INTRODUCTION
In India, ‘bail’ jurisprudence deals with criminal justice and ‘freedom’ at the same time. Courts in India have always held that, until proven guilty, the accused are to be treated as such, and therefore, pre-trial detention must be considered as an exception. Yet, in reality, this is grossly violated. Undertrials continue to be present in jails, justice is delayed, and is in fact, usually bought. Courts themselves play an important role in this contradiction. For justice to be achieved, it must be either supported through the right time and effort, or the right amount of money must be utilized to secure jurisdiction. The essence of this irregularity provides an endless supply of interest and complexity to the subject, both at the doctrinal and at the institutional level.1
The paradox that will be discussed and analysed below, is that the courts have always held that ‘prison must be the exception’ and that there must be a ‘prison rule’ that achieves coherence and unity, law, and justice, and is not merely an empty sentiment. The problem is not in the fact that the Supreme Court of India does not articulate the principle. This is a given. The harder question that must be answered with conviction is, ‘is the design and the drafting of the law, the practices of the subordinate judiciary, the trends in arrests, the delays that are intrinsic to the systems of investigation and of trial, the administration of legal aid, and other institutional systems and arrangements, conducive to this principle in shaping the outcomes?’ A combination of the Indian legal system and its theory must aim to answer these questions. ‘Bail’ as a right must be thoroughly researched in light of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ as important legal and constitutional facets.2
This paper employs a doctrinal framework supported by constitutional documents, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, special laws, recent Supreme Court decisions, and with archival parliamentary and prison materials, gauges the gap between practice and principle. It claims the proposition is neither an accomplished reality nor a myth. It identifies a true constitutional principle that is well articulated doctrinally. However, in practice, this principle is dislocated, partially operational, and dominated by harsh legislative frameworks, prolonged detention, ineffective release mechanisms, and social and economic obstacles that transform what is constitutionally a right into a vague and a selective remedy.3
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BAIL
Incorporated into the constitutional bail framework in India is the jurisprudential value of liberty that encompasses a doctrine of proceedings in which the bail framework is a testament to the principle of necessity, and pre-trial detention is not considered an instrument of punishment in advance. To be a framework of proportionality in a bail system, pre-trial detention must be a measure of last resort.4
A. Liberty, Presumption, and Limited Preventive Detention
Bail is one of the essential rights of the accused since the foundation of our Constitution originates from the principle of individual dignity articulated under Article 215. Article 21 states that the right to personal liberty should not be curtailed without the law’s due process. Therefore, putting a person behind the bars without the law’s due process is unacceptable. Therefore, bail is not an administrative duty but a constitutional responsibility to uphold the restraint of state power during the adjudication process. The criminal justice system should not punish a person, legally, irrationally and unjustly, prior to the conviction.6
That argument is also grounded from the constitutional presumption of innocence which is not lost during the accusation. There is a statutory presumption against bail. There is a culpable presumption of bail, i.e., willful, and presumable collusion, i.e., possibly willful perjury, which is not restrained. Balance is maintained through the restraint of detrimental and defensive (e.g., accused, arrest and detention, etc.) behaviour. Therefore, negative removal (as opposed to positive confinement (detention, arrest, etc.)) is justified. Therefore, bail is justified by the lack of restraint (detention) and by the line drawn or balance system (detention) of the flexible (e.g., unlawful detention) and judgment (e.g., unlawful removal of the right to personal liberty and unjust judgment, etc.) system of justice. Bail is an inalienable constitutional state right of the individual. Therefore, a liberty-based, bail preserving system is of paramount importance.7
Bail fulfills specific, recognizable functions within the legal system. The purpose of bail is to encourage the accused to show up during procedural activities, and serves the integrity of the system that is adjudicating the case. The accused is able to prepare their defence without the stress of their case being adjudicated in their absence. The ensured presence and convenience of the accused during a case are practically the most stretched forms of bail. The nature of bail ensures presence, and proceeds of convenience during a case, and allows the accused to prepare a defence without being suffered to the elongational stress of daily custody. Bail hearings assume a language of accusation of proof, a distortion of a rationally functioning system. Such distortion shifts the inquiry to the inherent value of surrendering bodily freedom and functions almost exclusively to the penal suffering of indefinite custody, or the temporarily convenient restraint that a legal system has to suffer, upon the poor accused during his/her defence.8
B. Speedy Trial and Reasoned Justification
The sustained entitlement to a speedy trial is a constitutional premise that strengthens the legal argument for bail. A criminal system that attaches a moral justification to prolonged custody during defence, i.e. systematically prolonged judicial proceedings and inescapable suffering, loses the moral justification to prolonged custody during the defence. The Supreme Court, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar9, was unequivocally persuasive when prolonged custody during defence, or the suffering of a legal system, without proceedings was deprived of defence.
