VidhiAagaz
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
ISSN 2581-5369 · Open access
International Journal ofLaw Management & Humanities
Open accessResearch PaperVol. 9 No. II (2026)pp. 978–1008

An Exploratory Study on the Legal Interface between Section 230 (CA 2013) and Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulation

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Published 3 April 2026 · pp. 978–1008 · Vol. 9 No. II (2026)
Abstract

This research explores the complex legal intersection between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, which governs schemes of arrangement and compromise, and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which facilitates such schemes during the liquidation phase of a Corporate Debtor. While the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 prioritizes the "revival" of a corporate entity, the practical invocation of Section 230 during liquidation often creates a procedural and jurisdictional tug-of-war between the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) acting as the Adjudicating Authority under the IBC and its role under the Companies Act. The study investigates the evolution of this interface, beginning with the landmark Swiss Ribbons and Meghal Pipes judgments, which reinforced the sanctity of the "going concern" principle even at the liquidation stage. It further analyzes the legal friction regarding timelines, specifically how the 90-day window provided under Regulation 2B aligns with the overarching objective of time-bound resolution. Key areas of inquiry include: The judicial shift from viewing liquidation as a "corporate death" to a final opportunity for restructuring., The eligibility criteria under Section 29A of the IBC and whether they should strictly apply to proponents of a scheme under Section 230., and The primacy of the IBC’s "overriding effect" (Section 238) versus the procedural requirements of the Companies Act. Through a doctrinal analysis of recent NCLT and NCLAT precedents, this paper concludes that while Regulation 2B serves as a vital bridge for corporate survival, a lack of legislative harmony leads to "liquidation arbitrage." The study suggests a need for a unified regulatory framework to prevent the dilution of the IBC’s core objectives while ensuring that the window for compromise remains a bona fide tool for value maximization rather than a dilatory tactic.

Keywords
Section 230 (CA 2013)Regulation 2BIBBI Liquidation ProcessCorporate RestructuringInsolvency and Bankruptcy Codeand Statutory Harmonization.
Contents
Full text

INTRODUCTION

A. Background of the Study

The legal landscape governing corporate insolvency and restructuring in India has undergone a significant transformation over the last decade. With the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter “IBC”), the Indian insolvency regime moved towards a consolidated, time-bound, and creditor-driven framework aimed at maximizing the value of assets and promoting entrepreneurship. Prior to the IBC, insolvency proceedings were fragmented across multiple statutes such as the Companies Act, 1956, Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 (SICA), and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. This multiplicity led to delays, inefficiencies, and erosion of asset value. The IBC sought to address these challenges by introducing a unified code with a clear focus on resolution rather than liquidation.

However, even within the IBC framework, liquidation is not intended to be the ultimate objective but rather a last resort when resolution fails. The Code emphasizes revival and continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern, thereby safeguarding employment, preserving economic value, and ensuring better recovery for creditors. This philosophy has been strongly endorsed by judicial pronouncements, which have consistently interpreted the IBC in a manner that prioritizes resolution over liquidation1. In this context, the integration of provisions from the Companies Act, 2013, particularly Section 230, into the liquidation process has emerged as a significant development in Indian insolvency jurisprudence.

Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides a statutory mechanism for compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or members. Traditionally, this provision has been used in the context of mergers, amalgamations, and corporate restructuring outside insolvency proceedings. It empowers the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to sanction schemes that are approved by the requisite majority of stakeholders, thereby making them binding on all parties. The flexibility inherent in Section 230 allows for innovative restructuring solutions, making it a powerful tool for corporate revival.

B. Statement of the Problem

The introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) marked a significant shift in India’s insolvency regime by emphasizing time-bound resolution and value maximization of distressed assets. While liquidation is envisaged as a last resort under the IBC, the legal framework still provides avenues for revival even during liquidation. One such mechanism is the use of Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 in conjunction with Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which permits compromise or arrangement during liquidation proceedings. However, the coexistence of these provisions has given rise to several legal and practical challenges, forming the core problem addressed in this study.

The primary issue lies in the lack of clarity and harmonization between the Companies Act and the IBC framework. While Section 230 is a broad and flexible provision designed for corporate restructuring, the IBC imposes strict procedural timelines and eligibility criteria, particularly under Section 29A. This creates a conflict regarding whether individuals or promoters disqualified under the IBC can propose or participate in schemes of compromise or arrangement during liquidation. Although judicial pronouncements have attempted to address this issue, inconsistencies in interpretation and application persist, leading to uncertainty in practice.

Another critical problem relates to the ambiguous role of the liquidator under Regulation 2B. Traditionally, the liquidator’s function is limited to asset realization and distribution of proceeds. However, Regulation 2B assigns an additional responsibility to explore the possibility of revival through compromise or arrangement. The absence of clear statutory guidelines regarding the extent of the liquidator’s powers, duties, and discretion in initiating or facilitating such schemes creates confusion and operational inefficiencies. This ambiguity often results in delays and divergent practices across different cases.

Further, there exists a procedural overlap and jurisdictional complexity between proceedings under the Companies Act and those under the IBC. While both fall under the jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the procedural requirements, timelines, and stakeholder participation mechanisms differ significantly. This dual framework can lead to duplication of proceedings, increased litigation, and delays in the resolution process, thereby defeating the objective of time-bound insolvency resolution.

Additionally, there is a concern regarding the potential misuse of Section 230 schemes by defaulting promoters to regain control of the corporate debtor during liquidation. Although judicial interventions have curtailed such practices by extending the applicability of Section 29A, the absence of explicit statutory provisions leaves room for interpretational challenges and litigation. This raises questions about the balance between promoting revival and preventing abuse of the legal process.

Moreover, the lack of uniform procedural timelines and regulatory coherence between Section 230 and Regulation 2B often leads to delays in implementation. Since liquidation under the IBC is intended to be a time-bound process, any delay caused by prolonged compromise proceedings can adversely affect creditor recoveries and diminish asset value.

In light of these issues, the central problem of this study is to examine the legal uncertainty, procedural inconsistencies, and potential conflicts arising from the interface between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations. The study seeks to critically analyze whether the existing framework effectively balances the objectives of revival and liquidation, or whether there is a need for legislative and regulatory reforms to ensure clarity, efficiency, and fairness in the insolvency process.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING SECTION 230 AND REGULATION 2B

The legal framework governing corporate insolvency and restructuring in India represents a dynamic blend of statutory provisions, regulatory mechanisms, and judicial interpretations. At the heart of this framework lies the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), which was enacted to provide a time-bound and efficient process for resolving insolvency and maximizing the value of distressed assets. However, the IBC does not operate in isolation. It interacts with other statutes, particularly the Companies Act, 2013, thereby creating a composite legal regime that governs corporate distress and restructuring.

One of the most significant intersections within this regime is between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. While Section 230 is a substantive provision enabling compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or members, Regulation 2B functions as a procedural bridge that allows such mechanisms to be utilized even during the liquidation stage under the IBC. This interface reflects a progressive shift in insolvency law, where liquidation is not viewed merely as a terminal process but also as an opportunity for revival and restructuring.

Traditionally, corporate insolvency frameworks were heavily liquidation-centric, focusing on the dissolution of the corporate entity and distribution of its assets among creditors. However, modern insolvency regimes, including that of India, have increasingly emphasized the importance of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern. This shift is driven by the recognition that revival often yields better outcomes for stakeholders compared to liquidation. In this context, the incorporation of Section 230 into the liquidation process through Regulation 2B represents a significant step towards achieving the objective of value maximization.

