INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom occupies a central position within the constitutional framework of India. The Constitution guarantees to every individual the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion under Article 251, while Article 262 grants religious denominations the autonomy to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. At the same time, these guarantees are not absolute. They remain subject to public order, morality, health, and the broader commitment of the Constitution to equality, dignity, and social reform. The Indian model of secularism, unlike strict separationist models, therefore envisages a principled interaction between the State and religion, where liberty and reform must coexist3. This constitutional balance has generated some of the most complex and contested questions in Indian public law.
In attempting to resolve such tensions, Indian courts developed what is now known as the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine. Under this doctrine, a court examines whether a disputed belief, ritual, or custom constitutes an essential and integral part of a religion. If the practice is found to be essential, it ordinarily receives constitutional protection; if not, it may be subjected to state regulation or prohibition. Since its emergence in Shirur Mutt Case4, the doctrine has profoundly shaped Indian religious freedom jurisprudence and has been applied in disputes involving temple administration, denominational autonomy, minority customs, gender justice, education, and public order.
Yet, despite its longevity, the ERP doctrine has attracted sustained criticism from scholars, judges, and litigants. Critics argue that it places secular courts in the position of theological authorities by requiring judges to interpret scriptures, determine orthodoxy, and rank religious practices according to perceived importance5. Others contend that the doctrine has been inconsistently applied, often privileging dominant or textual interpretations of religion while disadvantaging lived, diverse, or minority practices6. Recent controversies such as the Sabarimala Judgment and the Karnataka Hijab Case have further renewed debate over whether essentiality remains a legitimate constitutional test.
This paper argues that the core difficulty lies not merely in erroneous outcomes, but in a deeper doctrinal transformation embedded in the language of the jurisprudence itself. The early judicial inquiry was substantially concerned with whether a matter was essentially religious in character that is, whether it properly belonged to the sphere of religion rather than secular administration. Over time, however, this inquiry shifted toward determining whether a practice was essential to the religion itself. This semantic drift from identifying the religious nature of a practice to measuring its internal importance significantly expanded judicial power and narrowed the scope of constitutional protection.
The consequences of this shift have been far-reaching. By converting threshold classification into substantive theological evaluation, courts increasingly assumed authority to decide what constitutes “true” religion. This has led to doctrinal uncertainty, inconsistent reasoning, and the exclusion of many sincere religious claims before they are tested against constitutional principles such as equality, dignity, privacy, and autonomy. In effect, the ERP doctrine has often operated less as a shield for religious liberty and more as a gatekeeping mechanism.
The central thesis of this paper is that Indian religious freedom jurisprudence would be better served by abandoning rigid essentiality analysis and adopting a rights-based framework. Such a framework would ask whether a claimed practice is sincerely connected to faith or conscience and whether restrictions upon it are justified under principles of proportionality, reasonable accommodation, and competing constitutional rights. This would preserve judicial neutrality while respecting India’s plural and evolving religious traditions.
BIRTH OF THE DOCTRINE: SHIRUR MUTT AND THE JUDICIAL ARCHITECTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
No discussion of the Essential Religious Practices doctrine can begin without reference to The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt7. Decided in 1954, the case occupies a foundational place in Indian constitutional law because it was among the earliest authoritative attempts by the Supreme Court to interpret the scope of Articles 25 and 26. More significantly, it supplied the conceptual vocabulary from which later essentiality jurisprudence emerged. Yet, while Shirur Mutt is routinely cited as the origin of the ERP test, a closer reading reveals a more nuanced position: the judgment was less concerned with ranking practices according to theological importance and more concerned with protecting institutional autonomy from excessive state control. The later doctrine of essentiality may therefore be understood not as a faithful continuation of Shirur Mutt, but as a selective extrapolation from it.
A. Background of the dispute
The dispute arose from the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 19518, which sought to regulate Hindu religious institutions through extensive administrative supervision. The legislation empowered state authorities to oversee finances, appoint executive officers, and exercise substantial control over the internal functioning of temples and mutts. The petitioners, representing the Shirur Mutt, challenged the validity of several provisions on the ground that they infringed the autonomy guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26.
