INTRODUCTION: THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE ‘OPEN’ CATEGORY
The Indian jurisprudence of affirmative action has always represented a struggle between two opposing values; social justice for disadvantaged groups and equality of opportunity for all citizens. For years this tension was contained by the judiciary through an equilibrium where reservation was recognized as an exception or part of equality; however the exceptions had to be limited so they would not consume the entire principle. The Constitution (One Hundredth and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 has completely destroyed this equilibrium. Article 15(6) and 16(6) were added to the Constitution of India by Parliament to create a 10% reservation for “Economically Weaker Sections” (EWS) of the general population.1
The purpose of the legislation as per the Parliament was to promote economic justice to individuals excluded from current reservation frameworks, however, the way the legislation was implemented (the additive nature of the legislation); has created significant constitutional concerns. Prior enlargements of the reservation net, such as in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, were discussed with respect to the 50% limit established. The EWS quota was added “in addition to the existing reservations”2, creating an additional 9.5% of reserved positions available in central government jobs and educational institutions. Therefore, the unreserved (or “merit”) candidates were left to compete for a much smaller share of 40.5%.3
The assertion of this paper is that the “Addition Without Adjustment” model represents a constitutional anomaly that diminishes the rights of the unreserved citizen. By treating the open category not as a space for equal citizenship and merit but rather as a residual resource that can be used for the State’s own political purposes, the State has effectively created a new class of disenfranchised citizens; those who do not fall into either the “socially backward” group eligible for caste-based quotas or the “economically weak” group eligible for the new class-based quota. In the public debate these individuals have been appropriately referred to as the “State Orphans“; i.e., citizens who have lost their power and influence due to a system dominated by vote bank politics and statistical manipulation.4
A. The Mathematical Erosion of Equality
Understanding the gravity of the constitutional harm done by the Additive Model requires looking at the math behind competition, rather than just the abstract principles of law. In Central Government services prior to 2019, the Reservation Framework looked like this: 15% for Scheduled Castes (SC); 7.5% for Scheduled Tribes (ST); 27% for Other Backward Classes (OBC); together those three add up to 49.5%.5. Therefore, the 50.5% that was left over made up the “Open Category” or “General Merit” pool of applicants.
The important thing to realize here is that the Open Category is not a Reservation for Forward Castes; it is a pool open to ALL applicants — including applicants from the Reserved Categories who have the qualifications and want to be considered based solely on their merits. The creation of a 10% EWS quota — entirely taken from the 50.5% General Merit pool — has created a Zero-Sum Game for the applicant outside of the reserved categories. As noted by legal analysts, the General Merit applicant can now only apply for approximately 40.50% of available positions.6
. SC and ST applicants will have potential access to 55.50% and 48% of all available positions, respectively.7; whereas the General Merit applicant is structurally limited to competing for the 40.50% of positions that remain after the reservations have been allocated. The above-referenced mathematical compression of the General Merit candidate’s opportunities is a fundamental recasting of the equality code, one which increasingly limits the ability of a citizen to compete on the basis of their merits as a result of the inclusion of additional political constituencies.8
B. The Breakdown of the ‘Exceptional’ Nature of Reservation
Legitimacy to establish reservations under India’s Constitution has been based upon a history of being established as an extraordinary measure. Historically, it was viewed as an extraordinary measure; a temporary deviation from formal equality, to provide substantive equality to the specific, historically oppressed groups which were included in reservations. It was the same reasoning applied by the Supreme Court of India, in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, when they stated that “generally speaking and broadly, a special provision should be less than 50%.” 9 The Court also determined that adjustments to the interests of the weaker section needed to be made to the interests of the entire community. 10
The 103rd Amendment disrupts this logic and transforms reservation from a remedial exception to a general principle of governance, in that it validates the 10% EWS quota in Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India. The Supreme Court, in doing so, has essentially indicated that the 50% cap on the percentage of the population entitled to reservation is not an “inviolable” part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. 11This indicates that the state is no longer required to balance the interests of the unreserved community against the reserved classes. As opposed to a model of proportionate representation for all groups, the reservation system is moving towards. As a result, the merit principle will suffer.
