INTRODUCTION
Human rights belong to each and every one of us equally1
The protection of the human rights of prisoners has been a contentious constitutional topic in the justice system for ages. In India, as of 31st December 2022, a total of 5,73,220 prisoners2 Have been incarcerated. Among these, 4,32,302 were undertrial prisoners.3 It is a fact that the prisons in India are functioning above their capacity, and the prisoners are kept in extremely inhumane conditions. Even though prisoners have restricted liberty and imprisonment restricts one’s liberty and freedom, it doesn’t allow the state machinery to keep these prisoners bereft of their fundamental human rights. Persistent overcrowding in prisons, coupled with deficiencies in infrastructure, healthcare, and oversight, has resulted in conditions that frequently fall short of constitutional standards of human dignity. These conditions raise serious concerns under Article 214 The Constitution guarantees that the deprivation of personal liberty must occur only through a just, fair, and reasonable procedure. There is a chain of judgments by the constitutional courts of our country and international instruments that talk about the protection of the human rights of these prisoners. Traditional legal remedies have failed to address this brewing situation; prisoners are often not equipped to afford quality legal representation to voice their opinions against their rights violations.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India recognised this grave situation and attempted to address the issue through a unique method of dispensing justice via Public Interest Litigation (PILs). It can be understood that under this mechanism, any person whose fundamental rights have been violated, or any person on whose behalf they can approach the Supreme Court or High Courts for the enforcement of their rights, can do so. Through the dilution of the rule of locus standi and the exercise of epistolary jurisdiction, constitutional courts have intervened in matters concerning custodial violence, prison conditions, and the denial of fundamental human rights to prisoners. Public Interest Litigation has thus emerged as a crucial judicial tool in prison rights jurisprudence, raising essential questions about its effectiveness in translating constitutional ideals into meaningful and sustained protection for prisoners’ human rights. Why does this topic become relevant? The answer lies in a trend that has been observed recently, when people are kept in prolonged incarceration, which violates their liberty. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned the authorities against this blatant violation of constitutional limitations on imprisonment. Very recently, the court, while granting bail to Arvind Dham, noted that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial amounts to punishment.5 However, the influentials can afford this expensive approach; the poor strata generally remain unrepresented, and this is where the PIL mechanism comes into play.
The paper shall adopt a doctrinal approach. First, it will examine the existing literature and identify the research problem and objectives. Then, it shall proceed to evaluate the prisoners’ human rights protection through PIL in India. Further, while examining the effectiveness and limitations of PIL in protecting prisoners’ rights, the paper will conclude by deducing key findings and recommendations to improve the situation in our country.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholarly work on prisoners’ human rights in India has grown along two intertwined paths. One is the rise of Public Interest Litigation as a means of accessing justice, and the other is the constitutional affirmation that prisoners are rights-bearing individuals, as stated in Article 21 of the Constitution. Early scholars hail the PIL as a unique, homegrown judicial tool designed to tackle deep-seated inequalities embedded in the adversarial legal system. Parmanand Singh’s seminal analysis follows PIL’s birth in the post-Emergency era, viewing it as a deliberate judicial response to heavy-handed state repression and procedural exclusion that hit prisoners, bonded labourers, and other subordinated groups hardest. He perceives PIL not so much as a relaxed rule on locus standi but as “social action litigation” inspired by an urge to restrain governmental lawlessness, particularly within the precincts of institutions like prisons.6
Later scholarship has nuanced this understanding by exploring the role of PIL in the development of substantive fundamental rights. A good example in this regard can be seen in the interpretation by Saluja of the development in the PIL jurisprudence, which reflects how the judiciary has utilised Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution creatively to make up for the lack of action by the legislative and executive arms of government in giving effect to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. This literature attributes to PIL the democratisation of the Supreme Court and High Courts into fora that had the potential to respond to systemic human rights abuses such as custodial violence, unlawful detention, and the denial of legal aid. While this literature recognises the potential for empowerment contained within PIL, it generally takes an institutionally focused approach that focuses more on innovation than on practical impact that extends beyond the courtroom itself.7
Building upon this, scholars like Upendra Baxi conceptualise PIL as an ethical and constitutional project of “taking suffering seriously,” especially in contexts where the victims are unable to approach the courts.8 The literature underlines the fact that prisoners form a class that is procedurally invisible due to incarceration, poverty, and illiteracy, and for whom judicial intervention using PIL is a structural necessity, rather than a discretionary innovation. At another level, however, Baxi warns against the uncritical expansion of PIL outside its original human-rights-centred brief- a warning that gains great salience in any assessment of the efficacy of PIL in the contemporary period.