The constitutional conflict was therefore not initially about a ritual, symbol, or contested custom. It was about the relationship between the newly independent State and longstanding religious institutions. This context matters. The Court was not asked whether a specific practice was indispensable to Hinduism; rather, it was asked whether the State could penetrate the internal sphere of religious governance under the guise of regulation
B. Religion as More than mere Belief
One of the most cited propositions from Shirur Mutt is the Court’s statement that religion is not confined to doctrine or belief alone but includes outward acts done in pursuance of faith. This formulation was constitutionally significant because it rejected a narrow secular understanding of religion as purely private conscience. The Court recognized that religion, particularly in the Indian context, is often expressed through ceremonies, observances, institutions, and community life.
This recognition served an important protective function. If religion were reduced to inward belief alone, the State could regulate most external manifestations without constitutional restraint. By acknowledging that practice may also fall within the religious domain, the Court gave substantive content to Article 25.
However, this passage must be read carefully. The Court did not hold that every act associated with religion automatically became immune from regulation. Nor did it establish a rigid formula that only indispensable practices merit protection. Rather, it recognized that constitutional adjudication must distinguish genuine religious matters from secular activities merely connected with religious institutions.
C. The real core of the Judgement: Boundary setting
The deeper structure of Shirur Mutt lies in its attempt to draw boundaries between two spheres:
1. Matters of Religion, where autonomy is strongly protected: and
2. Secular administration, where regulation is permissible
This distinction reflected the constitutional text itself. Article 26(b) protects the right of denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, while Article 26(d) contemplates administration of property in accordance with law. The Court’s reasoning thus aligned with the Constitution’s internal separation between spiritual functions and temporal management.
Seen in this light, Shirur Mutt was primarily a case about jurisdictional competence rather than theological hierarchy. It asked: Which sphere belongs to the denomination, and which sphere may the State regulate? That is fundamentally different from later cases asking whether a ritual is sufficiently central or mandatory.
D. How Essentiality Entered the Jurisprudence
The judgment also observed that what constitutes an essential part of religion is to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. This sentence later became the cornerstone of ERP jurisprudence. Yet in its original setting, it functioned as a restraint on state interference. The Court was cautioning that the State could not simply redefine religion from outside; internal doctrines and traditions mattered.
Over time, however, this protective statement was transformed into an adjudicatory weapon. Later courts began using it to independently examine texts, scriptures, and historical materials in order to determine whether a claimant’s practice was truly essential. The inquiry gradually shifted:
• from Who decides the content of religion? to
• Is this practice sufficiently important to deserve protection?
That shift converted a shield into a filter.
E. Institutional Autonomy and the Post-colonial State
The broader significance of Shirur Mutt also lies in its post-colonial context. Independent India inherited a regulatory apparatus through which colonial authorities often supervised temples, endowments, and trusts9. The Court’s decision may therefore be read as an early assertion that constitutional democracy did not authorize unrestricted bureaucratic control over religious institutions.
This helps explain why the judgment strongly defended denominational autonomy. The Court was responding to the fear that the modern State, in the name of reform or efficiency, might subsume autonomous religious bodies into administrative departments. Shirur Mutt thus reflected a concern with decentralization, pluralism, and limits on executive power.
F. The Misreading of Shirur Mutt
Much subsequent jurisprudence cites Shirur Mutt as if it created a mature essential practices doctrine. That reading is incomplete. The judgment did not offer a comprehensive methodology for ranking rituals, measuring indispensability, or adjudicating scriptural disputes Those developments were later judicial constructions10.
Indeed, one may argue that the modern ERP doctrine often departs from the spirit of Shirur Mutt. Whereas the 1954 Court sought to preserve constitutional space for religious communities against excessive regulation, later courts sometimes narrowed that space by excluding practices deemed non-essential. In this sense, Shirur Mutt became both the source of protection and the source text for later restriction.
For the purposes of this paper, Shirur Mutt marks the starting point of the semantic and doctrinal journey from “essentially religious” to “essentiality.” The original case was largely concerned with identifying whether an issue belonged to the protected religious sphere or the regulable secular sphere. Only later did courts transform this into an inquiry into internal centrality.
Recognizing this distinction is crucial. It shows that the ERP doctrine was not born fully formed in 1954. Rather, it emerged gradually through reinterpretation. The semantic drift identified in this paper therefore began not with the constitutional text, but with the subsequent judicial reading of Shirur Mutt.