Justice S. Ravindra Bhat’s dissenting opinion in Janhit Abhiyan, correctly noted that allowing such violations can lead to a gateway for other violations, ultimately reducing the right to equality to merely a right to reservation. 12This paper agrees that the “Addition Without Adjustment” model represents this slippery slope. In adding to the reservations stack, without first examining and rationalizing the existing quotas, the State has demonstrated a preference for political expediency over constitutional stability.
C. The “State Orphan”: A New Constitutional Subject
Discourse about the reservation system generally divides Indian society into the “Upper Caste Privileges” and the “Backward Marginalized Classes“. However, this division does not account for the large degree of heterogeneity which exists within the “Open Category” (the General Category). Many citizens fall into an intermediate category of citizenship which is neither sufficiently privileged to be considered part of the “upper caste“, nor can they meet the asset-based criteria for inclusion in the EWS quota (for example, someone owning less than 5 acres of unirrigated land in a drought-prone area, or a dwelling house with an area of less than 1,000 square feet in a small town)13.
This group of citizens are the real victims of the additive model. They cannot benefit from reservations for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes (SC/ST/OBCs) because of their caste; they cannot benefit from reservations under the EWS quota because of the rigid criteria defining eligibility for such reservations; and they are being squeezed out of the Open Category as a result of the decrease in the number of seats available for Open Category candidates to 40.5%. Public comments made in response to articles posted online provide insight into the distress experienced by this demographic. They describe themselves as “State Orphaned“, that is, the citizens who pay taxes and follow the law, but experience no protection from the State’s redistributive mechanisms14.
The following sections of this paper will explain why this exclusionary treatment constitutes a violation of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. Part II of the paper will discuss how the 50 percent ceiling was breached as a collapse of the equality code. Part III of the paper will discuss how there is little empirical evidence to support the creation of an EWS quota, and therefore the quota is a policy “without evidence“. Lastly, the paper will argue that if economic justice is the goal of affirmative action then it should be achieved through adjustments and modifications to the existing distribution of seats and quotas, rather than through the elimination of what is becoming increasingly limited open competition.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE FALLACY OF THE FLEXIBLE CEILING
The structural integrity of the Indian reservation framework had been maintained for almost three decades by the “50% ceiling,” a judicial barrier created to stop the exception of the reservation from consuming the general rule of equality. The ceiling was not simply an artificial numerical limit; it was a constitutional requirement to allow for efficient administration and to protect the rights of those that were being excluded from affirmative action. However, the additive design of the EWS quota will dismantle this barrier, and create a jurisprudential paradox, where the “equality code” is ostensibly upheld, through violation of its most fundamental limitation.
A. The Erosion of Indra Sawhney and the “Compartmentalization” of Equality
The Supreme Court’s decision in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India laid down the law on how much Article 16(4) reservation is allowed under the Constitution. The Court ruled that no more than 50 percent of jobs could be reserved for any group unless there are “exceptional circumstances”, such as jobs in very remote parts of India. 15The Court felt that “the idea behind the creation of reservations is to create a protected area for a certain number of people.” 16Further, the reasoning was also supported in the case of M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, when the Court found that the 50 percent cap, along with the concept of the “creamy layer” and the need for efficient administration, were all “concepts essential to maintaining the structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16.” 17
However, after the 103rd Amendment and the validation of the amendment in Janhit Abhiyan, the cap on reservations will not be binding for the new EWS class. The majority in Janhit Abhiyan viewed the cap on reservations as applicable to caste-based reservations for backward classes (SC/ST/OBC), but did not limit the discretion of the Parliament concerning the new EWS class. 18By compartmentalizing equality, the State may now vertically reserve forever; first for caste and then for class. Therefore, the constitutional right to “equality of opportunity” has been converted into a system of “proportional representation.”