Doctrinal literature regarding prisoners’ rights also strengthens the constitutional stance that imprisonment does not abrogate fundamental rights. In fact, Naidu’s case study refers to the applicability of Article 21 within prisons with full force and effect.9 Ahlawat also locates prisoners’ rights within domestic constitutional and international frameworks, such as ICCPR and Nelson Mandela Rules, and refers to India’s legal system as having sufficient safeguards for prisoners.10 These studies are more descriptive and pertain to judicial recognition rather than analysing effective enforcement mechanisms.
Empirical and institutional reports, however, paint a more disturbing picture. The National Crime Records Bureau’s Prison Statistics India 2022 depicts a state of chronic overcrowding, excessive reliance on undertrial detention, and infrastructural deficiencies that persist across Indian prisons.11 Singh examines PILs that address custodial crimes and acknowledges the role of PIL in judicial recognition of abuse, yet observes how custodial deaths continue unabated despite guidelines to the contrary being issued time and again.12 Finally, institutional literature, such as a handbook published by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, identifies a significant amount of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding arrest, detention, and custodial rights, which is particularly notable for its implicit criticism of an implementation deficit.13
After analysing the literature, a few questions emerge that this paper will attempt to answer. 1. To what extent has Public Interest Litigation been effective in protecting the human rights of prisoners in India? 2. Has PIL resulted in structural reform of prison administration, or has its impact remained largely case-specific? 3. What institutional constraints affect PIL’s effectiveness in securing prisoners’ human rights?
The research objectives are: (1) To examine the role of PIL in the evolution of prisoners’ rights jurisprudence in India, (2) To critically assess the effectiveness of PIL in addressing systematic human rights violations in prisons, and (3) To identify structural and institutional barriers limiting the enforcement of prisoners’ rights through PIL.
EVOLUTION OF PRISONERS’ HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA
The concept of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was adopted by our judicial system from American jurisprudence. The PIL emerged as a mechanism to protect the fundamental rights of the poor and underprivileged.14 This concept was introduced in India by Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer, wherein the strict rule of Locus Standi was diluted by the court, allowing persons whose fundamental rights have been violated or someone on their behalf to approach the constitutional courts directly, so that the social interest at large is addressed. The Supreme Court in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161, “Public Interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation, but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the government and its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and to assure them social and economic justice which is the signature tune of our Constitution.”15 The court has clearly explained the scope of PIL via this observation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly protected the vulnerable strata of society from exploitation. In a series of cases, the courts have taken it upon themselves to protect the fundamental human rights of these individuals through the exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.16 However, nowadays, the PILs have also become a tool to gain publicity, as Justice Fali S. Nariman said, “PILs have now degenerated into publicity–seeking litigations.”17 This observation becomes true when many people, including celebrities, have started instituting PILs to gain publicity.18 The courts have consistently warned against abusing the legitimate tool of PIL and have been actively dismissing such unscrupulous and vexatious petitions filed by publicity-seeking individuals.
Before the 1970s, Indian courts generally adopted a hands-off approach in matters related to prison administration. Prisoners were considered to have lost most of their enforceable rights upon their incarceration. Judicial intervention in the prison systems was also regarded as inappropriate, owing to the concepts of administrative autonomy and the separation of powers. This practice ensured that the courts remained oblivious to the prison systems, even when there were reports of under-trial prison detentions, jails being violent, and inhumane prison facilities. The era of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was a radical departure from these notions, as the courts were now in a position to address the human rights of the inmates.
