Judicial Recognition of Passive Euthanasia in India: A Critical Analysis of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and the Right to Die with Dignity

The question of whether an individual possesses a constitutionally enforceable right to die with dignity has emerged as one of the most intellectually demanding and morally intricate questions confronting Indian constitutional jurisprudence in the contemporary era. Situated at the confluence of fundamental rights, biomedical ethics, and evolving human rights norms, the judicial treatment of passive euthanasia in India reflects a gradual yet decisive normative shift from near absolute prohibition to qualified constitutional recognition under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This paper undertakes a rigorous critical examination of the judicial architecture governing end-of-life decision-making in India, tracing its doctrinal evolution through a sequence of watershed Supreme Court pronouncements. The analysis proceeds through four critical stages: the foundational recognition of passive euthanasia as legally permissible in Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India ; its constitutional elevation and the validation of Advance Medical Directives in Common Cause v. Union of India ; the procedural liberalization introduced through the Supreme Court's 2023 modifications ; and the operational crystallization achieved in Harish Rana v. Union of India (2026) , which meaningfully extended the definition of medical treatment to encompass Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration. Adopting a doctrinal legal methodology, the paper draws upon primary judicial sources, Law Commission of India Reports , and comparative international legal frameworks to assess the efficacy and shortcomings of the prevailing regime. The central findings reveal a persistent implementation deficit despite the Common Cause judgment's robust theoretical affirmation of patient autonomy; the original procedural safeguards imposed excessive institutional burdens, fostering physician reluctance and contributing to a discernible rise in terminal discharges against medical advice. While the subsequent judicial interventions have alleviated some of these structural impediments, considerable ambiguities persist with respect to digital registry infrastructure, the capacity of rural healthcare institutions, and the resolution of intra-family disputes over end of life choices. The paper concludes that although the Supreme Court has constructed a constitutionally sound and progressively sensitive foundation for the recognition of passive euthanasia, the continued absence of comprehensive parliamentary legislation constitutes a critical lacuna that frustrates the meaningful realisation of this right in practice. Immediate legislative intervention is warranted to establish uniform, culturally attuned, and technologically integrated end-of-life care protocols that translate judicial intent into accessible, ground-level reality.