INTRODUCTION
The resolution of the Golden State Killer case in April 2018, achieved through a then-novel technique of uploading a crime-scene DNA profile to a public genealogy database and reconstructing a family tree until law enforcement could identify Joseph James DeAngelo as the suspect, marked a watershed moment in forensic science and criminal law.1 Forensic Genetic Genealogy (FGG) had conclusively demonstrated its capacity to crack cold cases that had defied resolution for decades using orthodox forensic DNA profiling. Since that breakthrough, the technique has been deployed to resolve hundreds of cold-case homicides and sexual assaults across jurisdictions as geographically and legally diverse as the United States, Australia, and the Netherlands.2
The scientific mechanism underpinning FGG differs fundamentally from traditional DNA database searches. Rather than seeking an exact or near-exact match between a crime-scene profile and a law enforcement database entry, FGG leverages the genetic relatedness between individuals by locating distant relatives of the unknown suspect within consumer-oriented genealogy databases such as GED match or Family Tree DNA.3 Investigators then construct extended family trees through open-source genealogical research, progressively narrowing the pool of candidates until a specific individual can be identified as a suspect or eliminated. The genetic footprint thus cast is enormous: a 2018 study in Science estimated that a database containing as few as three million individuals could yield a familial match for nearly any person of a given ancestry within the database’s demographic catchment.4
The legal and ethical ramifications are correspondingly vast. Every individual whose DNA profile is uploaded—whether by the individual personally, by a family member, or through coercive law enforcement extraction—is simultaneously authorising the potential identification of biological relatives who have never consented to any involvement in a forensic process.5 This third-party genetic exposure sits at the intersection of the right to privacy, the right against self-incrimination, anti-discrimination principles, and the rule of law requirements of legal certainty and proportionality.6
India’s criminal justice system is on the cusp of a technological transformation. The National Crime Records Bureau has recorded persistently low conviction rates for heinous crimes, partly attributable to inadequate forensic evidence.7 Yet India lacks any dedicated statutory framework governing FGG. The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill, which would have partially addressed the governance of forensic DNA databases, lapsed in the Lok Sabha in 2021 without enactment.8 The recently enacted Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (DPDPA) and the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022 provide only partial, indirect guidance.
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part II surveys the technical architecture of FGG. Part III undertakes a comparative analysis of the regulatory frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Part IV maps the existing Indian legal landscape. Part V diagnoses the gaps and constitutional tensions. Part VI proposes the Forensic Genetic Genealogy Regulation Model (FGGRM) as a normative framework tailored to India’s constitutional architecture and investigative needs. Part VII concludes.
TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE OF FORENSIC GENETIC GENEALOGY
Understanding the regulatory stakes of FGG requires a firm grasp of its technical components. FGG is a multi-stage process that begins with the recovery and genotyping of biological material found at a crime scene. Investigators extract a DNA profile from the crime-scene sample and subsequently convert it into a format compatible with consumer single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) arrays the same genotyping technology used by commercial direct-to-consumer (DTC) genealogy services.9
The converted SNP profile is then uploaded to an open-access genealogy database such as GED match. The database’s matching algorithm identifies individuals whose genetic profiles share substantial stretches of identical-by-descent (IBD) segments with the uploaded profile.10 These shared segments indicate common ancestry, typically within the range of second to fourth cousins.11 Genealogical investigators then construct extended family trees for each identified match, using public records including census data, obituaries, social media, and commercial genealogical databases to map family relationships across multiple generations. Through a process of progressive triangulation, the suspect’s tree is narrowed to individuals whose age, sex, geographic location, and other biographical characteristics align with details known from the crime.12
Two distinguishing features of FGG create acute regulatory challenges. First, the technique does not require the suspect to have voluntarily submitted biological material to any database. The suspect’s identification becomes possible solely because a biological relative chose to use a DTC genealogy service.13 This structural feature makes FGG categorically different from traditional DNA database matching, which depends on the prior enrolment of the suspect. Second, the genetic information revealed is not limited to identification. SNP profiles can disclose information about ancestry, health predispositions, physical characteristics, and familial relationships that carry significant implications for employment, insurance, and social stigma.14
The reliability of FGG is a further legal concern. The technique depends on the accuracy of genealogical reconstruction, a process susceptible to errors arising from incomplete records, non-paternity events, and misidentification of historical records. False leads can subject innocent individuals to intrusive investigation, and the costs of wrongful investigative focus are borne disproportionately by marginalised communities.15
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. United States
The United States was the first major jurisdiction to adopt FGG at scale and has developed a multi-layered, though still incomplete, regulatory apparatus. At the federal level, the Department of Justice issued an Interim Policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis in November 2019, subsequently formalised.16 The policy restricts FGG use to violent crimes and unidentified human remains, requires exhaustion of conventional DNA database searches first, and mandates supervisory approval. Crucially, however, the policy applies only to federal agencies and laboratories receiving federal funding; it does not bind state law enforcement agencies.17
State-level responses have been markedly divergent. Maryland enacted legislation explicitly prohibiting the use of genealogy databases for law enforcement purposes without user consent, while Montana has adopted statutory provisions requiring judicial authorisation before FGG may be deployed.18 Most states, however, have enacted no specific legislation, leaving FGG governed by a patchwork of database terms of service and prosecutorial discretion.
