This paper piece analyses the centre-state relation of the federal structure of India based on the Constitution. Indian federalism, which has been referred to by scholars like K.C.Wheare as 'quasi-federal', is a style of having a highly centralised authority bureaucracy to cater for its massive diversity yet decentralising to foster unity. The structure regarding federal polity has its roots in colonialism, most evidently reflected in the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, but during the constitution-making process needed to be developed a proper post-independence integration.
Some of the most fundamental principles of the correspondent legislation and regulation are applicable at the constitutional level of Indian federalism regarding the legislative, administrative, and financial division of power.
Some system dynamics have been influenced by judicial constructions at the federal level. Till recent judgements like Kesavananda Bharati and S.R. Bommai, federalism is the base of the constitution and also controls misuse of power like Article 356. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties now—fiscal gaps, the political use of emergency measures, and the governor’s questionable position.
According to the document, they recommend a revamp of cooperative federalism; the recommendations include the constitutional provision of financial control to the states, the establishment of effective dialogue among states, and the involvement of the judiciary. It ends on the note of contractual dynamism required to sustain the federal balance in India while catering to sociopolitical and economic claims.