SEMANTIC DRIFT: FROM “ESSENTIALLY RELIGIOUS” TO ESSENTIALITY
A. The original Judicial Inquiry: Identifying the Religious Domain
One of the most consequential developments in Indian religious freedom jurisprudence has occurred not through an explicit doctrinal break, but through a gradual shift in judicial language and reasoning. In its early phase, particularly in Shirur Mutt Case, constitutional adjudication was primarily concerned with identifying whether a matter was essentially religious in character or whether it fell within the realm of secular administration. This inquiry was fundamentally classificatory. Courts were required to demarcate the boundary between two constitutionally recognized spheres: the domain of religion, which attracted protection under Articles 25 and 26, and the domain of secular, economic, or administrative activity, which could legitimately be regulated by the State.
This approach was closely aligned with the constitutional text. Article 26 itself distinguishes between the management of religious affairs and the administration of property, indicating that not all activities associated with religion enjoy equal protection. The early judicial role, therefore, was limited and structurally grounded it involved locating the nature of the activity rather than evaluating its importance within a religious system. In this sense, the question “Is this essentially religious?” functioned as a boundary-setting device that preserved institutional autonomy while allowing space for state intervention in secular matters. It did not require courts to assess theological centrality or to determine whether a practice was indispensable to the survival of a religion.
B. The Shift Towards Essentiality and Judicial Theologization
Over time, this limited classificatory inquiry underwent a significant transformation. Courts began to move beyond determining whether a practice was religious in nature and instead asked whether it was essential, integral, or indispensable to the religion. This shift is visible in decisions such as the Durgah Committee Case11, where the Court introduced the idea that only those practices regarded as essential and integral would merit constitutional protection, while practices considered superstitious or extraneous could be excluded. Although this appeared to refine the earlier doctrine, it in fact marked a profound change in judicial function. The inquiry was no longer confined to classification; it now required courts to engage in theological evaluation. Judges began interpreting scriptures, examining historical practices, and determining doctrinal authenticity in order to decide whether a claimed practice was sufficiently central. The shift from asking what is religious to asking what is essential to religion effectively transformed the judiciary into an arbiter of religious truth an institutionally problematic development given that constitutional courts lack both the expertise and legitimacy to resolve internal questions of faith, belief, and doctrinal hierarchy12.
As the doctrine expanded, definitional complexities and doctrinal inconsistencies began to surface. In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay13, the Supreme Court paradoxically held that while Article 25(2) permits social reform, it cannot extend to essential religious practices, thereby insulating such practices from legislative intervention.This reasoning had the unintended consequence of rendering the social reform clause in Article 25(2)(b) largely redundant. If only essential practices are protected, then all non-essential practices may be freely regulated; yet once a practice is deemed essential, it becomes entirely immune from reform. Such an absolutist framework creates a constitutional imbalance and raises doubts about whether the framers intended to include a purposeless reform provision. The difficulty is compounded by the absence of a clear and consistent definition of what constitutes “essentiality,” resulting in fluctuating judicial standards and uncertainty regarding both the scope of religious protection and the limits of state intervention.
This instability is further illustrated by the introduction of new and often contradictory criteria in subsequent cases. In Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police14, the Court denied protection to the Tandava dance on the ground that it was a relatively recent addition to the Ananda Margi faith, thereby introducing recency as a factor in determining essentiality.This approach was later questioned even within the Court, with dissenting opinions arguing that the temporal origin of a practice cannot determine its religious significance if it is sincerely accepted by followers. Conversely, in Shayara Bano Case15, the Court discounted longevity as a relevant factor, holding that the continued existence of triple talaq did not make it essential if it was doctrinally impermissible. These conflicting approaches demonstrate the absence of a coherent methodology. At times, courts rely on antiquity; at others, they dismiss it. In some instances, scriptural mandate is decisive; in others, judicial interpretation of secondary legal texts becomes determinative. Such variability reveals that the essentiality test operates less as a principled standard and more as a flexible instrument capable of producing divergent outcomes.
