THE INTRODUCTION: TRIBUNALISATION AND CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF JUDICIAL POWER
Administrative law in India operates as the principal mechanism through which the exercise of public power is regulated and subjected to legal scrutiny. Within this framework, tribunals have emerged as specialised adjudicatory bodies intended to complement the traditional court system. The gradual shift from courts to tribunals, commonly described as tribunalisation, reflects a broader transformation in governance where adjudicatory functions are increasingly distributed across quasi-judicial institutions. While this shift is often justified on grounds of efficiency, technical expertise, and the need to reduce judicial backlog, it raises fundamental concerns about the nature and location of judicial power within the constitutional scheme, particularly in light of the doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of law.1
The constitutional basis for tribunalisation in India lies in the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution of India, which introduced Articles 323A and 323B, empowering the legislature to establish tribunals for specific subject matters. These provisions enabled the creation of alternative adjudicatory mechanisms that could, in certain cases, exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts. The enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 gave concrete shape to this framework by establishing Central and State Administrative Tribunals and excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts in service matters.2 This marked a significant departure from the traditional model of adjudication, where High Courts exercised wide powers of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The legislative intent appeared to favour a specialised and streamlined adjudicatory system, even at the cost of altering the conventional judicial hierarchy.
Judicial response to tribunalisation has been marked by both acceptance and recalibration. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of tribunals as substitutes for High Courts, emphasising that such substitution would be permissible only if tribunals ensured independence, competence, and effectiveness comparable to that of constitutional courts.3 However, this position was revisited in L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India, where the Court held that judicial review by High Courts and the Supreme Court is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded.4 Subsequent decisions, including Union of India v R Gandhi, have continued to emphasise that tribunals must conform to standards of judicial independence and cannot function as mere extensions of the executive.5 These decisions collectively underscore the constitutional limits within which tribunalisation must operate.
Despite these judicial safeguards, the expansion of tribunals has generated persistent concerns regarding their institutional design and functioning. Issues relating to executive control over appointments, tenure, and administration have raised doubts about their independence, while procedural inconsistencies and fragmentation of jurisdiction have affected the coherence of the justice delivery system. Legislative interventions such as the Finance Act, 2017 have further restructured the tribunal framework, often centralising control within the executive.6 Academic commentary has also highlighted that tribunals, instead of reducing delays, have in some instances replicated the inefficiencies of the traditional court system while lacking comparable safeguards of independence and accountability.7
This paper examines whether tribunalisation, in its current form, has resulted in a dilution of judicial power in India. It argues that although tribunals were conceived as instruments of efficiency and specialisation, their institutional design and operational realities have weakened the authority of constitutional courts, particularly the High Courts, and expanded executive influence over adjudicatory processes. By analysing the constitutional framework, judicial responses, and structural challenges associated with tribunals, the paper seeks to evaluate whether the promise of efficient justice has been achieved without compromising the foundational principles of judicial independence and constitutional supremacy.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND EVOLUTION OF TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION
The constitutional framework governing tribunals in India is rooted in a deliberate attempt to restructure the adjudicatory system to meet the demands of an expanding administrative state. The insertion of Articles 323A and 323B through the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution of India marked a pivotal moment in this evolution, as it explicitly authorised the creation of tribunals for specialised subject matters. Article 323A provides for the establishment of administrative tribunals for service matters, while Article 323B enables the creation of tribunals for a broader range of issues, including taxation, industrial disputes, and land reforms.8 These provisions reflect a constitutional recognition that traditional courts may not always be best suited to handle complex and technical disputes arising in a modern welfare state.
The underlying objective of these provisions was twofold. First, tribunals were intended to reduce the burden on High Courts and ensure speedier resolution of disputes. Second, they were designed to introduce subject-matter expertise into adjudication, thereby improving the quality of decision-making.9 However, the constitutional design also permitted the exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Courts in certain cases, thereby raising questions about whether tribunals were conceived merely as supplementary bodies or as substitutes for constitutional courts. This ambiguity lies at the heart of the constitutional debate surrounding tribunalisation.
