Abstract

Numerous national courts have examined the possibility of arbitrating disputes pertaining to competition law. Even though case law from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (E.U.) generally favors a positive outcome, this subject is still being contested in India to get around arbitration provisions. There is a consensus in India that rules that are necessary, like competition laws, are meant to safeguard important society interests, and therefore arbitration provisions should be avoided. The premise of the argument is that the implementation of such laws should not be left to uncontrolled national or international arbitral bodies. Considering this, this researcher examines the coherence between arbitration procedures and competition law issues in India and offers viable ways to reconcile the two fields while preserving the public interest. Considering that, Part I illustrates India's distinct method of dealing with issues arising under competition law, emphasizing the Competition Act's precedent and the civil courts' restrictions in handling these cases. Part II analyses the "four-fold test" for arbitrability that was presented in the Vidya Drolia case, evaluating its standards and consequences for Indian competition disputes. Part III investigates the potential for using the "second-look doctrine" and cooperative knowledge to protect public policy in India's arbitrability of competition disputes. Part IV compares the minimalist and maximalist viewpoints to examine the various standards of review and the degree of respect accorded to arbitrator rulings in competition law issues. Finally, Part V suggests a random de novo review of arbitration rulings as the best course of action, arguing that courts must strike a compromise between upholding required standards and maintaining the benefits of international arbitration.

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