INTRODUCTION
A. Meaning and Scope of Religious Freedom in India
Religious freedom is one of the core values that the Indian constitution is built upon. It is a direct outcome of the profound history of the subcontinent which was marked by not only the religious plurality but also the peaceful co-existence and the struggles for rights. The constitutional framers deliberately gave a significant place to religious freedom in the supreme law of the land. They knew that religion in India is not a matter of private faith only but it is deeply ingrained in the social practices, community identity, and cultural manifestation.1 Articles 25 and 26 capture this promise by assuring the freedom of conscience as well as the right to freely profess, practise and propagate one’s religion. In addition, the autonomy of religious denominations to manage their own affairs is also guaranteed.2 These articles envisage the protection of the individual and collective aspects of religious life.
The extension of religious liberty in India is not unlimited or unconditionally granted. Articles 25 and 26 are, in fact, subject to restrictions relating to public order, morality, health, and the rest of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.3 The architecture of this Constitution is a reflection of the effort to weigh up religious freedom against other constitutional values such as equality, dignity and social reform. Indian secularism, thus, does not entail a strict separation of religion and State. It rather accepts a model of principled engagement whereby the State is allowed to intervene in religious matters if such intervention is aimed at preventing harm, discrimination or social inequality injustice.4 Within this framework, the judiciary has assumed a central role in mediating conflicts between religious autonomy and constitutional governance.
B. The Essential Religious Practices Doctrine: Concept and Relevance
The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine, emerged as a judicial device within this balancing exercise to mark the limits of constitutionally protected religious conduct. This doctrine is based on the idea that the constitutional protection contained in Articles 25 and 26 only covers those practices that are essential or those which form the core of a religion.5 Practices that are considered as being merely secondary, optional or of a secular nature may be regulated by the State without religious freedom being violated.
The ERP doctrine is significant because it serves as a gatekeeping tool. By making a distinction between essential and non, essential practices, courts seek to thwart the use of religious freedom as a refuge against social reform or regulatory measures.6 However, the doctrine greatly increases the scope of judicial power in religious matters as well. Courts are often obliged to interpret religious texts, look into the doctrinal history, and decide the centrality of the practice to the religion.7 This has led to constitutional adjudication being very much like theological inquiry. In a society characterised by religious plurality and internal diversity within faiths, the legitimacy and effects of such judicial determination become of utmost importance.
C. Research Problem and Central Question
The principal research problem explored in this paper is the tension between the ERP doctrine and the constitutional value of religious pluralism. Although the doctrine claims to protect the core of religious freedom, its implementation often leads to the judicial support of one single, standardized version of religion.8 Such a method endangers the possible marginalization of dissenting, heterodox, or minority interpretations that might not align with dominant or scriptural understandings. Moreover, the lack of clear and consistent criteria for essentiality has resulted in doctrinal ambiguity and unpredictability of judicial decisions.9 Different benches have arrived at different conclusions on the same issues, often depending on selective readings of religious texts or historical practices.10 The inconsistency points to the subjective character of the investigation and questions whether courts, as institutions, have the capacity to take such a role. On this background, the main question of this research is whether the Essential Religious Practices doctrine, in its current form, is a factor that is opposite to the pluralistic character of religious freedom set out by the Indian Constitution.
D. Hypothesis and Objectives of the Study
This paper argues that the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine, as currently understood and implemented, materially endangers the concept of religious pluralism in India. It does so by the doctrine favouring the orthodox or majoritarian interpretations of religion, thus, it limiting the constitutional space for diverse and evolving religious practices.11
Moreover, it allows the judiciary to go beyond its limits by making courts the judges of religious authenticity rather than the ones who safeguard constitutional rights.12 The objectives of this research are fourfold. Firstly, it intends to inspect the constitutional basis of religious freedom and the court reasoning which led to the development of the ERP doctrine. Secondly, it wants to scrutinize how the doctrine was used in landmark and recent Supreme Court decisions. Thirdly, it wishes to measure the effect of the doctrine on the minority rights and intra, religious diversity. Lastly, this study endeavors to determine whether different constitutional, morality, dignity and harm, based perspectives could provide a more pluralistic framework for religious freedom adjudication.
