Abstract

The doctrine Speedy trial doctrine is a pillar of criminal jurisprudence that guarantees legal proceedings are made within a reasonable time to ensure fairness, due process, and judicial efficiency. Provided for in Sub-Clause (c) of Clause 3, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, this doctrine seeks to prevent unwarranted delays, procedural abuse, and miscarriage of justice. Prolonged trials can lead to extended pre-trial detention, erosion of evidence, and undue hardship for the accused, ultimately undermining public confidence in the justice system. This paper undertakes a jurisprudential analysis of the doctrine of speedy trial in India and the United States, examining its constitutional underpinnings, legislative frameworks, and judicial interpretations. In India, the doctrine has been read into Article 21 of the Constitution, with landmark rulings such as Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) shaping its legal contours. However, systemic inefficiencies, case backlogs, and procedural delays remain persistent challenges. Conversely, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution explicitly guarantees this doctrine, further reinforced by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 and judicial precedents such as Barker v. Wingo (1972). Using a comparative legal methodology, this paper evaluates the effectiveness, challenges, and compliance of both jurisdictions with Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR. By identifying best practices and potential reforms, it underscores the need for judicial and legislative measures to enhance the enforcement and effectiveness of the doctrine, ensuring timely justice and procedural integrity.

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