Relevant recent evidence concerning bail decisions made in Delhi shows a discrepancy between courtroom reasoning and constitutional values. Bail orders often mention the seriousness of the offence, which causes confusion between punishment and prediction; there also exists a contradiction in the stated purposes of detention in various cases. The constitutional issue is that, besides restricting liberty, decision making is also blurred. Jurisprudence which professes allegiance to Article 21 is required to not only present identifiers of the type of risk being relied on, but the evidence of that risk and the reasoning of the duty of care in relation to the justice of the situation, to present the nature of the balance, is also needed.10
STATUTORY DESIGN UNDER THE BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023
The bail law, which sets out the particulars of bail in a structured fashion, is the statute that the constitutional language can be integrated into. Within the framework of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, numerous forms of bail including anticipatory and default bail, as well as release after prolonged undertrial detention, provide a framework whereby judges can exercise discretion that is sensitive to liberty.11
A. Ordinary Bail and Judicial Discretion
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, reinterprets bail and preserves related logic, laying down Sections on bail, as parts of the new Criminal Procedure Code. Bail as governed by the new Sections, and Section 187(3)12, and the logic of default bail for which new provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, are concerned, continues to be a clear pointer on the ongoing policy of the legislative branch of the Government of India, in this case, as to the default position of the law. The provisions clearly demonstrate that liberty, situated among other legal factors, remains as the primary position of the law, as long as the risk and procedural issues remain legally justified.
The importance of the ordinary bail structure remains, as most criminal cases fall outside the ambit of special legislations. In non-bailable criminal cases, the mechanism of the law does not concern the question of whether the accused has the right to be discharged from the case, but whether the custodial detention of the accused. It is for this reason that the case of Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh13 remains relevant, despite the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita procedural shifts. The imperative remains, that the presumption of innocence, and thus, dignity should be upheld at the bail stage. It should be acknowledged as the beginning of a tacit cycle of bail opposition.
B. Anticipatory and Default Bail
Anticipatory bail serves to defend personal liberty when there is a preemptive threat of arrest. There is now a body of case-law governing this form of bail. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab14, which largely serves to provide a rejection of both narrow and exceptional readings of anticipatory relief, the emphasis was largely placed on the need for context-based discretion. There will always be a need for this context-driven discretion under Section 482 of the BNSS, if the bail in question is to remain granted or denied when threatened arrest exists for the sake of strategic coercive pressure, rather than in the absence of true investigatory necessity. There is a further need though the more recent judgment in Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani15, which holds that the anticipatory bail doctrine must remain adjustable to procedural complexities, multifarious prosecutions and contexts involving multiple (and/or) sequential incarcerations.
C. Arrest Discipline and Default Bail
Default bail, on the other hand, is equally (if not more) important, since it indeed ties liberty to the working limits of the investigation by the prosecution. It is almost as if the postponed investigations owed the presumptively guilty person a form of procedural entitlement which corresponds to both fairness and the ultimate accountability of the criminal process. The Supreme Court’s continuing procedural compliance demands involve issues concerning bail that are broader than the scope of Section 187(3) of the CPC. In this regard, it should be noted that arrest, remand, and bail issues must not be treated like nothing more than administrative steps in a process that defies justification. If there is no justification, even the most liberal bail rules will be absorbed into what is essentially an arrest driven system, of which the presumption-of-custody is the defining norm rather than an exception.16
D. Section 479 and Statutory Release
Section 479 of the BNSS17 is possibly one of the more impactful modern amendments. It sets the benchmark on the release of an undertrial after having spent a period of detention of not more than one-half the term of the maximum punishment as prescribed for the offence. More ambitiously, it provides for release after a period of not more than one-third of the maximum punishment, for a first offender, subject to the stated limitations. The modern commentary on the code rightly perceives this as an attempt to transform the frustration of a constitution with protracted durations of undertrial detention into an operational prison law mandate. The usefulness of the provision is, however, contingent on identification for application, reactive judicial orders and timely officials.18
E. Special Statutes and Constitutional Limits
Once special statutes are entered into the equation, the system undergoes a dramatic metamorphosis. The severity of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 196719 and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, whether fully justifiably or otherwise, has laws on bail which tend to severely limit the reasons for thegrant of bail. The absence of the greater good should as a result not be the denial of the existence of such a limitation, restrained by Article 21. In light of this, the Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb20 case is of enormous importance. It illustrates that there is a limit to the severity of statutes.
