Introduction
International investment arbitration has traditionally been regarded as an important mechanism through which foreign investors may obtain neutral and independent dispute settlement beyond the courts of the host State, together with internationally recognized mechanisms for the enforcement of arbitral awards.1 In Tanzania, however, the role and desirability of international investment arbitration have generated an important legal and policy debate. On the one hand, Tanzania’s participation in the international investment regime, including its membership in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),2 has historically been presented as an important assurance to foreign investors. Indeed, Tanzania’s investment legislation has provided avenues through which investment disputes may be referred to international arbitration,3 while Tanzania’s ratification of the 1965 ICSID Convention entails obligations concerning the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards.4
On the other hand, concerns have increasingly been expressed regarding the perceived imbalance of the investor-State dispute settlement system and its potential implications for developing States’ regulatory autonomy and sovereignty.5 These concerns have contributed to a significant shift in Tanzania’s legal and policy approach, particularly in relation to investments involving natural wealth and resources, where recent legislative reforms have imposed substantial restrictions on recourse to foreign dispute-settlement mechanisms.6 This evolving relationship between investment protection, access to international arbitration, and State sovereignty provides the broader context for the present article and forms the basis for the legal and conceptual analysis that follows. The article asks whether the absolute prohibition in Section 11 of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act is legally effective as a jurisdictional bar to international investment arbitration, and whether a conditional gateway model, such as that adopted by South Africa, could better reconcile Tanzania’s sovereign regulatory interests with its international investment obligations.
The article examines this question through Tanzania’s domestic and international legal framework and, for comparative purposes, considers South Africa’s approach. Particular attention is given to the contrast between Tanzania’s restrictive statutory approach and South Africa’s more conditional approach to international arbitration,7 under which domestic remedies are prioritized while international arbitration may remain available subject to prescribed conditions.8 The comparison is intended to illuminate whether protection of permanent sovereignty necessarily requires exclusion of international arbitration or whether sovereign regulatory interests can be preserved through a more carefully conditioned gateway.
Background: the emergence of Tanzania’s restrictive natural wealth and resources investment regime
Tanzania’s movement toward stronger sovereignty-oriented regulation of natural resources developed against longstanding concerns about the management of the mining sector. The 2008 Presidential Mining Sector Review Committee examined issues including contractual arrangements, benefit-sharing and State participation in mineral-resource exploitation.9 These concerns became particularly prominent in 2017 following the discovery and detention of 277 containers of mineral concentrates associated with Acacia Mining at the Port of Dar es Salaam,10 which triggered governmental investigations and intensified scrutiny of Tanzania’s existing mineral-resource arrangements.11 The Tanzanian government accused Acacia of understating the mineral levels in its exports and failing to pay billions of dollars of taxes, and the company responded by serving notices of arbitration.12
These developments contributed to a series of legislative reforms aimed at strengthening State control over natural wealth and resources.13 Among those reforms was the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act,14 which expressly affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty and established a domestic orientation for the resolution of disputes concerning natural wealth and resources.15 The Act was justified by relying heavily on the principle of permanent sovereignty of host States over natural wealth and resources,16 as provided for under the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.17 The legislation prohibits the referral of cases to international arbitration forums regardless of the fact that the extractive sector in Tanzania largely depends on foreign direct investment for its growth and development.18
This trajectory may be contrasted with South Africa, where disputes arising from the transformation of the mining sector, particularly Foresti v. South Africa,19 contributed to a broader reconsideration of the relationship between resource regulation and investment protection. In that case, a group of Italian nationals and a Luxembourg-based company filed for arbitration with ICSID on 8 November 2006, claiming that the country’s Black Economic Empowerment provisions of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act infringed their rights.20 Although the case was discontinued in 2010 when the tribunal dismissed the claims, and the claimants had to pay €400,000 towards the legal costs of the South African government,21 the case sufficed to awaken an aversion to the rules and procedures of foreign investment as established in the international investment agreements to which South Africa was a party.22 South Africa subsequently adopted a framework that gives priority to domestic remedies while retaining a conditional possibility of international arbitration.23 This contrast provides the background against which the different legal approaches of the two jurisdictions can later be assessed.
