degree of protection for IPRs which was otherwise not an option for them.25 This was done in order to provide smoother access of pharmaceutical products as well as agricultural products to the global north. Some commentators went extremely far to call TRIPs an “inequitable bargain reminiscent of colonialism.”26

A debate went on this aspect for years together and took concrete forms especially in the context of patents. In order to access expensive patents earlier, countries used to grant compulsory licenses. However, this was possible only when there was atleast one manufacture available domestically with the technical knowledge and infrastructure to make such an invention available in the country.27 In cases of non-availability of any such manufacturer in the domestic market, C.L. system would render no help to such countries. In such a situation, the countries were left with the option of procuring the invention from a foreign country where it was available at a low cost for wither of the following reasons-

•  The invention was not patented

•  A C.L. was granted for such an invention

However, TRIPs made it unviable for the countries to exercise any of the following options. While Article 2728 disturbed the first option to an extent, Article 31(f) completely disrupted the second option. Under Article 31 (f), countries were forced to provide C.L. for a predominant supply in the domestic market, thereby limiting export of the patents. This made it even more difficult for countries with no/less manufacturing capacities to access technologies.29 This was true especially for pharmaceutical products and processes. A need was felt to reviewing the C.L. mechanism under TRIPs when countries were unable to access medicines in order to contain epidemics such as HIV/AIDS.30

(A) Adoption of Article 31bis

Doha Declaration and the public health issues

From the beginning of the twentieth century, members started to condemn the system under Article 31 in respect of access to medicines even more strongly. The Fourth Ministerial Conference then took place in Doha in 2001 which was bolstered by the support from various activists and scholars.31 It was in this conference that a proposal was submitted in order to make reforms to the current system of compulsory licensing under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement.32 Members stressed that they attach most importance to both interpretation and implementation of TRIPs agreement in a manner supportive of the public health which is also one of the objectives of the TRIPs Agreement.33 This can be done in two ways-

•  Either by enhancing to existing medicines

•  Or promoting research and development for new medicines

The developed country members resisted to this proposal, however this proposal was the foundation for the unanimous adoption of the WTO Declaration on TRIPs Agreement and Public Health (hereinafter ‘Doha Declaration’). Para 6 of the Declaration categorically instructed the Council of TRIPs to find solutions in order to solve the problems that members with less or no manufacturing capabilities in pharmaceutical industry are facing in using the compulsory licensing system under TRIPs.34

After a lot of discussion on the said point, by the end of 2022 all the members except for the USA were ready to agree to this. USA did not agree in order to protect its pharmaceutical companies. In 2003, the General Council adopted a Decision on the implementation of Article 31bis which mandated the Council to make amendments to the TRIPs. This amendment was proposed for adoption by the members in 2005 with minimal changes from the decision of 2003.

Non-ratification of the proposed amendment

Post the amendment was proposed, the members officially accepted the said amendment in 2005 itself. However, according to the rule laid down under Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement, the accepted proposal would not find its place officially in TRIPs until it was ratified by at least 2/3rd members.35

The first imposed deadline for this purpose was December 2007. The deadline was extended to December 2009 and subsequently to December 2011. However, it is worth noting that by 2010, less than 55 members had ratified the amendment. The reason for this as argues by many scholars is that the members felt that the system laid down for the purpose of export of pharmaceutical products under Article 31bis was too complex to follow as it laid down layers of conditions on all the parties to the system.36

The amendment protocol was finally entered into force in the year 2017 post its ratification by 2/3rd members and it officially became a part of the TRIPs Agreement.37

Structure and contents of the amendment

Post the coming into force of the protocol, it was inserted as Article 31bis into the TRIPs agreement right after Article 31. There are three most important components of the amendment brought into force. The first amongst them are the provisions under Article 31bis, the second are the provisions under the Annex to the TRIPs Agreement and the third are the provisions under the Appendix to Article 31bis.

