The Crucible of Power: A Political Economy Analysis of Merger Control in India

This paper examines India’s merger control regime through a political economy lens, arguing that it functions not merely as a technocratic mechanism for safeguarding competition but as an instrument embedded within the country’s developmental state. Tracing the evolution of merger regulation from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 to the Competition Act, 2002 and its recent amendments, the paper highlights how legal frameworks have adapted to India’s transition from a protectionist economy to a liberalized market system. It demonstrates that merger review in India is shaped by broader political and economic considerations, including the pursuit of national champions, geopolitical and national security concerns, and pressures arising from labour and distributive justice debates. Through case studies and comparative references to jurisdictions such as the European Union and the United States, the paper illustrates how regulatory outcomes often reflect negotiated settlements between legal principles, industrial policy, and stakeholder pressures. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that merger control in India operates as a mechanism for governing economic power, where competition law simultaneously pursues market efficiency, strategic autonomy, and developmental objectives.