INTRODUCTION
Saranda forests in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand are among Asia’s most substantial Sal forest area; they represent a wildlife corridor providing an ecological link among forest ecosystems in Jharkhand, Odisha and Chhattisgarh. While the natural resource value of the Saranda area far exceeds that of the potential minerals available, it is this mineral wealth which has drawn intense mining for over 50 years and therefore has created considerable conflict between the need to protect Saranda as a wildlife sanctuary and the competing interest of the mining industries. As such, Saranda has been at the center of numerous legal and political disputes since the early days of Indian independence. In In Re: Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary1, the Supreme Court of India considered why the State of Jharkhand failed to officially designate a wildlife sanctuary in Saranda when in 1968 the then Bihar State Government had formally designated it as a wildlife sanctuary. Over fifty years have passed since Saranda was declared to be of ecological importance and yet the State governments’ inaction in the intervening time has left Saranda in limbo not protected under the Wildlife Protection Act, 19722(Herein after WPA), and subject to increasing encroachment by mining activities. Additionally, the case dealt with the rights of the Scheduled Tribes (primarily the Ho, Munda and Oraon tribes) who have legally recognized rights to manage and control the use of forest lands in which they reside under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 20063(Herein after FRA). The author will argue that the Saranda decision is a landmark decision for several reasons. Firstly, it interprets Article 48A4 of the Constitution of India as requiring states to act affirmatively to protect the environment and as such, to create enforceable obligations to do so and not simply to set out aspirational environmental policies. Secondly, the decision sets forth a method by which conservation of wildlife may be carried out in conjunction with the recognition of rights to live and manage the use of forest land by Scheduled Tribes under the FRA, without either conflicting or being mutually exclusive. Thirdly, the decision reflects the growing frustration of the judiciary with what it views to be an unacceptable delay on the part of the executive branch of the government to protect the environment particularly when there is scientific evidence demonstrating that the area in question is an environmentally sensitive ecosystem.
At the same time, however the decision leaves unresolved significant conflicts of interest regarding the balance between the role of the central government in managing and conserving wildlife resources, the right of Scheduled Tribes to govern themselves as provided for in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India and the ability of local governments to regulate mining activities in sensitive areas adjacent to the national park. Therefore, this analysis will examine the decisions’ theoretical contributions as well as their practical implications within India’s complex system of laws and governance.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The State Government of Bihar designated 31,468.25 hectares of Saranda Forest, which included 126 sections, as a game sanctuary in 1968 under then applicable state law. The WPA, passed by Parliament, provided in Section 66(4) that all existing sanctuaries would be given the same protections afforded under the new national law.5 At the time Jharkhand was created as a separate state in 2000, it became responsible for formally notifying Saranda as a Sanctuary, per the provisions of Section 26A of the WPA.6 In an unfortunate coincidence of timing, Jharkhand took no action over the course of twenty five years; during those twenty five years the lack of action put Saranda in an uncertain situation; while it was nominally protected based upon the state’s designation of the area as a Sanctuary, it lacked the formal designation and therefore, the necessary managerial structures and enforcement mechanisms required of a formally notified Sanctuary.
The Eastern Zone Bench of National Green Tribunal issued a directive to the State of Jharkhand to formally declare the Saranda Reserve Forest as a wildlife sanctuary on 12th July 2022 after R.K. Singh, a wildlife scientist, brought an application to the NGT on the basis of research carried out by the Wildlife Institute of India.7 The State of Jharkhand did not take action on the directive and thus, the case was referred to the Supreme Court under the ongoing T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India8 forest conservation case.
Jharkhand’s position changed many times prior to the Supreme Court. In December 2024, Jharkhand accepted to establish approximately 575 square km of the reserve as a sanctuary based upon conservation guidelines provided by the Wildlife Institute of India. However, within weeks Jharkhand reversed its position stating that the area calculation of 575 square km was incorrect and that only the original 31,468.25 hectares were to be protected. In October 2025, Jharkhand again altered its position requesting that the area of the sanctuary be reduced from 31,468.25 hectares to 24,941.64 hectares citing that there are tribal villages, schools, hospitals and steel mining operations of the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) located within the sanctuary.