Provisions under Article 31bis

Article 31bis essentially provides for certain exceptions to the obligations laid down on the members under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement. There are five clauses under the said provision.

a. Waiver of obligations under Article 31(f)

Clause 1 of Article 31bis is the waiver of the obligations of the members under Article 31(f) which lays down that the grant of compulsory licence by a member state must be predominantly for the purpose of supply in the domestic market only.38 What needs to be noted here is the purpose of this clause in the provision as such. The purpose of this clause is to free the member countries from their obligation of domestic supply alone in the cases of grant of a compulsory license so that developed country members may now be able to export pharmaceutical products to the developing of least developed country members who lack the manufacturing capacity to produce the product in their country.39

b. Waiver of obligations under Article 31(h)

The second clause waves off the obligations under Article 31(h) of the eligible importing country member (hereinafter EIM) in certain circumstances. The obligation under Article 31(h) is to provide for reasonable remuneration to the patentee if a compulsory license is granted. However, if a compulsory exporting license is granted in respect of a certain pharmaceutical product, the remuneration is to be granted by the exporting country. Once the exporting country has paid such remuneration, the EIM need not pay the same if the importing license is for the same product for which the exporting license was granted.40 This article fulfils two necessary functions- firstly that the patent holder has been compensated and the second that the burden of compensating the patent holder does not fall on the shoulders of the EIMs which is most likely either a least developed nation or a developing nation and might not be able to bear the costs.

c. Waiver of obligations of Article 31(f) for members of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)

Clause 3 of Article 31bis provides that the obligation of Article 31(f) shall not apply to members of RTAs which is made up of developing or least developed nations.41 There are conditions provided for and if fulfilled the members shall be waived off from their obligations under 31(f) to the extent it is necessary for them to export pharmaceutical products to another member who is a member of an RTA. The conditions for the RTA in question are-

•  The RTA must be recognized under GATT, 1994.

•  At least half of the current membership of the RTA must be under the UN list of LDCs.

The conditions for the exporting member are-

•  The country must be a member of the RTA in question.

•  The country must be a WTO member.

•  The country must either be a developing country member or a least developed country member.

The conditions for EIMs are-

•  It must either be a developing or least developed country.

•  It must share the health problem in question with the exporting member.

(B) Challenge to the measures taken under Article 31bis

Clause 4 imposes a permanent moratorium on ‘non-violation’ and ‘situation’ complaints against the measures taken under Article 31bis.42 Non violation complaints are complaints made by a member that another member has applied a certain measure which might not be in the violation of the agreement however is impeding certain benefits that the complaining member might have otherwise accrued. ‘Situation complaints’ are those complaints in which it is complained that the benefits mentioned are being impeded because of existence of any other situation.

(C) Existing rights and obligations

Clause 5 lays down that the provisions of Article 31bis shall not touch upon any of the other rights and obligations of the members under TRIPs agreement except for obligations under Article 31(f) and (h).43

Annex to TRIPs Agreement and Appendix to 31bis

The Annex to TRIPs Agreement lays down definitions of the terms used in Article 31bis such as pharmaceutical products,44 EIM45 and exporting member,46 the conditions which need to be used in order to use the system set out under the article and address one of the most important concerns with respect to such export, the diversion of goods into another market.47

Para 2 of the Annex48 lays down the conditions that need to be fulfilled by different stakeholders in order to be able to use the system under Article 31bis. The EIM is obliged to make a notification to the Council specifying the name and quantity of the product to be imported, establishing the lack or insufficient manufacturing capacity (except for least developed country members) of the country in respect of the pharmaceutical product in question and mentioning that there is an intention to grant compulsory license in respect of the product in their country. The Appendix to the Annex comes to rescue when lack of manufacturing capacity or no manufacturing capacity has to be established. The Appendix provides that the least developed countries shall be deemed to have lack of manufacturing capacity or no manufacturing capacity. For other EIMs there are two ways to establish the same-

•  Establishing that there is no manufacturing capacity at all

•  Establishing that even if there is a manufacturing capacity, it is not sufficient to meet the needs in the country.49

There are also conditions laid down on which the exporting country may grant a compulsory export license.

•  The C.L. must be granted only for the amount necessary to meet the needs EIM and the entire quantity produced must be exported.

•  The products manufactured for the purpose of such export must be identifiable and these suppliers must distinguish the same by special packaging or labelling to the extent it is feasible and not have a significant impact on the cost of the products.

•  Licensee must make a notification about the quantity supplied and the distinguishing features of the products on wither his own website or on WTO website.

With respect to the exporting member, there is an obligation to make a notification to the Council specifying that there is a grant of a C.L. and the conditions on which it is granted. It must also lay down the specifications of the exported product and place along with that of licensee.

