Abstract

One of the most sensitive legal and financial concerns, investigating international regulations, is insider trading. Some claim it damages investor confidence and levels the playing field, but others see it as a necessary evil that increases market efficiency. From a legal and economic perspective, this paper explores the intricate connection between market justice and law enforcement in cases of insider trading. It involves jurisdictional regulatory structures, landmark case legislation, and enforcement efficacy debates. It also examines surveillance technology, globalization's influence on enforcement, and corporate governance's role in limiting insider trading concerns. The research seeks to examine insider trading's effects on financial markets, investor protection, and ethics. The analysis also shows how insider trading restrictions have changed over time and affected market stability. It examines how firms, regulators, and investors see insider trading and the ethical issues with unequal access to crucial information. This article examines legal barriers and high-profile enforcement cases to determine how well regulatory measures reduce illegal trade. This study also considers the possibility that controlled insider trading might improve price discovery and market efficiency. It also explores how strict insider trading restrictions affect innovation, business decision-making, and financial market competitiveness. The research also examines whistleblowers' importance in exposing insider trading and reward-based programs' efficacy in encouraging disclosures. In the age of decentralised finance (DeFi) and cryptocurrency marketplaces, anonymity and jurisdictional complexity make insider trading law enforcement difficult. Psychological and behavioural factors such cognitive biases and moral disengagement impact insider trading decisions are examined. This study integrates legal research, economic theory, and practical case studies to contribute to insider trading debate and enlighten policymakers, legal practitioners, and financial market players on the best enforcement-market efficiency balance.

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