The introduction of Regulation 2B has expanded the scope of the liquidator’s role, enabling the exploration of compromise or arrangement during liquidation. This provision underscores the principle that even after the commencement of liquidation, the possibility of restructuring should not be entirely foreclosed. Instead, stakeholders should be provided with an opportunity to negotiate and implement schemes that may result in the revival of the corporate debtor. This approach aligns with the broader objectives of the IBC, which seeks to balance the interests of creditors, debtors, and other stakeholders.

At the same time, the coexistence of Section 230 and Regulation 2B raises several legal and procedural issues. These include questions regarding the applicability of eligibility criteria under the IBC, particularly Section 29A, the extent of the liquidator’s powers, and the procedural requirements for initiating and approving schemes of compromise or arrangement. Additionally, the overlap between the Companies Act and the IBC creates jurisdictional and operational complexities, as both statutes are administered by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) but follow distinct procedural frameworks.

This chapter seeks to examine the legal framework governing Section 230 and Regulation 2B in detail. It aims to analyze the statutory provisions, regulatory guidelines, and policy objectives underlying these mechanisms, as well as their interaction within the broader insolvency regime. By doing so, the chapter lays the foundation for understanding the subsequent judicial interpretations and practical challenges associated with the interface between these provisions.

In essence, the legal framework discussed in this chapter reflects the evolving nature of insolvency law in India, where flexibility and innovation are increasingly being incorporated to address the complexities of corporate distress. The interplay between Section 230 and Regulation 2B serves as a crucial component of this framework, offering valuable insights into the shift from a liquidation-oriented approach to a more balanced and revival-focused system.

A. Overview of Companies Act, 2013

The Companies Act, 2013 represents a comprehensive and modern legislative framework governing corporate entities in India. Enacted to replace the Companies Act, 1956, it was introduced with the objective of aligning corporate regulation with contemporary global standards, enhancing transparency, improving corporate governance, and protecting stakeholder interests. The Act provides a detailed legal structure for the incorporation, management, administration, and winding up of companies, and plays a crucial role in regulating corporate activities in India.

One of the most significant features of the Companies Act, 2013 is its emphasis on corporate governance and accountability. The Act introduces several provisions aimed at ensuring that companies operate in a transparent and responsible manner. It mandates the appointment of independent directors, constitution of audit committees, and establishment of vigil mechanisms to prevent fraud and mismanagement2. These provisions reflect a shift towards greater oversight and accountability in corporate functioning, thereby enhancing investor confidence and promoting ethical business practices.

The Act also introduces the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) under Section 135, making India one of the first countries to mandate CSR obligations for certain classes of companies. This provision requires companies meeting specified financial thresholds to spend a minimum percentage of their profits on socially beneficial activities3. The inclusion of CSR obligations demonstrates the legislature’s intent to integrate corporate responsibility with broader social and economic development goals.

Another important aspect of the Companies Act, 2013 is its focus on shareholder protection and minority rights. The Act provides mechanisms for addressing oppression and mismanagement, allowing minority shareholders to seek redressal before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)4. It also strengthens disclosure requirements and enhances the rights of shareholders to participate in decision-making processes. These provisions aim to ensure fairness and equity in corporate governance, thereby preventing the abuse of power by majority stakeholders.

The Companies Act, 2013 also introduces a streamlined process for incorporation and regulation of companies. It provides for various types of companies, including private companies, public companies, one-person companies (OPCs), and small companies, thereby offering flexibility to entrepreneurs5. The introduction of OPCs, in particular, has facilitated the growth of individual entrepreneurship by allowing a single individual to form a company with limited liability. The Act also simplifies incorporation procedures through the use of electronic filing and digital documentation, making it easier to establish and operate businesses.

In addition to regulating corporate governance and incorporation, the Act plays a significant role in corporate restructuring and insolvency. Section 230 to 232 of the Act deal with compromise, arrangement, and amalgamation, providing a structured mechanism for corporate reorganization6. These provisions empower the NCLT to sanction schemes of arrangement that are approved by the requisite majority of creditors or members. The flexibility of these provisions allows companies to restructure their operations, debts, and capital structure in a manner that is beneficial to stakeholders.

The relevance of these provisions has increased in the context of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, particularly during liquidation proceedings. Section 230 serves as a key tool for revival, enabling compromise or arrangement even when the company is undergoing liquidation. This demonstrates the enduring significance of the Companies Act, 2013 in the broader insolvency framework, as it complements the objectives of the IBC by providing alternative mechanisms for value maximization.

The Companies Act, 2013 also provides detailed provisions for winding up and liquidation of companies. Although the IBC has taken over most aspects of corporate insolvency and liquidation, certain provisions of the Companies Act continue to apply in specific situations, particularly voluntary winding up and schemes of arrangement7. The coexistence of these provisions with the IBC creates a dual framework that requires careful interpretation and harmonization.

Another notable feature of the Act is its emphasis on regulatory oversight and enforcement. The establishment of institutions such as the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has significantly improved the efficiency of corporate dispute resolution8. These specialized tribunals are equipped to handle complex corporate matters, including insolvency, mergers, and shareholder disputes, thereby ensuring faster and more effective adjudication.

The Act also strengthens provisions relating to fraud prevention and penalties. It introduces stringent penalties for corporate fraud, misrepresentation, and non-compliance with statutory requirements9. The inclusion of these provisions reflects the legislature’s intent to deter unethical practices and ensure strict compliance with the law. The role of regulatory authorities such as the Registrar of Companies (ROC) and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) has also been enhanced to ensure effective enforcement.

Despite its comprehensive nature, the Companies Act, 2013 is not without challenges. The coexistence of multiple regulatory frameworks, particularly with the IBC, often leads to overlapping jurisdictions and procedural complexities. Additionally, the dynamic nature of corporate law requires continuous amendments and updates to address emerging issues such as digitalization, cross-border transactions, and corporate insolvency.

In conclusion, the Companies Act, 2013 serves as a cornerstone of corporate regulation in India, providing a robust legal framework for the governance, management, and restructuring of companies. Its provisions relating to compromise and arrangement, particularly under Section 230, play a vital role in facilitating corporate revival, especially in the context of insolvency and liquidation. The Act’s emphasis on transparency, accountability, and stakeholder protection reflects a modern approach to corporate regulation, aligning with global best practices. At the same time, the interaction between the Companies Act and the IBC highlights the need for greater harmonization to ensure a coherent and efficient legal framework.

B. Analysis of Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013

Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 is one of the most significant provisions dealing with corporate restructuring through compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or members. It provides a statutory framework enabling companies to reorganize their financial and operational structure in a flexible and legally sanctioned manner. The provision plays a crucial role not only in normal corporate restructuring but also in insolvency situations, particularly during liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

At its core, Section 230 empowers the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to sanction a compromise or arrangement upon an application made by the company, its creditors, members, or in the case of liquidation, the liquidator. The term “compromise or arrangement” is not exhaustively defined in the Act, thereby allowing wide judicial interpretation. It includes reorganization of share capital, debt restructuring, mergers, demergers, and settlement of claims. This flexibility makes Section 230 a versatile tool for corporate revival and restructuring.

The procedure under Section 230 is structured yet flexible. It begins with an application to the NCLT, which may order meetings of creditors or members to consider the proposed scheme. For approval, the scheme must be accepted by a majority representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or members present and voting10. Once approved, the scheme is subject to sanction by the Tribunal, which examines its fairness, legality, and compliance with statutory requirements. Upon sanction, the scheme becomes binding on all stakeholders, including dissenting parties.

