Abstract

The doctrine of ‘Rarest of Rare’ in capital sentencing was evolved by the Indian Supreme Court in “Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab” to restrict the imposition of the death penalty and ensure it is awarded only in exceptional circumstances. Intended as a safeguard against arbitrary executions, the doctrine emphasizes a balance between aggravating and mitigating factors, focusing on whether life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. However, its vague formulation and subjective interpretation by courts have led to inconsistent outcomes, undermining constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21. The judiciary has often invoked public sentiment and “collective conscience” as grounds for capital punishment, blurring the lines between legal reasoning and populist justice. Case law analysis reveals disparities in sentencing even for similar offences, reflecting structural and procedural flaws. The absence of a uniform framework, insufficient consideration of reformative potential, and lack of codified sentencing guidelines continue to pose serious challenges. While judicial innovations such as life imprisonment without remission offer alternatives, they too lack legislative support. This research critically evaluates the doctrine’s theoretical foundation, judicial application, and human rights implications, ultimately questioning its suitability and reliability in a constitutional democracy committed to fairness, dignity, and justice.

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