The journey of the protection of human rights of prisoners via PIL can be traced when notable human rights activist and lawyer Kapila Hingorani who is also called as the mother of PIL in India, filed a PIL in the Supreme Court seeking the court’s attention on the plight of nearly 40,000 undertrial prisoners in the state of Bihar which resulted in the landmark ruling of the court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 10819 wherein the court held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential component of Article 2120, and further stressed upon granting free legal aid to these prisoners under Article 39 A21 of the constitution of India as a matter of legal right. The court ordered the release of these under-trial prisoners. This case not only expanded the substantive content of the right to life and personal liberty but also demonstrated the utility of PIL as a mechanism for representing prisoners who were otherwise incapable of accessing judicial remedies.22
Furthermore, this position was further strengthened when the Supreme Court in Khatri & Ors. V. State of Bihar & Ors.23 In the year 1980, a brutal, inhuman incident of custodial violence and torture against the undertrials was reported in the city’s central jail in Bhagalpur, Bihar. Wherein, the jail officials blinded several men by pouring acid in their eyes. This incident is famously known as the Bhagalpur blindings incident. The worst part of this case was that the victims were not represented before the courts, and the magistrate also didn’t bother to provide them with state legal assistance, which had been a constitutional mandate further fortified by the Hussainara Khatoon judgment. The Supreme Court, while adjudicating this case, criticised the state authorities, citing the famous Golden Triangle case.24 And reiterated the position that the right to free legal services is an essential ingredient of the just, fair, and reasonable process doctrine as espoused by the Supreme Court. And that right to a fair representation is a Fundamental right. The Court observed, “The State is under a constitutional mandate to provide free legal aid to an accused person who is unable to secure legal services on account of indigence, and whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be done by the State.”25
Shortly afterwards, the Supreme Court reiterated the status of convicts under the Constitution in the case of Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration.26 In a bold departure from the proposition that the arrest and imprisonment of a person lead to the suspension of fundamental rights, the court held that convicts continue to enjoy all rights except those that are necessarily impacted on as a consequence of their imprisonment. The court urged that the practice of solitary confinement and brutality within lock-ups must cease, and that the prison authorities must operate within the framework of the Constitution. Notably, the court upheld the role of the judiciary in reviewing the administration of the prison system in matters of fundamental rights through the doctrine of PIL. The case was further referred to in a catena of judgments which reformed the criminal justice system. In the case of Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration,27 the Supreme Court, exercising its epistolary jurisdiction, converted a letter written by a prisoner in Tihar Jail, in which he complained that he and his fellow inmates were forcibly handcuffed by the prison authorities while being taken to court for appearances. The court stressed the observance of the guidelines set by the Sunil Batra judgment and also emphasised against the indiscriminate use of handcuffs against these prisoners, except in exceptional cases. The court observed that a balance must be struck between the need to deter his escape and the preservation of his dignity. The court observed, “Zoological culture cannot be compatible with reverence for life, even of a terrible criminal.” The court also referred to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)28 and Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966).29
The parameters of prisoners’ rights jurisprudence were extended to cover the exceptional sensitivity of women prisoners in the case of Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra.30 In this PIL petition, a letter from renowned journalist Sheela Barse, regarding the treatment of women prisoners in custody, prompted the Supreme Court of India to formulate specific directives on the handling of women prisoners during the process of interrogation and detention, as well as provide legal aid to women prisoners. The Supreme Court reiterated the State’s enhanced duty of care to the beneficiaries of the criminal justice system, especially the vulnerable section of women prisoners.
Furthermore, the scope of prison discipline and the provision for constitutional guarantees were also reviewed by the Supreme Court in the case of Charles Sobhraj vs. Superintendent, Central Jail.31 Although being cognizant of the need for prison administration to ensure prison discipline, the Court made it amply clear that any punitive action taken by the prison authorities must also adhere to the principles of reasonableness under Article 21.