Apart from these obligations, the Annex to the TRIPs Agreement also lays down anti-diversion measures that EIMs and the members to which possible diversions take place need to have.50 Further, the Annex also lays an obligation on developed country members to undertake technology transfer to developing country members or least developed country members for future purposes.51

The Case Study of Rwanda-Canada

The provisions of Article 31bis have been used only once pre-COVID though it was the result of the first ever amendment made to the TRIPs Agreement.52 IN 2007, Rwanda made a notification to the Council of TRIPs in order to import a drug for HIV/AIDS for a period of two years. Thus drug was manufactured by a Canadian Co. Apotex, Inc. which applied for a C.L. in Canada in order to export the drug to Rwanda. As the C.L. was granted, Canada made a notification to the Council with all the requisites under para 2(b) of the Annex to the TRIPs Agreement.53

Thus, the agreement was settled and Canada was to provide the drugs requested to Rwanda in the course of 2 years. However, it took three years for Rwanda to receive the entire shipment from Canada which was a major cause of concern amongst many countries. An annual review meeting to discuss the implementation of Article 31bis was held in 2010 wherein many states expressed their dissatisfaction towards the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.54 While there were also states which viewed the framework as useful in situations of national emergency and extreme urgency.

Many countries argued that the time lost in the process of delivery is unacceptable owing to the fact that it would render the whole system useless. The system is used in cases of National Emergencies; however such timing is unacceptable in such situations.55 During such emergencies it is impossible for the countries to wait for cumbersome bureaucracies. Another important aspect was highlighted by countries in this regard. In case an emergency emerges post the grant of C.L. and the quantity had to be increased mid-way, would the process have to from the beginning again? Thus, this became a cause of concern amongst many countries and the future of this system was questionable.

Fulfilling the TRIPS Obligation in India

(A) Product patents for pharmaceutical products

India did not provide for product patents for pharmaceutical products before the coming of TRIPs Agreement. In order to become TRIPs compliant, India had to provide protection to pharmaceutical products from 1st January 2005, post the expiry of the transition period.56 However, India still had the option benefitting from the allowed ‘pipeline protection’. While the applications received during this term of protection were only liable to be examined post the transition period, the applicants would nevertheless get exclusive marketing rights during such period. Thus, an immediate change in the patent regime was required since India followed a dualist approach.57

Thus, the Patent Amendment Act, 2005 was brought into force through which various provisions such as import of medicines by government,58 C.L.,59 C.L. in situations of national emergency, extreme urgency and public non-commercial use,60 C.L. for export of pharmaceutical products61 etc. were also brought into force. The SC in fact dismissed the provision challenging the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Act enabling product patents for pharmaceutical products on the ground of violation of fundamental right to health.62

(B) Fulfilling obligations under Article 31bis

In order to fulfil its obligations under Article 31bis, India through the 2005 Patent Amendment Act of 2005 inserted 92A which is compliant with Para 6 of Doha Declaration as well as Article 31bis.63 Under Section 92A of The Patents Act, 1970, compulsory licenses have been allowed for exporting pharmaceutical products to the country having either no manufacturing capacity or not sufficient manufacturing capacity and such country has allowed for importation of such pharmaceutical products from India.64 In India, it is the Controller who is empowered to grant such a C.L.65 These provisions are in absolute compliance of Article 31bis and the Annex to TRIPs Agreement.

(C) COVID-19 and Article 31bis

While there is a mechanism provided under Article 31bis for the export of licensed pharmaceutical products to the countries with little or no manufacturing capacity, it does not provide for a viable solution.

(D) Failure of Article 31bis during COVID-19

One of the greatest examples of the failure of the system under Article 31bis during the COVID-19 pandemic is that of Bolivia. In 2021, Bolivia made a notification to the Council with an intention to import a vaccine for COVID-19 from Canada.66 After around a month from the date of notification, the producer of the said vaccine namely Biolyse, issued a statement stating that it failed to secure an IP licence from the developer of the Johnson and Johnson in order to produce the said vaccine for both domestic supply as well as export.67

In their statement, Biolyse also declared that they had the capacity to produce the requisite vaccines however, were unable to do so because of the patent barriers. Owing to this, the company sought a C.L. under Canada Access to Medicine Regime which was set-up in Canada in order to implement Article 31bis.68

After 3 months from the date of notification, a request was made to the Canadian Government in order to add ‘COVID-19’ in the schedule of CAMR which is a necessary step for the grant of C.L.69 While an agreement was signed between Bolivia and Biolyse for the supply of the vaccines should there be a voluntary/ compulsory licence obtained by Bolivia. However, even after 10 months of the notification being made, there was no grant of C.L. from Canada’s side.70