The constitutional framework provides limited protection. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure is the primary potential constraint, but the Supreme Court has held that DNA collection from arrestees upon arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, applying the balancing test between governmental interests and individual privacy.19 Courts have not yet directly addressed whether uploading a crime-scene profile to a private genealogy database constitutes a search requiring a warrant, and the third-party doctrine under which individuals have reduced privacy expectations in information voluntarily shared with third parties potentially circumscribes Fourth Amendment protection where database users consented to law enforcement access 20
Consumer genealogy platforms occupy a pivotal governance role given this statutory vacuum. GED match and Family Tree DNA have both adopted law enforcement access policies that condition access on user opt-in consent, although the operational consistency of these policies has been questioned following incidents in which law enforcement accessed data beyond agreed parameters.21 The Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act 2008 (GINA) offers additional protection against genetic discrimination in employment and insurance contexts but does not govern forensic use.22
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s regulatory framework for forensic DNA is among the most developed in the world, shaped significantly by the European Court of Human Rights’ landmark judgment in Marper v. United Kingdom (2008), which found that the indefinite retention of DNA profiles and cellular samples of individuals who had not been convicted of any offence violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.23
The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 responded to Marper by introducing a time-limited, offence-stratified retention scheme for the National DNA Database (NDNAD), requiring the deletion of profiles of unconvicted individuals after specified periods depending on the seriousness of the alleged offence.24 The NDNAD is governed by a statutory framework enforced by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, an independent oversight body. Familial searching on the NDNAD a more limited precursor to FGG—is permitted only for serious crime investigations, requires approval from a designated senior officer, and is subject to an equality impact assessment to address the risk of disproportionate ethnic profiling.25
FGG in the strict sense—querying consumer genealogy databases with crime-scene profiles—remains less regulated in the UK than NDNAD familial searching. The Human Tissue Act 2004 governs the use of biological material but does not directly address cross-database forensic searching.26 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has called for an explicit statutory basis for any forensic genealogical database search and for robust independent oversight.27 The UK’s post-Brexit data protection framework, substantially mirroring the GDPR, treats genetic data as special category data requiring explicit legal basis and heightened safeguards under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018.28
C. European Union
The European Union has constructed the most comprehensive legal architecture for personal data protection globally, with particular implications for FGG. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) classifies genetic data as a special category of personal data, subject to a default prohibition on processing unless one of the enumerated exceptions in Article 9 applies.29 For law enforcement purposes, the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) 2016/680 provides the applicable framework, permitting processing of sensitive data only where strictly necessary for the performance of a task carried out by a competent authority and subject to appropriate safeguards.30
The LED imposes several structural constraints directly relevant to FGG: the principles of purpose limitation, data minimisation, and storage limitation; the requirement that processing be based on Union or Member State law that meets the requirements of clarity and foreseeability; and the obligation to carry out a data protection impact assessment for high-risk processing operations.31 The requirement that any derogation from the special category data prohibition be founded on an explicit, accessible legal basis is particularly significant—it would bar informal FGG operations conducted through terms-of-service access to private databases absent specific legislative authorisation.32
The European Data Protection Board and national data protection authorities have emphasised the risks of algorithmic and biometric surveillance expanding into genetic genealogy and have called for statutory specificity, judicial authorisation, and independent oversight as preconditions for any legitimate forensic genealogy programme.33 The Council of Europe’s modernised Convention 108+ similarly demands that any processing of genetic data by public authorities for law enforcement purposes be grounded in law, proportionate, and subject to effective oversight.34
THE INDIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE: FRAGMENTATION AND GAPS
A. Existing Statutory Provisions
India does not possess a unified forensic DNA statute. The legal basis for DNA collection and use in criminal proceedings is distributed across several instruments. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (CrPC), as amended in 2005, permits a magistrate to order examination of a person accused of an offence by a registered medical practitioner, including the drawing of blood for DNA analysis, in cases of certain serious offences.35 The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (BNSS), which replaces the CrPC, retains and marginally expands these provisions but introduces no new framework specifically governing forensic databases or genealogical searches.