E. Methodology and Structure of the Paper
This research employs a doctrinal and analytical methodology. It mainly depends on the constitutional provisions and the Supreme Court of India’s judicial decisions, along with academic literature on secularism, religious freedom, and constitutional theory.13 The study is qualitative and focuses on understanding judicial reasoning, pinpointing inconsistencies, and assessing normative implications. The paper is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, Part II describes the constitutional framework for religious freedom in India. Part III discusses the origin and the court evolution of the Essential Religious Practices doctrine. Part IV considers the doctrine’s impact on religious pluralism, and Part V studies its use in current constitutional adjudication. Part VI provides a critical review of the ERP framework, and Part VII considers the different possible approaches to the adjudication of religious freedom. The paper ends with a summary of the findings and a proposal for reconciling religious freedom with constitutional pluralism.
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Indian Constitution provides for religious freedom through a well, balanced framework, which takes into account individual liberty, group autonomy and the secular nature of the State. Instead of absolute models of religious liberty, the Indian model integrates religion with constitutional morality, social reform and equality. Articles 25 and 26 form the nucleus of this framework, while other provisions serve as qualifications and interpretive guides.
A. Articles 25 and 26: Nature and Content
The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom in India is mainly found in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Article 25 assures to all individuals the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III.14 This provision is indicative of the Constitutions embrace of individual autonomy in faith, belief, and spiritual expression. Significantly, the right under Article 25 is available not only to citizens but to all persons, thereby strengthening its universal nature.15 Article 26 is in line with Article 25 in the sense that it recognises the collective and denominational religious rights. It ensures to every religious denomination or a section of it the right to set up and run institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and own as well as administer property in accordance with law.16 Unlike Article 25, Article 26 is confined to religious denominations and is primarily concerned with institutional autonomy. The Supreme Court has clarified that Articles 25 and 26 are not mutually exclusive but operate in a harmonious manner, balancing individual and collective dimensions of religious freedom.17 Together, these provisions establish a constitutional framework that protects both personal faith and organised religious life, while simultaneously permitting State intervention where religious practices conflict with broader constitutional values.
B. Individual, Denominational, and Collective Religious Rights
The Indian Constitution establishes religious freedom through multiple layers, including individual, denominational, and collective rights. Article 25 provides for individual religious rights, which cover not only the freedom of internal conscience but also external expressions of belief.18 Holding beliefs, changing ones religion, and religious observances are all included in this right, albeit subject to limitations laid down in the Constitution. Article 26 denominational rights acknowledge religion as a social and institutional reality. The Supreme Court, in Shirur Mutt, explained the term “religious denomination” as a body of people sharing the same faith, organization, and a distinctive name.19 Such rights empower religious groups to ensure doctrinal and institutional purity. Nevertheless, conflicts become issues when denominational claims confront the rights of individuals within the group, especially women, dissenters, or marginalized sub, groups. The constitutional problem is to harmonize the autonomy of the group with the individual’s dignity and equality. The judiciary has been using the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine as a tool to intervene in this task.
C. Constitutional Restrictions: Public Order, Morality, Health, and Other Provisions
Articles 25 and 26 guarantee religious freedom; however, this freedom is subject to limitations laid down in the Constitution. Respect for public order, morality, and health allows the State to regulate religious practices that endanger the harmony of the society or the well, being of an individual.20 Besides that, Article 25(2) authorizes the State to make laws regulating secular activities connected with religious practice and to bring in social welfare and reform measures. Court decisions have always been in favour of the view that such restrictions should be limited in scope but carried out with the necessary force. In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, the Court considered temple entry legislation as a lawful restriction on the rights of a denomination, made in the spirit of social reform, thus it was found to be Constitutional.21 This indicates that religious freedom in India is not absolute but is subject to a constitutional framework that takes social justice and reform into account.
D. Religious Freedom vis-à-vis Equality, Dignity, and Secularism
Religious freedom is not uncoupled from other fundamental values such as equality, dignity, and secularism. The Supreme Court has, time and again, declared that secularism is an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution.22 Indian secularism does not mean a complete separation of religion and State, rather it is principled engagement aimed at ensuring equality among religions. Conflicts between religious practices and equality norms have become more vocal, especially in those cases involving gender discrimination. The judiciary has tried to solve such conflicts by constitutional morality, in some instances, sacrificing religious autonomy.23 The ERP doctrine has been instrumental in this balancing act, thus, creating apprehensions of judicial overreach and selective intervention.
ORIGIN AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES DOCTRINE
A. Genesis of the ERP Doctrine: Shirur Mutt
The ERP doctrine finds its roots in the landmark case Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt, where the Supreme Court declared that only such practices that are “essential” and “integral” to a religion, enjoy the protection of Articles 25 and 26.24 The Court emphasized that the question of essentiality of a practice must be ascertained by looking at the religious doctrines themselves. Despite the intention of this definition to shield religion from the State, it has, however, ironically, put courts in the position of deciding religious essentiality, which is a highly delicate task, both interpretatively and epistemically.
