Collective Dominance in India: A Study of Benefits and Pitfalls

The Competition Act, 2002, has been the guiding force behind India’s antitrust regime in the 21st century. To tackle the ever-changing nature of the market and its offenses, the Competition Commission of India must regularly interpret the provisions of law in the contemporary context. An analysis of the market, along with judicial decisions, shows that the CCI has been successful in discharging its duties. However, certain aspects are bound to be either left untouched or too complex to determine. One such aspect is “Collective Dominance,” which proposes that completely separate entities can act in a manner that operates independently of competitive constraints. The Indian antitrust regime, however, only acknowledges single-firm dominance, while the rest of the market behaviour is governed through Section 3 of the Competition Act. While these provisions have generally been effective, there have been instances where the market would have benefited from the existence of explicit provisions for regulating collective dominance. This article explores the concept of “Collective Dominance” in the context of the Competition Act, 2002, and its recent amendments, along with administrative comments. The article draws a comparative analysis with foreign jurisdictions to draw upon their experiences and propose adequate suggestions for the Indian context. While giving due regard to the underlying challenges of implementation of such provisions, there exists a proper balance that can be achieved through explicit provisions that help the Indian anti-trust regime.