Scholars of law believe that by removing the only barrier against the complete expropriation of the rights of unreserved citizens, the judiciary has provided the State a means to add reservations ad infinitum. 19As Justice S. Ravindra Bhat noted in his dissenting opinion, if the judiciary permits this breach, it provides a gateway for additional breaches and will allow the State to increase reservations to 60%, 70%, etc. and leave the “Open Category” to be a disappearing residue. 20
B. The Zero-Sum Game: A Mathematical Analysis of Exclusion
The most obvious harm caused by the additive EWS model is that it creates a “mathematical squeeze” in the General Merit pool. Unlike before 2019, when theoretically 50.5% of the seats were available to everyone; under the new model, candidates who have no reserved category (i.e., candidates with neither social backwardness or economic weakness as per statute) will be limited to just 40.5% of the total number of seats available.
Table 2.1: The Shrinking Merit Pool
| Category | Reservation Quota | Accessible Pool (Pre-2019) | Accessible Pool (Post-2019) |
|---|---|---|---|
| OBC | 27% | 77.5% (27% Reserved + 50.5% Open) | 67.5% (27% Reserved + 40.5% Open) |
| SC | 15% | 65.5% (15% Reserved + 50.5% Open) | 55.5% (15% Reserved + 40.5% Open) |
| ST | 7.5% | 58.0% (7.5% Reserved + 50.5% Open) | 48.0% (7.5% Reserved + 40.5% Open) |
| General (Unreserved) | 0% | 50.5% (Open Merit) | 40.5% (Open Merit) |
Data presented above indicates structural discrimination against the unreserved candidate. A candidate from a Reserved Category (OBC, etc.) can compete for 67.5% of the total number of seats, (own quota + the open category). An unreserved candidate is limited to competing for the 40.5% of seats only. This results in a situation where the “Right to Equality” is unequal, as the reserved candidate has a “double opportunity“, (quota + merit), while the unreserved candidate is subjected to a “double penalty“, (excluded from 59.5% of the seats, and increased competition in the remaining 40.5% of the seats).
In addition, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the “Open Category” is not a quota for the forward castes, but a category open to everyone.21 Meritorious students from reserved categories are allowed to move into the Open Category when they meet the general cutoff, which further reduces the opportunities available for students with no protection or support.22 Therefore, the additive EWS quota does not balance society; it takes away the one area available to the “State Orphan”, (individuals who fall outside of the caste net, and do not qualify under the economic criteria of the state).
POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY VS. EMPIRICAL REALITY: THE DATA DEFICIT
The basis of the EWS reservation is the idea that economically disadvantaged members of the general category are excluded from access to high-quality education and government jobs. But the data indicate otherwise; the premise is incorrect; thus the evidence shows the policy is more about being populist in its constitutionality, rather than about good governance. 23
A. The Income Threshold Anomaly
The central government established an annual family income limit of ₹8 lakh (approx. $9,600) to identify EWS beneficiaries.24 This threshold is ostensibly identical to the “creamy layer” limit used to exclude affluent OBCs. However, its application as an inclusionary criterion for EWS creates a grotesque anomaly.
In a country where the per capita income hovers around ₹1.7 lakh, an income limit of ₹8 lakh covers nearly 95-98% of the population.25 By setting the bar so high, the State has effectively expanded the definition of “weakness” to include the middle class, thereby diluting the benefit for the truly destitute. Unlike the “creamy layer” test, which is designed to filter out the elite to protect the backward, the EWS criteria functions to include the elite (relative to the national average) to secure a political constituency. This creates a “fraud on the Constitution,” where reservation, a tool meant for the marginalized, is weaponised to protect the “newly anxious” middle classes of the forward castes.26
B. Policy Against Evidence
The Government set an annual family income threshold of approximately $9600 or ₹80 Lakh as the income limit for EWS.27. This threshold is intended to be identical to the “creamy layer” threshold that is applied to exclude affluent members from consideration in the OBC quota system; however, it is being applied as a threshold to determine who is eligible for benefits under the EWS quota system in a manner that creates a gross anomaly.