The Indian Evidence Act 1872 (and its successor, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023) provides the admissibility framework, recognising the opinion of experts, including forensic scientists, as admissible evidence.36 The provisions do not, however, address the chain-of-custody requirements specific to genetic material, the standards for DNA database operation, the legal basis for familial searching, or the rights of non-suspect relatives whose profiles are incidentally accessed through a genealogical search.37
The Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022 represents the most recent legislative development. The Act authorises the collection of biological samples, including blood samples for DNA profiling, from a wide range of persons including arrested persons, those convicted of offences, and even persons detained under preventive detention laws.38 Profiles may be retained in a national database administered by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). The Act, however, does not address FGG, familial searching, or the governance of any interaction between the national forensic database and consumer genealogy platforms.39
B. The DNA Technology Regulation Bill: An Unfinished Agenda
The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill 2019 was the most ambitious attempt to create a comprehensive forensic DNA governance framework for India. The Bill proposed the establishment of a National DNA Data Bank, the recognition of Regional DNA Data Banks, mandatory accreditation of DNA laboratories, and the creation of a DNA Regulatory Board.40 It provided for purpose-limited data use and contemplated familial searching in limited categories of serious crime, subject to regulatory oversight.
The Bill attracted significant criticism from civil liberties organisations, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology, and legal scholars. Critics identified the absence of a judicial warrant requirement for DNA collection in some categories of persons, the broad and imprecisely defined category of persons from whom samples could be taken (including victims, relatives of missing persons, and volunteers), the inadequacy of safeguards against misuse, and the absence of any independent oversight mechanism as fatal deficiencies.41 The Bill lapsed in 2021, and no successor legislation has been introduced, leaving India’s forensic DNA governance framework without a statutory spine.
C. Constitutional Constraints: Privacy and Self-Incrimination
The constitutional framework provides an important, if incomplete, source of protection. The Supreme Court’s nine-judge bench judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) authoritatively established the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassing informational privacy and the right to bodily integrity.42 The Court affirmed that any state interference with the right to privacy must satisfy the triple test of legality (grounded in law), legitimate aim, and proportionality.
Applied to FGG, the Puttaswamy framework requires that any deployment of forensic genealogical searching be founded upon a specific, accessible, and foreseeable legal provision; serve a legitimate state interest of adequate seriousness; and be the least intrusive available means of achieving that interest. The absence of a dedicated statutory framework currently renders any FGG operation in India constitutionally precarious under this test.43
The right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution was addressed in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), where the Supreme Court held that compelled extraction of biological material capable of conveying testimonial content violates Article 20(3).44 While the Court has generally treated DNA as a physical rather than testimonial matter, FGG’s capacity to reveal undisclosed familial relationships, health information, and ancestry may recalibrate this analysis, given that the information extracted goes substantially beyond physical identification.45
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 classifies certain categories of personal data as sensitive, though the Act’s primary regulatory architecture targets data fiduciaries in commercial contexts and grants law enforcement broad exemptions under Section 17(2), which permits the Central Government to exempt any state instrumentality from the Act’s obligations on grounds including national security, public order, and prevention, detection, or investigation of offences.46 The breadth of this exemption effectively removes law enforcement data processing from the Act’s protective ambit, replicating a structural weakness evident in comparable legislation elsewhere.