Although Jharkhand acknowledged in the hearing process that virtually all of the 126 original compartments have no active mining operations occurring therein, they claimed that the mining operations would be negatively impacted if the sanctuary area were to be maintained at its current size.
As of the October 2025 hearing process, the Court voiced significant displeasure with Jharkhand’s constantly changing positions. Chief Justice B.R. Gavai described Jharkhand’s behavior as “wholly unfair,” and cautioned that the Chief Secretary of Jharkhand could be found in contempt of court due to his persistent failure to abide by the directives of the Court. Senior Advocate K. Parameshwar, who was appointed by the Court as amicus curiae, forcefully articulated the position that the area of the sanctuary should remain unchanged and emphasized that mining within reserved forests is illegal. SAIL requested that the non active mining leases be excluded from the boundaries of the sanctuary and that the representative of the tribes stated that the establishment of a sanctuary would result in the loss of their historical rights to use the land for grazing and for access to forest products and water. The Court reserved judgment until 27th October 2025; the Court subsequently handed down its decision on 13th November 2025.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. Articles 48A and 51A(g): From Aspirational Duties to Enforceable Norms
The Saranda decision is based on the constitutional basis of Articles 48A9 and 51A(g)10. Both of these articles were included by way of the Constitution (forty second amendment) Act 197611. Article 48A directs that the “State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country.12” Article 51A(g) similarly obligates each citizen to “protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life and to have compassion for living creatures.13“
Even though Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties are technically non justiciable as such, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that they are used by the court as interpretive aids in the process of constitutional adjudication. The Court noted this relationship in the case of State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas14, when it noted that the directive principles are fundamental in governing the country and therefore cannot be treated as just pious declarations. In addition to being a critical tool in the implementation of the right to life under article 21, environmental protection has become one of the most frequently judicially enforced directive principles.
In the Saranda case, the Court made an important jurisprudential advance by explicitly establishing the doctrine that Article 48A imposes a positive duty on the state to identify and provide legal protections to areas of ecological significance. In other words, instead of treating the provisions as merely desirable or inspirational, the Court established the principle that after a scientifically established determination of ecological significance, the state may not continue to delay providing statutory protections ad infinitum. As such, the Court provided a mechanism for holding states accountable for their failure to act in accordance with constitutional requirements, and thus strengthened the enforceability of environmental obligations and limited the ability of states to act in contravention of constitutional requirements. The position of court represents a paradigmatic shift; the court no longer views environmental protection as simply a matter of governmental policy choice but rather as a matter of constitutional commitment that binds successive governments. This was particularly relevant in the Saranda case as the court found that nearly fifty years passed between the issuance of the 1968 notification and the court’s enforcement of those rights in 2025.
B. Article 21 and the Right to a Healthy Environment
Article 21, which states “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law,” has long been recognized as the key provision of the Constitution from which environmental law in India is derived.15 In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India16, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 21 to include all aspects of human dignity; it did so broadly enough to allow environmental quality to be included as a necessary element of dignified living.
The first time that environmental quality was explicitly incorporated into the right to life came in the case of Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh17; in that case the Supreme Court required the closure of illegal limestone quarry operations in the Dehradun Mussoorie area to protect against ecological damage. The court determined that when the fundamental rights of life and health are at stake, ecological preservation must take precedence over profit driven commercial interests. This principle was reaffirmed in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India18; in that case, the Supreme Court stated that environmental protection falls within the purview of Article 21 and established the doctrine of absolute liability for those who engage in hazardous activities. The Supreme Court consistently reaffirmed the idea that Article 21 includes the right to live in a clean and safe environment in later decisions regarding air pollution, water pollution and noise pollution.
In Saranda, the Supreme Court drew upon this precedent without directly stating it; the Court protected a large, unbroken forest system based on its connection to human welfare, ecological integrity and sustainability across generations. By doing so the Court aligned the protection of forests with the constitutional duty to protect the right to life, deeming environmental damage a deprivation of the most fundamental of constitutional rights.
