INTRODUCTION
According to Article 441 of Part IV of the Constitution of India, “The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”. It basically means that the state shall have a common set of laws governing matters such as marriage, divorce, adoption, inheritance, and property succession, and that these rules shall apply to all persons regardless of religion. These laws were originally introduced as part of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), which, unlike Fundamental rights, are non-justiciable as stated under Article 372 which states that, “The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.” This has now emerged as a big paradox: the article, originally intended to be made enforceable as a symbol of standardisation, equality and secularism, was made non-enforceable, almost rendering it, as one might call it, a toothless tiger.
The UCC or allied laws are in place in many countries, including France, Germany, and Turkey, demonstrating how they can be applied to promote secularism, national integrity and unity, and advance equality. As easy as it looks, the situation is not the same in India simply because of the huge diversity of faith and the presence of multiple religious personal laws, making any attempt by the parliament to introduce a single law rigorously opposed at various levels.
Statement of Problem
The UCC has been a highly contentious issue since the advent of independent India. Religious division, political sensitivity, national unity, integration, and security have been the country’s primary concerns. Now the way forward must be decided keeping in mind the secular nature of our constitution and the need to be sensitive towards the needs of various religions and their cultures, and not just blindly imposing the code which may result in adverse happenings.
HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In the British colonial times, the codification of Hindu personal laws started with the British governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings, in 1772 by the introduction of the ‘Judicial Plan3’, which appointed pundits who collected and compiled Hindu personal laws going back centuries on matters like succession, marriage, and inheritance, which was translated into English for the Britishers. It is worth noting that, although the British initially maintained a policy of non-interference in Muslim personal laws, they later codified it in the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 19374. Going forward, the B.N. Rau Committee Report of 19415 recommended a codified personal law for Hindus and called for uniformity in family laws through gradual reforms in India. This report served as a precursor to the Hindu Code Bills, which came into existence in the 1950s. The Hindu Code Bill debates are also an important topic of consideration here, in which it was seen that there was resistance towards reform of personal laws even within the majority community itself, citing that matters like marriage and succession are personal in nature and that any attempt at standardisation is against their interests while also violating the policy of non-interference of the state in personal law matters.
Another important thing affecting the UCC was that India had just undergone the process of partition, with tensions and rifts between different communities reaching an unprecedented height. Even during the Constituent Assembly debate on whether to introduce Article 356(as the UCC was known as then) as part of the Indian Constitution, and that too as part of the enforceable fundamental rights, various members such as Mohammad Ismail Khan saying that,” The right of a group or a community of people to follow and adhere to its own personal law is among the fundamental rights. This provision should really be made amongst the statutory and justiciable fundamental rights.”7 Naziruddin Ahmed, who said that,” It will be difficult at this stage of our society to ask the people to give up their ideas of marriage, which are associated with religious institutions in many communities”8, was in strict opposition to the UCC. The proponents of the UCC, however, argued that the UCC was an essential part if they were to build a secular republic while also recognising that they needed to respect different religious sentiments to maintain order and unity. As quoted by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, “It is perfectly possible that the future Parliament may make a provision for a Uniform Civil Code or may not. No one need be apprehensive that the State will immediately enforce a Uniform Civil Code.”9 The lack of consensus and the public disarray show why it was not introduced as a fundamental right, but rather as a DPSP that a future parliament may enforce.
WHY WAS THE UCC INTRODUCED AS PART OF THE DPSP?
The UCC, at the time of the constituent assembly debate, could not be introduced as part of the fundamental rights mainly because of the huge non-consensus on the issue and also considering various factors such as the highly politically charged and also a fragmented religious web of the country, owing to the partition and the associated bloodshed.
In the debate, speakers like K.M. Munshi and Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar had thrown their weight behind the adoption of the UCC, with K.M. Munshi giving the examples of “advanced Muslim countries”, saying,” the personal law of each minority has been recognised as so sacrosanct as to prevent the enactment of a Civil Code”10 and Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar saying that,” Today, even in regard to people in other parts of the country, if they have property in the continent of Europe where the German Civil Code or the French Civil Code obtains, the people are governed by the law of the place in very many respects. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that we are invading the domain of religion.”11 If we closely examine their arguments and analogies, we will see that their basic argument in favour of the UCC is that it is important for supporting and ensuring equality and secularism. On the other hand, speakers like Mohammad Ismail Khan and Pocker Sahib had thrown their weight behind the idea that the UCC cannot and should not be introduced in a country like India, citing various practical, religious and even constitutional constraints ( the then article 19, which is now article 25) and religious freedom. Pocker Sahib said that,” If such a body as this interferes with the religious rights and practices, it will be tyrannous.”12 For context, Article 35 of the draft constitution stated that “The State shall endeavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” This issue was then resolved when the chairman reached a compromise to move them to the DPSPs, ensuring they were included in the constitution without crushing religious autonomy.