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA: THE FORENSIC GENETIC GENEALOGY REGULATION MODEL (FGGRM)
A. Foundational Principles
The proposed Forensic Genetic Genealogy Regulation Model (FGGRM) for India rests on five foundational principles derived from comparative law, constitutional jurisprudence, and bioethics: (i) legality and legal certainty; (ii) proportionality and necessity; (iii) genetic privacy and informational self-determination; (iv) non-discrimination; and (v) accountability and transparency. These principles are not merely aspirational but are operationalised through specific institutional and procedural mechanisms described below.47
B. Statutory Authorisation
In conformity with the Puttaswamy proportionality test and the European approach reflected in the LED and GDPR, the FGGRM requires that FGG be conducted only on the basis of a specific statutory authorisation. India should enact a dedicated Forensic Genetic Genealogy Act (FGGA) distinct from, though complementary to, any general DNA regulation legislation. The FGGA should define FGG with precision, specify the categories of offences for which FGG may be authorised (limited initially to murder, culpable homicide, rape, abduction, and terrorism-related offences), and set out the legal conditions under which a law enforcement agency may apply for authorisation.48
The statute should expressly distinguish between FGG conducted on national forensic DNA databases operated by public authorities and FGG conducted by querying private consumer genealogy databases. The latter involves the voluntary genetic data of private individuals and requires correspondingly higher safeguards, including mandatory consent architectures within database terms of service and restrictions on law enforcement access to platforms that do not adopt opt-in consent mechanisms.49
C. Judicial Oversight
The FGGRM proposes that any FGG operation require prior judicial authorisation in the form of a warrant issued by a Sessions Court judge, analogous to the authorisation required under the Information Technology Act 2000 for electronic surveillance. The application for a warrant should demonstrate: exhaustion of conventional DNA matching methods; a reasonable basis to believe that FGG may yield evidence relevant to the identified offence; specificity of the databases to be queried; and a proportionality assessment. Judicial oversight introduces a structural check against fishing expeditions and ensures independent evaluation of necessity and proportionality.50
Emergency exceptions—permitting law enforcement to proceed without prior judicial authorisation where imminent threat to life is established—should be narrowly defined and subject to mandatory retrospective judicial review within forty-eight hours, consistent with the approach adopted in telecommunications interception law in several jurisdictions.51
D. Privacy-Protective Database Design
Borrowing from the UK’s NDNAD governance model and the EU’s data minimisation principle, the FGGRM prescribes that the national forensic genetic database operate on a segregated architecture that prevents the automatic cross-linkage of forensic profiles with consumer genealogy profiles. Forensic profiles should contain only the genetic markers required for identification and not include health-predictive markers, ancestry markers beyond those necessary for identification, or phenotypic information.52
Data retention periods must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the outcome of proceedings. Profiles of individuals acquitted or not charged within a specified period should be deleted automatically, subject to limited, judicially approved exceptions for ongoing investigations into serious crimes. The Marper judgment’s emphasis on the presumption of innocence as a foundation for proportionate retention policies is directly applicable in the Indian constitutional context, where the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 imposes positive obligations to avoid stigmatisation of the non-convicted.53
E. Purpose Limitation and Non-Discrimination Safeguards
The FGGRM incorporates a strict purpose limitation principle: genetic data collected for forensic genealogical purposes may not be shared with any other government agency, commercial entity, or foreign government except under specific, judicially authorised mutual legal assistance procedures. Cross-purpose use—for instance, accessing a forensic DNA database for immigration or employment vetting—must be expressly prohibited with criminal penalties for breach.54
Non-discrimination safeguards are essential given India’s complex social landscape. Empirical evidence from multiple jurisdictions demonstrates that forensic DNA databases over-represent racially, ethnically, and economically marginalised communities, creating a systemic risk that FGG operations will generate disproportionate investigative pressure on already-vulnerable populations.55 The FGGA should require a mandatory equality impact assessment before any FGG operation is approved and should establish an independent Forensic Genetics Ethics Board with representation from civil society, genetics experts, legal practitioners, and representatives of historically marginalised communities.56
F. Independent Oversight and Audit
The FGGRM proposes the establishment of a National Forensic DNA Commissioner—an independent statutory authority with powers to audit all FGG operations, investigate complaints, issue binding guidance, and publish annual transparency reports. The Commissioner’s office should be modelled on the UK’s Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and should have the power to order deletion of profiles held in breach of the statutory framework.57
Annual transparency reporting should include aggregate data on the number of FGG operations authorised, the offences concerned, the rate of successful identification leading to conviction, the number of non-suspect relatives whose genetic data was incidentally accessed, deletion compliance rates, and equality impact findings. Transparency mechanisms serve both accountability and public trust functions, demonstrating that the state’s deployment of a powerful investigative technology is subject to rigorous oversight and is not used disproportionately against any community.58