One of the key features of Section 230 is the emphasis on judicial oversight. The Tribunal plays an active role in ensuring that the scheme is not prejudicial to the interests of stakeholders and that it complies with principles of equity and fairness. This supervisory role distinguishes Section 230 from purely contractual arrangements and ensures that minority interests are protected. Judicial scrutiny also acts as a safeguard against misuse of the provision for fraudulent or unfair purposes.

The importance of Section 230 has been significantly enhanced in the context of insolvency and liquidation under the IBC. Although the IBC provides a comprehensive framework for insolvency resolution, it does not entirely exclude the application of the Companies Act. Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations explicitly allows the use of Section 230 during liquidation. This integration reflects a broader policy objective of maximizing value and exploring revival opportunities even at the liquidation stage.

Judicial pronouncements have played a pivotal role in clarifying the scope and applicability of Section 230 in insolvency proceedings. In Meghal Homes Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Niwas Girni K.K. Samiti, the Supreme Court recognized that a scheme of arrangement can be proposed even during winding up, thereby acknowledging the possibility of revival at a late stage11. This principle has been extended to liquidation under the IBC, reinforcing the relevance of Section 230 in modern insolvency law.

Further, in Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal, the NCLAT held that the liquidator should explore the possibility of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 before proceeding with asset sale12. This judgment effectively elevated Section 230 from a discretionary option to a necessary step in certain liquidation scenarios. It emphasized that revival should be prioritized over liquidation wherever feasible, aligning with the objectives of the IBC.

However, the application of Section 230 in insolvency has also raised concerns regarding the eligibility of applicants. A significant issue was whether promoters disqualified under Section 29A of the IBC could propose schemes under Section 230. This issue was conclusively addressed by the Supreme Court in Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, where it was held that persons ineligible under Section 29A cannot circumvent the law by proposing schemes under Section 23013. This judgment ensured that the integrity of the insolvency process is maintained and that defaulting promoters are not allowed to regain control through indirect means.

Another important aspect of Section 230 is its role in balancing the interests of various stakeholders. The provision requires disclosure of all material facts, including financial position, auditor’s report, and any pending investigations, thereby ensuring transparency14. Creditors and members are given an opportunity to evaluate the scheme and make informed decisions. The requirement of majority approval ensures that the scheme reflects the collective will of stakeholders, while judicial scrutiny protects minority interests.

Despite its advantages, the implementation of Section 230 is not without challenges. One of the major issues is the procedural complexity and time consumption involved in obtaining approvals and sanctions. The requirement of multiple stages, including meetings, voting, and Tribunal approval, can lead to delays, particularly in cases involving large and diverse creditor groups. This is in contrast to the time-bound nature of the IBC, which aims to expedite insolvency resolution.

Another challenge is the lack of clarity regarding the role of the liquidator in initiating and facilitating schemes under Section 230 during liquidation. While Regulation 2B allows the liquidator to explore compromise or arrangement, it does not provide detailed guidelines on the procedure to be followed. This often leads to inconsistent practices and uncertainty in implementation.

Comparatively, jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom have developed a more streamlined approach to schemes of arrangement, with well-defined procedures and judicial precedents15. In India, the coexistence of the Companies Act and the IBC creates a dual framework that requires careful harmonization. The absence of explicit statutory provisions integrating Section 230 into the IBC framework further complicates the process.

The significance of Section 230 also lies in its ability to maximize asset value and preserve economic activity. By allowing restructuring and revival, it prevents the destruction of value that often accompanies liquidation. It also protects the interests of employees and other stakeholders who may be adversely affected by the closure of the company. In this sense, Section 230 serves as a vital tool for achieving the broader objectives of insolvency law.

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the need to strengthen the framework governing Section 230 schemes. Scholars and policymakers have suggested the introduction of clearer guidelines, standardized procedures, and better coordination between the Companies Act and the IBC16. Such reforms would enhance the efficiency and predictability of the process, thereby encouraging greater use of compromise and arrangement as a means of corporate revival.

In conclusion, Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 represents a powerful and flexible mechanism for corporate restructuring and revival. Its integration into the insolvency framework through Regulation 2B has expanded its scope and relevance, making it an essential component of modern insolvency law in India. While judicial interpretations have clarified several aspects of its application, challenges related to procedural complexity, eligibility, and regulatory overlap remain. Addressing these issues through legislative and regulatory reforms would further strengthen the effectiveness of Section 230 as a tool for value maximization and corporate revival.

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: An Overview

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) represents a landmark reform in India’s financial and corporate legal landscape. Enacted with the objective of consolidating and amending laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals, the IBC provides a unified, time-bound framework to address insolvency. Prior to its enactment, India’s insolvency regime was fragmented across multiple legislations such as the Companies Act, 1956, the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 (SICA), and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. This multiplicity led to delays, inefficiencies, and significant erosion of asset value. The IBC was introduced to overcome these shortcomings and to establish a creditor-driven insolvency resolution process.

One of the defining features of the IBC is its emphasis on time-bound resolution. The Code prescribes strict timelines for the completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), typically within 180 days, extendable up to a maximum of 330 days, including litigation17. This time-bound approach is crucial in preventing value erosion and ensuring timely recovery for creditors. It also instills discipline among borrowers and promotes a credit-friendly environment.

The IBC adopts a creditor-in-control model, which marks a departure from the earlier debtor-in-possession regime. Upon initiation of CIRP, the management of the corporate debtor is transferred to an interim resolution professional (IRP), and subsequently to a resolution professional (RP), who manages the affairs of the company. The Committee of Creditors (CoC), comprising financial creditors, exercises significant control over the resolution process, including the approval of resolution plans18. This shift empowers creditors and enhances transparency and accountability in insolvency proceedings.

The structure of the IBC is comprehensive and well-defined. It is divided into multiple parts dealing with different categories of debtors and processes. Part II of the Code specifically deals with insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate persons. It provides for the initiation of CIRP by financial creditors, operational creditors, or the corporate debtor itself upon the occurrence of a default19. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) acts as the adjudicating authority for corporate insolvency matters, while the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) serves as the appellate body.

The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) is the cornerstone of the IBC. Once an application is admitted by the NCLT, a moratorium is imposed under Section 14, which prohibits the institution or continuation of suits, execution of judgments, and transfer of assets20. The moratorium ensures that the corporate debtor’s assets are preserved during the resolution process and provides a calm period for stakeholders to negotiate a viable resolution plan. The resolution professional invites claims, constitutes the CoC, and manages the operations of the corporate debtor as a going concern.

A key objective of the IBC is the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor. The resolution plan submitted by prospective resolution applicants must meet the requirements specified under Section 30 of the Code, including payment of insolvency resolution process costs, protection of operational creditors’ interests, and compliance with applicable laws. The CoC evaluates and approves the resolution plan based on its commercial wisdom, and the NCLT subsequently examines its legality before granting approval21. Once approved, the resolution plan becomes binding on all stakeholders.

However, if no resolution plan is approved within the prescribed timeline, the corporate debtor proceeds to liquidation under Chapter III of the Code. Liquidation involves the sale of assets and distribution of proceeds in accordance with the priority specified under Section 5322. The waterfall mechanism ensures an orderly distribution of assets among stakeholders, with secured creditors and workmen’s dues receiving priority. While liquidation is considered a last resort, it remains an essential component of the insolvency framework.