An annual family income threshold of ₹80 Lakh is far above the per-capita annual income of ₹1.7 Lakh, and thus will cover nearly 95-98% of the Indian population.28. In applying the threshold in this way, the State has essentially widened the scope of “weakness” to include the middle class and in doing so, has diluted the benefits provided by the EWS quota system to those most in need. Unlike the “creamy layer” test, which serves to filter out the elite to protect the interests of the backward, the EWS criteria serve to include the elite (i.e., those with incomes above the national average) to create a political constituency. Thus, the State’s use of the reservation system as a means to protect the “anxious” middle-class forward caste individuals constitutes a “fraud on the Constitution” in which the Constitution’s intent of using the reservation system to provide protections for the marginalized is being abused to provide protections to those who are not as vulnerable.29.
C. Policy Against Evidence
The “Addition Without Adjustment” model was implemented based on no “quantifiable data” typical of what the judiciary demands for Backward Class Reservations. In fact, the S.R. Sinho Commission (2010) has been widely referred to as the basis for the amendment which called for welfare programs (i.e. scholarships, subsidized coaching) and not a separate vertical reservation. 30
More recent research also contradicts the notion of exclusion. An examination of the NIRF enrollment data demonstrates that even prior to the implementation of the EWS quota, students from the EWS category comprised approximately 19-20% of enrollment in higher education institutions double the proposed 10% quota. 31Therefore, it can be concluded that the “General Poor” have long had access to education via the merit route. As such, when the State fences off 10% of seats for them, the State does not enable their access, it protects their access to these same seats from the meritorious backward classes who would have otherwise competed for them in the Open Category.
Therefore, the additive EWS reservation appears to be more of a “protectionist tariff” for the upper castes to protect themselves from the competitive process of open competition than a measure of “distributive justice.” This fundamentally alters the meritocratic premise of the Indian Republic. It sends a message to the unreserved citizens of India that their merit is secondary to their identity — or lack thereof — in the eyes of the State.
THE CREATION OF THE “STATE ORPHAN”: SYSTEMIC EXCLUSION OF THE UNRESERVED
A new type of citizenry has emerged as a result of the creation of an EWS quota. The amendment to the constitution, creating a separate category of vertical reservations for the economically disadvantaged within the “General Category”, creates a structure in which the previously open category of competition is now divided into two distinct areas of citizenship; the backward class (with their quotas) and the non-backward, non-poor citizen. Therefore, there exists a new constitutional subject: the “State Orphan”. These subjects are neither part of the SC/ST nor OBC categories, however, they fall outside of both the EWS quota due to the strict criteria used to determine eligibility based on either an individual’s assets or income level, thus leaving them with no constitutional protections at all.32
A. The “Residual” Citizen and the Burden of Merit
Prior to the 103rd Constitutional Amendment, the “Open Category” was the conceptual default space for all citizens as a representation of the equality of opportunity principle in Article 16(1). Affirmative Action was then the exception to the general rule of affirmative action. The additive design of the EWS quota has flipped the above relationship upside down. Approximately 60% of India’s population is now covered by vertical reservations (SC, ST, OBC, EWS). In contrast, the remaining 40% of seats, the “Open Merit” pool, will have to be occupied not only by unreserved “forward” castes, but also by meritorious applicants from reserved categories that do not use quota-based standards 33
The structure of the EWS system places a disproportionate burden on the unreserved applicant. An OBC applicant will have access to approximately 67.5% of the total number of seats (27% OBC reservation + 40.5% open merit), whereas an unreserved applicant will be structurally limited to only 40.5% of the available seats34. Thus, the unreserved applicant will suffer a “double penalty.” The unreserved applicant will be denied 59.5% of available opportunities based on either caste or economic status, and will face the heightened competition from those same groups that have been provided with protected quotas. Therefore, the “State Orphan” is the individual expected to be able to fulfill the role of providing “merit” and ensuring the “efficiency of administration” in accordance with Article 335, when they are deprived of state support for each and every demographic group that the state supports.