Conceptual framework
Natural wealth and resources investment arrangements24 bring foreign economic interests into a sphere over which the State exercises sovereign authority. Where disputes arise from governmental measures affecting such investments,25 investor-State dispute settlement provides mechanisms through which the investor may challenge the conduct of the host State.26 International investment arbitration is particularly significant because, unlike ordinary commercial arbitration, its jurisdiction depends upon the State’s consent, which may be expressed through a treaty, legislation or investment agreement.27 This makes consent the gateway through which an investor moves from having substantive investment protection to having access to an international adjudicatory forum.28
That gateway must nevertheless be considered alongside the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR). PSNR recognizes the authority of States and peoples to control and utilize their natural resources for national development and public benefit.29 The principle was authoritatively articulated in UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII)30 and has since been regarded as a rule of customary international law.31 It was further elaborated in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,32 which affirms the freedom of every State to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth, natural resources and economic activities, including their possession, use and disposal.33 PSNR not only establishes the sovereign’s rights and duties but also empowers States to withdraw from or renegotiate contracts that conflict with the primary objective of maximizing benefits for the people.34 The legal tension addressed in this article therefore arises where Tanzania exercises that sovereign authority through legislation that restricts foreign adjudication while simultaneously remaining subject to international investment commitments capable of providing access to international arbitration. The conceptual issue is consequently one of reconciling regulatory sovereignty with the legal consequences of State consent to international investment dispute settlement.
Legal framework
Tanzania’s domestic legal framework for dispute resolution in the natural resources sector is primarily expressed through the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act.35 Section 11(1)36 provides for the restriction of adjudication of disputes in foreign tribunals, citing Article 27(1) of the Tanzanian Constitution,37 which imposes the duty on every person in Tanzania to protect the natural resources. The instrument further provides that disputes arising from extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural wealth and resources shall be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs in the United Republic and in accordance with the laws of Tanzania.38 Subsection 11(3)39 requires that Tanzanian judicial bodies and the application of the laws of Tanzania be acknowledged and incorporated in any arrangement or agreement, thereby guaranteeing the use of local avenues in dispute settlement. The restriction imposed has far-reaching effects on potential investment interests in the State because of what is shown as an unpredictable investment environment.40
Tanzania’s international investment obligations present a markedly different picture. The country is a signatory to 20 bilateral investment treaties,41 two of which have been terminated and eight of which are not yet in force; the rest remain in force. These BITs provide for the adjudication of disputes in international arbitration forums.42 The forums specified include ICSID and its arbitration rules based on the 1965 Washington Convention, ad hoc tribunals established under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
The point of tension between Tanzania’s domestic framework and its international obligations is clear and well-documented. Section 11 of the Act43 conflicts with the bilateral investment treaties to which Tanzania is a signatory.44 The Act limits the adjudication of disputes to judicial bodies or other organs in Tanzania, whereas the analyzed BITs allow for referral of disputes to international forums, provided that the institution of such proceedings adheres to both the bilateral agreements and the international forum’s conditions precedent to submission of claims. This conflict raises fundamental questions under international law. Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. The Vienna Convention further provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty obligation.46 Tanzania therefore cannot use Section 1147 as a justification for failing to perform its BIT obligations.
Access to international investment arbitration by the foreign investor in Tanzania’s natural wealth and resources sector
Section 1148 prohibits the submission of natural wealth and resources arrangements disputes to any foreign court or tribunal and mandates adjudication by Tanzanian bodies under Tanzanian law. Its legal effect, however, is confined to the domestic plane. Tribunal jurisdiction in investment arbitration derives from treaty-based consent, not from the respondent State’s domestic legislation.49 Where a BIT contains a standing offer to arbitrate, the investor perfects consent by accepting it, and a subsequent statute does not withdraw that offer.50 Tanzania has taken no step under either Convention to restrict its consent:51 it ratified the ICSID Convention52 without any Article 25(4)53 notification excluding natural-resource disputes, and its New York Convention54 reservation is confined to reciprocity.55 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,56 Tanzania cannot invoke the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act57 to justify non-performance of its BIT obligations.