The legislative implementation of this framework, particularly through the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, reinforced the substitution model. The Act established the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals, while expressly excluding the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136.10 This exclusionary clause significantly altered the traditional judicial hierarchy by removing a substantial category of disputes from the purview of High Courts. The constitutional validity of such exclusion was initially upheld in S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that tribunals could validly replace High Courts as long as they provided an equally effective mechanism for adjudication.11
The reasoning in Sampath Kumar was grounded in a functional understanding of judicial review, where the focus was on the adequacy of the alternative forum rather than the identity of the adjudicatory body. The Court treated tribunals as permissible substitutes, provided they met standards of independence, fairness, and competence comparable to those of High Courts. This approach effectively endorsed the legislative intent behind tribunalisation and marked a significant shift from a rigid conception of judicial power. However, it also opened the door to the possibility of extensive transfer of jurisdiction away from constitutional courts, thereby raising concerns about the erosion of their supervisory role.
This position was fundamentally reconsidered in L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India, which represents the constitutional turning point in the jurisprudence on tribunals. A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review vested in High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and in the Supreme Court under Article 32, forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution.12 Consequently, any provision excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts was declared unconstitutional. While tribunals were retained as adjudicatory bodies of first instance, their decisions were made subject to scrutiny by High Courts. This decision re-established the primacy of constitutional courts and clarified that tribunals could only supplement, not supplant, judicial review.
Subsequent jurisprudence has sought to refine this balance between legislative innovation and constitutional limitation. In Union of India v R Gandhi, the Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and emphasised that tribunals exercising judicial functions must possess characteristics akin to courts, particularly in terms of independence and qualifications of members.13 The Court underscored that the transfer of judicial functions to tribunals cannot result in the dilution of judicial standards. Similarly, in Madras Bar Association v Union of India and later decisions, the Court repeatedly struck down provisions that compromised the independence of tribunals or enhanced executive control over their functioning.14
The evolution of tribunal jurisdiction thus reflects a continuous tension between efficiency-oriented reforms and constitutional safeguards. While the Constitution permits the creation of specialised adjudicatory bodies, judicial interpretation has consistently imposed limits to ensure that such bodies do not undermine the essential features of the Constitution. The trajectory from Sampath Kumar to L. Chandra Kumar and beyond demonstrates a shift from acceptance of tribunals as substitutes to a more cautious approach that emphasises their supplementary role.
This constitutional framework reveals that tribunalisation, though formally sanctioned, is subject to substantive constraints derived from the basic structure doctrine. The preservation of judicial review, the independence of adjudicatory bodies, and the supervisory role of High Courts remain non-negotiable elements of the system. Any attempt to expand tribunal jurisdiction beyond these limits risks upsetting the constitutional balance between the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Accordingly, the evolution of tribunal jurisprudence underscores the need to reconcile administrative efficiency with the enduring principles of constitutionalism.
INDEPENDENCE, COMPOSITION AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL
A central concern in the discourse on tribunalisation is whether tribunals, as presently constituted, satisfy the constitutional requirement of judicial independence. Unlike traditional courts, which are institutionally insulated from executive influence through constitutionally entrenched safeguards, tribunals often function within a framework that permits significant executive involvement in their establishment, administration, and functioning. This structural feature raises serious questions about whether tribunals can genuinely perform adjudicatory functions without compromising the principles of impartiality and independence that are integral to the exercise of judicial power.15
The issue of appointments lies at the heart of this concern. In many tribunal frameworks, the executive plays a dominant role in appointing members, including both judicial and technical members. This contrasts with the constitutional scheme governing the higher judiciary, where judicial primacy in appointments has been firmly established. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that tribunals exercising judicial functions must be constituted in a manner that ensures independence from executive control. In Union of India v R Gandhi, the Court held that the selection process must ensure that judicial members are appointed in a manner comparable to judges of constitutional courts, and that the presence of technical members should not dilute judicial dominance.16 The Court further stressed that tribunals cannot be treated as mere extensions of the executive, particularly when they discharge functions traditionally performed by courts.
This concern was elaborated in a series of decisions involving challenges to tribunal structures. In Madras Bar Association v Union of India, the Supreme Court invalidated provisions relating to the composition of the National Company Law Tribunal, holding that excessive executive involvement in appointments and service conditions undermined judicial independence.17 The Court reiterated that when judicial functions are transferred to tribunals, the standards of independence, security of tenure, and qualifications must be equivalent to those applicable to courts. Subsequent rulings, including Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd, have continued to scrutinise tribunal rules framed under the Finance Act, 2017, particularly those granting the executive substantial control over appointments and conditions of service.18
Tenure and service conditions of tribunal members further illustrate the structural vulnerabilities of these institutions. Unlike judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court, who enjoy constitutionally protected tenure and removal processes, tribunal members are often appointed for relatively short terms, with the possibility of reappointment. This creates a potential incentive for members to align with executive preferences, thereby compromising decisional independence. The Supreme Court has expressed concern over such arrangements, noting that short tenure and the prospect of reappointment are inconsistent with the requirements of an independent adjudicatory body.19 In several instances, the Court has directed the government to modify service conditions to ensure greater security of tenure and to reduce executive discretion.