C. Public Trust Doctrine and State Trusteeship of Natural Resources
A second crucial constitutional principle reflected in the Saranda judgment is the Public Trust Doctrine. The Public Trust Doctrine is a theory developed from Roman Law and later adopted in Common Law Jurisprudence, that certain natural resources (rivers, forests, beaches, water) are held by the state in trust for the benefit of the public and cannot be used to create private property rights in those natural resources nor can they be used for private profit. In M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath19the Supreme Court interpretated the Constitution of India in such a way that Public Trust Doctrine found its place in the constitution when it prohibited the diversion of river resources for private commercial use. In Fomento Resorts & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Minguel Martins20 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that environmental resources were to be used for public enjoyment and ecological balance rather than for private commercial gain.
In Saranda case the Supreme Court stated clearly that the State’s pursuit of immediate economic gain from mining was secondary to the preservation of ecological integrity. As such, the Court found that the fiduciary obligation of the State regarding its management of forests precluded reliance upon executive discretion favouring the interests of mining and extractive industries, as well as other forms of administrative convenience, lobbying by interested parties or political influence. The Supreme Court has thereby established that after an area is identified as having special ecological significance, it will be considered part of the public trust for environmental purposes and the public trust may not be diminished through the actions of government officials acting in their own self interest or favouring specific industry interests.
D. Positive Constitutional Obligations and Judicial Enforcement
Traditionally, Fundamental Rights related Litigation in India has primarily addressed negative rights such as Protection from the State’s Interference; whereas environmental protections require Positive State Action like identification of ecological sensitive areas, statutory notification of protected zones, allocation of conservation resources and establishment of effective enforcement machinery. The Saranda decision is important because it explicitly holds that Article 48A read together with Article 21, imposes a justiciable positive duty upon the State. The Court also held that the State has both constitutional and statutory duty to complete the sanctuary notification process and cannot permanently postpone its actions through administrative delay. The above rationale follows prior decisions such as Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand21, wherein the Court instructed a Municipality to Take Positive Action to Abate Public Nuisance regardless of Financial Constraints, Holding that Lack of Funds could not be an Excuse to Avoid Statutory Duties Concerning Health and Environment. Similarly, Saranda Extends this Logic to Forest Governance, Establishing that Once Environmental Harm or Ecological Significance are Demonstrated, Constitutional Obligations become Enforceable Judicial Directions. Nevertheless, the Court Also Exercised Institutional Restraint; although the Court Established a Timeline for Notification, the Court Did Not Itself Delineate Micro Boundaries nor Assume Day to Day Management Functions, Reflecting a Mature Understanding of Judicial-Executive Balance.
STATUTORY INTERPLAY: THE WPA AND FRA
A. The WPA, 197222 Framework
The main legislation of India governing protection of wild animals, birds, plants and their habitats is the WPA, 197223. The WPA contains a regulatory scheme for creating and managing wildlife sanctuaries which is mentioned within Chapter IV of the Act. Under the Act, states can notify the public of an intention to establish a wildlife sanctuary pursuant to Section 1824. Notification under Section 18 commences a formalized process of resolving rights issues with respect to the land proposed to be used as a sanctuary as described by Sections 19 through 25. Once all of these rights issues are resolved, the state shall formally declare the area a sanctuary pursuant to Section 26A25. The use of the word “shall” in Section 26A establishes that declaration of a wildlife sanctuary is required once the preliminary requirements of Section 18 have been fulfilled.
The Supreme Court in the Saranda case established that the 1968 Bihar notification constituted a Section 18 notification of the WPA, based on the fact that, pursuant to Section 66(4)26, all previously created sanctuaries were deemed to have been created pursuant to the 1972 Act. As such, the Court found that Jharkhand was merely fulfilling a long delayed requirement of Section 26A27 and did not make a present day determination as to whether or not to create a wildlife sanctuary. This decision was important in that it defeated the state’s position that establishing a wildlife sanctuary is a matter of present day policy choice and not a continuing legal obligation resulting from the succession of the State from the original Constitution.