B. Tests Applied by Courts to Determine “Essentiality”
Judicial authorities have introduced different criteria over time to figure out what counts as an essential religious practice, such as scriptural command, historical continuity, and being mandatory.25 Nevertheless, these criteria have been utilized sporadically and, in most cases, have favored the orthodox interpretation of the religion rather than the lived and evolved practices. The dependence on textual sources has, in particular, been a factor that has put non, codified and minority religious traditions at a disadvantage.
C. Judicial Interpretation through Landmark Decisions
In the case of Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali26, the court in Durgah Committee restricted the extent of the protection to the religious practices by excluding those that were considered superstitious or that were extraneous to the core religious doctrine. This was a move towards the judicial rationalization of religion which had the effect of reducing the recognition of the internal religious diversity. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan27, the Court maintained the right of the denominations to manage their own affairs but allowed the State to regulate the secular aspects of the temple administration. The decision led to the delineation of the religious and secular activities, although the line between the two was still somewhat ambiguous. The Court made a controversial decision that a mosque is not an essential part of Islamic practice. This conclusion was largely criticized as an overreach of theology in Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India28. Thus, it shows how determinations of religion by courts may be fraught with errors and be dangerous.
ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN INDIA
A. Understanding Religious Pluralism in the Indian Context
Religious pluralism in India is not only a social and constitutional reality at its core but also goes beyond being a mere descriptive characteristic of the diversity. Indian society, through the ages, has been hospitable to various faiths, sects, and belief systems that in many cases have not only co, existed but have also overlapped and interacted through the shared spaces, rituals, and cultural practices.29 Such pluralism does not end at inter, religious coexistence but, in fact, covers the deep internal heterogeneity of the religious traditions themselves.
The five major world religions namely Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, as well as numerous other faiths, exhibit the diversity in ideas, sects, and customary practices influenced by geographical factors, caste, language, and local culture.30 The Indian Constitution mirrors this pluralistic spirit by prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion and guaranteeing to every person freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion as per Articles 25 and 26.31 Being different from rigidly doctrinal models of religion, the Indian constitutional framework sees religion not as something that is prescribed by dogma, but as something that is lived, practiced, and socially embedded.
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that religious belief in India should not be seen as one single uniform dogma.32 Still, constitutional adjudication is often at odds with this intricate matter. The difficulty is to reconcile pluralism with the requirements of legal certainty, equality, and social reform. It is in this very discord that the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine, as a major judicial instrument, with far, reaching consequences for pluralism, has come into being, has been found.
B. ERP and the Standardisation of Religious Belief and Practice
The ERP doctrine sets out a system that differentiates between religious practices considered “essential” to a religion and those regarded as optional or peripheral. Only the former are granted constitutional protection.33 Although this distinction was largely aimed at protecting the core religious autonomy from the influence of the State, its gradual effect has been the religious belief and practice becoming standardized. In deciding essentiality, courts often depend on scriptural texts, theological authorities, and historical interpretations. This approach presupposes that religions have a fixed core which can be objectively identified. Such a presupposition is very problematic in India, where a number of religious practices have been handed down by custom, oral tradition, and collective memory rather than formal doctrine.34 By giving preference to text, based and orthodox interpretations, the ERP doctrine excludes those practices that are syncretic, localised, and reformist. It also impels courts to assume a homogenised view of religion, thereby simplifying complex belief systems into categories that are easier for the judiciary to deal with. The constitutional promise of equal respect for different religious expressions is being compromised by this process of standardisation.35
C. Impact on Minority and Non-Orthodox Religious Practices
The ERP doctrines adverse impact minority religions and non, orthodox sects is most minority religious traditions often lack an authoritative single scripture or hierarchical structure, making it difficult for the court to show judicial standards essentially.36 As a result, their practices are disproportionately exposed to regulation, prohibition, or exclusion from constitutional protection. The ERP doctrine also tends to favour dominant sects and orthodox interpretations even in majority religions. The practices of marginalized communities such as women, lower castes, or regional sects are often considered non, essential. This, therefore, reproduces the existing power hierarchies within religions and reinforces social exclusion through constitutional reasoning.37 Such consequences are incompatible with substantive equality, which entails being sensitive to the differential impact. By considering religions as internally uniform, the ERP doctrine hides internal diversity and dissenting voices.