The problem is further exacerbated by the selective use of sources and interpretive frameworks. Judicial reliance on secondary materials such as legal treatises rather than lived religious practices has often overridden the internal understanding of communities themselves. In Shayara Bano, for instance, reliance on doctrinal classifications within Islamic jurisprudence led to the conclusion that triple talaq was not essential, while dissenting opinions elevated the same practice to the status of an essential religious feature on the basis that it was sanctioned by the faith. This divergence illustrates how the essentiality test can be moulded to support contrasting conclusions, depending on the sources and interpretive lens adopted by the judge. Such flexibility raises serious concerns about objectivity and predictability, as it allows courts to effectively validate or invalidate religious practices based on selective reasoning.
Ultimately, the evolution of the essentiality doctrine reveals a deeper structural issue: the gradual theologization of constitutional adjudication. Instead of acting as neutral arbiters of constitutional boundaries, courts have increasingly engaged in determining the content and hierarchy of religious belief. This shift not only undermines the autonomy of religious communities but also distorts the role of the judiciary within a secular constitutional framework. As has been increasingly recognized, including in later judicial opinions, courts lack both the institutional competence and democratic legitimacy to decide questions of religious essentiality. The continued reliance on this test therefore not only produces doctrinal inconsistency but also risks eroding the foundational principles of religious freedom and constitutional neutrality.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT: FROM PROTECTION TO RESTRICTION
The transformation of the Essential Religious Practices doctrine from a boundary-setting tool into a test of theological indispensability has had profound consequences for Indian constitutional law. What initially appeared as a method to protect religion from excessive state interference has, over time, evolved into a mechanism that often restricts the very freedom it was meant to secure. The problem is not merely one of inconsistent outcomes, but of structural distortion: the essentiality test alters the nature of constitutional adjudication by shifting the focus from rights and limitations to theological validity.
One of the most immediate consequences of this shift is the contraction of religious freedom. Articles 25 and 26, on their plain reading, guarantee the right to practice religion subject to specified limitations such as public order, morality, and health. The introduction of an additional judicial threshold namely, that a practice must be “essential” to the religion effectively narrows this guarantee16. Practices that are sincerely followed but do not meet the court’s standard of indispensability are excluded from protection at the outset. This is particularly problematic in a society like India, where religious traditions are not uniform or centrally codified but are instead diverse, localized, and often contested. By privileging only those practices that appear central or orthodox, the doctrine risks marginalizing minority sects, reformist traditions, and individual expressions of faith17.
Closely related to this is the problem of institutional competence. The essentiality test requires courts to interpret religious texts, examine doctrinal history, and determine what is fundamental to a belief system. This effectively places judges in the position of theological arbiters. As seen in cases such as the Sabarimala Judgment18 and the Karnataka Hijab Case19, courts have engaged in detailed analysis of scriptures and religious practices in order to assess essentiality. Such an exercise raises serious concerns. Constitutional courts are designed to interpret law, not to adjudicate competing interpretations of faith. Moreover, religions themselves are rarely monolithic; they contain multiple traditions, sects, and evolving practices. Judicial attempts to identify a single “true” version of a religion inevitably privilege certain interpretations while silencing others, thereby distorting the internal diversity of religious life.
The doctrine also suffers from conceptual indeterminacy. The Constitution does not define what constitutes an “essential” practice, nor does it prescribe a method for identifying one. As a result, courts have relied on a variety of inconsistent criteria—scriptural authority, historical continuity, community acceptance, or even perceived rationality. This lack of a stable standard has led to unpredictability in judicial outcomes. Similar claims have been treated differently depending on the bench, the context, or the interpretive approach adopted. Such inconsistency undermines the rule of law and weakens confidence in constitutional adjudication.
Perhaps the most significant critique of the essentiality doctrine is that it displaces a rights-based analysis. Constitutional adjudication, particularly in matters involving fundamental rights, is expected to involve a careful balancing of competing values—religious freedom on one hand, and equality, dignity, and social reform on the other. The essentiality test, however, often operates as a threshold filter that prevents this balancing from taking place. Once a practice is declared non-essential, the claim is effectively dismissed without engaging with broader constitutional principles. This was evident in the hijab litigation, where the question of whether wearing the hijab was essential to Islam overshadowed considerations of personal autonomy, dignity, and access to education. Similarly, in Sabarimala, the determination of essentiality played a central role in shaping the outcome, even as deeper questions of gender equality and constitutional morality were at stake.
