The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Tying as Abuse of Dominance in Technology Markets

The technology sector has revolutionized global markets, but it has also triggered concerns about anti-competitive conduct and market dominance. One such practice is tying, where the purchase of one product is made conditional on the purchase of another. While tying may sometimes enhance efficiency, promote innovation, or boost sales, it can equally serve as a tool for dominant firms to suppress competition, limit consumer choice, and distort market conditions. The intersection of tying with intellectual property rights (IPRs) adds further complexity. On the one hand, IPRs incentivize innovation by granting exclusivity and protecting investments in research and development. On the other hand, they can be strategically leveraged by dominant firms to foreclose markets and restrict entry by potential competitors. This tension necessitates a careful balance between fostering innovation and ensuring fair competition. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of tying practices in the technology sector across four jurisdictions: the United States, the European Union, India, and Singapore. It evaluates the foundational principles of tying, the role of IPRs in such practices, and how competition laws have addressed these concerns. In particular, the paper highlights the European Union’s relatively strict approach, the U.S.’s more lenient stance, and India’s evolving jurisprudence. Singapore, by contrast, has limited legal provisions and lacks significant precedents on technology tying. The paper ultimately considers whether Singapore, as a hub of technological innovation, should align with the European Union’s stringent framework or adopt the more flexible approaches of the U.S. and India, proposing potential pathways for its future competition law landscape.