G. Voluntary Database Governance
India currently has a nascent consumer genealogy market, but the sector is growing rapidly. The FGGA should establish a licensing regime for consumer genealogy platforms operating in India, requiring that such platforms: prominently disclose any law enforcement access policy at the point of user enrolment; offer a genuine opt-in mechanism for law enforcement access rather than treating consent as implicit; implement technical measures to prevent law enforcement from accessing the database in ways that exceed the consented scope; and cooperate with the National Forensic DNA Commissioner’s audit functions.59
Platforms that do not comply with the licensing regime should be prohibited from operating in India, consistent with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023’s framework for cross-border data transfer and its provisions relating to data fiduciaries’ accountability obligations.60
ADDRESSING INDIA’S STRUCTURAL GAPS: INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPACITY DIMENSIONS
A normative framework, however well-designed, is only as effective as the institutional capacity deployed to implement it. India faces significant challenges in this regard. The country’s forensic science infrastructure is under-resourced: a substantial proportion of forensic laboratories lack NABL accreditation, there are significant backlogs in sample analysis, and trained forensic geneticists are in short supply.61 Any FGG regulatory framework must therefore be accompanied by a commensurate investment in forensic science capacity, including the establishment of accredited regional DNA laboratories, structured training programmes for forensic geneticists, and quality assurance protocols aligned with ISO standards.62
Judicial capacity to evaluate warrant applications for FGG operations is an additional concern. Sessions Court judges who receive applications for FGG warrants will require technical literacy to assess proportionality claims intelligently. The National Judicial Academy and State Judicial Academies should incorporate forensic genetics literacy into training programmes for judges and magistrates. This precedent has been set in other jurisdictions: the UK’s Surveillance Commissioner framework provides training materials, and the US Federal Judicial Center has published bench books on forensic evidence.63
The multiplicity of agencies potentially involved in FGG—the NCRB, Central Bureau of Investigation, state police forces, the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, and private laboratories—creates coordination challenges. The FGGA should designate a single nodal agency responsible for maintaining the national forensic genetic database and for receiving and processing all judicial warrant applications, with clear protocols for inter-agency data sharing consistent with purpose limitation.64
CONCLUSION
Forensic Genetic Genealogy is not a distant horizon for India: it is a technological capability available today, and its deployment in the absence of a dedicated regulatory framework poses serious constitutional and human rights risks. The comparative analysis of the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union reveals a spectrum of regulatory approaches, united by common principles—statutory authorisation, proportionality, judicial oversight, data minimisation, independent accountability—even if the implementation of those principles varies significantly across jurisdictions.
India’s existing legal architecture is inadequate to govern FGG. The CrPC and its successor, the BNSS, the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022, and the DPDPA 2023 collectively provide an incomplete, fragmented, and insufficiently rights-protective basis for any systematic FGG programme. The lapse of the DNA Technology Regulation Bill represents a missed opportunity that must not be repeated. The Supreme Court’s right-to-privacy jurisprudence, anchored in Puttaswamy, provides a constitutional compass: any FGG regime must satisfy the tests of legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality.
The Forensic Genetic Genealogy Regulation Model (FGGRM) proposed in this paper offers a principled, practically implementable framework. Its core components—a dedicated statute with precise scope limitations, prior judicial warrant requirement, privacy-protective database architecture, purpose limitation and non-discrimination safeguards, voluntary database licensing, independent oversight, and mandatory transparency reporting—are calibrated to India’s constitutional architecture, investigative needs, and institutional realities.
The task ahead is one of legislative urgency matched by epistemic humility: FGG is a rapidly evolving field, and the regulatory framework India adopts must be designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate technological change while maintaining its constitutional and ethical foundations. The law must keep pace with science—but it must do so on its own terms, not on science’s.
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Footnotes
1. Golden State Killer Case: California Department of Justice Press Release, ‘Suspected Golden State Killer Arrested’ (25 April 2018), accessed 12 March 2025.
2. Ibid
3. Leah Larkin, ‘Investigative Genetic Genealogy: A Primer’ (2018) DNA Detectives Blog, accessed 10 March 2025.
4. Yaniv Erlich et al., ‘Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches’ (2018) 362 Science 690, 691.
5. Erin E. Murphy, ‘Law and Policy Oversight of Familial Searches in Recreational Genealogy Databases’ (2018) 92 Forensic Science International 107, 108.
6. Ibid
7. Michael E. Smith, ‘Investigative Genetic Genealogy: A New Frontier in Forensic Science’ (2019) 67 Journal of Forensic Sciences 1201, 1202.
8. Barbara Prainsack, ‘The Dark Side of Personalised Medicine: Ethical Issues in Genetic Genealogy’ (2020) 20 EMBO Reports e50143, 2.