B. The Asset Criteria Trap: Arbitrary Exclusion
The Government’s definition of the “economically weaker section” further widens the gap in this exclusivity. While the income limit of Rs. 8 Lakhs is broad, the property limit that will disqualify a family – such as owning 5 acres of land or owning residential plots of 100 sq yards in notified municipal areas – creates an un-necessary and artificial cutoff. 35
An example of how this can be seen in a rural drought area with a family owning 5.1 acres of land of poor quality; or a family in a small town who have lived in their ancestral home which exceeds 1000 square feet. Despite these families’ disposable income being well below the poverty line, these families would be barred from receiving economically weaker section status.36. This citizenry falls into what we can call a “Policy Void“; they are too “Upper Caste” for traditional reservations and technically “Too Asset-Rich” (income-wise) to qualify for EWS reservations. They are truly the “State Orphans”, tax-paying citizens who the constitution has made invisible through its drive for vote bank saturation.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD RATIONALIZATION, NOT ADDITION
The 103rd Constitutional Amendment is a major turning point in India’s constitutional evolution. While the Supreme Court of India in the case of Janhit Abhiyan upheld the idea of economic reservation, this paper has established that the “Addition Without Adjustment” model, that is, adding a 10 % EWS quota onto a prior stack without adjusting the total pool has resulted in a structural anomaly.
It has cut down the Open Category to a mere 40.5 % and therefore has imposed a penalty upon the unreserved citizen and has created a new category of “State Orphans” that have been denied access to the social contract of affirmative action. If true economic justice is what one seeks then the answer does not lie in increasing the size of the reservation pie but in adjusting it.
In Indra Sawhney the Supreme Court has consistently held that the “creamy layer” needs to be excluded so that the benefits of affirmative action can reach those who are in greatest need37.
A constitutional way forward would include the following:
1. Strict implementation of creamy layer rules: Excluding affluent beneficiaries from the lists of SC/ST/OBC would enable the free flow of space for the backward classes that are genuinely backward and could result in a lower percentage of quotas being needed.
2. Horizontal reservations: Instead of using vertical job reservations to address economic weakness, addressing economic weakness through scholarships and fee waivers will provide a means to help economically weak individuals while at the same time preventing the creation of a fractured labor market38.
3. Restoration of the 50 % cap: In reaffirming the 50 % ceiling as an integral part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution, there would be a preservation of a reasonable amount of space for open competition and thus a guarantee that the “equality of opportunity” is a right available to all and not a privilege reserved for those that are protected39.
4. Dismantling the perpetual trap (Sunset clause): Ultimately, the State must recognise that the reservation was intended to be a temporary remedy and not a permanent entitlement. As Justice Pankaj Mithal pointed out in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024), “reservation benefits… should normally be limited to first-generation recipients,” and to extend them hereditarily is to violate equality because it treats the elevated equally to the oppressed40; as stated by Justice Pardiwala in Janhit Abhiyan, “reservation should never become a vested interest” and therefore a mandatory sunset clause and periodic review are necessary to ultimately phase-out quotas and lead to India becoming a caste-less and meritocratic society41.
The “Addition Without Adjustment” model runs the risk of changing the Indian Republic from a union of equal citizens to a confederation of competing quotas. If the judiciary and legislature do not act to modify, the “State Orphan”, the unreserved and unprotected citizen, will continue to be the collateral damage of India’s affirmative action story.
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Footnotes
1. The Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, § 2-3 (India).
2. 103rd Amendment Act, supra, at § 2(b).
3. 10% EWS Reservation – How will it affect your chances of getting a government job?, CLEARIAS (Sept. 26, 2023), https://www.clearias.com/ews-reservation/.
4. Buchi Reddy G, Comment to 10% EWS Reservation, CLEARIAS (Mar. 21, 2019, 8:15 PM), https://www.clearias.com/ews-reservation/ (contending that reservations have created a class of “State Orphans” without the benefits of compensatory discrimination).
5. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 (India); also (PDF) An Evaluation of the Reservation System in India, ResearchGate 220 (March 2023)
6. CLEARIAS, supra note 2 (“If you belong to general merit, you can apply for only 40.50% of positions as 59.50 positions are reserved.”). By comparison, applicants in the reserved categories will continue to have access to a significantly greater portion of available positions. For example, an OBC applicant will have access to their 27% Reservation Quota PLUS the 40.50% Merit Pool — so they can potentially compete for 67.50% of all positions.Id.
7. Id.
8. Dhruva Gandhi, Janhit Abhiyan: Where does it lead us? , 19 Socio-Legal Rev., 75, 77 (2023).
9. M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649, 663 (India).
10. Id.
11. Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1, 6 (India) (by majority holding that the 50% cap is flexible).
