Hydropower Governance in India: Constitutional Federalism, Regulatory Gaps, and Technology-Driven Sustainability

In India, hydropower administration is subjected to a complex and fragmented legal framework, where laws pertaining to water, forests, electricity and the environment are sometimes inconsistent to each other and sometimes leave large gaps. A major part of the confusion comes from the Grundnorm (the Constitution of India): States control “water power,” but the Union has authority over “inter-state rivers.” This tension has already resulted in different decisions from the High Courts of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand on the same issue of “water cess”, causing significant financial uncertainty for the states. This paper highlights some of the gaps in this legal landscape. Discussing the current Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system, it looks at each project separately and, in doing so, it fails to take into account the larger, combined impact on the river basin. Latest amendments to the Forest Act, carves out an exemption for certain “strategic” projects, further reduce environmental oversight. This paper also explores the practical problems related to public safety such as weak pollution control enforcement and dam safety rules that focus more on the structure that on the actual risk to people. The study concludes by suggesting reforms to improve hydropower governance. To ease federal tension, it suggests equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms in hydropower governance. It further advocates for the adoption of cumulative impact assessment, grounded in the Valued Environmental and Social Components framework. The paper also recommends the implementation of a holistic and continuously monitored environmental flow (e-flow) regime to ensure the sustainability of the river ecosystem. Finally, it emphasizes the need to modernize dam safety regulation by transitioning from a size-based to a risk based framework to enhance accountability.