B. The FRA, 2006: A Rights Based Legal Framework
The FRA, 200628 was passed to rectify historical injustices to forest dwelling communities who were forced out of their homes or criminalized through colonial and post colonial forest legislation; unlike the WPA which focused on conservation of wildlife, the FRA is primarily based on recognition of rights to land and natural resources. Under section 329 of the FRA, there are a variety of rights recognized including individual rights to grow crops on the forest land they have been using for subsistence, communal rights to collect non timber forest products (ownership), rights to graze livestock and other forms of traditional use, rights of particularly vulnerable tribal groups to maintain habitats, and communal rights to preserve and manage community forests. Additionally, under section 430, these rights are inheritable but cannot be sold or transferred, whereas under section 531, Gram Sabhas can take action to protect wildlife, biodiversity and community forest resources creating a linkage between rights and responsibility for the management of the environment.
Therefore, the FRA represents a fundamentally new legal paradigm for treating forest dwelling communities as legal right holders and possible stewards of the environment as opposed to seeing them as encroachers or recipients of government benevolence. The fundamentally different legislative philosophies of the two pieces of legislation created an apparent contradiction that Saranda has to reconcile.
C. Harmonious Construction through Section 24(2)(c)
In its submission to the Supreme Court of India, Jharkhand argued that establishing a sanctuary would by necessity prohibit the practice of forest rights as outlined in the FRA. The state’s argument assumed that sanctuaries will inevitably lead to the displacement of people, prohibition of access to an area or criminalizing the human presence within those areas; these assumptions have been found to lack support from the statutory language of the WPA or from modern conservation science.
However, the Court found a way to reconcile what appeared to be a contradiction through the well established principle of “harmonious construction,” a basic principle of statutory interpretation which requires that when two statutes are being applied in the same field they should be interpreted so as to allow both to operate rather than allow one statute to negate another. The Court determined that Section 24(2)(c)32 of the WPA was the critical link that connected conservation efforts with rights protection. Section 24(2)(c)33 of the WPA specifically allows land on which rights are claimed to remain within the boundaries of a designated sanctuary if the land is not being used in a manner that could be considered detrimental to the objectives of the sanctuary.
Through the application of Section 24(2)(c) of the WPA in conjunction with Sections 3 and 4 of the FRA, the Court ruled that declaring an area a sanctuary does not inherently result in the extinguishment of all rights that can be claimed under the FRA. As long as the assertion of rights does not cause demonstrable harm to the goals of conservation, all rights recognized under the FRA continue to exist. The Court’s ruling created a new regulatory balance where both conservation and customary uses may coexist under constitutional oversight without the extreme legal stance of deeming wildlife protection and tribal rights as mutually exclusive. The ruling of court demonstrated a creative attempt at designing institutions providing space for both the mandates of conservation and rights recognition within a single legal framework.
D. Rejection of the State’s Displacement Narrative
The Government of Jharkhand consistently represented to the Court that the act of issuing a sanctuary notification would require the destruction of tribal homes, schools and medical facilities and would cause the total displacement of all the people living in the tribal villages. The Supreme Court completely repudiated this representation with what was described as “unusually forceful language” when it characterized it as “a figment of the imagination of the State.” The characterization of the State’s representations by the Court, therefore, is reflective of institutional distrust of the State’s administrative narrative. The Court found two important things: (1) neither the WPA nor the FRA has any statutory requirement that requires the displacement of individuals or communities merely because the government declares a sanctuary; and (2) the state breached its obligation to provide the public with education on the rights of the communities that live in the forests as they are entitled to protection pursuant to the provisions of the FRA.
Rather than viewing the State as protecting the rights of tribal peoples, the court impliedly viewed the State as providing misinformation and administrative manipulation to the tribal peoples. Of greater significance, however, the Court ordered the State to informally notify the people who live in the forests of the State’s judgment so that they can be assured that their individual and community rights will remain unaltered. Therefore, the judgment was transformed from a passive determination to an active governmental directive that requires the State to correct the errors that the State previously misrepresented to the people who live in the forests.
E. Doctrinal Significance
Saranda’s ruling is a very clear judicial affirmation that the FRA is not legally inferior to the WPA; that conservation law cannot be used as a means to carry out evictions or dispossessions indirectly; and that environmental protection should take place by rights based governance methods. It is also in line with the previous landmark case Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests34, which held that Gram Sabha approval will be constitutional in order to divert forests in Scheduled Areas. The Saranda ruling extends the rights protective approach previously established in forest diversion cases under the Forest (Conservation) Act, to include the right of approval in the establishment of protected areas under the WPA, providing a major extension of rights conscious environmental jurisprudence to wildlife law.