The IBC also introduces the concept of ineligibility under Section 29A, which disqualifies certain categories of persons, including defaulting promoters, from submitting resolution plans23. This provision aims to prevent those responsible for the financial distress of the corporate debtor from regaining control without addressing their past defaults. Section 29A has been a subject of extensive judicial interpretation and has significantly influenced the insolvency landscape in India.

Another important aspect of the IBC is the establishment of a robust institutional framework. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) serves as the regulatory authority overseeing insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies, and information utilities. Insolvency professionals play a critical role in managing the resolution process, while information utilities facilitate the collection and dissemination of financial information24. This institutional framework ensures the smooth functioning of the insolvency ecosystem.

Judicial pronouncements have played a pivotal role in interpreting and shaping the provisions of the IBC. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Code and emphasized its objective of revival and continuation of the corporate debtor25. The Court observed that the IBC is not merely a recovery mechanism but a comprehensive framework aimed at resolving insolvency in a manner that balances the interests of all stakeholders. Similarly, in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Supreme Court recognized the primacy of the CoC’s commercial wisdom in approving resolution plans, thereby limiting judicial interference26.

The IBC has undergone several amendments since its enactment to address practical challenges and improve its effectiveness. These include the introduction of pre-packaged insolvency resolution processes for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), amendments to streamline timelines, and provisions to enhance transparency and accountability. These reforms reflect the dynamic nature of insolvency law and the need to adapt to evolving economic conditions.

Despite its success, the IBC faces certain challenges. Delays in judicial proceedings, capacity constraints of tribunals, and complexities in cross-border insolvency are some of the issues that need to be addressed. Additionally, the interaction between the IBC and other laws, such as the Companies Act, 2013, often leads to interpretational challenges, particularly in the context of schemes of arrangement under Section 230 during liquidation.

In conclusion, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 represents a transformative reform in India’s insolvency regime. By introducing a time-bound, creditor-driven process and a comprehensive institutional framework, the IBC has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency resolution. Its emphasis on revival, value maximization, and stakeholder balance aligns with global best practices. At the same time, the evolving jurisprudence and ongoing reforms highlight the need for continuous improvement and harmonization with other legal frameworks to ensure a robust and coherent insolvency system.

D. Liquidation Process under IBC

The liquidation process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) constitutes the final stage in the insolvency resolution mechanism, invoked when efforts to revive the corporate debtor through the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) fail. While the primary objective of the IBC is resolution and revival, liquidation serves as a necessary fallback to ensure an orderly exit of non-viable businesses and equitable distribution of assets among stakeholders. The liquidation framework under the IBC is structured, time-bound, and designed to maximize value while maintaining transparency and fairness.

The liquidation process is governed by Chapter III of Part II of the IBC (Sections 33 to 54), read with the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. Liquidation may be initiated in several circumstances: (i) when no resolution plan is received within the prescribed timeline; (ii) when the resolution plan is rejected by the Adjudicating Authority; or (iii) when the Committee of Creditors (CoC) decides to liquidate the corporate debtor before the expiry of the CIRP period27. Upon the occurrence of any of these conditions, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) passes an order for liquidation.

Once a liquidation order is passed, a moratorium under Section 14 ceases, and a fresh moratorium under Section 33(5) comes into effect, prohibiting the institution or continuation of suits or legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, except with the permission of the NCLT28. This ensures that the liquidation process proceeds without interference and that the assets of the corporate debtor are preserved for equitable distribution.

A crucial aspect of the liquidation process is the appointment of a liquidator, who is typically the resolution professional appointed during CIRP unless replaced by the NCLT29. The liquidator assumes control of the corporate debtor’s assets, records, and operations. The powers and duties of the liquidator are extensive and include verifying claims, taking custody of assets, conducting valuations, and selling assets. The liquidator acts as a fiduciary for all stakeholders and is responsible for ensuring transparency and compliance with statutory requirements.

The liquidation process begins with a public announcement, inviting claims from creditors within a specified period30. Creditors are required to submit their claims along with supporting documents, which are then verified by the liquidator. Based on this verification, the liquidator prepares a list of stakeholders, categorizing them according to the nature of their claims. This step is critical for determining the distribution of proceeds and ensuring that all legitimate claims are recognized.

The next stage involves the valuation and realization of assets. The liquidator appoints registered valuers to assess the value of the corporate debtor’s assets31. The assets may be sold through various methods, including auction, private sale, or sale as a going concern. The IBC and the Liquidation Process Regulations emphasize value maximization, encouraging the sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern wherever possible. This approach helps preserve business operations, protect employment, and achieve better recovery for creditors.

An important feature of the liquidation process is the waterfall mechanism for distribution of assets under Section 53 of the IBC32. This provision establishes a clear order of priority for distributing the proceeds from the sale of assets. Insolvency resolution process costs and liquidation costs are given the highest priority, followed by secured creditors and workmen’s dues, wages of employees, unsecured creditors, and finally, shareholders. The waterfall mechanism ensures fairness and predictability in the distribution process.

The IBC also provides certain rights to secured creditors, allowing them to either relinquish their security interest and participate in the liquidation proceeds or realize their security outside the liquidation process33. This flexibility enables secured creditors to make strategic decisions based on their interests, while also ensuring that the overall process remains efficient and equitable.

Another significant aspect of the liquidation process is the possibility of revival during liquidation, particularly through schemes of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013. Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulations allows the liquidator to explore such schemes within a specified timeframe. This provision reflects the evolving nature of insolvency law, where liquidation is not necessarily the end but may serve as a platform for restructuring and revival.

Judicial interpretations have played a vital role in shaping the liquidation framework under the IBC. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphasized that liquidation should be considered a last resort and that the primary objective of the IBC is the revival of the corporate debtor34. Similarly, in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Court highlighted the importance of value maximization and equitable treatment of stakeholders35. These judgments reinforce the principles underlying the liquidation process and guide its implementation.

Despite its structured framework, the liquidation process under the IBC faces several challenges. One of the major issues is delay in completion, often due to litigation, disputes over claims, and difficulties in asset realization. Although the Regulations prescribe timelines, practical constraints often lead to deviations. Additionally, the lack of a robust market for distressed assets can hinder value maximization, resulting in lower recoveries for creditors.

Another challenge is the complexity of stakeholder interests, particularly in cases involving multiple classes of creditors. Balancing the interests of secured and unsecured creditors, employees, and shareholders requires careful consideration and may lead to disputes. The role of the liquidator becomes crucial in managing these complexities and ensuring that the process remains fair and transparent.

Furthermore, the interaction between the IBC and other laws, such as the Companies Act, 2013, creates jurisdictional and procedural overlaps. The use of Section 230 during liquidation, for instance, introduces additional layers of complexity, as it involves compliance with both the IBC and the Companies Act. This highlights the need for greater harmonization between different legal frameworks.

In recent years, regulatory amendments and judicial pronouncements have sought to address these challenges. The introduction of provisions for the sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern, the clarification of timelines, and the strengthening of the institutional framework have contributed to improving the efficiency of the liquidation process. However, continuous reforms are necessary to address emerging issues and ensure that the process remains effective and responsive to the needs of stakeholders.

In conclusion, the liquidation process under the IBC is a critical component of India’s insolvency framework, providing a structured and transparent mechanism for the orderly exit of distressed companies. While it serves as a fallback when resolution fails, it also incorporates elements of flexibility, allowing for revival through mechanisms such as Section 230 schemes. The success of the liquidation process depends on effective implementation, robust institutional support, and continuous refinement of the legal framework. As the insolvency regime in India continues to evolve, the liquidation process will remain a key area of focus for policymakers, regulators, and stakeholders.

ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERFACE AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

The evolution of insolvency law in India, particularly after the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), has brought about a paradigm shift in the manner in which corporate distress is addressed. The introduction of a time-bound and creditor-driven insolvency framework has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of resolution processes. However, the integration of provisions from different statutes—especially the interaction between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016—has created a complex legal interface that requires careful analysis.

This chapter seeks to critically examine the interplay between these provisions and to identify the practical challenges arising from their application. While Section 230 provides a flexible mechanism for compromise or arrangement between a company and its stakeholders, Regulation 2B incorporates this mechanism into the liquidation stage under the IBC. This convergence reflects a progressive approach in insolvency law, where liquidation is not treated as a terminal stage but as an opportunity for revival. At the same time, it raises important questions regarding statutory interpretation, procedural coordination, and the balance between flexibility and discipline.

The legal interface between Section 230 and Regulation 2B is characterized by both complementarity and tension. On one hand, the provisions work together to promote value maximization and stakeholder protection by enabling restructuring even after the commencement of liquidation. On the other hand, differences in their objectives, procedures, and underlying philosophies can lead to conflicts and uncertainties. For instance, while the IBC emphasizes strict timelines and creditor control, Section 230 allows a more flexible and court-driven process. Reconciling these differences is essential for ensuring the effectiveness of the insolvency framework.

Another critical aspect of this interface is the role of judicial interpretation in harmonizing the two regimes. Courts and tribunals have played a pivotal role in clarifying the applicability of IBC principles—such as eligibility criteria under Section 29A—to Section 230 schemes. These judicial interventions have helped prevent misuse of the restructuring mechanism while ensuring that the objectives of the IBC are not compromised. However, the reliance on judicial interpretation also highlights the need for clearer legislative guidance.

From a practical perspective, the application of Section 230 during liquidation presents several challenges. These include procedural complexities, delays in implementation, lack of uniformity in tribunal decisions, and difficulties in coordinating stakeholder participation. The role of the liquidator has also expanded, requiring a balance between facilitating revival and ensuring efficient asset realization. Additionally, the absence of detailed guidelines for the implementation of Section 230 schemes within the IBC framework often leads to uncertainty and inconsistent practices.

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of these issues by examining the legal framework, judicial developments, and practical implications of the interplay between Section 230 and Regulation 2B. It will explore key aspects such as the role of the liquidator, the applicability of eligibility criteria, stakeholder participation, and the challenges of procedural integration. By identifying the strengths and limitations of the current framework, the chapter seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the evolving insolvency landscape in India.

In essence, the analysis presented in this chapter underscores the need for a balanced and coherent approach that integrates the flexibility of corporate restructuring with the discipline of insolvency law. Such an approach is essential for achieving the dual objectives of value maximization and stakeholder protection, which lie at the heart of the IBC.

A. Interplay between Section 230 and Regulation 2B

The interplay between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 represents a unique convergence of corporate restructuring law and insolvency law in India. This interface embodies a hybrid legal mechanism that allows compromise or arrangement even during liquidation, thereby blurring the traditional distinction between resolution and liquidation. While Section 230 provides the substantive legal framework for restructuring, Regulation 2B acts as a procedural gateway enabling its application within the liquidation process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

At a conceptual level, Section 230 and Regulation 2B are complementary in nature. Section 230 empowers the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to sanction schemes of compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or members. It is inherently flexible and allows for innovative restructuring solutions such as debt rescheduling, capital reorganization, and business restructuring36. On the other hand, Regulation 2B integrates this mechanism into the liquidation stage of the IBC by permitting the liquidator to explore such schemes within a specified timeframe37. This integration reflects the legislative intent to maximize value and provide a second opportunity for revival even after the failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).

B. Role of Liquidator in Compromise and Arrangement

The role of the liquidator under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) has undergone a significant transformation with the incorporation of Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which enables the exploration of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 during liquidation. Traditionally, the liquidator’s function was limited to the realization of assets and distribution of proceeds among creditors. However, the evolving jurisprudence has expanded this role, positioning the liquidator as a key facilitator in the revival of the corporate debtor even at the liquidation stage.

At the outset, it is important to understand that the liquidator operates as an officer of the court and a fiduciary for stakeholders. The liquidator is entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of creditors, employees, and other stakeholders while ensuring compliance with statutory provisions38. With the introduction of Regulation 2B, the liquidator is no longer confined to a passive role but is required to actively explore the possibility of compromise or arrangement before proceeding with the sale of assets.

The judicial recognition of this expanded role can be traced to the decision of the NCLAT in Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal, where it was held that the liquidator must take steps to revive the corporate debtor by invoking Section 230 before proceeding with liquidation39. The Tribunal emphasized that liquidation should not be treated as an automatic consequence of the failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), and that all possible avenues for revival must be explored. This decision marked a significant shift in the understanding of the liquidator’s duties, transforming the liquidator into an active participant in restructuring efforts.

C. Jurisdictional and Procedural Issues

One of the primary jurisdictional challenges arises from the fact that both Section 230 proceedings and IBC liquidation proceedings are adjudicated by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). Although this common forum is intended to streamline the process, it often creates ambiguity regarding the applicable procedural framework. Section 230 proceedings are governed by the Companies Act and related rules, which allow a relatively flexible and court-driven approach. In contrast, the IBC mandates a strict, time-bound process emphasizing efficiency and creditor control40. The coexistence of these two procedural paradigms within the same forum leads to confusion regarding which procedural norms should prevail in specific situations.

A significant procedural issue concerns the initiation of Section 230 schemes during liquidation. Regulation 2B allows the liquidator to explore compromise or arrangement within a specified period, generally 90 days from the liquidation commencement date41. However, Section 230 does not prescribe such rigid timelines, leading to potential conflicts. In practice, delays in obtaining stakeholder approval or Tribunal sanction under Section 230 may extend beyond the prescribed period, thereby undermining the time-bound nature of the IBC. Tribunals have attempted to address this issue by emphasizing adherence to IBC timelines while allowing limited flexibility, but inconsistencies remain.

Another important jurisdictional concern is the scope of the NCLT’s powers in Section 230 proceedings during liquidation. While the Tribunal has wide powers under the Companies Act to sanction schemes, its role under the IBC is more constrained, focusing on ensuring compliance with statutory provisions and protecting stakeholder interests. This dual role can lead to conflicting approaches in decision-making. For instance, while the Tribunal may adopt a liberal approach under Section 230 to facilitate restructuring, it must also ensure that the scheme does not violate the principles of the IBC, such as transparency and fairness.

The issue of stakeholder participation and decision-making further complicates the procedural landscape. Under the IBC, the Committee of Creditors (CoC) plays a central role in approving resolution plans. However, during liquidation, the CoC ceases to exist, and decision-making shifts to a broader group of stakeholders under Section 230. This transition creates uncertainty regarding the appropriate decision-making mechanism and the weight to be given to different categories of creditors. The absence of a structured body like the CoC often leads to coordination challenges and delays.

Procedural challenges also arise in relation to the role of the liquidator. As discussed earlier, the liquidator is required to initiate and facilitate Section 230 schemes while simultaneously carrying out liquidation functions. This dual responsibility can create practical difficulties, particularly in terms of resource allocation and prioritization. The lack of detailed guidelines on how the liquidator should balance these roles further exacerbates the problem.

Another area of concern is the lack of uniformity in tribunal decisions. Different benches of the NCLT have adopted varying approaches to the application of Section 230 during liquidation, leading to uncertainty and increased litigation. While appellate decisions by the NCLAT and the Supreme Court have provided some clarity, the absence of comprehensive statutory guidance continues to pose challenges.

