INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, computers are increasingly capable of producing creative works of literature, art, and music in addition to performing tasks that have traditionally been the purview of human intelligence. This development raises important legal questions in the area of copyright law, particularly in regard to the concept of “authorship.” The idea that an author must be a singular, imaginative human being has historically served as the cornerstone of copyright laws in both India and the US. However, with AI systems now creating works that are exactly the same as those created by humans, the traditional notion of authorship is encountering unprecedented challenges. This study’s main focus is on whether copyright law views AI as a legal person and, hence, as a “author.” In addition to doctrinal interpretation, the discussion focuses on legal philosophy, policy, and jurisprudence. If AI were believed to be capable of authorship, legal frameworks would be drastically altered, granting non-human creatures rights that were previously reserved for natural humans. Refusing AI this recognition, however, raises concerns about ownership, accountability, and innovation incentives at a time when the value of AI-generated content is growing.
India’s Copyright Act of 1957 firmly supports authorship as a component of human creativity, despite the fact that the law is still somewhat ambiguous when it comes to computer-generated works. However, based on court rulings, the United States Copyright Act of 1976 strongly rejects the notion of non-human authorship and emphasizes human inventiveness as a prerequisite for copyright protection. These disparate approaches enable comparative analysis and demonstrate how different legal systems grapple with the tension between conventional legal principles and technological development. A fundamental component of copyright law is the concept of authorship. It grants the creator of original works rights and obligations. This individual has historically been a human. But thanks to advancements in AI, machines can now perform tasks that previously exclusively required human imagination. It has been demonstrated that generative AI systems, like as Google’s DeepMind, Open AI’s Chat GPT, and other autonomous art generators, are capable of producing unique and worthwhile works. The main query is whether the creators and users of these AI systems or the systems themselves deserve legal authorship. Despite having different legal systems, India and the US share a common legacy in Anglo-American copyright, which forms the basis of their legal doctrine. The comparative analysis that follows evaluates both legal systems’ readiness and adaptability to handle AI-generated works. In addition to defending the rights of authors, copyright law promotes innovation and knowledge sharing.
Determining what or who can be an author has significant implications for innovation policy, economics, ethics, and law in the data-driven, algorithm-driven digital age. Whether artificial intelligence is considered a legal person and falls under the definition of “author” under copyright law is the main question this article seeks to answer. This discussion becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing commercialization of AI-generated content, where companies and individuals are increasingly relying on autonomous systems to create marketable intellectual products. A key component of copyright law is the concept of authorship. It grants the author of original works rights and obligations. The author has historically been a person. But thanks to developments in AI, machines can now perform tasks that formerly required human inventiveness. Original and priceless creative works can be produced by generative AI systems such as Google’s DeepMind, Open AI’s Chat GPT, and other autonomous art generators.
The primary query is whether legal authorship should be granted to these AI systems, their creators, or their users. Although the legal systems of the US and India differ, they are both rooted in Anglo-American copyright law. In order to assess how prepared and adaptable both legal systems are to handling AI-generated works, this comparative analysis examines both. Reading the laws is only one side of the problem; there are deeper philosophical facets of intellectual property law as well. Copyright has long been justified as a means of promoting innovation, preserving moral rights, and fostering creativity. Lawmakers and courts must reevaluate whether the current frameworks are adequate or whether a significant adjustment is required as AI increasingly blends human and machine innovation. At the heart of this conversation is the concept of legal personhood. Through the concept of legal personality, the law recognizes that entities can have rights and responsibilities. In addition to natural persons, legal personhood has historically extended to artificial beings such as corporations, trusts, and, in certain legal traditions, even rivers and idols. But giving AI personhood raises special problems. AI lacks moral agency, social responsibility, and consciousness. In the past, these characteristics have supported the recognition of legal people. In addition to expanding the legal term, treating AI as a “author” will alter our understanding of the interplay between creativity, the law, and technology.
Using a comparative approach, this study seeks to determine whether AI is a legal person under the definition of “author” under US and Indian copyright laws. It will examine statutory frameworks, court decisions, and scholarly discussions to critically assess how well-suited current legal doctrines are to handle AI-generated works. By doing this, the article aims to contribute to the ongoing global debate about copyright law’s future in an era where artificial creativity is commonplace.
THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INDIAN AND US COPYRIGHT LAWS
The historical foundation for the legal frameworks governing copyright law in both India and the US is the need to protect the results of human ingenuity. However, with the development of artificial intelligence, which can create literary, musical, artistic, and even cinematic works with little to no human involvement, these frameworks appear to be becoming increasingly flimsy. Whether the current definitions of “author” and “original work” are sufficient to characterize these AI- generated products is a topic of much debate. The main copyright legislation in India is the Copyright Act of 1957. The term “Author” has different meanings depending on the type of work; Section 2(d) provides a definition1. The creator of a work of literature, drama, music, or art (apart from pictures) is referred to as the author. However, by designating the “person who causes the work to be created” as the author, the law provides a special provision in the case of computer-generated works. Additionally, this clause may allow for the recognition of a human figure associated with AI-generated works, such as a programmer or user who codes and/or launches the system.
However, the law makes no mention of this clause, and it contains no clause recognizing AI as a co-author, either as a natural person or as a legal person. The U.S. copyright regime, which is governed by the Copyright Act of 19762 and interpreted by a plethora of case law and administrative practice, also supports the notion that authorship must originate from a person. The U.S. Copyright Office and courts have repeatedly stressed the anthropocentric nature of copyright protection, despite the Act’s lack of a precise definition for the term “author.” The U.S., Third Edition. Copyright Office’s Compendium5 states that works produced by non-human agents, like robots or animals, are categorically not eligible for copyright. The basic tenet is that human ingenuity is required for copyright protection, which is intimately tied to the constitution’s requirements for originality and expression.
The contrast between the Indian and American frameworks lies primarily in the statutory accommodation for computer-generated works in Indian law, which, while still human-centric, at least acknowledges the growing role of machines in creative processes. However, the legal stance in the United States is still stringent, completely prohibiting any non-human authorship from the threshold outward. However, the two regimes continue to share a common reluctance to venture into the highly dubious territory of giving artificial intelligence author status or even legal personality. The fundamental elements of authorship, according to the present perspectives in the two jurisdictions, are inextricably linked to the attributive dynamic of humanity: agency, intentionality, and moral accountability qualities that AI systems, despite their technological superiority, simply cannot replicate. This section demonstrates that while Indian copyright law provides a marginally more flexible framework for addressing AI-generated content through its statutory definitions, neither India nor the United States has yet developed a concrete legal mechanism that allows AI to be considered an author in its own right. This limitation highlights how urgent it is to reevaluate the traditional notions of authorship and originality in the age of algorithms and digitization. The Copyright Act of 1957 is the law that applies in India for granting copyright. The definition of “author” for various types of work is covered in the “definitions” part of this act, which is part 2(d). A piece of literature, drama, music, or art that is not visual art is created by a person known as the author.
The author is considered to be the creator of computer-generated works. This formulation implies that authorship, even in computer- generated contexts, is attributed to a human or legal person behind the creation process, not the machine itself. The U.S. Copyright Act of 19763 provides statutory copyright protection. The widespread notion, supported by the Copyright Office and case law, presumes that the inventor is human even though there is no precise description. The U.S. Copyright Office Compendium, Third Edition makes it clear that works produced by artificial intelligence or machines are not protected by copyright. Although the issue of AI authorship has not been formally resolved by Indian courts, certain rulings address authorship principles. According to the court’s ruling in Ramesh Sippy v. Shaan Ranjeet Uttamsingh, 20136 (53) PTC 539 (Bom), an author must put in intellectual effort. This intellectual connection is difficult to establish in AI-generated works due to the autonomous and algorithmic nature of AI creativity.
Despite not including AI, the Indian court recognized the involvement of employers and employees in the authorship dispute in its ruling in the Tech Plus Media Private Ltd. v. Jyoti Janda case. Given the expanding use of AI in the nation’s software, media, and advertising sectors, the matter is awaiting resolution in Indian courts as there are currently no formal rulings addressing authorship rights for AI. This isn’t the situation in the US, though, where numerous important rulings about the scope and function of non-human authorship have been rendered. Discussions concerning AI authorship often bring up the Naruto v. Slater case, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018)4, despite being a macaque monkey. The court held that only humans have the right to copyright protection and that animals lack the statutory capacity to litigate under copyright law. Although AI was not addressed in this ruling, it is clear how it would affect writings by non-human authors.
The court upheld the anthropocentric theory of legal authorship. In another significant case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)5, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted that copyrightability necessitates a minimum degree of innovation as mandated by the Constitution. The idea that creativity must result from human intelligence and judgment was tacitly supported by the Court. This standard presents a major barrier to recognizing AI-generated works, which are produced by computational logic rather than human creativity. Most notably, in Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C. 2023)6, Accordingly, the court maintained the U.S. copyright office’s decision to deny copyright registration for the work “A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” which was wholly produced by an artificial intelligence program known as the “Creativity Machine.” Dr. Stephen Thaler, the petitioner, argued that since the AI program developed the entire work, he should be given copyright because he is the program’s owner and operator. However, the court dismissed the argument on the grounds that copyright should only be extended to works created by humans.
