Abstract

The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the primary objective of maintaining international peace and security. However, eight decades later, the organization finds itself increasingly unable to fulfil its foundational mandate. This research critically examines the structural, legal, and political limitations that have contributed to the UN’s recurrent failure in responding to major conflicts and humanitarian crises. Beginning with the historical context of its formation and the legacy of the League of Nations, the paper analyses key successes of UN peacebuilding missions in Cambodia, Namibia, and El Salvador, followed by an extensive evaluation of institutional failures in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Syria, Ukraine, Palestine, and Myanmar. Through a doctrinal and comparative study of regional models such as the European Union and the African Union, the research highlights alternative frameworks of governance that have emerged in response to UN paralysis. The research additionally evaluates the structural bottlenecks of the UN, including, (a) veto diplomacy, (b) lack of enforcement capacity, (c) political selectivity, and (d) financial dependency, and examines contemporary reform proposals such as Security Council expansion, veto regulation, legal accountability frameworks, and reform of funding streams. It then analyses India's status as a leading promoter of "reformed multilateralism," as an illustrative Global South perspective on changing the structure of institutional arrangement. It concludes that while the UN is necessary as a universal platform for legitimacy, it will only sustain its credibility through meaningful structural, functional, and normative reform, else, it runs the risk to be become symbolic and scriptural rather than the functional guardian of international peace.

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