INTRODUCTION
The gig economy has become an important part of the new-age economy in India; it is accelerating innovation, flexibility, and efficiency of digital and platform-based services.1 The Government of India has made huge steps to provide social security and wellbeing to gig and platform workers after realizing that these workers are making large contributions to the economy of the country.2 The introduction of special identity cards, enrolment in the e-Sram portal, and healthcare availability within the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY) are some of the steps, which would be a radical change in the recognition and safety of this workforce. Such initiatives are likely to help almost one crore of workers in the country.3
The gig and platform economy in India has experienced a high growth.4 In the report India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy by NITI Aayog, the labor force in this industry is expected to reach over one crore employees by 2024-25 and 2.35 crore by 2029-30.5 In recognition of this structural change, the Code on Social Security, 2020 (CoSS, 2020) provided, the first, statutory definitions of an aggregator, a gig worker and a platform worker, which has the potential to make them part of the social security system.6
The Union Budget 2025-26, based on this legislative change, will become a milestone as it suggests extensive actions to register online platform workers on the e-Shram portal, provide them an identity card, and cover them by the AB-PMJAY. These steps will be taken with greater resources and institutional back-up to make the social security net stronger and rebrand the willingness of the Government to protect the interests of gig and platform workers.
This study is guided by two central questions, first, what are the working mechanisms of the four new labour codes in improving the social security and general welfare of gig and platform workers in India? And How do the four labour codes to conceptualize and regulate gig and platform work in the changing labour law system in India?
IMAGINING GIG AND PLATFORM WORKERS IN INDIA
The Concurrent List of the Constitution at which labour regulation belongs gives authority to both Parliament and legislatures of states to enact laws. Gig workers are employees who work in a gig economy, which is a temporary or flexible work outside the conventional full-time employment.7
The NITI Aayog Report (2022) includes workers as gig workers who participate in non-traditional employer-employee relationships with two subcategories, which are platform workers and non-platform workers. Online algorithmic matching platforms, such as Amazon or Uber, are used by platform workers to find customers, and non-platform workers work in technology-independent temporary jobs, such as construction and day jobs.8 India has the fifth-largest workforce in the gig economy in the globe, and this is expected to reach third by the year 2030.
Social security code, 2020 proposes the formal definitions. A gig worker refers to an employee not in the old system of employers and employees. A platform worker is equally not a part of this relationship but must have access to organizations or people through online platforms to provide paid services. The Code is also applicable to unorganized workers, i.e. workers in the unorganized sector, not provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or other benefits such as provident fund and gratuity and in this context, self-employed people are included. It requires specific schemes of these categories, but there are still gaps of definition.
Still, an example of an app-based taxi driver: without appointment letters, social security benefits, controlled working hours, or exclusivity (they can change aggregators), he or she does not have a standard employer-employee relationship, which makes him or her a gig worker. Their dependence on an online platform makes them a platform worker, and self-employment makes them match with an unorganized worker. These ambiguities obscure the applicability of the scheme. In considering the 2019 Bill, the Standing Committee on Labour suggested: (i) the inclusion of unorganized workers to be explicit to cover gig and platform workers; (ii) the narrowing down of the gig worker; and (iii) the extension of platform worker to cover the emergent work models. Only the third is employed in the 2020 Code.
Aggregators are central, and schemes are financed through the contributions of central/state, and aggregators are reported in Schedule 7 (e.g. ridesharing, food delivery, e-marketplaces). The contributions are between 1-2 percent of annual turnover but not exceed 5 percent of payments to gig and platform workers. Gig workers are identical to independent contractors: most of them are legally considered to be independent contractors, although not all independent contractors become gig workers.9
APPLICABILITY AND BETTERMENT UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY CODE, 2020
The Code on Social Security, 2020 provides a separate welfare structure to unorganised, gig, and platform workers with separate schemes required, even when the definition overlaps with a taxi driver on an app being covered by all three groups. This mixed structure places them between the normal employment and the mere self-employment, which carries discretionary schemes through government notification, with central/state governments and aggregators, and without giving them the status of employees or the full burden of independent contractors.
A. Institutional Architecture: Boards, registration, schemes.
The Code is composed of National and State Social Security Boards of unorganised workers, gig workers and platform workers. The roles of the National Board are to advise the Central Government on schemes, administration, central scheme oversight, review state level record-keeping and expenditure among other mandated responsibilities. These are reflected at the state level in State Boards.10 The registration through e-Shram (described in Section 113 and Rule 50) is conducted by an electronic registration (using prescribed forms); workers (those who have turned 16 and self-declared) are registered, being assigned unique identifiers; only registered workers can enjoy schemes, and contributions made by the government to them are specified. The Ministry encourages the enrolment of platform workers by making appeals and announcing such special benefits as the insurance of accidents and health coverage via new platform-specific interfaces.11
B. Aggregator Contributes and Social Security Fund.
Section 114 requires aggregators to contribute 1-2% of annual turnover (government notification, limited to 5% of amounts paid/payable to gig/platform workers) to the Social Security Fund, topped up by government and CSR funds. The schedule VII has nine types of aggregators, such as ride-sharing, food/grocery delivery, content/media services, and e-marketplaces.12 This is celebrated by PIB notes and labour ministry factsheets as a radical move towards protecting gig workers. However, the mechanisms of adequacy and enforcement by the quantum are open to question, due to the challenges of size on platforms and compliance.