Another dimension of the problem is the administrative and financial dependence of tribunals on the executive. Many tribunals operate under the administrative control of the very ministries whose decisions they are required to adjudicate. This institutional arrangement raises concerns of bias and undermines public confidence in the impartiality of tribunal adjudication. The lack of a unified and independent administrative framework for tribunals has led to inconsistencies in infrastructure, staffing, and procedural norms, further affecting their efficiency and credibility. Reports of the Law Commission and parliamentary committees have repeatedly highlighted these issues and recommended the creation of an independent body to oversee tribunal administration.20
The composition of tribunals, particularly the inclusion and role of technical members, also raises important questions. While the inclusion of subject-matter experts is often justified on grounds of specialised knowledge, it has been argued that excessive reliance on non-judicial members may dilute the adjudicatory character of tribunals. The Supreme Court has clarified that technical members may assist in decision-making but cannot replace the central role of judicial members in adjudication.21 The balance between expertise and judicial reasoning remains a contested issue, particularly in tribunals dealing with complex commercial or regulatory matters.
The cumulative effect of these structural and functional concerns is that tribunals, in many instances, fall short of the constitutional standards expected of bodies exercising judicial power. While judicial intervention has sought to correct some of these deficiencies, recurring legislative attempts to retain or expand executive control suggest an ongoing institutional tension. The question, therefore, is not merely whether tribunals can function effectively, but whether they can do so without compromising the independence that is fundamental to the legitimacy of adjudication.
This section demonstrates that the dilution of judicial power through tribunalisation is not solely a question of jurisdictional transfer, but also one of institutional design. The degree of executive control over appointments, tenure, and administration directly affects the ability of tribunals to function as independent adjudicatory bodies. Unless these structural deficiencies are addressed, tribunals risk undermining the very principles they were intended to uphold, thereby weakening the broader framework of constitutional governance.
TRIBUNALISATION VS JUDICIAL REVIEW: DILUTION OF HIGH COURT POWERS
One of the most significant constitutional concerns arising from tribunalisation is its impact on the jurisdiction and authority of High Courts. High Courts occupy a central position within the Indian constitutional framework, particularly through their powers of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227. These powers are not merely procedural but form part of the basic structure of the Constitution, ensuring that all administrative and quasi-judicial action remains subject to constitutional scrutiny.22 The transfer of substantial areas of adjudication to tribunals, therefore, raises the question of whether such a shift undermines the supervisory and corrective role traditionally exercised by High Courts.
The exclusion of High Court jurisdiction was a defining feature of early tribunal legislation, most notably under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. By routing service matters directly to tribunals and limiting judicial oversight to the Supreme Court under Article 136, the Act effectively bypassed High Courts. This structural arrangement led to fragmentation in the adjudicatory system and created barriers to access, particularly for litigants who would otherwise have approached High Courts under Article 226.23 Although the decision in L. Chandra Kumar restored the power of judicial review, the practical consequences of tribunalisation continue to affect the accessibility and coherence of remedies available to litigants.
Judicial decisions subsequent to L. Chandra Kumar have highlighted the continuing tension between tribunal jurisdiction and High Court authority. In State of Gujarat v Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association, the Supreme Court emphasised that tribunals cannot function in isolation from the constitutional framework and that the supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts must remain meaningful and effective.24 The Court observed that any attempt to dilute or bypass this supervisory role would be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. Similarly, in Rajeev Kumar v Hemraj Singh Chauhan, the Court addressed delays and inefficiencies within tribunals, noting that the very objective of providing speedy justice was being defeated, thereby compelling litigants to approach High Courts for relief.25 These decisions indicate that, despite formal restoration of jurisdiction, High Courts continue to bear the burden of correcting systemic deficiencies within tribunals.