The doctrine also creates a subtle but important shift in the burden of justification. Under a rights-based framework, the State bears the burden of justifying restrictions on fundamental rights. However, under the essentiality test, the burden effectively shifts to the claimant, who must demonstrate that the practice is indispensable to the religion. This inversion weakens the protective character of fundamental rights and places individuals and communities in the difficult position of having to prove the theological centrality of their beliefs.
From a broader constitutional perspective, the essentiality doctrine sits uneasily with the idea of secularism as understood in India. Indian secularism is not premised on strict separation between State and religion but on principled engagement and equal respect for all faiths. By engaging in theological determinations, courts risk undermining this neutrality. Instead of maintaining a position of principled distance, the judiciary becomes entangled in internal religious debates, thereby blurring the line between constitutional adjudication and religious interpretation.
Taken together, these consequences suggest that the difficulties associated with the ERP doctrine are not incidental but structural. The shift from “essentially religious” to “essentiality” has expanded judicial power into areas where it lacks both expertise and legitimacy, while simultaneously narrowing the scope of religious freedom. The doctrine, in its current form, neither provides a stable standard nor adequately protects the diversity of religious expression in India. This calls for a rethinking of the framework through which religious freedom claims are adjudicated one that moves away from theological essentiality and toward a more principled engagement with constitutional values such as sincerity, autonomy, equality, and proportionality.
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A comparative examination of constitutional systems demonstrates that India’s Essential Religious Practices doctrine represents neither the only nor the dominant judicial method for resolving disputes involving religion. Different constitutional democracies have evolved distinct approaches to balancing religious freedom with competing state interests such as equality, public order, social harmony, and institutional neutrality. While some jurisdictions consciously avoid theological adjudication and focus instead on sincerity, proportionality, and accommodation, others adopt stronger models of state involvement in religion20. India occupies a particularly distinctive position within this spectrum. Unlike strict separationist systems that refuse to determine religious truth, Indian courts have repeatedly undertaken the task of identifying what constitutes “essential” religion. The comparative experience of other jurisdictions therefore offers an important lens through which the limitations and peculiarities of the ERP doctrine may be understood.
A. South Africa: Sincerity, Dignity and Judicial Non-Entanglement
South African constitutional jurisprudence presents one of the clearest contrasts to the Indian ERP framework. Rather than engaging in deep theological inquiry to determine whether a practice is mandatory or indispensable to a religion, South African courts generally adopt a restrained approach that avoids excessive judicial entanglement in doctrinal matters. The emphasis is placed not on whether a practice is objectively essential to a faith, but on whether the claimant sincerely regards the practice as connected to their religious or cultural identity. This approach reflects the broader constitutional philosophy of South Africa, where freedom, dignity, equality, and pluralism occupy a central place within constitutional adjudication.
The decision in MEC for Education v. Pillay21 illustrates this approach. The case concerned a Hindu student who was prohibited from wearing a nose stud in school due to uniform regulations. Instead of examining whether the nose stud was an essential religious requirement within Hinduism, the Constitutional Court focused on whether the refusal to permit the practice amounted to indirect discrimination and whether reasonable accommodation could be provided without causing substantial harm to institutional objectives. The Court recognized that religious and cultural identity often manifests in deeply personal ways that may not always be uniformly practiced across a community. Consequently, constitutional protection was linked to sincerity of belief and dignity of expression rather than theological indispensability.
South African jurisprudence also demonstrates a strong nexus between religious freedom and human dignity. The constitutional inquiry centres on whether the individual’s autonomy and identity are unfairly burdened by state action. This allows courts to avoid becoming arbiters of doctrinal correctness while still ensuring meaningful protection of religious liberty. Such an approach stands in sharp contrast to Indian ERP jurisprudence, where constitutional protection frequently depends upon whether judges regard a practice as sufficiently central to a religion. The South African model therefore represents a rights-oriented and accommodation-based framework that prioritizes pluralism over theological classification.