D. Practical Challenges in Implementation

The integration of Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 with the liquidation framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) through Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 represents a progressive development in Indian insolvency law. However, despite its conceptual strengths, the practical implementation of this hybrid mechanism has revealed several structural, procedural, and operational challenges. These challenges not only affect the efficiency of the process but also have significant implications for various stakeholders involved.

One of the foremost challenges in implementing Section 230 schemes during liquidation is the lack of clear procedural guidelines. While Regulation 2B provides a broad framework for initiating compromise or arrangement, it does not prescribe detailed steps for implementation. Section 230, on the other hand, follows a different procedural regime under the Companies Act. The absence of harmonized procedures creates uncertainty regarding timelines, documentation, and stakeholder participation42. This often leads to delays and inconsistent practices across different cases.

Another critical challenge is the time constraint imposed under Regulation 2B, which generally limits the exploration of compromise or arrangement to a period of 90 days43. While this aligns with the IBC’s objective of time-bound resolution, it may not be sufficient for complex restructuring proposals that require extensive negotiations and approvals. In many cases, viable schemes fail to materialize within this timeframe, leading to premature liquidation and loss of value.

The issue of delay and misuse of the process further complicates implementation. Stakeholders, particularly promoters or interested parties, may propose schemes with little intention of successful revival, using the process as a means to delay liquidation. This not only prolongs proceedings but also results in the depreciation of asset value. Judicial scrutiny has sought to address this issue, but the absence of stringent safeguards continues to pose risks.

Another significant challenge is the verification of eligibility under Section 29A of the IBC. Following judicial pronouncements, particularly in Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, it is mandatory to ensure that ineligible persons do not propose schemes under Section 23044. However, determining eligibility can be complex, especially in cases involving multiple entities, indirect control, or layered ownership structures. The liquidator and the Tribunal must undertake detailed due diligence, which can be time-consuming and resource-intensive.

The dual role of the liquidator also presents practical difficulties. As discussed earlier, the liquidator is required to act both as a facilitator of compromise or arrangement and as an executor of liquidation. This dual responsibility can create conflicts in prioritization, particularly when the exploration of a scheme delays asset realization. The lack of clear guidelines on balancing these roles further exacerbates the problem.

Another challenge lies in stakeholder coordination and consensus-building. Unlike the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), where the Committee of Creditors (CoC) provides a structured decision-making mechanism, Section 230 schemes involve a broader and less organized group of stakeholders. Achieving the required majority approval can be difficult, especially in cases with diverse and conflicting interests. This often leads to prolonged negotiations and delays.

The lack of uniformity in tribunal decisions is another major concern. Different benches of the NCLT and NCLAT have adopted varying approaches to the application of Section 230 during liquidation. While some tribunals adopt a liberal approach to facilitate revival, others emphasize strict adherence to IBC principles. This inconsistency creates uncertainty and increases litigation, thereby affecting the predictability of outcomes.

Additionally, the interaction between the Companies Act and the IBC creates procedural complexities. Differences in timelines, approval mechanisms, and statutory objectives can lead to conflicts that require judicial intervention. Although courts have attempted to harmonize these frameworks, the absence of explicit legislative provisions continues to create ambiguity.

Academic literature highlights that these challenges are inherent in hybrid legal frameworks that combine elements of different statutes. Scholars such as Verma argue that while such frameworks enhance flexibility, they also require robust procedural safeguards and clear guidelines to ensure effective implementation45. Similarly, recent studies emphasize the need for regulatory reforms to address these challenges and improve the efficiency of the insolvency process46.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND COMPARATIVE STUDY

The evolution of insolvency law in India, particularly through the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), has fundamentally transformed the legal landscape governing corporate distress. The introduction of a unified, time-bound, and creditor-driven framework marked a significant departure from the fragmented and inefficient regime that existed earlier. However, the integration of provisions such as Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 within the liquidation framework—especially through Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016—has created a complex legal interface that warrants critical examination.

This chapter seeks to undertake a comprehensive analysis of this interface by evaluating its effectiveness, identifying inherent limitations, and comparing it with international insolvency frameworks. While earlier chapters have explored the statutory provisions, judicial interpretations, and practical challenges, this chapter adopts a more analytical and comparative perspective. It aims to assess whether the existing legal framework adequately achieves the objectives of value maximization, stakeholder protection, and efficient resolution, which are central to insolvency law.

At the core of this analysis lies the question of whether the hybrid mechanism of compromise or arrangement during liquidation represents a progressive innovation or a source of legal ambiguity. On one hand, the incorporation of Section 230 into the liquidation process reflects a flexible and pragmatic approach, allowing for revival even after the failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). This aligns with global best practices, where insolvency regimes increasingly emphasize restructuring over liquidation. On the other hand, the coexistence of two distinct legal frameworks—the Companies Act and the IBC—creates challenges related to procedural coordination, statutory interpretation, and consistency in application.

A critical aspect of this chapter is the evaluation of the effectiveness of judicial interpretation in harmonizing these frameworks. Courts and tribunals have played a pivotal role in clarifying ambiguities, particularly with respect to the applicability of provisions such as Section 29A of the IBC to Section 230 schemes. While these judicial interventions have provided much-needed clarity, they also highlight the limitations of the legislative framework and the need for more explicit statutory guidance.

The chapter also seeks to examine the practical implications of the legal framework, particularly in terms of its impact on stakeholders. The success of any insolvency regime depends on its ability to balance the interests of creditors, debtors, employees, and other stakeholders. The integration of Section 230 into the liquidation process has significant implications for each of these groups, influencing recovery rates, business continuity, and overall economic efficiency.

A. Strengths of the Existing Framework

The legal framework governing the interplay between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), particularly through Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reflects a progressive and dynamic approach to corporate insolvency in India. Despite certain practical and procedural challenges, the framework possesses several inherent strengths that contribute to its effectiveness in addressing corporate distress. These strengths lie in its flexibility, emphasis on value maximization, stakeholder protection, judicial clarity, and alignment with global best practices.

One of the foremost strengths of the existing framework is its flexibility in providing multiple avenues for revival. Traditionally, liquidation was viewed as the final stage of insolvency, leading to the dissolution of the corporate debtor. However, the integration of Section 230 into the liquidation process has transformed this perception by allowing compromise or arrangement even after the failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP)47. This ensures that viable businesses are not prematurely liquidated and that stakeholders have an additional opportunity to restructure the corporate debtor. The availability of such a mechanism enhances the resilience of the insolvency framework and promotes economic stability.

Another significant strength is the framework’s emphasis on value maximization. The primary objective of the IBC is to maximize the value of the corporate debtor’s assets for the benefit of stakeholders48. The use of Section 230 schemes during liquidation aligns with this objective by enabling the restructuring of the corporate debtor as a going concern. This approach often results in higher recovery rates compared to piecemeal asset liquidation, as it preserves the operational and intangible value of the business. Judicial decisions have consistently reinforced this principle, emphasizing that liquidation should be a last resort.

The framework also ensures enhanced stakeholder protection, which is a critical aspect of insolvency law. Section 230 requires the approval of creditors and members, thereby ensuring that the interests of stakeholders are taken into account in the restructuring process49. At the same time, the IBC provides safeguards such as the priority of claims and transparency requirements, which protect the rights of creditors. The combination of these provisions creates a balanced mechanism that addresses the interests of different stakeholders while promoting fairness and equity.