D. Judicial Subjectivity and Majoritarian Tendencies
Deciding which religious practices are essential, although presented as an objective investigation, is a subjective matter. People in authority thinking to decide essential practices in religion, they unconsciously depend on their assumptions and cultural patterns, they have in their mind, their social norms of the day, and the sources they are using. When interpreting religious doctrine, judges in this case they try to find the objective truth but end up considering it a subjective one.38 This kind of subjectivity is, particularly, problematic when we live in a society where religious narratives of the majority influence more or less the public discourse. Critics of the method of identifying essential religious practices (ERP) consider that the ERP adjudication might have the effect of reinforcing the majoritarian understandings of religion wrapped as constitutional neutrality.39 It may happen that the judicial or court endorsement of some particular interpretations over others might thus not only support the dominant religious practices but also may have the effect of making the minority or heterodox traditions appear as less valid or even invalid. This weakens the Constitution as a counter, majoritarian safeguard.40
ERP DOCTRINE IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
A. ERP and Gender-Based Exclusion
Gender-based exclusion has become a central site of conflict between religious autonomy and constitutional equality. Courts have increasingly relied on the ERP doctrine to resolve such disputes. In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala), the Supreme Court determined that the prohibition of women from menstruating age attending the Sabarimala temple was not an essential religious practice and that it infringed the rights protected under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.41 The Court thus made a powerful statement of gender equality and dignity. Still, the Courts analysis pointed to the shortcomings of the ERP framework. The Court did not base its decision mostly on equality and dignity but rather took an in, depth theological inquiry about the nature of the deity and the historical grounds of the exclusion.42 This use of ERP enabled the dissenting opinions to interpret the doctrinal framework differently and, therefore, arrive at different conclusions, thus revealing its indeterminacy.43
B. ERP, Religious Reforms and State Regulation of Religious Expression
In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, the Supreme Court condemned the practice of instant triple talaq. Most of the Court held that the practice was not a part of core tenets of Islam and thus, it was not protected under Article 25.44 Although the decision was a victory for women’s rights, it demonstrates the problematic role of ERP in religious reform. By determining the theological status of triple talaq, the Court entered the highly debated area of religion. Critics say that the ruling could have been more strongly based on constitutional guarantees of equality and non, discrimination rather than on religious essentiality.45
In Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court considered whether wearing the hijab was an essential religious practice. The Court’s finding that it was not led to a considerable restriction of the scope of individual religious freedom under Article 25.46 The ruling gave more weight to institutional discipline and uniformity than to individual conscience, thereby raising the issue of possible personal religious autonomy being lost.47 The case shows how the ERP method can turn religious theological questions into personal liberty ones, thus minority rights are often harmed.
CRITIQUE OF THE ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES DOCTRINE
A. Doctrinal Ambiguity and Lack of Objective Standards
The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine has been singled out repeatedly for its doctrinal vagueness as one of the most enduring criticisms. The Supreme Court has been unable to set out a consistent or objective standard for what an “essential” religious practice is in a total of about seven decades during which the doctrine has been in operation. Different courts have emphasized different things in the Bible, such as relying more on scriptural injunctions, historical continuity, mandatory observance, and community belief of the religion, sometimes even going their own way without telling us why they use one criterion rather than another.48 This uncertainty gives judges a lot of freedom to decide which results they want to achieve, and so their decisions are not predictable. Practices that have been recognized as essential in one instance may be rejected in another to the extent that they might be different even within the same religious tradition.49 Inconsistency of this kind threatens the rule of law which is about clarity, predictability, and principled reasoning. Instead of being a neutral doctrinal filter, ERP serves as a flexible instrument that can be shaped to bring about different results.
B. Transformation of Courts into Religious Adjudicators
The ERP doctrine changes the constitutional courts’ institutional role essentially by forcing them to perform theological adjudication. When deciding on essentiality, judges have to interpret religious texts, understand doctrinal disputes, and figure out the authenticity of the competing religious claims.50 These courts are secular in character and their role is not compatible with this one and also the courts exceed their judicial competence. Courts do not have the necessary epistemic tools to solve theological questions which are contested, especially in religions that are characterised by interpretive plurality. By taking the power to define religious doctrine, courts may estrange religious communities and lose judicial legitimacy.51
C. Conflict between ERP and Constitutional Morality
The ERP doctrine is a typical example of a principle that conflicts with the idea of constitutional morality which has become a main normative framework in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The notion of constitutional morality is based on the principles of human dignity, autonomy, inclusiveness and the empowering potential of fundamental rights.52 By giving precedence to religious orthodoxy over individual rights, ERP frequently weakens these values. Thus, those practices that violate dignity or equality may be allowed to continue if they are declared essential while at the same time reformist or dissenting practices may be excluded on the ground that they do not meet doctrinal thresholds.53 Such a reversal is a negation of the Constitution’s transformative vision which envisages not only the preservation of the tradition but also its scrutiny in the light of constitutional values.
