Reconsidering Criterion of Value Addition of CCI Leniency Regime: Discretion, Ambivalence, and Demand of Normative Clearness

The problem of cartel enforcement is quite challenging because of the secretive nature of agreeing collusively and this can only be managed through the use of the leniency programmes as one of the main detection tools. In India, the regime of leniency is included into the Competition Act, 2002 and in the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 the concept of the value addition is adopted in order to calculate the penalty waivers to the next applicants. The paper is a critical analysis of the understanding and use of the value addition criterion stating that it is not precisely defined and depends on administrative discretion thus making it more difficult to predict and enforcement not strongly encouraged. The study finds that there are flaws in the Indian framework to be present through the doctrinal analysis of statutory provisions and key CCI decisions and a comparative assessment of the leniency regimes of the United States and European Union. It argues that inconsistency and regulatory opaqueness are caused by the lack of evidentiary benchmarks, reduction bands, and rational decision making. The paper ends with the recommendation of reforms that would lead to greater transparency, predictability, and effectiveness via systematic direction and correspondence to global-best practice.