The Indian constitutional framework does not adhere to the strict ‘separation of powers’ as enumerated by Montesque but has a functional overlap between three organs for which independent autonomous bodies such as Election Commission of India(hereafter ECI) and Comptroller and Auditor General of India (hereafter CAG) act as checks and balances. If the government was incharge of conducting elections then certain minority groups would be excluded. The goal is to achieve good governance through administrative justice be it conducting audits or elections. This paper will study the scope of Election Commission of India and how its functions are being curtailed by the legislature and executive. It will also study another constitutional body being Comptroller and Auditor General of India and how the legislature does not fully appreciate the velocity of ‘independent body’ principle. The study of both these institutions is to analyze how the legislature/government is curtailing the powers of these institutions in performing its functions thereby being in violation of the very intent of forming such agencies.