9. Yaniv Erlich and Arvind Narayanan, ‘Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy’ (2014) 15 Nature Reviews Genetics 409, 411.
10. Ibid
11. Forensic Science International: Genetics, ‘Ethical Issues Surrounding the Use of Genetic Genealogy in Law Enforcement’ (2020) 47 FSI Genetics 102308, 3.
12. US Department of Justice, ‘Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching’ (2019), accessed 15 March 2025.
13. Maryland Code, Public Safety § 2-506 (2021); Montana Code Annotated § 44-6-101 (2021).
14. Ibid
15. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act 2008 (GINA), 42 USC § 2000ff.
16. Fourth Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Maryland v. King, 569 US 435 (2013).
17. Ibid
18. GEDmatch Terms of Service (revised May 2019 and June 2020); FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide (2019).
20. Ibid
21. Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (UK), c 9, ss 1-25; DNA Database (Retention, Destruction and Fingerprints) Regulations 2013 (UK).
22. Marper v United Kingdom (2008) 48 EHRR 50 (Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights).
23. Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), c 30; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK), c 25.
24. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues’ (2007) Nuffield Council Report, 62.
25. Ibid
26. General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 [2016] OJ L119/1, arts 9, 22.
27. Directive (EU) 2016/680 on Law Enforcement Processing of Personal Data [2016] OJ L119/89, arts 6, 10.
28. Ibid
29. European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 05/2022 on the Use of Facial Recognition Technology in the Area of Law Enforcement’ (2022) 14, applied by analogy to biometric/genetic data.
30. Ibid
31. Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108, as modernised 2018), art 6.
32. Ibid
33. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (India), ss 53, 53A, 54; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, s 51.
34. The Indian Evidence Act 1872 (India), ss 45, 73; Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, ss 39, 56.
35. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
36. Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (India), ss 2(t), 4, 6, 8.
37. Ibid
38. The Use of DNA Evidence Act (Draft) India 2021 (DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill 2019, lapsed); Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on the DNA Technology Bill (2021).
39. Ibid
40. Identification of Prisoners Act 1920 (India), repealed by Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022; Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022, ss 2, 3, 5.
41. Selvi v State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 (Supreme Court of India).
42. National Human Rights Commission of India, ‘Guidelines on DNA Profiling and Human Rights’ (2019) NHRC Report.
43. Ibid
44. Law Commission of India, ‘271st Report: Human DNA Profiling – A Draft Bill for the Use and Regulation of DNA-Based Technology’ (2017).
45. Ibid
46. Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637; Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
47. Oliver M. Tuazon, Bart Custers, Gerrit-Jan Zwenne, Legitimacy of investigative forensic genetic genealogy under Art. 8 ECHR, Forensic Science International: Synergy, Volume 11,2025,100636,ISSN 2589-871X,
48. Ibid
49. Dowdeswell, T. L. (2022). Forensic genetic genealogy: A profile of cases solved. Forensic Science International: Genetics, 58, 102679. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2022.102679
50. Diya Uberoi, Nicole Palmour, Yann Joly, The advent of forensic DNA databases: It’s time to agree on some international governance principles!, Forensic Science International: Genetics, Volume 72,2024,103095, ISSN 1872-4973, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2024.103095.
51. Ibid
52. Supra note.49.
53. National Crime Records Bureau, ‘Crime in India Report 2022’ (NCRB 2023) 14, 47.
54. Supra note. 50.
55. Veena Bhatt v State of Uttarakhand (2022) Crim LJ 401; State (NCT of Delhi) v Nanavati (2006) 9 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
56. Ibid
57. Erlich, Yaniv, Tal Shor, Itsik Pe’er, and Shai Carmi, ‘Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches’ (2018) 362 Science 690.
58. Ibid
59. Kumar Tiwari, A., & Kumar Pandey, A. (2025). Forensic DNA Phenotyping: The Future of Investigative Genetics. JOURNAL OF ADVANCE AND FUTURE RESEARCH, 3(12). https://doi.org/10.56975/jaafr.v3i12.502227
60. Ibid
61. Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank v State of Kerala (2013) 16 SCC 82 (Supreme Court of India); GDPR, art 5(1)(e).
62. Ibid
63. Pemmasani, S. K., Raman, R., Mohapatra, R., Vidyasagar, M., & Acharya, A. (2020). A Review on the Challenges in Indian Genomics Research for Variant Identification and Interpretation. Frontiers in Genetics, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fgene.2020.00753
64. Ibid