The judicial concern with custodial abuse reached a broader articulation in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, where the Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines governing arrest and detention to prevent custodial torture and deaths.32 Although not confined exclusively to prison conditions, this judgment had a significant impact on prisoners’ rights jurisprudence by establishing procedural safeguards for the period of custody. The Court treated custodial violence as a direct violation of Article 21 and reinforced the compensatory jurisdiction of the constitutional courts in cases of custodial abuse. This particular case has been cited in numerous court decisions to protect the fundamental rights of prisoners, as seen in Dr Rini Johar & Anr. v. State of MP & Ors.33 The Petitioners in this case faced an infringement of their fundamental rights as the arrest made was in grave violation of the guidelines as set by the Supreme Court in the D.K. Basu case and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines.34 The arrest was made, not satisfying the essential ingredients of Section 41 of the CrPC, and in addition, the Petitioners were treated with indignity and were humiliated. Thus, the court ordered compensation to be paid to the Petitioners while upholding their right to be treated with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Taken together, these judgments represent the gradual yet inevitable impact of change in Indian constitutional law. The courts have, through PIL, discarded the hands-off doctrine, recognised prisoners as bearers of ights and framed enforceable standards that regulate detention and the administration of prisons. In expanding the substantive content of Article 21, while relaxing procedural obstacles to reach justice, PIL has formed the fulcrum for the development of prisoners’ human rights jurisprudence in India. At the same time, the question of how such judicial intervention has contributed to lasting institutional change within prisons warrants critical inquiry.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A detailed analysis of the entire prisoners’ human rights landscape in India presents a strong case that the courts here have repeatedly affirmed that incarceration doesn’t extinguish the basic fundamental human rights of the prisoners. However, there is a yawning gap between judicial recognition and actual enforcement of these decisions by state authorities. For instance, decisions such as Hussainara Khatoon established the principles of speedy trials under Article 21, the humane treatment of prisoners, and prison oversight. However, even after decades of passing of these judgments, a whopping 74% of the prisoners in Indian prisons are undertrials. The overcrowding of prisons has been a serious issue that authorities have ignored for decades.35 In addition to this, the problem of custodial violence persists.36
The study further finds that even though the PIL is a very effective tool to raise the issue of prisoners’ human rights. However, the courts lack the institutional and infrastructural capacity to continuously supervise prisons, and thus compliance with these judgments largely depends on the executive’s will. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bhim Singh v. Union of India37 Had passed directions under section 436A of the CrPC, which had mandated the release of undertrials who had already spent half of the period of their maximum possible sentence. The court in this judgment issued directions to the judges to conduct weekly visits to jails to examine the status of undertrial prisoners and grant bail to them if they fulfil the conditions stipulated under Section 436A. However, the observations of these judgments are swiftly countered by the actual reality, as evidenced by the NCRB’s 2022 data on prisoners, as discussed above. Moreover, the predominantly reactive nature of PIL has resulted in case-specific remedies rather than preventive, systemic solutions.
For the human rights of prisoners to be effectively safeguarded, judicial intervention via PIL must be supplemented with legislative efforts and reforms. There have been attempts made through various legislations to protect the human rights of these disadvantaged groups; however, a lack of awareness is one of the most significant impediments to upholding their human rights. The state machinery shall also endeavour to educate the prisoners about their fundamental human rights.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the efficacy of PIL as a tool for protecting prisoners’ human rights in India. In response to the first research question, it becomes apparent that PIL has contributed to the development of constitutional jurisprudence by affirming that prisoners are entitled to rights under Article 21 and by establishing enforceable standards regarding humane treatment, the right to a speedy trial, and protection against custodial abuse.
Regarding the second research question, the analysis suggests that PIL has not led to durable structural reform of prison administration. While courts have passed elaborate orders through landmark judgments, the persistence of issues such as overcrowding, prolonged undertrial detention, and custodial violence testifies that PIL’s effect has been substantially limited to case-specific, reactive outcomes. The absence of institutional mechanisms for monitoring and proper enforcement has limited the transformation of judicial standards into regular prison governance.
In answering the third research question, several institutional constraints are highlighted that inhibit the effectiveness of PIL: its inability to continuously supervise prison administration by the judiciary; dependence on executive compliance to carry out its directions; and the reactive character of PIL, which usually intervenes after violations have occurred. Further, the increasing judicial caution against the misuse of PIL may inadvertently result in restricting prisoners’ access to justice, a demographic that already faces substantial procedural disadvantages.
In sum, PIL remains an indispensable constitutional tool for publicising human rights abuses and promoting discussion of prisoners’ rights; however, it cannot achieve meaningful and lasting reform on its own. For the meaningful protection of prisoners’ human rights, PIL needs to be supplemented by legislative action, administrative accountability, and systemic prison reforms, all of which require continued judicial support.
