Abstract

Specific Performance was originally envisaged as an equitable relief based on judicial discretion under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“SRA”) which was available only when damages in the form of monetary relief were not sufficient . However, after the enactment of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 (“2018 amendment”), the provisions were amended to an extent to make specific performance mandatory unless barred by the provisions of the SRA . This raises the question whether the grant of decree of specific performance, which has always been a equitable principle dependant on judicial discretion coupled with varying factual circumstances, can be mechanised to such an extent as to make it mandatory and enforceable based on certain limitations. Recently, a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu (“Haridasan”)came up with a split verdict with respect to enforceability of such claims on specific performance where the observations made by the judges are quite significant and raises new points of discussion as to the scope of their judicial discretion vis-a-vis enforcing specific performance. It is the scope of this discretion which is the point of discussion in this paper. The author has tried to analyse the scope of judicial discretion in granting decrees of specific performance after the 2018 amendment, especially in light of the recent Haridasan judgement. The author briefly discusses the legal position as to obtaining a specific relief under the SRA pre and post the 2018 amendment, followed by a brief discussion on relevant case laws. This is further followed by a portion analysing the advantages and disadvantages of such compulsorily enforceable specific performance reliefs vis-a-vis contractual agreements and disputes relating to its subsequent breach with a concluding remark as to any suggestions which might help improve and further clarify the legal landscape.

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