INTRODUCTION
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is defined under the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982”1, is one of the most comprehensive projects in international law in the reconciliation of conflicting interests over ocean space and resources. The EEZ regime was supposed to establish a balance between the equity of resources and maintenance of an open sea order through allowing the coastal States to have exclusive economic rights within a 200 nautical mile area without interfering with basic freedoms of navigation and overflight. Nevertheless, the EEZ has now become a geopolitical conflict hub rather than a geopolitical cooperative governance after forty years. The current disputes, especially the “South China Sea”, shows the effectiveness of EEZ law does not depends on its doctrinal accuracy but the political intent of the states to comply. The entry of the “WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in 2025”2 brings in another dimension of introducing a further layer of trade-based disciplines seeks to curb illegal and unsustainable fishing, including in disputed EEZs. The broader question that emerges out of this development is whether the international ocean governance is developing in an integrated or a fragmented way across parallel regimes. This article examines the framework of EEZ provided in Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS3, the functions of fisheries subsidy disciplines in conservation, and the ways in which the maritime delimitation can be done fairly through the judicial adjudications. It states that the advanced offer of resource equity offered by the EEZ is still constrained by selective compliance and power imbalances that the regulations of law can address.
THE EEZ OF UNCLOS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND STRUCTURAL LIMITS
A. Concept and Legal Framework
According to Part V of UNCLOS, the EEZ defined as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines (Articles 55–57). In this zone, the coastal State has got the rights to exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of natural resources of both the water column and the seabed and subsoil (Article 56)4. These rights also include the economic exploitation of “water energy, currents, and winds, the jurisdiction over artificial islands, marine scientific research, and protection of environment”.
More importantly, UNCLOS does not granting sovereignty. Article 585 safeguards in case of other States, “the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines”, and thus highlights the functional not the territorial nature of the EEZ. The regime is therefore a negotiated balance between the coastal States economic interests and the need to have an open maritime order6.
UNCLOS has its positive obligations as well. Articles 61 and 627 provide that coastal States are required to preserve their living resources and promote optimum utilization including the provision of access to excess allowable catch in the event that domestic harvesting capacity is insufficient. Article 738 offer powers to enforce the fisheries offences but this is restricted by the terms of proportionality, release on bond, and denial of imprisonment as a remedy of fisheries offences. Nevertheless, the EEZ regime presupposes rights of which there is no legal dispute.
UNCLOS does not give definitive direction in any case of overlap of claims. Articles 74 and 839 states that, during delimitation, the states must agree to achieve a just solution and that they must exercise restraint until they have achieved final delimitation. The absence of implementation means that the regime is most efficient in the States in which the States have embraced to a judicial settlement and internalize its normative restrictions restrictions10.
B. Judicial Interpretation of EEZ Rights and Enforcement
The content and limits of EEZ jurisdiction has been clarified by International jurisprudence. In the case of M/V Saiga (No 2),11 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) held that enforcement actions of Guinea in its EEZ against a foreign vessel has violated UNCLOS, and the scope of coastal State jurisdiction are limited to the competences related to resources and had to take into account flag-State rights and proportionality. The Tribunal reaffirmed that the EEZ is a separate entity and not an extension of territorial sovereignty12.
Similarly, in Virginia G13, ITLOS held that in case of bunkering of fishing vessels the competence of coastal state could fall under Article 5614, but emphasized that the penalty and detention must comply with the provisions of Article 7315. The Arctic Sunrise16 provisional measures order also further emphasized that despite the existence of resource-related jurisdiction, the coastal states still have to be adhere of the navigation rights and the obligations of dispute-settlement.
All these decisions collectively show that the EEZ is not a disguised extension of territorial sovereignty but a functional zone of shared competences. This is the core of criticism of expansive claims in the South China Sea.
EEZ GOVERNANCE THE 2025 WTO AGREEMENT ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES
The “WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies” has adopted in 2023 and entered into force in the end of 202517 is referred as the “first multilateral trade agreement” that has an explicit focus on environment. It prohibits some types of subsidies that are contributing to “illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, fishing of overfished stocks and high‑seas overcapacity”, which provides special and differential treatment to developing and least-developed countries. In terms of EEZ, obligations of UNCLOS in Articles 61 and 6218 are applied in the Agreement to enhance the “conservation of living resources and optimum utilization of marine resources by controlling state-subsidized practices that contribute to the unsustainable fishing practices”19.