C. Betterment Interactive: Evaluations, Adequacies, Access.
Betterment occurs in three dimensions. The coverage depends on registration and proper identification of the gig workers in the databases, which are not registered. Adequacy compares amounts of benefits to income risks and volatility (e.g. accidents, health problems) reported in Indian gig worker research, asking whether schemes are appropriate to precarious Indian reality.13 The entry has procedural barriers to access, barriers of digital literacy, and scanty dispute-resolution of the denied benefits. Platform-mediated, extrasomatic employer-employee relationships, which Gig workers emulate, are distinct from non-platform professionals, such as consultants. This difference details misclassification controversies where employee-like protections are determined according to control, dependence, and integration examinations. Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT) stipulates social security as a worker for equality on Articles 14 and livelihood rights on Articles 21 in the face of vulnerabilities of the COVID-19 situation, but without being allotted full employment status.14
OTHER CODES: WAGES, SAFETY AND COLLECTIVE VOICE
The Code on Wages, 2019; Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (OSH) Code, 2020 and Industrial Relations (IR) Code, 2020 are partial protections given to gig workers even though they are not included in the conventional employer-employee relationships, using universal principles modified indirectly.15
Wages and Income Security.
A. Code on Wages and Income Security.
The Code on Wages also provides minimum/floor wages-countrywide floors provided by the Central Government in accordance with living standards with regional variations and requires the-on-time payment of all employees without unjustified deductions of all minimum wage earners including unorganised sectors who previously covered only some 30% under the Minimum Wages Act. The indirect means of ensuring the remunerations of gig workers through government briefs and parliamentary resources include proficiency, geography and perilous conditions, overtime at twice the amount, and equality of gender.16 Real life barriers still exist: The piece-rate/dynamic pricing, the surge algorithms make verification more difficult, and the inspector-cum-facilitators might have difficulties in enforcing compliance in place of the platform-mediated work without permanent establishments.17
Code of Practice and Working Conditions
B. OSH Code.
The OSH Code brings together 13 acts that bring in unified registration (10+ employees), safety committees (500+ workers), free annual health examinations, inter-state migrant workers protection, including travel allowances, PDS portability, and helplines which could be extended to delivery/ride-hailing through hazardous work-notification and commuting accident cover. The formalization is improved with the help of appointment letters, whereas the night work of women is not possible without the consent/safety.18 Critiques point to the constraints of the establishment-based model to platform-mediated work out of the traditional workplace, where new factory thresholds (20-40 workers) and contract labour regulations (50+ threshold, all-India licenses) do not ensure enough flexibility in gigs adequately.19
C. IR Code and Limited Organisational Protections.
The mechanisms of the IR Code, trade unions (51 percent recognition or councils), standing orders (300 or more threshold), fixed-term employment with parity, re-skilling funds, and tribunals, apply to the workers in an establishment in principle, but not to gig workers explicitly, even though the definitions have been broadened (e.g., supervisors up to 18,000).20 This bypasses collective bargaining, which is why the app-based unions such as IFAT are using PILs and policy advocacy in lieu of the traditional industrial-relations paradigm, which is reflected in strike notices, representation of women grievances, and decriminalization of non-compliance.21
CONSTITUTIONALIZING OF COURTS, MISCLASSIFICATION
Judicial skepticism constitutionalises the protection of gig workers, with the misclassification being questioned by changing labour codes with the impact of such case law as the Air India Statutorial Corporation v. Equal rights of the contract and regular employees were equalised through United Labor Union.22
A. IFAT and Scrutiny of Supreme Court.
Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers (IFAT) v. Union of India (2021). In 2021, the petition was filed by the Union of India (2021), which was created during the COVID protests and demanded safety equipment and decent wages, with the 35,000 members of the platform including Swiggy, Zomato, Ola, and Uber. It alleges a breach to Articles 14 (equality, excluding gig workers in the category of unorganised workers in the 2008 Act, whereas they are similar), 21 (right to life, livelihood, decent work through denied social security), and 23 (forced labour through low payment and exploitation). It seeks to have a classification of partners which would exempt the platforms of benefits as provided under acts such as Workmen Compensation Act, 1923; industrial Disputes Act, 1947; ESI Act, 1948; EPF Act, 1952; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008 requiring them to be treated as unorganised workers. Recent hearings put Union on its toes to adopt the Social Security (SS) Code on gig workers, emphasizing that rights cannot be continued to be denied.23
B. Constitutional and ILO Standards.
These assertions refer to Articles 14, 21, 23, and Directives Principles on just conditions and social security, reflecting the development of labour codes in the globalisation and technological world. Section 2(35) of the SS Code which covers gig workers (Section 2(35)) complies with ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention and Recommendation No. 202, which extends benefits such as provident fund, gratuity, maternity (per Maternity Protection Convention), and accident compensation to non-traditional work. Nonetheless, differences still exist not having the same standards in states can create inequity, and having discretion in the central government can create ILO proportionality, predictability and uniformity across regions/areas.