MINING REGULATION AND BUFFER ZONES
A. The SAIL Mining Question and Developmental Accommodation
While mining interests were the largest and most economically influential groups opposing the full implementation of sanctuary status, Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL), a large state owned entity, contended that continued access to iron ore resources in the region would have significant implications on national industrial capacity and therefore the economy. At the time of litigation several mining leases had been granted to SAIL; however some had not yet commenced operations.
Rather than impose a complete ban on mining activities in the area, the Supreme Court of India chose to adopt a policy of managed accommodation for the Saranda area. Specifically, while the Court directed the creation of the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary through notification of approximately 31,468.25 hectares, it also permitted the exclusion of six specific compartments (KP-2, KP-10, KP-11, KP-12, KP-13 and KP-14) of land from the designated sanctuary area to allow mining activities to occur. In doing so, the court demonstrated its commitment to the principle of sustainable development, that environmental protection and economic development need not be mutually exclusive objectives to be pursued, but can be pursued through reasonable and proportionate regulatory approaches.
In doing so, the Court simultaneously made clear that the accommodation being offered would represent the maximum permissible level of extractive activity within the Saranda landscape. Consequently, no further diminishment of the sanctuary’s boundaries could be permitted. Thus, the Saranda decision established a significant legal precedent regarding the relationship between developmental necessity and the degradation or reduction of ecologically defined protected areas. The Court reiterated an existing Supreme Court of India doctrine articulated in N.D. Jayal v. Union of India35, that development projects can only proceed where there has been a determination that environmental risks associated with such projects can be effectively managed and socially justified. In Saranda, the Court fixed a geographically limited zone of extraction and protected the ecological core of the Saranda area from further encroachment.
B. The One Kilometer Mining Prohibition Around Protected Areas
The most impactful element of the Saranda decision relates to the expansion of the prohibition on mining with in one km of National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries throughout India. As stated by the Court: “Mining within National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries and within an area of One Kilometre from the boundary of such Protected Areas shall not be permissible.”
Earlier, the Court had also used judicial intervention to create a buffer zone around mines in Goan Mining Litigation; particularly in Goa Foundation v. Union of India36 as part of efforts to prevent widespread ecological damage resulting from unregulated mining. With the Saranda decision, the court took the regional specific judicial trial of a buffer zone in mining and turned it into a nationally applicable environmental standard in India.
From a scientific perspective, the rationale behind buffer zones in ecology is well established; buffer zones provide wildlife corridors, reduce edge effect on the environment, allow animals to migrate during seasons, decrease human animal conflicts and protect the hydrologic integrity of forested watershed systems. However, the Court did not clearly articulate if the prohibition would be applied retroactively to existing mining operations or only prospectively to new mining permits, causing regulatory confusion among current lessees, state governments which manage natural resource minerals and local communities that have jobs related to mining.
C. Sustainable Development and Precautionary Principles
The Saranda Judgment clearly incorporates three fundamental environmental principles. The first is the Principle of Sustainable Development (the balance between the pursuit of development and the protection of the environment). The second is the Precautionary Principle (to act to prevent an environmental hazard even if there is no absolute certainty of a causal relationship between the activity causing the risk and the environmental hazard). And the third is the Principle of Intergenerational Equity (the preservation of natural resources and the environment for the benefit of future generations). The Saranda decision does not explicitly state or apply these three fundamental environmental principles by name. However, the doctrinal structure of the decision clearly demonstrates the application of each of them.
The Court did not require absolute scientific certainty regarding the potential for environmental degradation as a result of further mining activities. Rather, the Court found that sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate the vulnerability of the ecosystem to such degradation, combined with clear evidence of governance failure, was sufficient to warrant the imposition of very protective regulations to prevent such damage. The actions of the court are consistent with another landmark case, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India37. In that case, the Court used caution in making decisions relative to relocating industries to prevent damage to the Taj Mahal, which resulted in the use of caution rather than definitive proof of causation in those decisions. Thus, Saranda reaffirms that in forest ecosystems which have been identified as having high levels of ecological sensitivity, regulatory doubt will always be resolved in favor of protecting the ecosystem, rather than exploiting it.