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF BAIL DOCTRINE
Judicial doctrine has provided explanation of legislative intents, which statutory texts fail to explain, with regard to bail. For instance, the Supreme Court has stated the reasons why bail is conceived, the rationales for which detention is reasonable, and threats to the fabric of the Constitution when custody prosecution is of a singular and interminable duration.21
A. Foundational Clarifications
Transformative Supreme Court doctrine turned bail from a fine procedural intricacy into a state power constitutional doctrine. That Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation22, stood apart from the other decision, unprecedentedly, it stated that bail is, by design, non-punitive, and that liberty deprivation in the absence of a conviction is, at best, of a necessity. The decision is of value because it converted antiquated notions of a complex and intricate modern prosecution of a white-collar crime. Additionally, the offence has value in the implementation of a sub-Section of a modern concept to which the prosecution was remanded. It has value in the sub-Section of the remand culture. An accused, remanded in custody for a protracted duration of the trial, suffers punishment, in both the severe and irreversible, that the society ephemerally suffers.
The Court has linked bail doctrine to arrest restraint as a tool to discipline the lower judiciary. The importance of Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation23 lies in his doctrinal restatement as well as his administrative desire. Antil classified cases, linked bail to arrest notice law, and deemed trial courts’ non-compliance to be a systemic issue. Liberty can be encroached long before the bail hearing through a combination of unnecessary and prolonged remand/post-arrest bail as well as the absence of distinction between a court appearance and custodial interrogation.
B. Contemporary Corrective Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence has only intensified. The importance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement24 lies in the Court admitting that long imprisonment during the trial can, in and of itself, justify bail, even given the political sensitivities and nature of the fact of the case as an alleged case of money laundering. The ruling in this instance is of particular importance as the Court has elevated trial delay to a ‘constitutional fact’ as opposed to a regrettable and unfortunate circumstance. There is an even greater significance to this judgment as, through the indirect provisions of the law, in this case, money laundering, the Court has acknowledged that the law’s rigidity and imprisonment of an accused, who until then has been presumed innocent, as a principled right, is only justifiable and commensurate to the protection of the law once the trial has been imminent and the costs to the right to liberty have increased.
The same unwritten rules can be seen in Prem Prakash v. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement25. The Court understands the well-known saying, bail is the rule, and jail is the exception, as a narrowed interpretation of Article 21. That shift in language has its doctrinal impact. The principle is then called a signature of constitutional method and, therefore, the Court is called upon to justify its departure from the principle of liberty by referring to process risks, and case statutes, and considering the case facts rather than eloquently referring to the gravity of the matter and the public interest.
On similar lines, the Supreme Court has dealt with the impact of long imprisonment of those who are convicted for terrorism-related offences. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra26, the court stated that the constitutional courts are not obliged to oversee Article 21, even if the case is a special law offence. The resistance to interpretive drift in the case law is commendable. It is understood that they are direct victims of the law, and the case law is then deemed to be special law offence, taking into consideration the circumstances of the law. The constitutional balance, then, really justifies the burden of ordering the law. The essence of the case law is that the reincarceration of the law is justified if the death and the terrorism-related offence is a case then the law seeks to justify the balance.
V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement27 demonstrates similar doctrinal constitutional limiting framework. This case shows doctrinal propagation relating to custody and/or delay of health or trial cases as a greater phenomenon. The case crystallizes the issues as ‘permissible’ and ‘impermissible’ coercive exclusions of cases pertaining to pre-conviction in a constitutional framework of freedom, dignity, and due process. The case calls for clarification to some extent on the contemporary bail doctrinal and present bail issues in a serious, normatively just and serious framework, despite the absence of legal and functional framework as evidenced by trial courts’ open defiance and great irregularity in the bail orders.