A key strength of the existing framework is the judicial clarity and harmonization of overlapping statutes. The Supreme Court and other judicial bodies have played a crucial role in resolving ambiguities and ensuring consistency in the application of the law. In Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, the Supreme Court clarified that persons ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC cannot propose schemes under Section 230 during liquidation50. This decision harmonized the provisions of the Companies Act with the IBC, preventing misuse of the restructuring mechanism and reinforcing the integrity of the insolvency process. Such judicial interventions have significantly strengthened the framework by providing clear guidance on complex legal issues.

The framework also benefits from a time-bound and structured approach, which is a hallmark of the IBC. Regulation 2B introduces a defined timeline for exploring compromise or arrangement during liquidation, thereby ensuring that the process does not result in undue delays51. This emphasis on efficiency enhances the credibility of the insolvency framework and promotes investor confidence. At the same time, the flexibility of Section 230 allows for tailored solutions, striking a balance between speed and adaptability.

Another important strength is the expanded role of the liquidator as a facilitator of revival. Under the current framework, the liquidator is not merely an executor of asset sale but also plays a proactive role in exploring restructuring options. This shift reflects a modern approach to insolvency, where the focus is on maximizing value and preserving business continuity. Judicial decisions such as Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal have reinforced this role, emphasizing the duty of the liquidator to explore all possible avenues for revival52.

B. Weaknesses and Legal Gaps

Despite the progressive features and strengths of the existing insolvency framework, the legal interface between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the liquidation regime under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), particularly through Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, is not without significant weaknesses and legal gaps. These shortcomings arise from structural inconsistencies, procedural ambiguities, and the lack of comprehensive statutory harmonization. A critical analysis of these issues is essential to understand the limitations of the current framework and to identify areas for reform.

One of the most fundamental weaknesses is the absence of explicit statutory integration between Section 230 and the IBC. While Regulation 2B provides a procedural bridge, there is no clear legislative provision within the Companies Act or the IBC that formally establishes the applicability of Section 230 during liquidation53. This lack of express recognition creates ambiguity regarding the scope and limitations of the provision. As a result, much of the legal framework governing this interface has been developed through judicial interpretation rather than legislative clarity, leading to uncertainty and inconsistency.

Closely related to this is the over-reliance on judicial interpretation to resolve conflicts between the two statutes. Courts and tribunals have played a crucial role in harmonizing the provisions, particularly in relation to the applicability of Section 29A of the IBC to Section 230 schemes. However, the absence of clear statutory guidance means that different benches may adopt varying interpretations, resulting in a lack of uniformity. This judicial dependence undermines predictability and increases the risk of prolonged litigation.

Another significant gap is the lack of detailed procedural guidelines for implementing Section 230 schemes during liquidation. While the Companies Act provides a general framework for compromise or arrangement, it does not address the specific context of liquidation under the IBC. Similarly, Regulation 2B outlines only a broad timeline without prescribing detailed procedures54. This procedural vacuum creates practical difficulties for liquidators, stakeholders, and tribunals, often leading to delays and inefficiencies.

The issue of conflicting timelines further highlights the weaknesses in the framework. The IBC emphasizes strict, time-bound processes to ensure efficiency, whereas Section 230 allows greater flexibility in procedural timelines. This divergence can result in delays, particularly in complex cases where stakeholder approval and Tribunal sanction require additional time. The lack of a harmonized timeline mechanism creates tension between the objectives of speed and thoroughness.

Another major concern is the ambiguity in stakeholder participation and decision-making. Under the IBC, the Committee of Creditors (CoC) plays a central role in approving resolution plans. However, during liquidation, the CoC ceases to exist, and decision-making shifts to a broader group of stakeholders under Section 230. The absence of a clearly defined decision-making body can lead to coordination challenges and disputes among stakeholders, particularly in cases involving multiple classes of creditors.

The dual role of the liquidator also presents a structural weakness. The liquidator is required to act both as a facilitator of compromise or arrangement and as an executor of liquidation. This dual responsibility can create conflicts of interest and complicate decision-making. For instance, the liquidator may face challenges in balancing the need to explore revival options with the obligation to complete liquidation within the prescribed timeframe. The lack of clear guidelines on managing this dual role further exacerbates the problem.

Another critical legal gap is the potential for misuse of Section 230 schemes. Although judicial decisions have imposed safeguards, particularly through the application of Section 29A, the risk of abuse remains. Stakeholders may use the provision to delay liquidation or to achieve outcomes that are not in the best interests of creditors. The absence of stringent statutory checks and balances increases the likelihood of such misuse, undermining the credibility of the insolvency framework.

The inconsistency in tribunal decisions is another significant weakness. Different benches of the NCLT and NCLAT have adopted varying approaches to the application of Section 230 during liquidation. While some tribunals emphasize flexibility and revival, others prioritize strict adherence to IBC principles. This lack of uniformity creates uncertainty for stakeholders and increases the cost and complexity of insolvency proceedings.

Another area of concern is the conflict between the objectives of the Companies Act and the IBC. While both statutes aim to address corporate distress, their approaches differ. The Companies Act focuses on compromise and arrangement, emphasizing flexibility and stakeholder consensus, whereas the IBC prioritizes creditor interests and time-bound resolution. Reconciling these objectives is often challenging, particularly in cases where the interests of different stakeholders conflict.

The lack of clarity in the application of priority rules under Section 230 schemes during liquidation is another gap. The IBC prescribes a specific waterfall mechanism for the distribution of assets, ensuring priority for certain categories of creditors. However, Section 230 allows parties to negotiate the terms of the scheme, which may deviate from the statutory priorities. Courts have generally required compliance with IBC principles, but the absence of explicit statutory provisions creates uncertainty.

Academic literature also highlights these weaknesses and gaps. Scholars such as Gupta argue that the coexistence of multiple legal frameworks without clear integration leads to inefficiencies and uncertainty55. Similarly, recent studies emphasize the need for comprehensive legislative reforms to address procedural ambiguities and ensure consistency in the application of insolvency law56.

Another important weakness is the limited institutional capacity of tribunals and insolvency professionals. The increasing complexity of cases involving Section 230 schemes during liquidation places additional demands on the NCLT and liquidators. Delays in adjudication and resource constraints can further exacerbate the challenges associated with the implementation of these schemes.

Furthermore, the framework lacks a clear mechanism for monitoring and enforcing approved schemes. While Section 230 provides for Tribunal oversight, the absence of detailed provisions for post-approval monitoring can lead to difficulties in ensuring compliance. This gap can affect the effectiveness of the scheme and undermine stakeholder confidence.

The issue of transparency and information asymmetry also poses challenges. Although the law requires disclosure of relevant information, the quality and completeness of disclosures may vary. Stakeholders may not always have access to accurate and timely information, affecting their ability to make informed decisions. Strengthening disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms is essential to address this issue.

In conclusion, while the existing framework governing the interplay between Section 230 and the IBC represents a significant advancement in insolvency law, it is characterized by several weaknesses and legal gaps. These include the lack of explicit statutory integration, procedural ambiguities, conflicting timelines, and inconsistencies in judicial interpretation. Addressing these issues will require comprehensive legislative reforms, clearer regulatory guidelines, and enhanced institutional capacity. By addressing these weaknesses, the insolvency framework can be strengthened to achieve its objectives more effectively and to provide greater certainty and confidence to stakeholders.

FINDINGS, SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. Major Findings of the Study

The present study on the legal interface between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 reveals several significant findings that contribute to the understanding of India’s evolving insolvency framework. One of the primary findings is that the integration of Section 230 into the liquidation process represents a progressive and innovative development in Indian insolvency law. Traditionally, liquidation was treated as a terminal stage leading to dissolution; however, the current framework allows for revival even after the failure of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). This reflects a shift from a liquidation-centric approach to a revival-oriented insolvency regime.