Given that it makes it abundantly evident that current law just does not permit this, this case seems to be a turning point in the legal discussion surrounding AI writers. Additionally, a graphic novel containing “images created by AI technology through the Mid Journey platform” was at issue in the 2022 Zarya of the Dawn case before the U.S. Copyright Office. Certain copyright rights were given to the complete graphic novel, but not to the “images created by AI technology.” This selective registration reflects the difficult balance that exists in this field: “Components generated by machines alone without any human modification or intervention remain outside the protection of copyright law altogether, even though human input is still protectable.” When considered collectively, these instances create a strong legal and administrative consensus in the US: authorship should be human. It goes without saying that Indian courts have not yet directly addressed this matter; nonetheless, it should be noted that this lack of precedent should not be interpreted as permissiveness. In fact, the Indian judiciary is probably going to depend on global events, especially those in the United States.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: INDIA VS. UNITED STATES
A significantly broader meaning is suggested by the fact that the Indian copyright law mentions the idea of a human or legal entity interacting with a computer-generated work. The phrase “person who causes the work to be created” is included in the Indian Copyright Act, indicating a nascent understanding of the complexity imposed by contemporary technology. By allowing for a more flexible interpretation of the concept of “authorship,” this phrase may make it possible for a human operator or programmer to enter the frame. However, this approach still falls short of recognizing AI as an independent author and is instead a legal workaround that ensures human involvement remains central. The United States has, however, maintained a more adamant position that only human authors are acceptable. In fact, the U.S. Copyright Office and federal courts have denied copyright protection to AI-generated works that do not have human authorship. Constitutional considerations that link human inventiveness, technological advancements, and valuable arts to copyright protection strengthen this viewpoint. Clarity is achieved, but the autonomous creative capabilities of advanced AI systems are also obscured. Notwithstanding these differences, the fundamental idea that AI lacks the legal standing required to be granted rights or responsibilities is shared by both states. Deeper philosophical similarities between the laws of the two nations that are related to moral agency, consciousness, and responsibility—qualities that AI does not possess are reflected in this unity. Despite this convergence, however, the lack of legislative reform in either country has made it possible for the growing influence of AI-generated works in the creative and commercial sectors to aggravate the legal gap. The two jurisdictions’ interpretations of what intention and creativity signify give a second point of disjunction. Generally speaking, no particular “human element of intent” needs to be met in order for a work to be eligible for copyright protection under Indian law. This might be a means of integrating AI-assisted projects, particularly when those projects are started or directed by human input.
Conversely, U.S. Actually, a crucial point is made by copyright law, which has been greatly impacted by court rulings like the Feist publication verdict and the Thaler case ruling: uniqueness is important, and human intelligence and personality are essential. India may be a jurisdiction that is amenable to the gradual legal recognition of AI-related rights, at least in practice if not in principle, as the country’s legal system appears to offer a degree of interpretive flexibility that can be used to accommodate the changing role of AI. It will be intriguing to see if legislation can address this disparity. The United States, despite its technological advancements in AI research and development, may also be hindered by an overly orthodox legal approach. Overall, while India and the U.S. take different paths, both legal systems face significant challenges in aligning their copyright regimes with the technological realities posed by AI. In light of a future in which machines significantly contribute to human culture and creativity, the comparative analysis shows that while neither jurisdiction has yet offered a comprehensive solution, both are useful teachers for how the legal system might adapt or resist adaptation. A much broader interpretation is provided under Indian copyright law, which allows for a human or legal person to be behind a computer-generated work. In contrast, the United States continues to insist on human authorship in both administrative policy and law interpretation. However, it is evident that both jurisdictions are reluctant to acknowledge AI as a legal person. Under current legal thought, the emphasis remains on human creativity, purpose, and expression norms that AI cannot match.
THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
AI lacks the rights, accountability, and social interaction characteristics that legal individuals do. Despite being legal entities, corporations are managed by people. AI lacks consciousness yet is autonomous. From a normative standpoint, it is problematic to assign authorship to an AI-generated work of art. Is it better to think of the person who used AI as a sort of author or is it appropriate to give AI rights?
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several legislative options available to address the authorship of works created by AI. The Human Proxy Model is one such proposal that grants authorship to the work’s creator in accordance with Indian law. Corporate Authorship is an additional option that aims to establish authorship as a respectable company that uses the AI technology. Establishing a system of Sui Generis protection tailored to AI work would be the more drastic option, giving the work a special kind of intellectual property protection. Regarding a worldwide framework, groups like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have started looking into how AI affects copyright, but there isn’t a consensus on the matter. Although they haven’t given AI legal personhood or authoring rights, the EU and the UK have started holding public talks on the topic.