EMPIRICAL REALITY OF PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
Whether the doctrine of liberty in the criminal process has shifted the balance in favor of liberty is an empirical question. The information available in parliamentary and officially published information about prisons within the German legal system shows a constitutionally surviving presumption of freedom at the doctrinal level, but everyday practices, including delay, classifications, systems of legal aid, and prescriptive gaps, weakens and deprives its enforcement.28
A. Duration of Undertrial Confinement
Official data29 underline that the problem of undertrials is serious in the context of Indian prisons. Earlier studies30 view, therefore, incarceration in the context of Indian punishment systems, not in the context of the system’s statistical margins. Contemporary institutional reporting, similarly, does not treat prolonged contraction and the inadequate capacity of prisons as mundane legal state systemic stress rather than simple state level legal exceptions. The empirical problem is not whether the bail doctrine is there, but whether it works in making jails the “normal” part of the legal system. From the data, undertrial detention is likely to continue playing that role in jails in the legal system.
In this context, duration specific data can be informative. As per the data on Parliament as of December 31, 2023 and as per the Prison Statistics India (2023) Report, as many as 356,512 undertrials were jailed for up to three years, more than 23,000 for three to five years, and 10,392 for more than five years. (See Figure 1). As mentioned earlier, this distribution shows the data. It is not so much the distribution in the first subsection that is informative, as it is the distribution in the last two. More than 33,000 persons have Prison Time = 3 or more (in violation of the logic of “temporary” or “exceptional” custody).31

Figure 1: Duration of undertrial detention in India, 31 December 2023.
Insertable figure text: At least, most of the people detained as undertrials spent up to a maximum period of 3 years, whereas 33,398 of the detention undertrials (33.3%) spent more than 3 years as demanded by the now-executed formal liberty obligation, indicating the sad reality of detention undertrials and protracted deprivation.
B. Release Mechanisms and the Implementation Gap
Under Trial Review Committees
Release’s framework design is more of a release mechanism. Despite 2021 and 2022 securing 36,983 and 70,780, respectively, delegated to me from the Under Trial Review Committees’ proposed release and/or bail, the number of releases remained merely at 17,020 and 35,480. As depicted in Figure 2, almost the same number of cases was reported from 2021 to 2025. Considering the official records, almost 49.2% of all cases, categorized as eligible based on the criteria, were discharged. The remained cases were ‘De jure declared eligible, but de facto’ and ignited by the absence post-official, direct, or indirect formal incentive, prompt judiciary, organised/decent or delivered paperwork, or post-final surplus to be organised.32

Figure 2: Under Trial Review Committee recommendations and actual releases, 2021 to 2025.
Insertable figure text: Between 2021 and 2025, the release rate due to recommendations from the Under Trial Review Committee continued to be below full compliance. This reflects the gap between the identification of candidates for release and the commitment to concluding their detention. Simply, recommendations were not sufficient and liberty remained secured.
C. Social Profile and Structural Disadvantage
Figure 3 sheds light on the social stratification Panel 5, the contract for granting permission for survey detention. Cumulative official figure data for the category undertrials collected on the 31st of December, 2023, show the existence of 80,192 Scheduled Caste undertrials, 38,987 Scheduled Tribe undertrials, and 137,665 Other Backward Class (OBC) undertrials and 100,628 undertrials classified as (others). This parliamentary admit stated, “Maharashtra has been insufficient, and has not been categorical. ” The analysis performed in figure 3 positions these numeric count data as singular and comparatively, and while these data in and of themselves may not identify discriminatory behaviours, they do lend themselves, in a substantial manner, to the social targeting nuances of bail, inequity of representation, and the escalatory poverty as a determinant of procedural survival.33

Figure 3: Category-wise profile of undertrial prisoners in India, 31 December 2023.
Insertable figure text: Category-wise data from the source illustrate significant representation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes in the data on undertrial prisoners. Given the absence of a Maharashtra category breakup in the source, the figures justify the need for a bail analysis that recognizes social disadvantage.
D. Legal Aid and Financial Barriers
Data on legal aid provides insight into why the right to bail often does not result in actual release. A study of state legal aid and undertrials34 claims that low uptake of legal aid should not be understood simply as a refusal to apply, but also as the result of explanation failure, trust failure, and design failure, i.e. the absence of the assumption that representation is a right that continues through the remand. A further study of undertrials released on bail35 describes a series of hindrances such as the inability to provide surety, the absence of verified documents in the locality, and the delay in response from family. These studies demonstrate that empirically, bail depends as much on the legal as on the infrastructural realities.
