Abstract

Bioterrorism is a developing security threat; it is a deliberate use of pathogenic microbes or toxins to harm, terrorize, or use it as a political weapon. This study reviews the modern state of the threat of bioterrorism based on the systematic review of the case studies, international law, and new technological weaknesses. It compares policy by utilizing comparative policy analysis and interviewing experts working in the field of biosecurity in twelve countries to assess the effectiveness of current multilateral agreements, specifically the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in dealing with non-state actor threat. Although the BTWC contains a ban on development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons, it does not have strong verification features and practices of enforcement. The examples of such regulatory gaps in history such as the anthrax letter attacks in the United States in 2001 and the bioweapon development programs of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan demonstrate the potential that the various regulatory gaps have to be used by non-state actors. It cites three major weaknesses to include ineffective control of dual-use research, low international practice of sharing information and poor practice within states of meeting treaty requirements. The framework has three main pillars, namely: reinforced domestic laws (that would obligate states to criminalize bioweapon-related activities through national law); setting up an International Biosecurity Verification Agency with the force of verification and reporting requirements on an annual basis; and enhanced systems of multilateral cooperation (the dynamics of which would include the creation of standard procedures of threat assessment as well as rapid response coordination systems). Findings of the study reveal that bioterrorism prevention cannot be complete without bringing in traditional security methods and incorporating public health preparedness and the scientific community. The suggested framework deals with the problem of implementation by creating gradual adoptive guidelines and capacity development of developing countries. The study can be of interest to the body of knowledge on biosecurity as a consequence of it proposing policy suggestions based on sound empirical evidence and mediating between the mutually inconsistent requirements of security-driven and nature of scientific freedom and international cooperation.

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