The logic of the WTO regime reflects with the jurisprudence of UNCLOS. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna20, ITLOS ordered Japan to cease “unilateral experimental fishing” and to comply with presetting of catch limits, highlighting that “conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment.” The Tribunal thus took a precautionary approach, where it expanded the view that scientific evidence is still uncertain, but stock depletion is severe, states have a dutay to focus on conservation.
The case study of Southern Bluefin Tuna alongside the 2025 WTO Agreement indicates an emerging dual‑track regime which are judicially bound duties to cooperate and conserve under UNCLOS, and trade‑law prohibitions on subsidies that undermine these duties. In disputed EEZs, such financial discipline would theoretically suppress the economic impulse that distant-water ships and paramilitary so-called fishing militias have to conduct IUU activities that undermine the stability of a given region.
SETTING BOUNDARIES EEZS: FROM NORTH SEA TO CONTEMPORARY EQUITY
The classic “North Sea Continental Shelf case” rejected the automatic application of the equidistance principle, and instead delimitation must be based on what it calls equitable principles, taking into consideration the relevant factors, including the coastline and proportionality of maritime jurisdiction. Prior to UNCLOS, this equity-based doctrine significantly influenced, Article 74 and 83 and remains the paradigm of EEZ and shelf delimitations in the modern periods21.
Later jurisprudence has further narrowed this down into a three‑stage methodological approach. In “Bangladesh v. Myanmar”, the tribunal established a provisional equidistance line which was later amended to depict relevant circumstances such as the concave coast of Bangladesh and the disproportionality between the coastline and the maritime limits, which eventually agreed on an equidistance line with slight modifications as equitable22.
The decision in the case of “Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire” 23 agreed to this three-step approach and evaluated the interim obligations before delimitation and established that Ghana was not violating the rights of Cotte d Ivoire and good faith actions were expected to be exercised24.
All these instances shows that equity is not a vague plea for fairness but a structured judicial technique, that can be applied in the South China dispute or future India-China maritime conflicts, depending on whether the parties accept jurisdiction or not.
SOUTH CHINA SEA: LEGAL ASPECTS AND NON‑COMPLIANCE
A. Historic Rights and features
The “South China Sea Arbitration” 25 represents as the key authority on the legal aspects of South China Sea. The tribunal stated that none of the features of Spratly qualifies as an “island” within the purview of “Article 121(3)”, most of them are “rocks or low‑tide elevations” and hence, cannot generate an independent EEZs or continental shelves. By this ruling, the maritime zones which may be lawfully occupied by any state, including China, are significantly reduced over the Spratly’s.
On the issue of historic rights, tribunal has decided that China’s “nine‑dash line” being inconsistent with the overall regimes of EEZ and the continental shelf regimes as established by UNCLOS and that any pre‑existing historic rights is refuted in cases where it is inconsistent with the claim of EEZ by other states. This argument is conceptually similar to the jurisprudence of Guyana v. Suriname, which arrives at the conclusion that unilateral assertions cannot possibly replace the delimitation based on treaties or entail the duty of restraint in disputed maritime areas26.
B. Environmental Duties and Law‑Enforcement Behavior
The SCS Tribunal also found that, China violative of its obligations under “Articles 192-194” through causing severe harm to vulnerable coral reef ecosystems through “large‑scale land reclamation efforts and the creation of artificial islands”. This determination is congruent with the due-diligence standard as defined in the “ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area”, that placed stringent environmental obligations on the sponsoring states involved in deep-sea mining.
With regard to law-enforcement practice, the tribunal criticized the unsafe practices of Chinese vessels and blockade of Philippine vessels, implicitly contrasting them with case laws under ITLOS such as “M/V Saiga27 and Arctic Sunrise”28 which protects the sovereignty of navigation and the necessity of proportionality in the enforcement of EEZ. In doctrinal terms, the SCS award builds upon previous jurisprudence and it makes use of equity-driven delimitation to feature status determinations and at the same time incorporates environmental due diligence and human-safety imperatives.
THE TENSIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
India does not have any part in South China Sea conflicts; however, India still has huge stakes in the stability of the EEZs and the freedom of navigation. It has its own EEZ of about 2.37 million square kilometers within the Indian Ocean which supports a great fisheries and offshore hydrocarbon company. Moreover, in India Bay of Bengal cases of 2012 and 2014, equidistance plus equity methodology as discussed above was used to determine their result. In contrast with the renunciation of the “South China Sea” by China, India agreed to a significant revision of its asserted maritime boundary, which strengthens the image of a country that complies with a rules-based maritime order29.