Poor Prisoner Assistance and Decision Conditions
The recent national effort to support impoverished prisoners demonstrates the potential and the constraints of the specific reforms. Official parliamentary documents indicate that the initiative had a budget of Rupees 20 crore for 2023-24, 2024-25, and 2025-26, yet, as of 10 February 2026, only 273 prisoners had benefited. Such a disparity between allocated and utilized funding is difficult to overlook. It signals that the State has recognized the costs of imprisonment, but has failed to devise an implementation strategy to transform budgetary funding into mass liberation.36
Funding for bail has also been shown to reflect permanent social characteristics of the society in which the adjudication is performed. One of the recent studies in economics has shown that judges whose families were affected by Hindu-Muslim riots in their childhood were much more likely to refuse bail. This is problematic, as the gap between theory and practice becomes a permanent characteristic of an organisation that is not easily closed with regular legislation.37
ASSESSING THE FORMULA: MYTH, REALITY, AND THE STRUCTURE OF DISCRETION
This phrase contains persuasive power because it reflects a correct constitutional intuition, and the practical credibility of the phrase relies on the lower courts, prosecution, police, prison administration, and legal aid, learning the discipline that the formula requires.38
A. Why the Doctrine Remains Real
The idea that the formula is a complete myth cannot be defended. Bail law in India now expresses coherent constitutional grammar: liberty in Article 21, the limits of preventative detention, the right to a speedy trial, the limits on arrest, the right to be released after an unjust period of time as an undertrial, and be in a state which, after a statute hath had the effect of causing constitutional amendments to be made to the precipitate of the law, be of the position of an undertrial. None of these ideas are decorative in nature. They inform the outcomes of appeal, instruct the interpretation of statutes, and increasingly, the reasons for bail in cases once believed to be categorically and extreme. A myth would not create this degree of doctrinal stubbornness or this level of judicial disobedience.39
Concurrently, the argument that the formula already stipulates the general criminal process cannot be sustained either. Reports from prisons still reveal a system that is structurally organised around undertrial detention, rather than rapid trial processes and minimal Section of custodial resort. The persistence of large undertrial groups does not, of course, conclusively establish that bail doctrine is dishonest. Still, it does show that doctrine has not reorganized institutional behaviour at a scale that would make the process of detention exceptional. A constitutional rule mainly operating at the level of correcting appeals remains normatively real, but it is, in a sense, operationally thin.40
B. Why the Practice Remains Uneven
One reason for this gap is the structure of statutory exceptionalism. Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 200241, creates additional challenges for the conditions of release, which may encourage the courts to make early determinations on the merits of the case at the bail stage, and may lead courts to treat custody as the presumptive response to the prosecution’s assertion. Similar effects occur under anti-terror legislation. When combined with case delay, there is a practically insurmountable asymmetry. The prosecution has the support of presumptive factors, which means that the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the seriousness of the charge and the complexity of the investigation, while the defence has the burden of demonstrating the charge, and the accused bears the burden of the time cost. Constitutional doctrine may soften that asymmetry, but it does not control it.
Second is the inequality of social class. The differences that lead to the potential for release from custody or, in reality, the grant of bail and actual freedom may depend on factors such as capacity to provide bail in the form of a surety, proof of resident in the locality, knowledge of formalities, knowledge of court routines, paired, and continuing, access to legal counsel, and the ability of one’s family to respond quickly. These factors mean that the state of freedom is almost always conditional in ways that are not captured by formal legal doctrine. The challenge of reform then is to alter the judicial practices in the typical case, and not in the rare case under an appellate review, in such a way as to change the general state of freedom to custody.42
CONCLUSION
The Indian Bail Law is not entirely disorganized and presents an understandable description. Case law and constitutional doctrine provide additional clarity. However, the actual state of liberty is determined by the capacity of the said institution, procedural formalism, and the social character (or class) of the offender.43
Assessing the case law of the Supreme Court and understanding the statutes of the Constitution concerning bail law in the country leads one to conclude that the proposition under study is legally valid. The law on bail in India has built the concept of the legal person not as an isolated and abstract entity. This body of work defines liberty of the person in the context of Article 21 of the constitution, regulates preventive detention in the name of proportionality, looks towards the value of the right to a speedy trial, and increasingly begins to view the right to not remain in a state of prolonged detention under special laws as a constitutionally protected right. The various theories postulating that the said principle supports the proposition under study can no longer be classified as argumentative. The principle of bail is clearly a legal doctrine and has the potential to be one of the fundamental doctrines of law under the new justification and new paradigm of the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Justice System.44
Nevertheless, some empirical evidence demonstrates that the formula should not be viewed as an accurate description of everyday behaviour. Long-term detention, the phenomenon of an incomplete conversion of review recommendations into formal release, the use of financial support, and the grip of social and economic resources all suggest that imprisonment is routine for many accused. Perhaps, in the context of the Indian legalcratic argument, it is not yet possible to say that imprisonment is the institutional exception. The goal of modern legal reforms is to interconnect, and align arrest, trial, legal aid, prison, and lower-court administration, and integrate those elements, into the prison, via the existing constitutional framework.45
SUGGESTIONS
In relation to the reforms proposed these are the efforts that address the real and operational aspects of pre-trial freedom.