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS
A. Administrative Compliance and Timeline Enforcement
The directive of Supreme Court of India in the Saranda Judgment that the State of Jharkhand shall issue the final Sanctuary Notification within three months from the date of this Judgment represents an explicit temporal mandate and represents a new paradigm in Indian environmental governance that shifts from advisory environmental adjudication to compliance based judicial oversight.
However, as seen in extensive history of environmental governance of India, there is no automatic relationship between judicial mandates and actual implementation. In the case of the long running T.N. Godavarman litigation, the Supreme Court has been required to continue issuing mandamus directives and receiving status reports from experts and monitoring committees on a regular basis due to consistent non compliance by the executive branch.
Notification of a Sanctuary does not represent merely an exercise in the Gazette; it represents demarcating boundaries at ground level, deploying sufficient forest and wildlife protection personnel preparing a comprehensive sanctuary management plan, allocating funds for implementation and coordinating with district and tribal welfare authorities. Therefore without continued judicial oversight, the risk of Symbolic Compliance remains high; i.e., a formal Sanctuary Notification issued but then diluted through bureaucratic inaction and ultimately failed enforcement.
B. Sanctuary Governance in Fifth Schedule Areas
The majority of the Saranda forest is located in Fifth Schedule area under the Constitution. This requires that the government protect the social, economic and cultural interest of Scheduled Tribes. In addition, PESA provisions provides full authority to gram sabhas in managing natural resources in these types of areas; including control over the minor forest products, prevention of land alienation and local development planning.
However, the wildlife governance in India has been a technocratic system and has been very centralized. Most of the decisions have been made by State Forest Department and wildlife bureaucrats with few or no representation from tribes. Typically the sanctuary management committee is formed without local community input. The Saranda Judgment has reaffirmed that forest rights continue to be valid, however it does not require that there be institutional input from Gram Sabhas in the sanctuary governance structure. Therefore, without giving local communities formal decision making capacity, who have both statutory rights under the FRA and constitutional rights under the Fifth Schedule, the coexist model supported by Saranda may revert back to administrative paternalism; in which right exist formally on paper but the state agency can enforce conservation priority unilaterally.
C. Forest Rights Implementation Within Sanctuaries
While it is clear that the Court has ruled that forest rights remain intact after a sanctuary notification has been issued; there is an unevenness across all states of India for the implementation of the FRA. There are numerous empirical studies and governmental audits that demonstrate how bureaucratic officials can reject individual forest rights applications; that there are relatively few communities who have had their community forest rights recognized, with many more entitled to do so; and that wildlife authorities have treated the FRA as being secondary, hindering or irrelevant to their conservation objectives. The Saranda judgment does not address the operational conflict between the Forest Rights Committee (FRC) established under the FRA, the Gram Sabha empowered under PESA, and the State Forest Department responsible for managing sanctuaries in each State. For legal co existence as pronounced in court judgments to also occur through institutional coexistence on the ground, this currently remains both weak and highly contested.
D. Judicialization of Environmental Administration
The Saranda decision also extends an even greater trend toward the judicialization of environmental regulation of India. In this area of law, as with many other areas, courts in India are increasingly acting as environmental regulators de facto. The development of judicialization of environmental regulation is occurring at a time when the ability of regulatory authorities to enforce regulations is poor; many regulatory authorities have been captured by development interests; pollution control boards in states are heavily dependent upon politics; and there are a number of different regulatory authorities involved in governing forests.
In circumstances of institutional failure, it may be appropriate or necessary for courts to intervene in matters concerning the environment, however, as a result of the progressive extension of judicial authority into this area of law, there are both constitutional and practical implications arising from such interventions. Specifically the judiciary does not possess the same level of ecological field capacity, long-term monitoring capability, scientific expertise to support adaptive management strategies, or the democratic accountability mechanisms possessed by administrative agencies (i.e., those mechanisms which permit administrative agencies to be held accountable through democratic means).