Tanzania’s treaty practice confirms that consent extends to natural wealth and resources investment arrangements. The Tanzania–UK BIT58 consents to ICSID arbitration over legal disputes concerning investments,59 and its definition of investment expressly includes concessions to extract natural resources,60 subject only to a six-month period for settlement through the pursuit of local remedies or otherwise.61 The Tanzania–Canada BIT62 permits ICSID, Additional Facility, or UNCITRAL arbitration,63 and expressly addresses enforcement of awards.64 Comparable provisions appear in the Swiss, Turkish and Mauritian BITs. None of these instruments carves out natural resources from consent. The gateway to arbitration is therefore already open at the treaty level, and the investor relies on the BIT rather than on any domestic permission.
The post-2017 record demonstrates that investors have continued to access arbitration despite Section 11. In Nachingwea v. Tanzania,65 the tribunal proceeded under the UK–Tanzania BIT,66 found the six-month condition satisfied, and awarded USD 76.70 million for unlawful expropriation, with annulment proceedings following.67 Winshear Gold68 and Montero Mining69 were both initiated under the Canada–Tanzania BIT70 and settled for USD 30 million and USD 27 million respectively. EcoDevelopment in Europe AB v. Tanzania71 produced an award of USD 164.60 million. PanAfrican Energy72 was registered in 2025 on the basis of a contract. These cases establish that Section 1173 has not functioned as an effective jurisdictional barrier.
A further point follows from Tanzania’s own treaty practice. The UK, Canadian, Swiss and Turkish BITs already contain conditional gateways, such as negotiation periods, exhaustion of local remedy requirements, and temporal conditions before arbitration may be commenced. Section 1174 departs from that practice by substituting an absolute prohibition for the conditional access that Tanzania has accepted in instrument after instrument. The inconsistency is internal to Tanzania’s framework, not merely a matter of domestic law against international law. The amendment to Section 11 made by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act, 2026,75 which permits Cabinet-approved special arrangements on proceedings, the seat of arbitration and jurisdiction,76 is a legislative acknowledgment that the categorical approach has been counterproductive.
The practical conclusion is that Section 11 is formally absolute but legally ineffective as a jurisdictional bar. What it achieves is not the exclusion of arbitration but uncertainty: a domestic statutory statement conflicting with treaty commitments leaves investors, tribunals and courts to determine which instrument governs. The accessibility question is therefore not whether access is formally prohibited, but whether the prohibition is coherent and effective within Tanzania’s broader framework of investment obligations. It is neither, and that finding frames the comparative inquiry into South Africa’s conditional gateway that follows.
South Africa as a comparative jurisdiction
A. Foresti v. South Africa and the background to reform
South Africa’s journey toward restricting international investment arbitration began with the Foresti v. South Africa case.77 In that case, a group of Italian nationals and a Luxembourg-based company filed for arbitration with ICSID on 8 November 2006, challenging the government’s policy of redistributing 26% of mining interests to historically disadvantaged South Africans as part of the Black Economic Empowerment programme, arguing that it infringed their rights.78 The case demonstrated that even well-intentioned domestic policies aimed at addressing historical injustices could be challenged before international tribunals, prompting a fundamental reconsideration of South Africa’s approach to investment protection.
B. South Africa’s conditional gateway to international arbitration
In response to these concerns, South Africa terminated most of its first-generation BITs with European countries79 and enacted the Protection of Investment Act.80 Section 1381 regulates the dispute resolution mechanism available to investors. It provides that an investor that has a dispute in respect of action taken by the government may, within six months of becoming aware of the dispute, request the Department to facilitate the resolution of such dispute by appointing a mediator.82 Recourse to mediation must be governed by prescribed rules.83 Investors must have the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.84
Crucially, in terms of section 13,85 foreign investors no longer have any right of recourse to investor-State international arbitration, which is a key form of investment protection globally. As a palliative, the Act affords foreign investors the right to refer disputes with the South African government to mediation. However, unlike Tanzania’s absolute prohibition, South Africa’s approach does not completely foreclose the possibility of international recourse. The Act provides a conditional gateway, as domestic remedies are prioritized, and international arbitration, conducted between the Republic and the investor’s home State, may remain available subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the government’s consent.86 This represents a more calibrated approach that preserves sovereign discretion while leaving a pathway, however narrow, to international adjudication in appropriate cases.
Comparative discussion: absolute restriction or conditional gateway?
The comparison between Tanzania and South Africa reveals two fundamentally different approaches to reconciling permanent sovereignty with international investment obligations. Tanzania has adopted an absolute prohibition under Section 11,87 which restricts the adjudication of disputes to judicial bodies or other organs in Tanzania. South Africa, by contrast, has adopted a conditional gateway under Section 13 of the Protection of Investment Act,88 which prioritizes domestic remedies and mediation while retaining the possibility of State-to-State international recourse subject to government consent.