B. United States: Separation, Neutrality and the Religious question Doctrine
The constitutional approach of the United States stands in marked contrast to the Indian ERP framework. Rooted in the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, American constitutionalism is premised upon a strong principle of state neutrality toward religion22. Historically, courts employed the “Lemon Test”23 to determine whether government action violated the Establishment Clause, although more recent jurisprudence has shifted toward historical and tradition-based reasoning. Despite doctrinal evolution, one consistent feature of American constitutional law has been judicial reluctance to adjudicate internal theological disputes.
This restraint is reflected in the “religious question doctrine,” under which civil courts avoid deciding matters that turn upon doctrinal interpretation, internal church governance, or theological correctness. American courts generally consider themselves institutionally incompetent to determine religious truth and therefore refrain from deciding whether a practice is genuinely essential to a faith tradition. The constitutional inquiry instead focuses on whether state action is neutral, generally applicable, or unjustifiably burdens religious exercise.
The American model is particularly significant in comparison with India because it demonstrates a constitutional framework in which religious liberty is protected without requiring judges to become interpreters of scripture. Unlike Indian ERP jurisprudence, where constitutional protection often depends upon judicial findings regarding essentiality, the American approach emphasizes institutional neutrality and limits judicial engagement with theology. This reflects a fundamentally different understanding of secularism and judicial role.
C. Singapore: Public order, Communitarianism and Controlled Accomodation
Singapore adopts a comparatively restrained but state-centric approach toward religious freedom. Unlike the Indian judiciary, Singaporean courts generally avoid extensive theological determination, yet religious liberty remains closely tied to concerns of public order, social harmony, and communitarian governance. The constitutional framework in Singapore prioritizes stability and multicultural coexistence, resulting in a more controlled conception of religious freedom than that found in liberal rights-oriented systems.
Rather than focusing on whether a practice is essential to a religion, Singaporean jurisprudence tends to examine whether accommodating the practice would undermine public order or institutional discipline. The courts have shown greater deference to executive and administrative authorities in matters involving religious regulation. Scholars have observed that an emerging two-stage approach can be identified within Singaporean constitutional reasoning: first, a relatively broad acceptance of a group’s claim to religiosity unless fraudulent or manifestly insincere; and second, a balancing inquiry examining whether restrictions are justified by legitimate state interests.
This model differs from India’s ERP doctrine in an important respect. Although Singapore permits state intervention for reasons of harmony and discipline, courts generally avoid detailed scriptural interpretation and theological ranking. The emphasis remains on governance and public interest rather than on judicial determination of doctrinal truth. Thus, while Singapore does not provide a fully liberal model of religious freedom, it nevertheless demonstrates a more restrained judicial role than that adopted under India’s essentiality jurisprudence.
D. Kenya: Proportionality and Anti-Discrimination Analysis
Kenyan constitutional jurisprudence reflects a preference for proportionality and anti-discrimination analysis over rigid theological scrutiny. In disputes involving religious attire and institutional regulations, Kenyan courts have generally focused on the practical burden imposed upon individuals rather than undertaking an extensive inquiry into the doctrinal essentiality of the practice itself. This approach aligns with Kenya’s broader constitutional commitment to equality, diversity, and protection against indirect discrimination.
In Mohamed Fugicha v. Methodist Church in Kenya24, the issue concerned restrictions imposed on Muslim students wearing hijab in a Christian mission school. Rather than asking whether the hijab was indispensable to Islam in a theological sense, the Court examined whether the restrictions disproportionately disadvantaged Muslim students and whether the institutional objectives of the school justified such limitations. The analysis effectively resembled a proportionality inquiry, requiring the Court to balance religious freedom with competing educational and administrative concerns.
The Kenyan approach is significant because it shifts the judicial focus away from doctrinal determination and toward the impact of state or institutional action upon constitutional rights. The central concern becomes whether the restriction is reasonable, proportionate, and non-discriminatory, rather than whether the practice itself satisfies a judicial standard of essentiality. In this respect, Kenyan jurisprudence offers an alternative constitutional model where courts preserve religious liberty without assuming the role of theological authorities.
E. Malaysia: The expansion of Essentiality based Reasoning
Malaysia presents a particularly important comparative example because its courts have, at times, adopted reasoning similar to India’s ERP jurisprudence. Unlike South Africa and Kenya, where courts generally avoid theological centrality tests, Malaysian jurisprudence has shown a greater willingness to determine whether a practice is integral to Islam before extending constitutional protection. This has resulted in a more restrictive understanding of religious freedom and demonstrates how essentiality based reasoning can narrow constitutional guarantees.