Thus, the Saranda case presents a structural paradox. Judicial control is required by the Constitution as a last resort to remedy failures on the part of executive branch institutions to perform statutorily mandated duties; yet the continued application of judicial authority in such situations raises significant normative concerns within a separation of powers framework designed to promote democratic administration.
CONCLUSION
In the case of In Re: Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, the Supreme Court of India issued an important constitutional obligation regarding environmental protection. While the ruling dealt with a late statutory notification from 1968, the court effectively identified a much larger pattern of inaction from government agencies, political indecision and regulatory capture that undermines environmental protection in many of India’s richly natural resources filled forested regions.
The Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary ruling made three important foundational judicial rulings. First, the ruling recognized that Article 48A created an enforceable environmental duty rather than simply providing a non enforceable policy guideline. When scientific study establishes the environmental value of an area, the state cannot delay the provision of legal protection through inaction. Second, the ruling was significant because it reconciled the WPA, 1972 with the FRA, 2006 through section 24(2)(c) of the WPA. This ruling represents a critical rights based recasting of the laws relating to wildlife conservation and clearly rejects models of exclusivity where tribal rights and environmental protection are mutually exclusive. Finally, the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary ruling limited the ability to expand extractive activities by protecting the ecological core of Saranda and reaffirmed the one kilometer mining prohibition around protected areas as a consistent national standard.
While the ruling clearly articulated the need for greater cooperation between central Forest Department officials, constitutionally empowered Gram Sabhas and local administrators; the ruling did not develop specific governance structures or mechanisms for meaningful tribal participation in the management of sanctuaries. Furthermore, the ruling failed to articulate frameworks for transitioning workers out of mining industries, for diversifying livelihoods in mining impacted areas, and for rehabilitating economically displaced people in mining impacted areas. Therefore, the limitations of using litigation driven environmental regulation to require environmental protection and to prevent long term social and economic harm were exposed.
Therefore, the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary ruling is best understood as a corrective action in a deeply fractured governance system. It attempts to reconcile the need for environmental protection, the right to tribal justice and the need for development in a manner that is constitutionally enforceable. Whether or not Saranda will become a model for environmental conservation with justice is not dependent on the sophistication of judicial reasoning but instead depends on the quality of environmental governance at the ground level including: the enforcement capacity of environmental regulators, independent monitoring, financial commitment to environmental protection, protections for frontline forest workers, and effective prosecution of environmental offenses. The Court has defined constitutional obligation, provided relief from long term delay, harmonized statutory rights and limited the extent of extractive exploitation. What now remains is the significantly more difficult task of translating judicial principle into effective environmental governance for both the forest and the community that relies on it.
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Footnotes
1. In Re: Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 INSC 1311 (India).
2. The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, No. 53, Acts of Parliament, 1972 (India).
3. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
4. INDIA CONST. art. 48A.
5. WPA § 66(4).
6. WPA § 26A.
7. R.K. Singh v. State of Jharkhand, O.A. No. 59/2020/EZ (Nat’l Green Trib. E.Z. Kolkata July 12, 2022).
8. Dr. Daya Shankar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand, I.A. No. 153500 of 2024 in W.P. (C) No. 202 of 1995 (T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India) (India).
9. INDIA CONST. art. 48A.
10. INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g).
11. Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976 (India).
12. INDIA CONST. art. 48A.
13. INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g).
14. State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 (India).
15. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
16. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India).
17. Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., (1985) 2 SCC 431 (India).
18. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 (India).
19. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 (India).
20. Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins, (2009) 3 SCC 571 (India).
21. Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand, (1980) 4 SCC 162 (India).
22. WPA.
23. Id.
24. WPA §§ 18.
25. WPA § 26A.
26. WPA § 66(4).
27. WPA § 26A.
28. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
29. FRA § 3.
30. FRA § 4.
31. FRA § 5.
32. WPA § 24(2)(c).
33. Id.
34. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment & Forest, (2013) 6 SCC 476 (India).
35. N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362 (India).
36. Goa Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590 (India).
37. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Taj Trapezium), (1997) 2 SCC 353 (India).