The Tanzanian approach presents significant legal difficulties. The Act conflicts with the bilateral investment treaties to which Tanzania is a signatory.89 This conflict exposes Tanzania to international claims and undermines investor confidence.90
The South African approach, while also restrictive, is legally more sustainable. By terminating its BITs before passing the Act, South Africa cleared the legal deck and avoided direct treaty conflicts.91 The conditional gateway provides a predictable sequence of steps: mediate, then litigate locally, and only then consider international recourse. This approach avoids the absolute prohibition that creates direct treaty conflicts and exposes the State to international claims. However, both models have costs in terms of FDI attraction. The key variable is that Tanzania remains party to many BITs, whereas South Africa terminated most of its BITs before enacting its restrictive legislation.
Reconciling permanent sovereignty and international investment obligations
The reconciliation of permanent sovereignty with international investment obligations requires acknowledging that PSNR is not absolute but must coexist with the international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.92 Sovereignty includes the right to enter into binding treaties and the duty to honor them.93 As the International Law Commission has rightly described pacta sunt servanda, it is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties.94 A State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty obligation.95
Tanzania should acknowledge that investments made prior to 2017 retain their BIT protections. Unilaterally stripping those protections via Section 11 constitutes a breach of fair and equitable treatment and exposes the State to international claims.96 For future investments, Tanzania should consider amending Section 11 to introduce a conditional gateway, similar to South Africa’s approach, that preserves sovereign discretion while leaving a pathway to international adjudication. This would involve requiring mandatory domestic mediation and exhaustion of local administrative remedies before international arbitration could be considered.
Main findings
The article finds that Section 1197 is formally absolute but legally ineffective as a jurisdictional bar to international investment arbitration. Tribunal jurisdiction derives from treaty-based consent that Tanzania has never withdrawn at the treaty level. Tanzania ratified the ICSID Convention in 1992 without any Article 25(4)98 notification excluding natural-resource disputes, and its New York Convention reservation is confined to reciprocity. Tanzania’s BITs extend consent to natural-resource investments without any carve-out, and the post-2017 record (Nachingwea, Winshear Gold, Montero Mining, EcoDevelopment and PanAfrican Energy) confirms that investors continue to access arbitration despite the prohibition.
The article further finds that Tanzania’s own treaty practice already incorporates conditional gateways, through negotiation periods and local-remedy requirements, which makes Section 11’s blanket prohibition internally inconsistent with the State’s own approach in instrument after instrument. The comparative analysis of South Africa demonstrates that sovereign regulatory authority and international arbitration need not be structured as mutually exclusive alternatives. South Africa’s conditional gateway, established in Section 13 of the Protection of Investment Act,99 prioritizes domestic remedies while preserving a defined route to international arbitration upon exhaustion of local processes and government consent.
Conclusion and recommendations
A. Conclusion
This article has shown that Section 11 of Cap. 449 R.E. 2023, which conforms with the principle of PSNR, is formally absolute but in conflict with Tanzania’s international obligations, which leads to uncertainty, because tribunal jurisdiction derives from treaty-based consent that Tanzania has never withdrawn at the treaty level, and the post-2017 record of ICSID claims confirms that investors continue to access arbitration despite the prohibition. South Africa’s conditional gateway demonstrates that sovereign regulatory authority and international arbitration need not be mutually exclusive, and Tanzania’s own BIT practice already incorporates negotiation periods and local-remedy conditions that operate as conditional gateways. A conditional gateway adapted to Tanzania’s ICSID membership would therefore achieve the objectives that motivated the 2017 reforms, namely domestic primacy, scrutiny of resource arrangements, and protection of national interests, without the treaty conflict and uncertainty that the blanket prohibition generates. The path to sovereignty lies not in excluding international arbitration, but in conditioning access to it in a manner that is coherent, predictable, and consistent with Tanzania’s international obligations.
B. Recommendations
First, the Legislature should consider amending Section 11 of Cap. 449 R.E. 2023 to remove the blanket prohibition and replace it with a conditional gateway requiring mandatory domestic mediation and exhaustion of local administrative remedies before international arbitration.