GOVERNANCE, TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT
India Gig economy The Gig economy is projected by NITI Aayog to grow to over 1 crore workers by 2024-25, and over 2.35 crore workers by 2029-30, incorporates digital governance through the Code on Social Security, 2020, and efforts through the Union Budget 2025-26 of e-Shram registration, identity cards, and PM Jan Arogya Yojana to cover up to 1 crore workers.24
Data Architecture, Privacy, Digital Registration.
The e-Shram portal will enable mass registration of the unorganised, gig, and platform employees (aged 16 or above, through Aadhaar-linked self-declaration), giving them unique IDs to access the scheme, and structure platform-specific modules to collect personal data, work history, and income. This facilitates integration into national databases, which allows contributions and welfare of the government such as healthcare. Nonetheless, the management of such data is of concern according to the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in India: registered workers only, errors in databases that leave vulnerable gig workers out, and potential surveillance by sharing work data on the platform during welfare delivery.
Exertion, Inspector-cum-Facilitator and Algorithmic Supervision.
The traditional inspections of the labour codes are replaced by randomised web-based models of inspections/facilitators (e.g., guidance, awareness, algorithm-driven compliance (e.g., electronic records, 30-day notices) as per the ministry resources), which may help to implement smarter, more targeted regulation with the scale of a gig. However, this can water down the deterrence to non-compliance. Existing platform tactics such as ratings, algorithmic allocation, and dynamic pricing contribute to enforcement challenges: the existence of opaque controls prevents the verification of wages/safety, misclassification is still present, and think-tank studies (e.g., ICRIER) point to regulatory failures in auditing algorithms that would facilitate the introduction of innovations and worker protection.
CONCLUSION AND REFORM INTELLIGENCE
The four labour codes in India, including the Social Security (2020), Wages (2019), OSH (2020), and IR (2020), are a pivotal development of the new understanding of gig and platform workers as a new category of workers that is not based on traditional employer-employee relationships but has a separate track of welfare rights. The Social Security Code proposes new definitions of gig workers, platform workers, and aggregators, requiring government-funded schemes and aggregator payments of 1-2% (with a 5 percent cap) with e- Shram registration and boards to control it. Complementary codes will increase indirect benefits such as floor wages, safety committees, and migrant protections, and Union Budget 2025-26 will add a large number of workers through identity cards and AB-PMJAY, to almost 1 crore. This framework, which is estimated to be projected by 2.35 crore gig workers by 2029-30 according to the forecasts of NITI Aayog, offers legal and partial improvement in coverage, income security, and health, without being entirely incorporated into enforceable employee rights and collective bargaining.
But the efficacy is sabotaged by definitional overlaps, discretionary schemes, establishment-based restrictions, and gaps in enforcement which are magnified by the lack of algorithmic visibility and misclassification, as noted in IFAT petitioning the Supreme Court under Articles 14, 21, and 23.
Specific changes are needed: (i) more explicit legal criteria on worker status based on control and dependence, and integration; (ii) faster notification and subsidizing schemes with standardized state standards; (iii) increased aggregator requirements, such as increased contributions and compliance audits; (iv) algorithmic disclosure of ratings, pricing, and allocation; and (v) an intermediate category of dependent worker between independent contractors and employees, which is consistent with ILO standards of fair social security.
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Footnotes
1. Ministry of Info. & Broad., Gov’t of India, New Labour Code for New India (2020).
2. Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Emp’t, Union Government’s Four Labour Codes Simplify and Streamline Labour Laws (2025).
3. Id. at 01.
4. PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020: Key Issues and Analysis 8 (2020).
5. NITI Aayog, India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy (2022), as summarised in PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020: Key Issues and Analysis 8 (2020).
6. Code on Social Security, 2020 §§ 2(35), 2(60), 2(61), 114, sched. VII; PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020: Bill Summary 1–2 (2020).
7. PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020.
8. Supra nt. 05.
9. International Labour Organization, The Role of Digital Labour Platforms in Transforming the World of Work 21–22 (2021), as cited in background material on gig work (BIICL/VVGNLI).
10. PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020.
11. Supra nt. 02.
12. Code on Social Security, 2020 § 114 & sched. VII; PRS Legislative Research, The Code on Social Security, 2020: Bill Summary 2 (2020).
13. Supra nt. 02.
14. Supreme Court Observer, Gig Workers’ Access to Social Security: Indian Federation of App-Based Transport Workers v. Union of India.
15. PRS Legislative Research, Labour Codes: Comparison of Key Provisions of the 2019 and 2020 Bills.
16. Supra nt. 02.
17. PRS Legislative Research, Labour Codes: Comparison of Key Provisions of the 2019 and 2020 Bills.
18. Supra note 3.
19. PRS Legislative Research, Labour Codes: Comparison of Key Provisions of the 2019 and 2020 Bills.
20. Supra note 3.
21. Supra note 15.
22. Supra note 2.
23. Supra note 15.
24. Supra note 5.