Another key finding is that the framework effectively promotes value maximization by enabling restructuring during liquidation. The availability of compromise or arrangement mechanisms allows stakeholders to explore alternatives that may yield better economic outcomes than asset liquidation. This aligns with the broader objectives of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), which prioritizes preservation of the corporate debtor as a going concern.

The study also finds that judicial interpretation has played a crucial role in shaping the interface between the Companies Act and the IBC. In the absence of explicit statutory provisions, courts and tribunals have provided clarity on critical issues such as the applicability of Section 29A, the role of the liquidator, and the scope of Section 230 schemes during liquidation. This judicial intervention has ensured that the objectives of the IBC are not undermined.

However, the study identifies significant legal and procedural gaps in the framework. The lack of explicit statutory integration between Section 230 and the IBC creates ambiguity and uncertainty. Additionally, the absence of detailed procedural guidelines for implementing Section 230 schemes during liquidation leads to inconsistencies and delays. These gaps highlight the need for legislative and regulatory reforms.

Another important finding is the dual role of the liquidator, which creates practical challenges. The liquidator is required to balance the responsibilities of facilitating compromise or arrangement and executing liquidation, often without clear guidance. This dual function can lead to conflicts and inefficiencies.

The study further reveals that stakeholder participation mechanisms are not clearly defined during liquidation. Unlike the resolution process under the IBC, where the Committee of Creditors (CoC) provides a structured decision-making body, the process under Section 230 involves a broader and less organized group of stakeholders. This creates coordination challenges and affects the efficiency of the process.

Finally, the comparative analysis with international jurisdictions highlights that while the Indian framework is innovative, it lacks the procedural clarity and integration observed in systems such as the UK and US. This underscores the need for harmonization and reform to enhance the effectiveness of the insolvency regime.

B. Suggestions and Recommendations

In light of the findings and observations, several suggestions and recommendations can be made to enhance the effectiveness of the legal framework.

Firstly, there is a need for explicit statutory integration between Section 230 of the Companies Act and the IBC. This can be achieved through legislative amendments that clearly define the scope, applicability, and limitations of Section 230 schemes during liquidation. Such integration would reduce ambiguity and enhance legal certainty.

Secondly, detailed procedural guidelines should be formulated for the implementation of Section 230 schemes within the IBC framework. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) can play a crucial role in issuing regulations that address issues such as timelines, documentation, stakeholder participation, and approval mechanisms.

Thirdly, the role of the liquidator should be clearly defined and strengthened. Guidelines should be provided to ensure that the liquidator can effectively balance the responsibilities of facilitating compromise or arrangement and executing liquidation. Training and capacity-building initiatives for insolvency professionals can further enhance their effectiveness.

Fourthly, a structured mechanism for stakeholder participation should be established during liquidation. This could involve the creation of a representative body similar to the Committee of Creditors (CoC) to ensure efficient decision-making and coordination among stakeholders.

Fifthly, measures should be taken to prevent misuse of Section 230 schemes. This may include stricter eligibility criteria, enhanced due diligence requirements, and judicial oversight to ensure that only genuine and viable schemes are approved.

Sixthly, efforts should be made to harmonize procedural timelines between the Companies Act and the IBC. This would ensure that the flexibility of Section 230 does not undermine the efficiency of the IBC framework.

Seventhly, institutional capacity should be strengthened by increasing the number of NCLT benches, providing specialized training to judges and insolvency professionals, and improving infrastructure. This would enhance the efficiency and consistency of decision-making.

Finally, India can benefit from adopting international best practices, such as unified insolvency frameworks and mechanisms like cramdown, which allow for greater flexibility in restructuring. Adapting these practices to the Indian context can enhance the effectiveness of the insolvency regime.

C. Conclusion

In conclusion, the legal interface between Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Regulation 2B of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 represents a significant evolution in Indian insolvency law. By enabling compromise or arrangement during liquidation, the framework provides a valuable mechanism for revival and value maximization. This reflects a progressive approach that aligns with global trends in insolvency law.

However, the framework is characterized by several legal and procedural challenges, including lack of statutory integration, procedural ambiguities, and inconsistencies in judicial interpretation. These challenges highlight the need for comprehensive reforms to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the insolvency regime.

The study underscores the importance of harmonization, clarity, and institutional capacity in ensuring the success of the framework. By addressing existing gaps and adopting best practices, India can develop a robust and efficient insolvency system that meets the needs of stakeholders and supports economic growth.

Ultimately, the success of the insolvency framework depends on its ability to balance flexibility with discipline, promote value maximization, and ensure fairness and transparency. The integration of Section 230 into the liquidation process is a step in the right direction, but its full potential can only be realized through continued reforms and effective implementation.

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Footnotes

1. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.

2. Companies Act, 2013, §§ 149, 177.

3. Companies Act, 2013, § 135.

4. Companies Act, 2013, §§ 241–242.

5. Companies Act, 2013, § 2(62).

6. Companies Act, 2013, §§ 230–232.

7. Companies Act, 2013, §§ 270–272.

8. Companies Act, 2013, §§ 408–410.

9. Companies Act, 2013, § 447.

10. Companies Act, 2013, § 230(6).

11. Meghal Homes Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Niwas Girni K.K. Samiti, (2007) 7 SCC 753.

12. Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 224 of 2018 (NCLAT).

13. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, (2021) 7 SCC 474.

14. Companies Act, 2013, § 230(2)

15. Companies Act, 2006 (UK), Part 26.

16. Insolvency Law Committee Report, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2018.

17. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 12.

18. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §§ 21–22.

19. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §§ 7–10.

20. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 14.

21. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 30.

22. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 53.

23. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 29A.

24. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §§ 188–196.

25. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.

26. Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531.

27. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 33.

28. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 33(5).

29. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 34.

30. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 12.

31. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 35.

32. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 53.

33. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 52.

34. Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.

35. Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531.

36. Companies Act, 2013, § 230.

37. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

38. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 35.

39. Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 224 of 2018 (NCLAT).

40. Companies Act, 2013, § 230.

41. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

42. Companies Act, 2013, § 230.

43. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

44. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, (2021) 7 SCC 474.

45. S. Verma, Corporate Insolvency and Hybrid Mechanisms in India (2023).

46. P. Sharma, “Implementation Challenges under IBC Liquidation Framework,” (2024) Indian Journal of Insolvency Law.

47. Companies Act, 2013, § 230.

48. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, preamble.

49. Companies Act, 2013, § 230(6).

50. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, (2021) 7 SCC 474.

51. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

52. Y. Shivram Prasad v. S. Dhanapal, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 224 of 2018 (NCLAT).

53. Companies Act, 2013, § 230; IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

54. IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, reg. 2B.

55. R. Gupta, Corporate Insolvency Law in India: Issues and Challenges (2023).

56. S. Iyer, “Gaps in the Insolvency Framework: A Critical Analysis,” (2024) Indian Journal of Corporate Law.

How to cite

Abhijatya Dubey & Dr. Shova Devi, An Exploratory Study on the Legal Interface between Section 230 (CA 2013) and Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulation, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 978 (2026).

Cite this article

Abhijatya Dubey & Dr. Shova Devi, An Exploratory Study on the Legal Interface between Section 230 (CA 2013) and Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Process Regulation, 9 Int'l J.L. Mgmt. & Human. 978 (2026).
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