D. Implications for Secularism and Minority Protection
Indian secularism bases its respect on equal dignity to all religions rather than a complete separation of religion from the State.54 However, ERP adjudication has the potential to upset this equilibrium by allowing the judiciary to selectively intervene in religious affairs. Minority religions and marginalised groups suffer more because their religious practices are more likely to be examined for essentiality.
REIMAGINING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WITHOUT ERP
A. Structural Limitations of the ERP Framework
The deficiencies inherent in the ERP framework extend beyond the procedural aspects and are deeply embedded in its structural nature. The doctrine relies heavily on the idea that religion has a clear, fixed, and universal core. Such a presumption goes against sociological and constitutional interpretations of religion as superordinate concepts that are dynamic, contextual, and evolving.55 By categorizing religious practices into mere binaries of essential and non, essential, ERP disregards the intricacies of religious life.
B. Rights-Based and Dignity-Oriented Adjudication
A possible alternative to ERP could be represented by a rights-based and dignity-oriented framework. Courts, instead of inquiring whether a practice is essential to a religion, should determine whether State interference impinges on individual dignity, autonomy, equality, or freedom of conscience.56 Such a measure corresponds to religious freedom being one of the fundamental rights framework features and thus, prevents the courts from entering into theological disputes.
C. Emphasis on Harm, Exclusion, and Coercion rather than Essentiality
Judicial scrutiny of religious practices must place the highest emphasis on harm, exclusion, and coercion. Any such practices that result in harm being demonstrated or that violate the rights of others may be regulated, regardless of their religious character. On the other hand, non, coercive, harm, free practices should be protected, even if they are not doctrinally central.57
D. Suggested Judicial Approach for a Pluralistic Constitutional Order
A pluralistic constitutional order calls for the judiciary to refrain from imposing its views in matters of theology and to recognize the diversity with heightened sensitivity. It is appropriate for the courts to assume as a starting point the protection of religious freedom and to step in only when there is a need to protect other vital constitutional interests.58
This kind of treatment would acknowledge the differences within the various religions, ensure that the minority groups have their rights and be instrumental in preserving the secular nature of the judiciary. Most importantly, the religious freedom would be put on a right footing with other constitutional principles without compromising either of them.
CONCLUSION
The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine has been at the center of Indian constitutional jurisprudence on religious freedom, but its position has been very much contested. The doctrine, which was initially designed to separate the religious domain from secular regulation, has become a means of judicial intervention in religious belief and practice. This change of the doctrine issues constitutional problems of the first order, especially in a society like India, which is not only religiously diverse but also internally plural and historically syncretic. This paper has demonstrated that the ERP doctrine endangers religious pluralism structurally. The doctrine, by making constitutional protection dependent on judicial decisions of “essentiality, ” leaves no room for different religions to exist side by side. It standardises religions thus on the one hand it favours the orthodox, text, based, and dominant interpretations of the religions, while on the other hand, it marginalises the lived, localised, and reformist practices of the religions. Such a vision is in contradiction with Indian constitutional vision that sees religion not as a unitary or a static phenomenon, but as a social one that is changing and evolving.
Under the ERP (Essential Religious Practice) framework, judicial engagement with theology has led to considerable institutional distortions as well. On one hand, constitutional courts which are supposed to protect fundamental rights, find themselves in a position where they must act as religious adjudicators. This means they not only interpret scriptures, but also resolve doctrinal disputes and even define religious authenticity. While this is far beyond the court’s capabilities, it also weakens the authority of constitutional adjudication as it mixes courts with questions that are inherently contested in the religious domain. In such adjudication, the danger of subjectivity, cultural bias, and majoritarian influence co, vary and becomes particularly high. On top of that, the ERP doctrine is often at loggerheads with the transformative ideals of the Constitution. Indian constitutionalism is not just preservative but also aspirational; it aims at tearing down hierarchies, broadening individual dignity, and securing substantive equality. By giving religious orthodoxy preference over constitutional morality, ERP adjudication, in most cases, has the effect of watering down such commitments. For instance, a practice that perpetuates exclusion or inequality may be allowed to continue after judicial scrutiny if it is labelled essential, while a progressive or dissenting practice may not be given the right to exist because it does not conform to the doctrine.