The 2025 maritime doctrine of India30 links SAGAR (“Security and Growth for All in the Region”) program are coupled with the concern of Chinese naval and coastguard operations extending from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean, especially around the key maritime routes close to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Despite the fact that no active dispute over the demarcation of the EEZ can be anticipated between India and China, the vast activities of China in “South China Sea” raise some concerns that similar initiatives can be extended to other areas, challenging legal entitlements of India and regional influence.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND REFORM: TOWARDS THE ASEAN CODE OF CONDUCT
The “Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” is defined in “Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS”, and subject to the interpretation of a number of seminal cases, which are collectively called the North Sea cases, “Bangladesh v. Myanmar, Ghana v. Cote d Ivoire and the South China Sea Award”. All of these judicial decisions create a complex image of resource equity based on the legally controllable standards. The WTO Agreement on fisheries subsidies 2025 adds an economic aspect since harmful subsidies that hamper conservation and fair play are disciplined. However, the gap between the codified law and its practice still remains strong.
To start with, EEZ regime is structurally biased towards coastal states to give them broad rights to resources and diffuse responsibilities in cooperating, and in conserving resources, providing incentives to creeping jurisdiction and unilateral operation, which is already seen in militarization of South China Sea. Second, courts and tribunals rely on consent of states; when these fail to appear or to comply, even legally sound award can not necessarily work practically as China did in the “South China Sea case”. Third, the success of the subsidy regime of WTO depends on being a part of it as well as domesticized which gives the major fishing nations the freedom to weaken it by under-notifying or not complying at all.
It is against this backdrop that a binding Code of Conduct of ASEAN31 based on the current jurisprudence may partially fill the compliance gap. A Code such as that, ideally to be finalized by 2026, could include the interpretations of Article 121 and the rights by the 2016 “South China Sea Award”, and would therefore strengthen the norms of consistency of UNCLOS in the region. It would also promote joint-development agreements and forbearance in contentious EEZs, and they are values expressed in “Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire”, by ensuring coordinated application of fisheries subsidy disciplines by use of regional data-sharing strategies.
India, who is not a member of the ASEAN, it could offer a supportive role through the Diplomacy of the Code and capacity building to the same practice in the Bay of Bengal to the same normative jurisprudence and ensure it builds its own normative status over China.
CONCLUSION
The EEZ regime under UNCLOS 1982 constitutes a carefully calibrated compromise. It gives coastal states broad rights to resources and safeguards primary freedoms and fair distribution of the delimitation and environmental care. The above decisions have transformed the concept of equity, beyond a political slogan, into a more formal judicial approach, whereas fisheries issues like “Southern Bluefin Tuna” and enforcement cases like “Saiga and Arctic Sunrise” have brought into action the abstract provisions as operative limitations and responsibilities.
This framework is strengthened by the “WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, 2025” which deals with the subsidies which encourage IUU fishing and overcapacity, which is applicable to the disputed EEZs. However, non-compliance in the “South China Sea” and the growing competition between India and China in the sea reveals the weakness of the legal systems that lack political will. An ASEAN Code of Conduct of conduct which is informed by the existing jurisprudence and is supported by the regional powers such as India is a realistic incremental reform. It would not follow a new law but would on the contrary ingrain and affirm equity-based EEZ order that UNCLOS, and international courts have so tediously created.
*****
Footnotes
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
2. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, WT/MIN (22)/33, WT/L/1144 (June 17, 2022) (2025).
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55-75, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 58, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
6. R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 161–210 (3d ed. 1999)
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 61 and 62, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 73, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 74 and 83, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
10. Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea 179–248 (3d ed. 2019).
11. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, 1999 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 10 (July 1).
12. Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 4.
13. M/V Virginia G (Pan. v. Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, 2014 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 4 (Apr. 14).
14. Supra Note 5.
15. Supra Note 6.
16. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 22, 2013, 2013 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 230.
17. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, WT/MIN (22)/33 (June 17, 2022).
18. Supra Note 7.
19. Clive Schofield, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation: An Overview’ (2014) 30 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1.
20. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 1999 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 280.
21. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark and Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
22. Bangladesh v. Myanmar, Judgment, 2012 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 4 (Mar. 14).
23. Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire, Judgment, 2017 I.T.L.O.S. Rep. 4 (Sept. 23).
24. Supra Note 8.
25. South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award, PCA Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. July 12, 2016).
26. Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar, ‘The South China Sea: Toward a Cooperative Management Regime?’ (2012) 17 Ocean Development & International Law 1.
27. Supra Note 10.
28. Supra Note 14.
29. Government of India, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015).
30. Government of India, Indian Maritime Doctrine (2025).
31. ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) (4 November 2002), ASEAN – China, Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (Single Draft Text, 2018).