Another dimension of this issue is the fragmentation of adjudicatory mechanisms resulting from the proliferation of tribunals across different subject areas. Unlike High Courts, which possess broad and flexible jurisdiction, tribunals are typically confined to narrow statutory mandates. This creates a disjointed system in which litigants may be required to navigate multiple forums for related disputes. The absence of uniform procedural standards further complicates this landscape, leading to inconsistencies in adjudication and increased litigation costs. Academic commentary has noted that such fragmentation undermines the coherence of the legal system and weakens the integrative role played by High Courts.26
The appellate structure of tribunals also raises concerns regarding the dilution of judicial oversight. In many cases, appeals from tribunals lie either to specialised appellate tribunals or directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing High Courts altogether. While this may appear efficient in theory, it places an additional burden on the Supreme Court and limits the development of a robust intermediate appellate jurisprudence. High Courts, by contrast, have traditionally served as crucial forums for refining legal principles and ensuring consistency in the application of law across jurisdictions. The marginalisation of High Courts in this process risks weakening the overall quality and coherence of judicial decision-making.27
Furthermore, the practical functioning of tribunals often necessitates continued intervention by High Courts, thereby undermining the very rationale for their creation. Frequent challenges to tribunal decisions, procedural irregularities, and questions of jurisdiction have led to an increase in writ petitions before High Courts. This phenomenon suggests that tribunalisation has not eliminated the role of High Courts but has instead added an additional layer to the adjudicatory process. As a result, rather than reducing judicial burden, tribunals may inadvertently contribute to duplication and delay.28
The cumulative effect of these developments is a gradual dilution of the institutional role of High Courts within the constitutional framework. While their formal powers of judicial review remain intact, their practical authority is often constrained by the structural design of tribunal systems. The diversion of cases, fragmentation of jurisdiction, and altered appellate pathways collectively diminish the centrality of High Courts as primary forums for constitutional adjudication.
This section demonstrates that tribunalisation has not merely redistributed adjudicatory functions but has also reshaped the dynamics of judicial review in India. The challenge lies in ensuring that tribunals function as effective supplementary bodies without undermining the constitutional position of High Courts. Unless this balance is carefully maintained, the expansion of tribunal jurisdiction risks eroding one of the most critical safeguards of constitutional governance—the supervisory and corrective role of the High Courts.
CONCLUSION: EFFICIENCY, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF TRIBUNALISATION
The evolution of tribunalisation in India reflects an ongoing attempt to reconcile the demands of administrative efficiency with the constitutional commitment to judicial independence and the rule of law. Conceived as specialised forums to deliver expeditious and expert adjudication, tribunals were expected to reduce the burden on constitutional courts and enhance access to justice. However, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, the practical functioning of tribunals has fallen short of these expectations. Persistent issues such as delays, vacancies, infrastructural deficiencies, and procedural inconsistencies have undermined their effectiveness, raising serious doubts about whether the objective of efficiency has been meaningfully achieved.29
At the same time, tribunalisation has generated deeper constitutional concerns relating to the dilution of judicial power. The transfer of significant adjudicatory functions away from High Courts, coupled with executive control over appointments, tenure, and administration, has altered the balance of power within the constitutional framework. Judicial decisions have repeatedly emphasised that tribunals must conform to standards of independence and cannot function as substitutes for constitutional courts in a manner that undermines judicial review. Yet, recurring legislative attempts to retain executive influence suggest that this balance remains unsettled.30 The result is a system in which tribunals operate in a constitutionally contested space, neither fully independent nor entirely effective.
The continued reliance on High Courts for supervisory review further highlights the structural limitations of the tribunal system. Rather than replacing or significantly relieving the burden on constitutional courts, tribunals have often added an additional layer to the adjudicatory process. Frequent challenges to tribunal decisions and procedural irregularities have led to increased litigation before High Courts, thereby undermining the claim that tribunalisation enhances efficiency. This duplication of processes not only affects judicial economy but also imposes additional costs and uncertainty on litigants.31
From a constitutional perspective, the central issue is not the legitimacy of specialised adjudication per se, but the manner in which it is institutionalised. The doctrine of basic structure imposes clear limits on the extent to which judicial functions can be transferred away from constitutional courts. Any system that compromises the independence, coherence, or supervisory role of the judiciary risks undermining the foundational principles of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has consistently held, judicial review and the independence of adjudicatory bodies are essential features that cannot be diluted in the pursuit of administrative convenience.32
Accordingly, the future of tribunalisation in India must be guided by a renewed emphasis on constitutionalism. Structural reforms are necessary to address the deficiencies identified in this paper. These include the establishment of an independent tribunal commission to oversee appointments and administration, the introduction of greater security of tenure for members, the reduction of executive control, and the strengthening of High Court supervision. Such measures would help align the functioning of tribunals with constitutional principles while preserving their intended role as specialised adjudicatory bodies.