Other possible reasons for doing this may be moral and security concerns. Making UCC mandatory right off the bat may have led to a breakdown of trust between communities and could also have caused serious communal backlash. So, it was only natural that it might be placed under the DPSP, with persuasive value until the allied concerns are addressed.
The assembly also faced constitutional hurdles, such as Article 19 of the draft constitution (Article 25, as it is now known —freedom of religion) and Article 35 (Article 44, as it is now known). For this reason, placing the article under the DPSP may have been seen as a control measure to introduce reform without coercion.
Even the Indian Judiciary has given many landmark judgments on the UCC and the nature of Article 44. In Mohd. In Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), the Supreme Court (SC) urged Parliament to enact a UCC to standardise and avoid undue complexity while promoting national integration. In Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995)13, the court emphasised the need for a UCC to promote gender justice and national unity. This goal was reiterated in John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003)14. However, to date, there has been no central law on this matter due to political sensitivity and to prevent any disruption, which aligns with the constituents’ assembly’s reasons for not adopting it as a fundamental right.
WHY IS IT NOW BEING INTRODUCED AT THE STATE LEVEL?
As is now being seen, the UCC, the framers of which originally envisaged it to be a law at the central level, is now ironically being implemented at the state level, as it has been implemented in the state of Goa since 1870 based on the Portuguese Civil Code15 and the state of Uttarakhand in the year 2024 with the passing of the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand Act, 202416. Even in the wording of Article 44, the words” throughout the territory of India” imply that it should have been a central and not a state legislation. An important point to note is that the topics relating to personal laws (marriage, divorce, inheritance) fall under Entry 5 of List III of the Concurrent List, meaning that both the centre and the state can legislate and regulate matters concerning these heads. However, the central law may prevail in the event of a conflict. So, constitutionally, the states are well within their legislative powers to legislate on these subjects.
Another important consideration is the political and social feasibility of passing a UCC at the central level. At the central level, there are many broader factors and variables to consider, and there is much greater political resistance to addressing diverse religions, minority concerns, and regionalism. At the state level, however, laws can be tailored to address people’s needs and be culturally sensitive. An example in question may be the Uttarakhand Code, which includes many regulations, including codified provisions concerning live-in relationships and marriage registration, that address problems specific to the state.
Passing the UCC at the state level may also serve as a field test of public reception, allowing the parliament to make adjustments to ensure it becomes foolproof legislation. This also shows the spirit of cooperative federalism, which encourages the state and the centre to work together on such matters. This also reflects constitutional flexibility, meaning that by not making UCC a fundamental right, the drafters of the article allowed it to remain responsive to changes in context. The UCC may be called a ‘grand experiment’.
There are, however, many problems associated with the UCC being passed at the state level. Passing these regulations at the state level runs counter to the core ethos of the UCC. The word ‘Uniform’ itself will lose its meaning if all the states pass UCC legislation tailored to their specific contexts. As noted above, it is also against the article’s exact wording. This shows the deep-seated political and religious divide, which risks boiling over if any imposition is made at the central level.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
In the end, the author concludes that the UCC was not initially placed in the fundamental rights category out of prudence to prevent the country’s destabilisation at that critical juncture. The UCC’s state-level implementation, from the initially intended central-level to the state-level, reflects shifting realities and the various political considerations of our country, though the spirit of Article 44 endures.
The author would also like to offer the following suggestions:
a) Consensus-building mechanism – The implementation of the UCC must be done gradually, and for this, it is essential to foster consensus among all stakeholders by spreading awareness that a common civil code does not automatically imply uniform cultural practices; it simply aims to simplify laws.
b) Working of Government Organisations – For the implementation of the UCC, it is extremely important that various government organisations, such as the National Commission for Backwards Classes, canthe National Commission for Women and Child Rights, are involved so that informed decisions and error-free implementation may occur.
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Footnotes
1. India Const. art. 44.
2. India Const. art. 37.
3. Shashankupmanyu, Warren Hastings’s Judicial Plan of 1772, LegalServiceIndia, https://www.legalserviceindia .com/legal/article-10515-warren-hasting-s-judicial-plan-of-1772.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
4. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (India).
5. B.N. Rau, Report on the Hindu Law Committee 23 (Gov’t of India 1941).
6. Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII, art. 35 (Nov. 23, 1948).
7. Statement of Mohammad Ismail Khan, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
8. Statement of Naziruddin Ahmed, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
9. Statement of B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
10. Statement of K.M. Munshi, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
11. Statement of Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
12. Statement of Pocker Sahib, Constituent Assembly of India, Debates vol. VII (Nov. 23, 1948), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/23-nov-1948/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2025).
13. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1531.
14. John Vallamattom v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 2900.
15. The Portuguese Civil Code (Civil Code of Goa, Daman and Diu), 1867 (India).
16. Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand Act, No. 3 of 2024 (India).