(E) India’s efforts to obtain medical supplies

India was one of the countries which supported the change to be brought by Para 6 at the international level. However, India itself faced problems during the worst health crisis that the world face, COVID-19. While COVID-19 was at its peak during the second wave, India was in the dire need of oxygen and other medical supplies, the most important being remdesivir. Russia promised to help India with Remdisivir supplies.71 However, Russia failed to do it promptly. The reason behind the same was that Russia issues a C.L. for remdesivir in 2021 permitting a company called Pharmasyntez JSC to use the same for one year.72

It is to be noted that this C.L. was granted under the Russian National Law and therefore was bound by Article 31(f) of TRIPs agreement. Thus, this C.L. could be used for supply predominantly in the domestic market, thereby limiting exports.73 There were concerns raised that if there were exports made by Russia now, it would invite patent infringement suits at the international level too. While the C.L. holder company in Russia was willing to export the drug, it wanted to find a legal way to do so.

The supply could be sent to India under the system of Article 31bis, however there were problems attached to it. The most major problem was that it was doubtful whether India would qualify as an EIM in this case and would be able to establish less/no manufacturing capacity. The reason behind this was that the original patent holders of Remdisivir had already granted voluntary licenses to 4 Indian Companies for the production of this drug in India.74 Thus, after a month of heavy contemplations, Russia decided to export the products to India as humanitarian aid contributions.75

Shortcomings of Article 31BIS

While Article 31bis, in theory was supposed to rectify the shortcomings of Article 31 however, it resulted in an increase in problem in reality. There are a few concerns with Article 31bis that I shall deal with in detail-

i. The administrative burdens

A joint report of WTO, WIPO and WHO tried to highlight the concerns of members with the current C.L. regime internationally.76 Looking at the Canada-Rwanda case, countries raised concerns regarding the complex administrative procedures that are there under Article 31bis. While the procedure may look as simple as an EIM making a request to which the exporting country grants a C.L. and in the notification, labelling, listing requirements under the Annex are met with in order to complete the process, the reality is far from that. The administrative burden under the system falls largely on the resource-poor country which has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to prove that it indeed has sufficient or no manufacturing capacity.77

The compliances under the system of Article 31bis are so many that it requires a lot of time to complete. While these compliances are taken care of, the situation of national emergency or extreme urgency might pass by.

ii. Social costs to EIMs

It might so happen that the countries get reluctant in using the system as an EIM considering that they might have to first establish that they have either insufficient or no manufacturing capacity at all. In this situation, their country might be conceived as unfriendly environments for patent holders due to lack of infrastructure in their countries.78 This would reduce the number of patent registrations in their country and ultimately hinder their growth. There is also a threat to these countries that the exporting country governments might later retaliate towards them in other trade-related transaction as a matter of revenge for the loses they incurred by being a part of this licensing deal.

iii. Pharmaceutical challenges

The system under Article 31bis was proposed a long time ago and there is a shift in the treatment mechanisms since then. Thus, the system does not take into consideration things like patient-tailored treatments with biologics. There are emerging types of therapeutics which are tailored according to the patients and are therefore patient specific.79 It is not possible for these pharmaceuticals to be made in the exporting country and then be exported to the EIM.

iv. Legal uncertainties

Legal uncertainty in the context of 31bis is essentially the lack clear and consistent interpretation and application of the provisions under the Article. It can further lead to difficulties in understanding the boundaries of this provision. The language used in the provision is very open ended, leaving a lot of flexibility with the member countries such as deciding a public health emergency. It can later on create disputes amongst the members.

Another point of consideration is that due to lack of precedents owing to the fact that Article 31bis is relatively a newer provision, there might be differences in opinions between the countries and the way they interpret this article leading to inconsistencies in how the provision is utilized globally. While the TRIPS Agreement provides the overall structure, there could be differences in the recommendations made on how to apply Article 31bis by international organizations and experts. Uncertainty may result for nations wishing to use the mechanism as a result.80

Potential Solutions to the Problems under Article 31BIS

i. Encouraging RTAs

The role of RTAs in the system of Article 31bis is already mentioned under Article 31bis (3). Encouraging such RTAs will help to solve the problems posed by the system to at least some extent. The system of RTAs allows the least developed or developing countries having insufficient or lack of manufacturing capacities to handle the problem together as they lack the capacity to do it on their own and under the system of 31bis most likely for the administrative burdens and the social costs that are attached with it. Thus, encouraging RTAs might result in reducing the burden on these countries.