Second, the Government should issue a formal unilateral declaration clarifying that existing PSAs and BITs remain valid and that consent to ICSID arbitration is unaffected for investments predating the 2017 amendments, thereby stabilizing the legal environment.
Third, Tanzania should fully operationalize the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and other international obligations, ensuring that legitimate international awards are enforceable domestically, subject only to narrow public policy exceptions.
Fourth, Tanzania should engage with key investment partners to renegotiate BITs that include a “right to regulate” carve-out and a mandatory cooling-off period, rather than unilaterally tearing them up.
Fifth, resources should be allocated to the Tanzanian judiciary and arbitration institutions to build the technical capacity required to handle high-value extractive industry disputes, thereby making domestic adjudication a credible alternative.
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Footnotes
1. Nicolas Hachez & Jan Wouters, International Investment Dispute Settlement in the Twenty-First Century: Does the Preservation of the Public Interest Require an Alternative to the Arbitral Model?, in Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives 417 (F. Baetens ed., 2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139855921.027.
2. Tanzania signed the ICSID Convention on January 10, 1992, deposited its instrument of ratification on May 18, 1992, and the Convention entered into force for Tanzania on June 17, 1992. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (ICSID/3, July 17, 2026) [hereinafter ICSID/3].
3. The Tanzania Investment Act, Cap. 38 R.E. 2023, § 33 (Tanz.), repealed by the Tanzania Investment and Special Economic Zones Act, No. 6 of 2025 (Tanz.). See Bank of Tanz., Tanz. Inv. & Special Econ. Zones Auth. & Nat’l Bureau of Stat., Tanzania Investment Report 2025 9 (2026), https://www.bot.go.tz/Publications/Other/Tanzania%20Investment/en/2026041311531522.pdf.
4. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States arts. 53–54, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
5. This has resulted in a backlash by States against the system and withdrawal from traditional BITs. Ecuador, for instance, denounced the ICSID Convention with effect from January 7, 2010, before ratifying it again in 2021. ICSID/3, supra note 2, at 3 n.1. See also U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Phase 2 of IIA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of Old-Generation Treaties (2017), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d3_en.pdf (“of 212 BITs terminated as of March 2017, 19 treaties (9 per cent) were jointly terminated, without any replacement or consolidation; another 59 (28 per cent) were unilaterally terminated, while 134 (63 per cent) were replaced by a new treaty”).
6. The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, Cap. 449 R.E. 2023, § 11 (Tanz.) [hereinafter Permanent Sovereignty Act].
7. Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 § 13(5) (S. Afr.).
8. Lindelwa Mhlongo, A Critical Analysis of the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, 34 S. Afr. Pub. L. 1, 14–15 (2019), https://doi.org/10.25159/2522-6800/4190.
9. United Republic of Tanz., Report of the Presidential Mining Review Committee to Advise the Government on Oversight of the Mining Sector vol. 2 (2008).
10. Press Release, Permanent Sec’y, Ministry of Energy & Minerals, United Republic of Tanz., Export Ban of Metallic Mineral Concentrates and Ore (Mar. 3, 2017).
11. See Muhtasari wa Taarifa ya Kamati Maalum Iliyoundwa na Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania Mhe. Dkt. John Pombe Magufuli Kuchunguza Mchanga wa Madini (Makinikia) (2017), https://lglb.go.tz/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/MUHTASARI%20TAARIFA%20YA%20KAMATI%20MAALUM.pdf.
12. Acacia Mining PLC v. United Republic of Tanzania, LCIA Case No. UN 173686.
13. These legislative instruments are the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, No. 5 of 2017; the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017; and the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 7 of 2017 (Tanz.).
14. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6.
15. Id. § 11.
16. Id. pmbl. The Act also reproduces UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in its First Schedule. Id. sched. 1.
17. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 2(1) (Dec. 12, 1974) (declaring that “[e]very State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities”). The Charter is reproduced in the Second Schedule to the Act. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, sched. 2.
18. Tanzania Investment Report 2025, supra note 3, at viii, 14–15. The report states that Tanzania’s FDI inflows grew by 0.4 percent to USD 1,656 million in 2024 and that FDI inflows remained concentrated in mining and quarrying, finance and insurance, manufacturing, and information and communication, which together accounted for 73.6 percent of total FDI inflows. See also Prezidius Malimi, The Effect of Section 11 of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act No. 5 of 2017 on Bilateral Investment Treaty Protection in Tanzania (2023) (LL.M. mini-dissertation, University of Pretoria) (abstract), http://hdl.handle.net/2263/94896.
19. Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug. 4, 2010).
20. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 §§ 3(1), 100(2)(a), sched. II items 6–7 (S. Afr.), which led to the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry (2002) (requiring 26% HDSA ownership). See Foresti, supra note 19, ¶¶ 1, 56.
21. Foresti, supra note 19, ¶ 133, pt. IV.
22. Sean Woolfrey, South Africa’s Stance on Bilateral Investment Treaties, Tralac (2012), https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5287-south-africa-s-stance-on-bilateral-investment-treaties.html.
23. This involved South Africa giving notice of termination of several BITs, including those with Denmark, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands. See Mhlongo, supra note 8, at 3–4; Mohammad Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experience Exiting Its BITs 4 (Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 2015/97, 2015).
24. Section 3 of the Act defines an “arrangement or agreement” as “any contract relating to extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural wealth and resources”. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 3.
25. Jonathan Bonnitcha & Zoe Phillips Williams, State Liability for ‘Politically’ Motivated Conduct in the Investment Treaty Regime, 33 Leiden J. Int’l L. 77 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156519000566.
26. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community (OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 2012/03, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.
27. Makane Moïse Mbengue, Consent to Arbitration through National Investment Legislation, Inv. Treaty News (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.), July 19, 2012, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/consent-to-arbitration-through-national-investment-legislation/.
28. Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore & Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (2d ed. 2017).
29. Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties 171–72 (1997).
30. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Dec. 14, 1962) (adopted by 87 votes in favour to 2 against, with 12 abstentions). The resolution builds on G.A. Res. 523 (VI) (Jan. 12, 1952) and G.A. Res. 626 (VII) (Dec. 21, 1952), which it recalls.
31. Telesphory D.B. Magogo, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) vis-à-vis Benefits from Extractive Investments: A Highlight on Natural Resources Investment Arrangements, 6(1) Int’l J. Legal Dev. & Allied Issues 10, 13 (2020), https://thelawbrigade.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Priyanka-Mane_Dr.-Telesphory-D.B-Magogo.pdf.
32. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), supra note 17.
33. Id. art. 2(1).
34. Magogo, supra note 31, at 23–24.
35. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6.
36. Id. § 11(1).
37. Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania art. 27(1) (1977, as amended).
38. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11(2), as amended by the Arbitration Act, No. 2 of 2020, § 100 (Tanz.) (deleting the word “established” from subsections (2) and (3)).
39. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11(3).
40. Malimi, supra note 18, at 51.
41. These include the Canada–Tanzania, China–Tanzania, Tanzania–Turkey, Mauritius–Tanzania, Denmark–Tanzania, United Kingdom–Tanzania and Germany–Tanzania BITs. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., International Investment Agreements Navigator: United Republic of Tanzania, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/222/united-republic-of-tanzania?type=bits; Malimi, supra note 18 (abstract). The Canada–Tanzania agreement was terminated, on Tanzania’s notice, with effect from December 9, 2023; under its Article 40(2) it continues to apply to investments made before that date until December 9, 2038. Glob. Affs. Can., Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tanzania-tanzanie/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng.
42. For instance, Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Tanz.–U.K., art. 8, Jan. 7, 1994 [hereinafter Tanz.–U.K. BIT]; Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of Mauritius for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mauritius–Tanz., 2009; Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.–Tanz., art. 23, May 16, 2013 [hereinafter Can.–Tanz. BIT]; Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the United Republic of Tanzania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.–Tanz., 2004; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.–Tanz., art. 10, 2011.
43. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
44. Malimi, supra note 18 (concluding that Section 11 conflicts with the bilateral investment treaties to which Tanzania is a signatory).
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
46. Id. art. 27.
47. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
48. Id.
49. Christoph Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 McGill J. Disp. Resol. 1, 8–9 (2014).
50. Guiguo Wang, Consent in Investor-State Arbitration: A Critical Analysis, 13 Chinese J. Int’l L. 335, 340–41 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmu017.