CONCLUSION
AI calls into question the fundamentals of copyright law. In India and the United States, AI is not yet acknowledged as an author. The dominant viewpoint is still human-centric, and for good reason, given AI’s current limitations in demonstrating creativity, intent, and accountability. However, considering the speed at which AI is evolving, a forward-looking approach is necessary. Legal frameworks will need to change to accommodate AI’s creative role possibly by using human substitutes or new IP regimes while maintaining the fundamental humanistic copyright ideals. Thus, the future of copyright law hinges on how successfully it reconciles upholding the value of writing as a human endeavor with advancing technological advancement. As AI systems become integral tools for creative professionals, there is a pressing need for legal clarity to determine where human contribution ends and machine involvement begins. This is particularly important in commercial contexts, where the economic value of AI-generated content can be substantial. Without a coherent legal framework, disputes over ownership, infringement, and licensing of such works are bound to increase. Lawmakers must create adaptable regulations that safeguard the fundamental values of uniqueness and inventiveness while taking into account the needs of developers, users, and the general public. In conclusion, through comparative legal research and international discussions, both the US and India should consider whether it is possible to amend the copyright laws based on current case law.
The recognition of artificial intelligence as an author and its legal personality raises important ethical and philosophical issues. Is it ever possible for anything devoid of moral agency and consciousness to be regarded as the legitimate owner of intellectual property. It is obvious that reform is necessary to bring our legal system up to date with the rapid advancement of technology, whether it be through interpretation, direct legislative amendment, or new categories of intellectual property created especially to cope with AI. Even in the era of artificial intelligence, copyright law will remain robust, equitable, and pertinent to society provided a forward-thinking legal framework is constructed. Furthermore, the rapid proliferation of AI technology necessitates collaboration between national and international governments. As a result, AI-generated rights are included in intellectual property rights, which are by definition international. To guarantee that a balanced approach is taken, it will be essential to homogenize different rights, possibly through a treaty or model law, with the assistance of international organizations like WIPO, among others. Furthermore, failing to secure protection for AI-generated rights may theoretically make it more difficult to invest in AI creativity overall from an economic perspective. Therefore, if there are no financial advantages, inventors, new businesses, or tech developers who use AI-generated rights may be at a disadvantage. This could result in a halt in the advancement of creative AI or a withdrawal of interest from markets with an unfriendly regulatory environment. On the other hand, overly generous protection may lead to monopolies over content produced by machines and pose issues related to access, fairness, and the democratization of cultural output.
Giving authors to AI poses ethical questions regarding our understanding of work, accomplishments, and even social contracts. By assigning writers to AI, the concept of authors itself suggests recognition of creative work and even a moral incentive for it. We might unintentionally diminish the value of human-based intellectual activity if we do this. Therefore, the legal system must exercise caution when interpreting how and to whom such acknowledgment is granted, whether it be to programmers, users, entities, or even society as a whole Furthermore, the issue of culpability cannot be disregarded. It can be difficult to decide who should be held accountable if an AI-generated work is discovered to violate an existing copyright or to promote hate speech or harmful content. The arguments for preserving a human-centric approach to copyright liability and legal recourse, at least for the time being, are further supported by the difficulty in promoting legal redress in the absence of clear authorship and liability attribution. Furthermore, from a jurisprudential standpoint, courts and legislative bodies have the chance to shape the future of copyright law by taking a progressive stance on interpretation. A middle ground for judicial assessment of the degree of human contribution, intentionality, and control for individuals qualifying for authorship, for example, is provided by the idea of hybrid models of authorship, in which humans may collaborate with machines. In addition to a possibly wider definition of what can be described by the “person who caused the work to be created,” as it is defined in India, this could, for example, include a sophisticated kind of human-artificial intelligence cooperation. The United States’ legal system can be changed to close the gaps left by seminal rulings such as Thaler v. Perlmutter. Respecting the fundamentals of copyright while keeping content creation in mind is crucial in both situations. Therefore, in conclusion, although Artificial Intelligence is not recognized as a legal person or author under the current US and Indian copyright laws, these legal determinations must be reassessed in the backdrop of the enhanced creative capabilities of Artificial Intelligence. As the demarcation between human and computer authorship becomes increasingly obscure, the law must make a cautious but progressive shift, grounded on human accountability, justice, and the promotion of creativity, to ascertain whether the copyright law is still relevant in the twenty-first century.
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Footnotes
1. The Copyright Act, 1957, s. 2(d), No. 14 of 1957, Acts of Parliament, India.
2. The United States Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
3. ibid
4. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
5. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
6. Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case No. 1:22-cv-01564 (D.D.C. 2023).