One notable example is the judicial treatment of the wearing of the serban (turban) by Muslim students25. Malaysian courts held that the practice did not constitute an integral or mandatory component of Islam and therefore did not merit constitutional protection in the face of school regulations. Similarly, in the widely debated “Allah” controversy, the courts adopted a narrow interpretation of religious necessity, effectively suggesting that only those practices without which the religion itself would fundamentally change deserve constitutional protection.
The Malaysian experience reveals the dangers inherent in essentiality based adjudication. Once courts assume the authority to determine what is doctrinally central, constitutional protection becomes contingent upon judicial interpretations of theology rather than upon individual freedom of conscience. The result is a model in which the judiciary effectively controls the boundaries of permissible religious expression. This comparative example is particularly relevant to the Indian context because it demonstrates how the logic of essentiality can evolve into a restrictive mechanism that privileges state-approved understandings of religion over internal diversity and lived religious experience.
F. Jurisdictions with constitutionally integrated Religious Frameworks
A different constitutional model emerges in jurisdictions where religion is formally integrated into the structure of the State itself. Countries such as Pakistan and Iran constitutionally embed Islamic principles within governance and legal interpretation. In Pakistan, for instance, constitutional provisions require that laws conform to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah. Similarly, Iran’s constitutional system grants significant authority to Islamic jurists and institutions in determining constitutional validity and legal conformity.
In such systems, judicial engagement with theology is not viewed as exceptional because religion forms an explicit constitutional foundation of the State. Questions of doctrinal conformity are institutionally embedded within governance itself. Some constitutional frameworks even require judges or constitutional authorities to possess expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. These systems therefore differ fundamentally from India, which formally identifies itself as a secular constitutional democracy.
The comparison is nevertheless important because it highlights the peculiar position occupied by Indian ERP jurisprudence. India is constitutionally secular, yet its courts frequently undertake theological inquiries comparable in intensity to systems where religion is constitutionally integrated with governance. This creates a conceptual tension within Indian secularism itself while the Constitution does not establish an official religion, judicial practice often involves extensive engagement with doctrinal questions. The result is a unique and sometimes unstable model in which secular constitutional courts continue to define the boundaries of religious authenticity.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A BETTER CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN INDIA
The evolution of the Essential Religious Practices doctrine reveals one of the most significant tensions within Indian constitutionalism: the attempt to reconcile religious freedom with secular constitutional governance. What began in the early years of constitutional adjudication as a limited inquiry into whether a practice was religious or secular gradually transformed into a far deeper judicial examination of theological centrality. This semantic and doctrinal shift from determining what is “essentially religious” to deciding what is “essential” to a religion substantially altered the scope of protection available under Articles 25 and 26. In the process, constitutional courts increasingly assumed the role of theological arbiters, interpreting scriptures, assessing doctrinal authenticity, and determining the internal hierarchy of religious beliefs and practices.
As this paper has demonstrated, the consequences of this transformation have been profound. The ERP doctrine has generated doctrinal inconsistency, institutional overreach, and uncertainty regarding the boundaries of religious liberty. The absence of a stable definition of “essentiality” has enabled fluctuating judicial standards, where courts have alternately relied upon scriptural authority, antiquity, community acceptance, rationality, or even historical continuity in determining constitutional protection. Such inconsistency weakens both predictability and legitimacy in constitutional adjudication. More importantly, the doctrine often privileges dominant and orthodox interpretations of religion while marginalising minority, reformist, localised, or evolving practices that may nevertheless hold deep religious significance for believers.
The comparative constitutional analysis undertaken in this paper further demonstrates that India’s approach is neither inevitable nor universally accepted. Jurisdictions such as South Africa and Kenya generally avoid intrusive theological determinations and instead emphasize sincerity of belief, dignity, proportionality, and reasonable accommodation. Even systems like the United States, despite their distinct constitutional structure, maintain judicial restraint in doctrinal matters through principles of neutrality and non-entanglement. These models suggest that constitutional protection of religious freedom need not depend upon judicial determination of theological indispensability
In light of these concerns, there is a compelling need to rethink the framework through which Indian courts adjudicate claims involving religious freedom. A more constitutionally coherent approach would require a gradual movement away from the essentiality doctrine toward a rights-based model centred upon sincerity, autonomy, dignity, and proportionality. Instead of asking whether a practice is indispensable to a religion, courts should primarily examine whether the claimant sincerely believes the practice to be religiously significant and whether restricting such practice is constitutionally justified. This would restore the focus of adjudication from theological correctness to constitutional rights.