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Footnotes
1. UNICEF, What Are Human Rights? (last visited Jan. 4, 2026), https://www.unicef.org/child-rights-convention/what-are-human-rights.
2. National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics India 2022 (Ministry of Home Affairs, Gov’t of India, 2023).
3. Ibid.
4. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
5. Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 INSC 12.
6. Parmanand Singh, Protection of Human Rights Through Public Interest Litigation in India, 42 J. INDIAN L. INST. 263 (2000).
7. Dr. Gunisha Saluja, Public Interest Litigation in India: Evolving Jurisprudence and Judicial Innovation, 13 J. RSCH. HUMANS. & SOC. SCI. 66, 68–70 (2025).
8. Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, in LAW AND POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 387, 389–92 (Upendra Baxi ed., 1988).
9. Nirnesh Naidu, A Case Study on Prisoners’ Right, 5(2) SHODHKOSH: J. VISUAL & PERFORMING ARTS 656, 657–60 (2024).
10. Chhavi Ahlawat, Protection to the Rights of Prisoners in the Light of Constitution of India, 8(3) INT’L J. NOVEL RSCH. & DEV. c259, c260–62 (2023).
11. NAT’L CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, Prison Statistics India 2022, at 9–14 (Ministry of Home Affairs, Gov’t of India 2023).
12. Kanwaljit Singh, Public Interest Litigation on Custodial Crimes and Protection of Basic Human Rights, 5(3) INT’L J.L. MGMT. & HUMAN. 721, 724–27 (2022).
13. COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, Handbook of Landmark Judgments on Human Rights and Policing in India 1–5, 64–70 (2020).
14. Genesis and Growth of Public Interest Litigation in India, Legal Bites, https://www.legalbites.in/topi cs/articles/genesis-and-growth-of-public-interest-litigation-in-india-893219. (last visited Jan 04, 2026).
15. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161.
16. A. Fand, Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra: Expanding Horizons of Prisoners’ Rights Under Article 21, 3(3) LAWFoyer INT’L J. DOCTRINAL LEGAL RSCH. 432, 432–40 (2025). https://doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.99
17. Fali S. Nariman, Busy Bodies Hazir Ho, OUTLOOK, Apr. 23, 2007, at 6.
18. 5G Lawsuit: High Court Proposes To Reduce Penalty on Juhi Chawla from Rs 20 Lakh to Rs 2 Lakh, NDTV (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/5g-lawsuit-high-court-proposes-to-reduce-penalty-on-juhi-chawla-from-rs-20-lakh-to-rs-2-lakh-2728539.
19. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 108.
20. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
21. INDIA CONST. art. 39 A.
22. Pushpa Kapila Hingorani, The Problem of Undertrials–I: Hussainara Khatoon and Public Interest Litigation, in PUNISHMENT AND THE PRISON: INDIAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 185, 185–90 (Rani Dhavan Shankardass ed., 2000).
23. Khatri & Ors. V. State of Bihar & Ors, (1981) 1 SCC 627
24. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
25. Hingorani, supra note 20.
26. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admin., (1978) 4 SCC 494; Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 3 SCC 488.
27. Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1535.
28. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
29. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
30. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96.
31. Charles Sobhraj v. Superintendent, Cent. Jail, (1978) 4 SCC 104.
32. D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416.
33. Dr. Rini Johar & Anr. v. State of MP & Ors, AIR 2016 SC 2679.
34. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2014 SC 2756.
35. anishka Goswami & Shikhar Aggarwal, Prison Overcrowding in India Is Truly the Story of Overwhelming Systemic Apathy, The Leaflet (June 11, 2025), https://theleaflet.in/criminal-justice/prison-overcrowding-in-india-is-truly-the-story-of-overwhelming-systemic-apathy.
36. Suresh Chandra Sagar & Uday Veer Singh, Legislative Reforms in India and Custodial Violence: A Legal Upgradation in Present Scenario, 4(2) INT’L J. CRIM., COMMON & STATUTORY L. 214, 214–16 (2024). DOI: https://doi.org/10.22271/27899497.2024.v4.i2c.108
37. Bhim Singh v. Union of India, (2015) 13 SCC 605.