ii. Encouraging infrastructure development

Another course of action is to emphasize the value of strengthening science-infrastructure in developing and least developed nations. Despite the fact that this strategy won’t be simple, the nation is likely to gain from it in a number of ways. There is a significant opportunity to create jobs at all stages, including design, construction, implementation, and research. These nations will also become more independent as a result of this type of infrastructure development, which has the potential to have further advantages.

iii. Data exclusivity

Data exclusivity issues also seem to provide a special problem with an elusive solution. Data exclusivity and the ensuing exclusive period granted to patent holders are currently in direct conflict with expanding access to medications. It is reasonable to anticipate that this data exclusivity may impose an additional burden on members who may need regulatory requirements to be in place before a drug can be marketed but who lack the ability to produce test data pertaining to the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical product. One solution to this could be to alter the stringent conditions of Article 31bis to incorporate this.

Data transfer can take place between exporting country and EIM under seal as part of the compulsory licensing framework if a country demonstrates that marketing approval is necessary and that it meets specific criteria proving the inability to produce the regulatory data itself.

It is safe to conclude that there is no blanket way to resolve the problems that are posed by Article 31bis as such. Instead, efforts to streamline Article 31bis are expected to concentrate on strengthening particular clauses, stressing regional agreements, and highlighting the economies of scale clause in Article 31bis(3). There just isn’t a single, simple cure for Article 31bis’ flaws, so the answer will have to be multifarious and multidimensional.

Conclusion

Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement is crucial in pursuing equity in access to vital medicines and global health. The difficulties with the provision, prospective fixes, and its applicability during the COVID-19 pandemic have all been looked at in this study. Even if Article 31bis is complicated and ambiguous, it offers a way to balance the need for public health with the rights to intellectual property. The importance and restrictions of international accords like Article 31bis have been highlighted by the COVID-19 epidemic.

In order to ensure that the provision changes to meet the changing needs of global health, it is critical that we embrace flexibility and international cooperation as we look to the future. Our joint objective remains striking a balance between the protection of intellectual property and our commitment to global wellbeing. Article 31bis is a ray of hope and a reminder of our shared responsibilities in a society where everyone has the right to obtain critical medications.

*****

Footnotes

2. Ther Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. Int'l Econ. L. 921 (2007).

3. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 317 (2005).

4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197. [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]

5. Oliver Brand, The Dawn of Compulsory Patent Licensing, 11 Intell. Prop. Q. 216 (2007).

6. Daniel J. Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting History And Analysis 3.439-3.449 (5th ed. 2021).

7. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 30.

8. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(a).

9. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(b).

10. Carlos M Correa, Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights- A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 335 (1st Ed. 2006).

11. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(c).

12. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(d).

13. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(e).

14. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(f).

15. Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 J. World Trade 571 (2009).

16. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(h).

17. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(i).

18. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(j).

19. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(k).

20. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 31(l).

21. Susan K. Sell, TRIPs Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 447, 453-54 (2011).

22. Cameron Hutchison, Over 5 Billion Not Served: The TRIPs Compulsory Licensing Export Restriction, 5 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 43, 63-67 (2008).

23. Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents, and Access To Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 211, 222-23 (2004).

24. Max Planck, WTO- Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 358 (Peter- Tobais Stoll, Jan Busche, Katrin Arend, 7th Ed. 2009).

25. Carlos M. Correa, Will the Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement Enhance Access to Medicines? 57 South Centre Policy Brief, 5 (2019).

26. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 369 (2006).

27. Gervais, supra note 5, at 3.55.

28. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 27.

29. UNCTAD & ICTSD, Resource Book On Trips And Development 468 (2005).

30. Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 Ind. Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 613, 620-21 (2003).

31. Id at 622.

32. Draft Ministerial Declaration, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/mindecdraft_w312_e.htm.

33. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8.

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63. Agricas, supra note 3 at 23.

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How to cite

K. Ankita Rao, Access to Essential Medicines: Challenges and Solutions within Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement, 8 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1598 (2025).

Cite this article

K. Ankita Rao, Access to Essential Medicines: Challenges and Solutions within Article 31bis of the TRIPs Agreement, 8 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 1598 (2025).
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