The review of recent cases such as Sabarimala, Shayara Bano, and hijab decision reveals that even as these results promote equality and gender justice, they become doctrinally fragile due to grounding in ERP reasoning. Dependence on essentiality allows disparate judicial resolutions from the same framework, thus causing doctrinal uncertainty and legal predictability erosion. Such instability jeopardizes the rule of law and lowers the trust in constitutional safeguards for religious freedom. When addressing the main research question, Is the Essential Religious Practices doctrine a threat to religious pluralism?, this paper decides that the doctrine in its present state acts as a limitation for pluralism rather than a safeguard. As ERP adjudication leads to the enforcement of uniformity, the marginalisation of minority and non, orthodox practices, and the freezing of religion in time, it reduces the constitutional space for religious diversity.
The solution is not to discard judicial review of religious practices entirely but to change the focus of constitutional adjudication from theological essentiality to rights, based analysis. A dignity, centred approach that pays attention to harm, coercion, exclusion, and the effect on individual autonomy provides a more consistent and pluralistic framework. This approach allows the State to intervene where it is necessary, thus, respecting the internal diversity and the changing nature of religious life. Religious freedom reimagined without ERP does not weaken secularism but, instead, it becomes stronger. By reducing judicial involvement in doctrine and re-establishing constitutional values as the main criteria, courts are in a better position to be neutral arbiters in a plural society. In the end, the protection of religious freedom in India depends on a constitutional commitment to persons rather than practices, dignity rather than dogma, and pluralism rather than uniformity. It is only by such a reorientation that the Constitution can continue to be responsive to the complex religious landscape of India and, at the same time, loyal to its transformative promise.
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Footnotes
1. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES, Vol. VII (Dec. 6–7, 1948).
2. INDIA CONST. arts. 25–26
3. INDIA CONST. arts. 25(1)
4. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India).
5. Comm’r, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
6. Durgah Comm. v. Syed Hussain Ali, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1402 (India).
7. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638 (India).
8. B.K. Mathew, Judicial Review of Religious Freedom, 42 J. INDIAN L. INST. 189 (2000).
9. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 360 (India).
10. Indian Young Lawyers Ass’n v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 S.C.C. 1 (India).
11. GAUTAM BHATIA, THE TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION: A RADICAL BIOGRAPHY IN NINE ACTS (2019).
12. Faizan Mustafa, Freedom of Religion and Judicial Review, 7 NUJS L. REV. 35 (2014).
13. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed. 2013).
14. INDIA CONST. art. 25.
15. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388 (India).
16. INDIA CONST. art. 26.
17. Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
18. B.K. MATHEW, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 45 (2000).
19. Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. at 290.
20. INDIA CONST. art. 25(1).
21. Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255 (India).
22. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India).
23. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
24. Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282.
25. Faizan Mustafa, Freedom of Religion and Judicial Review, 7 NUJS L. REV. 35 (2014).
26. Durgah Comm. v. Syed Hussain Ali, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1402 (India).
27. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638 (India).
28. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 S.C.C. 360 (India).
29. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed. 2013).
30. id.
31. INDIA CONST. arts. 25–26.
32. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388 (India).
33. Comm’r, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
34. Faizan Mustafa, Freedom of Religion and Judicial Review, 7 NUJS L. REV. 35 (2014).
35. Gautam Bhatia, The Supreme Court and Religion, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 12 (2010).
36. Mustafa, supra note 7.
37. Bhatia, supra note 8.
38. id.
39. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India).
40. id.
41. Indian Young Lawyers Ass’n v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 S.C.C. 1 (India).
42. id.
43. id. (Malhotra, J., dissenting).
44. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 S.C.C. 1 (India).
45. Mustafa, supra note 7.
46. Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, (2022) S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 1398 (India).
47. Bhatia, supra note 8.
48. Faizan Mustafa, Freedom of Religion and Judicial Review, 7 NUJS L. REV. 35 (2014).
49. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed. 2013).
50. Comm’r, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282 (India).
51. Gautam Bhatia, The Supreme Court and Religion, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 12 (2010).
52. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
53. Bhatia, supra note 5.
54. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1 (India).
55. Bimal N. Patel et al., Religion and Constitutionalism in India, 50 J. INDIAN L. INST. 1 (2008).
56. Navtej Singh Johar, supra note 6.
57. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 S.C.C. 39 (India).
58. Seervai, supra note 3.