In conclusion, tribunalisation in its current form presents a paradox. While it seeks to promote efficiency and access to justice, it has often failed to deliver these outcomes and, in the process, has raised serious concerns about the dilution of judicial power. The challenge lies not in abandoning tribunals, but in reforming them to ensure that efficiency does not come at the cost of constitutional integrity. Only by restoring the balance between administrative necessity and judicial independence can the tribunal system fulfil its intended purpose within India’s constitutional framework.
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Footnotes
1. HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, OUP 2014) 4–9; MP Jain, Indian Administrative Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 1–10; AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 188–205.
2. Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, ss 14, 28; Constitution of India, arts 226, 227, 323A, 323B.
3. S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 124; see also J.B. Chopra v Union of India (1987) Supp SCC 422.
4. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261; see also Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625.
5. Union of India v R Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1; Madras Bar Association v Union of India (2010) 11 SCC 1; Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.
6. Finance Act 2017; Law Commission of India, Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India (Report No 272, 2017); Ministry of Law and Justice, Tribunal Reforms Ordinance 2021.
7. S De Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 115–120; Nick Robinson, ‘Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court’ (2015) 8 Wash U Global Studies L Rev 1; Arun K Thiruvengadam, ‘Tribunalisation of Justice in India’ (2010) 2 NUJS Law Review 1.
8. Constitution of India, arts 323A, 323B; MP Jain, Indian Administrative Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 2125–2135.
9. HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, OUP 2014) 769–772; Law Commission of India, Laws Relating to Tribunals (Report No 162, 1998).
10. Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, ss 14, 28; see also s 15 (State Administrative Tribunals).
11. S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 124; see also J.B. Chopra v Union of India (1987) Supp SCC 422.
12. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261; Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225.
13. Union of India v R Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1; see also Union of India v Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1.
14. Madras Bar Association v Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1; Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1; Union of India v Madras Bar Association (2021) 7 SCC 369.
15. HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, OUP 2014) 772–776; MP Jain, Indian Administrative Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 2140–2148.
16. Union of India v R Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1; see also Union of India v Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1.
17. Madras Bar Association v Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1; see also Madras Bar Association v Union of India (2010) 11 SCC 1.
18. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1; Finance Act 2017.
19. Union of India v Madras Bar Association (2021) 7 SCC 369; Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.
20. Law Commission of India, Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India (Report No 272, 2017); Law Commission of India, Laws Relating to Tribunals (Report No 162, 1998); Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, Report on Tribunal Reforms (2015).
21. Union of India v R Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1; Arun K Thiruvengadam, ‘Tribunalisation of Justice in India’ (2010) 2 NUJS Law Review 1.
22. Constitution of India, arts 226, 227; Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th edn, OUP 2014) 601–605.
23. Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, s 28; MP Jain, Indian Administrative Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 2150–2155.
24. State of Gujarat v Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association (2012) 10 SCC 353.
25. Rajeev Kumar v Hemraj Singh Chauhan (2010) 4 SCC 554.
26. S De Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 121–125; Nick Robinson, ‘Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court’ (2015) 8 Wash U Global Studies L Rev 1.
27. Union of India v Major General Shri Kant Sharma (2015) 6 SCC 773; Arun K Thiruvengadam, ‘Tribunalisation of Justice in India’ (2010) 2 NUJS Law Review 1.
28. Law Commission of India, Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India (Report No 272, 2017); V Sudhish Pai, Constitutional Supremacy: A Revisit (LexisNexis 2019) 145–150.
29. Law Commission of India, Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India (Report No 272, 2017); MP Jain, Indian Administrative Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 2155–2165.
30. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1; Union of India v Madras Bar Association (2021) 7 SCC 369.
31. Union of India v Major General Shri Kant Sharma (2015) 6 SCC 773; V Sudhish Pai, Constitutional Supremacy: A Revisit (LexisNexis 2019) 150–155.
32. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; Upendra Baxi, ‘The Indian Supreme Court and Politics’ (1980) 8 Eastern Book Co 1; S De Smith, H Woolf and J Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 125–130.