At the same time, abandoning rigid essentiality does not imply absolute immunity for all religious claims. Courts must continue to intervene where practices violate constitutional guarantees relating to equality, dignity, public order, health, or protection against exploitation. However, such intervention should occur through transparent constitutional balancing rather than through judicial reconstruction of religious doctrine. The proportionality principle offers a more principled mechanism in this regard. By requiring the State to demonstrate legitimate purpose, necessity, and minimal impairment of rights, proportionality allows courts to balance competing constitutional interests without transforming themselves into religious authorities.
Indian courts may also adopt a stronger culture of reasonable accommodation in matters involving religious expression. In a plural constitutional democracy, uniformity cannot become the default constitutional value. Accommodation enables institutions to preserve regulatory objectives while respecting individual conscience and cultural diversity. This approach is particularly important in a society such as India, where religious practices are often decentralized, internally diverse, and historically evolving rather than doctrinally uniform.
Ultimately, the future of religious freedom jurisprudence in India depends upon preserving the delicate balance between constitutional secularism and genuine pluralism. A secular court must protect religion without defining religion itself. The legitimacy of constitutional adjudication lies not in determining what constitutes “true religion,” but in ensuring that the exercise of faith remains compatible with constitutional morality, equality, and human dignity. The shift away from essentiality toward sincerity, accommodation, and proportionality would therefore not weaken constitutional secularism; rather, it would strengthen the constitutional commitment to liberty, diversity, and democratic coexistence in a deeply plural society.
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Footnotes
1. INDIA CONST. art 25
2. INDIA CONST. art 26
3. Rajeev Bhargava, The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism, in The Future of secularism 20, 32–35 (T.N Srinivasan ed., oxford univ. Press 2006)
4. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282
5. Rajeev Dhavan & Fali S. Nariman, The Supreme Court and Group Life: Religious Freedom, Minority Groups, and Disadvantaged Communities, in Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India 256 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
6. Radley Henrico, The Essential Religious Practices Test Used by the Judiciary in India: Restricting or Advancing the Constitutional Protection of Religious Freedom? 1 TSAR 79, 90-91 (2023)
7. Supra note 3
8. The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, No.19 Acts of Parliament, 1951(India)
9. Marc Galanter, Secularism, East and West 7 CSSH 133, 142-144 (1965)
10. Rushil Batra, ERP a Story Tale of Judicial Misreading 11 IJCL 71, 79-80 (2024)
11. The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and another v. Syed Hussain Ali and ors, AIR 1961 SC 1402
12. Yuvraj Pratap Singh, Essential Religious Practices(ERP) 2 JCLJ 706 (2022)
13. 1962 AIR 853
14. (1983) 4 SCC 522
15. Shayara Bano v. Union of India and ors. AIR 1017 SC 4609
16. SM Aamir Ali & Deekshita Sriram, Putting the essential religious practice test through the test of essentiality: A socio legal study through the lens of the hijab verdicts in India 20 JILIL 17, 23 (2024)
17. Omkar Upadhyay, For whom to decide? Conundrums of Ascertaining Essential Religious Practices Manupatra article (May. 06, 2026, 03.25 PM), https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/For-Whom-to-Decide-Conundrums-of-Ascertaining-Essential-Religious-Practices
18. Indian young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1
19. Smt. Resham v. Sate of Karnataka and ors, WP no. 2347/2022
20. Stijn Smet, comparative constitutional Interpretation of Religious Freedom” 69 ICLQ 611, 620-625 (2020)
21. 2007 ZACC 21
22. Anoop Kumar, Impact of Religious Values in the adjudication process 4 BJLS 1, 9-10 (2023)
23. Established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602 (1971)
24. 2019 JELR 99136 (SC)
25. Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak and ors v. Fatimah bte Sihi & ors. (2006) 2 MLJ 375
