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Research Paper Volume 9 Issue 1 2378 - 2389 March 23, 2026

Tribunalisation and the Dilution of Judicial Power in India: Constitutional Tensions, Institutional Realities, and the Quest for Independence

Lead author · Corresponding
Ryan Bang
Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, M.P., India
Co-author
Aviral Singhai
Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, M.P., India
Co-author
Padmapriya Pradhan
Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, M.P., India
Co-author
Shubham Sharma
Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, M.P., India
View PDF Full text DOIhttps://doij.org/10.10000/IJLMH.1111536
Abstract

The increasing reliance on tribunals as specialised adjudicatory bodies marks a significant shift in the landscape of administrative justice in India. Conceived as mechanisms to ensure efficiency, expertise, and expeditious dispute resolution, tribunals were constitutionally entrenched through the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution of India, which enabled the creation of alternative institutional forums for adjudication. Over time, however, this process of tribunalisation has raised important constitutional concerns, particularly regarding its impact on the structure and distribution of judicial power within the Indian legal system. This paper examines whether the expansion of tribunal jurisdiction has led to a dilution of judicial power, especially that of the High Courts. It analyses the constitutional framework governing tribunals alongside key judicial decisions such as S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India and L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India, which reflect the judiciary’s evolving approach to tribunalisation. While tribunals were initially accepted as effective substitutes for courts, subsequent jurisprudence has reaffirmed the centrality of judicial review as part of the Constitution’s basic structure, thereby limiting the extent to which judicial functions can be transferred away from constitutional courts. The paper argues that although tribunalisation was intended to enhance access to justice and reduce delays, its implementation has exposed structural and functional deficiencies, including executive control over appointments, lack of independence, and fragmentation of adjudicatory processes. Legislative developments such as the Finance Act, 2017 have further intensified these concerns. It concludes that in its present form, tribunalisation risks undermining judicial authority and calls for institutional reforms to ensure that tribunals operate in alignment with constitutional principles of independence, accountability, and effective judicial oversight.

Type
Research Paper
Information
International Journal of Law Management and Humanities, Volume 9, Issue 1, Page 2378 - 2389
DOI: https://doij.org/10.10000/IJLMH.1111536
Creative Commons
CC BY-NC 4.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits remixing, adapting, and building upon the work for non-commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Copyright © IJLMH 2026
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The views and opinions expressed in this manuscript are those of the author(s) alone and do not reflect the views, policies, or position of the Journal.

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