12. Id. at 315 (Bhat, J., dissenting); also Deepali Singh & Aadarsh Sharma, Reservation Policies in Transition: The Supreme Court’s Approach to the EWS Quota and the 50% Cap, 4 INDIAN J. INTEGRATED RSCH. L. 1, 5 (2024).
13. 103rd Amendment Act supra at Explanation to Article 15(6), (which defines EWS on the basis of family income and other indicators)
14. Buchi Reddy G, supra, note 3 (“They are the ones without any reservation or other benefits of compensatory discrimination/affirmative action… pre-conceived notions and vote-bank politics render a sizable section of Indian population helpless“)
15. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 (India).
16. Id. at paragraph 809.
17. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212, 278 (India).
18. Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1, paragraph 172 (Justice Maheshwari, concurring).
19. Dhruva Gandhi, Janhit Abhiyan: Where Does It Lead Us?, 19 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 75, 91-93 (2023).
20. Janhit Abhiyan, supra note 5, at paragraph 610 (Justice Bhat, dissenting).
21. Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 4 SCC 542 (India).
22. Sleepy Classes, Demystifying Reservation Quotas: What the Supreme Court’s Latest Ruling Means for Merit and Equality, SLEEPY CLASSES (2024), https://sleepyclasses.com/general-vs-reserved-seats-explained-supreme-court-on-reservation-ruling-polity-upsc-2026/.
23. Sunny Jose et al., EWS Quota: A Policy Against Evidence, 53 SOC. CHANGE 117, 118 (2023).
24. Dept. of Personnel & Training, O.M. No. 36039/1/2019-Estt (Res), Gov’t of India (Jan. 31, 2019).
25. S.R. Sinho Commission, Report of the Commission for Economically Backward Classes, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Gov’t of India (2010); also Jose et al., supra note 9, at 119.
26. Prabhash Ranjan, EWS Reservation and Basic Structure of Constitution of India, INT’L J. LEGAL RSCH. & ANALYSIS (2023).
27. Department of Personnel & Training, O.M. No. 36039/1/2019-Estt (Res), Government of India (January 31, 2019)
28. S.R. Sinho Commission, Report of the Commission for Economically Backward Classes, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India (2010); also Jose et al., supra note 9, at 119
29. Prabhash Ranjan, EWS Reservation and Basic Structure of Constitution of India, INT’L J. LEGAL RSCH. & ANALYSIS (2023).
30. Sinho Commission, supra note 12, at 20.
31. Jose et al., supra note 9, at 120.
32. Buchi Reddy G, Comment to 10% EWS Reservation, CLEARIAS (Mar. 21, 2019, 8:15 PM), https://www.clearias.com/ews-reservation/ (“The system of reservations… has created a new category of citizens whom I call ‘State orphans’. They are the ones without any reservation or other benefits of compensatory discrimination“).
33. Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 4 SCC 542 (India), which held that meritorious reserved candidates have a right to open category seats.
34. CLEARIAS, supra note 3 (highlighting how OBCs can target 67.5% of seats and General Merit applicants will be restricted to 40.5%.)
35. Department of Personnel & Training, Office Memorandum No. 36039/1/2019-Estt (Res), Government of India (January 31, 2019).
36. Niranjan, Comment on 10% EWS Reservation, CLEARIAS (March 20, 2019 at 08:04 am) https://www.clearias.com/ews-reservation/ (asks “my family has 3 Lakh Annual Income. And has exactly 5 Acre Land. Can I Apply For EWS Category?“)
37. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 INSC 562 (India)
38. S.R. Sinho Commission, Report of the Commission for Economically Backward Classes, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Gov’t of India (2010)
39. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 (India)
40. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 INSC 562 (India) (Mithal, J., concurring); also Remarks of Justice Pankaj Mithal regarding Reservation: What did he say and why is it being debated?, ROZGAR SAMACHAR (November 16, 2025)
41. Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1 (Pardiwala, J., concurring); also EWS Amendment Judgment: The Unending Closure on Reservation, INDIA FOUNDATION (2023)