51. ICSID records no notification by Tanzania under Article 25(4) of the Convention, and no legislative or other measures communicated to the Centre under Article 69 to make the Convention effective in Tanzania. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., Database of ICSID Member States: Tanzania, https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-states/database-of-member-states/member-state-details?state=ST137. At the bilateral level, Tanzania gave notice terminating the Canada–Tanzania agreement, subject to its fifteen-year survival clause. See supra note 41.
52. ICSID/3, supra note 2.
53. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(4).
54. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
55. This means Tanzania will apply the Convention, “in accordance with the first sentence of article I (3) thereof, only to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another Contracting State”, on the basis of mutual recognition and enforcement. United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxii-1&chapter=22&clang=_en.
56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 27.
57. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
58. Tanz.–U.K. BIT, supra note 42.
59. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 252 (July 24, 2008) (quoting Article 8(1) of the Tanz.–U.K. BIT, supra note 42).
60. Tanz.–U.K. BIT, supra note 42, art. 1(a)(v); Biwater Gauff, supra note 59, ¶ 242.
61. Tanz.–U.K. BIT, supra note 42, art. 8(3); Biwater Gauff, supra note 59, ¶ 260.
62. Can.–Tanz. BIT, supra note 42.
63. Id. art. 23(1).
64. Id. art. 34.
65. Nachingwea U.K. Limited, Ntaka Nickel Holdings Limited & Nachingwea Nickel Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/38, Award (July 14, 2023).
66. Tanz.–U.K. BIT, supra note 42.
67. Nachingwea, supra note 65, ¶¶ 182, 294, 388. Counsel for the claimants reported damages of US$76.7 million, amounting to over US$109 million after interest. Lalive, News (July 18, 2023), https://www.lalive.law/?p=3749. Tanzania’s application for annulment, registered on July 28, 2023, was discontinued on October 17, 2025. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps., Case Details: ICSID Case No. ARB/20/38, https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/20/38.
68. Winshear Gold Corp. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/25, Procedural Order Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding (Nov. 1, 2023), https://www.italaw.com/cases/10158; see Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, BSF Solidifies $30 Million Settlement for Winshear Gold (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.bsfllp.com/news-events/bsf-solidifies-30-million-settlement-for-winshear-gold.html.
69. Montero Mining & Exploration Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/21/6, Procedural Order Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding (Mar. 31, 2025); see Montero Mining Settles with Tanzania for US$27M, N. Miner, https://www.northernminer.com/news/montero-mining-settles-with-tanzania-for-us27m/1003875175/.
70. Can.–Tanz. BIT, supra note 42.
71. EcoDevelopment in Europe AB & EcoEnergy Africa AB v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/33, Award (Apr. 13, 2022) (claim under the Sweden–Tanzania BIT of 1999). Tanzania’s application for annulment was discontinued on May 16, 2023.
72. PanAfrican Energy Tanzania Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania & Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, ICSID Case No. ARB/25/43 (registered Aug. 28, 2025; instrument invoked: contract). The arbitral phase is pending; the tribunal was constituted in February 2026.
73. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
74. Id.
75. Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act, No. 7 of 2026, § 19 (Tanz.) (assented to Sept. 19, 2026; published Oct. 2, 2026), enacting clause 16 of the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Bill, 2026.
76. Id. (adding section 11(4) to the Permanent Sovereignty Act); see Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Bill, 2026, Statement of Objects and Reasons (Tanz.) (stating that the purpose of the amendment is “to strengthen the investment environment in the country”).
77. Foresti, supra note 19.
78. Id. ¶¶ 1, 56; Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, supra note 20.
79. Mhlongo, supra note 8, at 1, 3–4.
80. Protection of Investment Act, supra note 7.
81. Id. § 13.
82. Id. § 13(1).
83. Id. § 13(2)(d).
84. Id. § 6(4).
85. Id. § 13.
86. Id. § 13(5); Mhlongo, supra note 8, at 14–15.
87. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
88. Protection of Investment Act, supra note 7, § 13.
89. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
90. Claims such as Winshear Gold, supra note 68. See also Malimi, supra note 18.
91. Woolfrey, supra note 22.
92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 26.
93. Id.
94. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187, 211 (commentary to draft art. 23, ¶ 1).
95. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 45, art. 27.
96. See supra note 90.
97. Permanent Sovereignty Act, supra note 6, § 11.
98. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(4).
99. Protection of Investment Act, supra note 7, § 13.