1. Enforce arrest necessity at the first stage: Police officers are now compelled to substantiated reasons to the authorities concerning the necessity of an arrest for every non-bailable case. Investigative necessity should be the basis for arrest, and magistrates should refuse remand where the rationale is habitual and/or mechanical.
2. Make Section 479 screening automatic: Within the framework of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita of 2023, every correctional facility is to compile and submit screenings to the jurisdictional court regarding inmates that have reached one-third and/or one-half of their custody threshold using Section 479, on a monthly basis, without individual petitions.
3. Strengthen Under Trial Review Committee follow-through: Trial Review Committees have the additional burden of not only documenting suggestions for release but documenting the rationale behind non-releases in each case to which the suggestion pertains. A consistent reporting framework would bring to light the patterns of missing sureties, delays or unserved orders, etc.
4. Reform bail conditions for indigent accused: To the extent that any of the financial sureties are impracticable, courts should prefer to impose personal bonds, community verification, or supervised reporting. Bail conditions that are impossible for the accused to satisfy are in effect the denial of legislative bail, and should be similarly treated.
5. Integrate legal aid into the remand process: Counsel of record should be appointed at the first remand and continue to be responsible until the bail stage, unless substituted. Representation that starts only after an extended period of custody fails to safeguard freedom when the circumstance most warrants the intervention.
6. Create custody duration dashboards for courts: All district courts should implement a live dashboard indicating the age and trending status of each case and the duration of custody of each accused. Judges would be able to identify urgent cases that require constitutional protections before precedent would render custody punishment.
7. Require reasoned bail orders in a standard format: Trial courts ought to document the particular risk invoked, the foundation of that risk, and the justification of why lesser conditions would not suffice. More simplified reasoning frameworks would mitigate the use of vague and reflexive denials based on the nature of the case.
8. Use appellate review to correct structural patterns: High Courts should assess the recurring local trends of automatic turnover of bail denials instead of waiting for one-off appeals to be received. More specific administrative and judicial (management) instructions could improve districts where custodial remand has become the easy and routine answer.
9. Expand and audit poor prisoner assistance: Prison conditions should be adjusted to include basic application processes, prison level identification of potential participants, and public accountability to determine how frequently the programmes are used. Merely allocating financial resources in the budget does not support prisoners unless their exit routes are directly managed.
10. Train judges and prosecutors on liberty-centred doctrine: Judicial and prosecutorial education should be conducted on Article 21, the right to a speedy trial, Section 479, and the recent Supreme Court case law on the issue of prolonged detention. Real change in institutions occurs when liberty is viewed as a concrete discipline and not as an abstract philosophy.
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Footnotes
1. Law Commission of India, “268th Report on Amendments to Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Provisions Relating to Bail” (May, 2017).
2. K.I. Vibhute, Criminal Justice: A Human Rights Perspective of the Criminal Justice Process in India 154 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1st edn., 2004).
3. Upendra Baxi, The Crisis of the Indian Legal System 119 (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1st edn., 1982).
4. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 216 (Universal Book Traders, Delhi, 4th edn., 1996).
5. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 188 (LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 9th edn., 2025).
6. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 60 (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968).
7. Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice 96 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1st edn., 2014).
8. K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, R.V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure 220 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 7th edn., 2021).
9. AIR 1979 SC 1369.
10. Anup Surendranath and Gale Andrew, “Confused Purposes and Inconsistent Adjudication: An Assessment of Bail Decisions in Delhi’s Courts”, 19 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 294 (2024).
11. Law Commission of India, “268th Report on Amendments to Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Provisions Relating to Bail” (May, 2017).
12. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023), s. 187(3).
13. (2018) 3 SCC 22.
14. (1980) 2 SCC 565.
15. 2024 INSC 669.
16. Law Commission of India, “78th Report on Congestion of Under Trial Prisoners in Jails” (February, 1979).
17. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023), s. 479.
18. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 163 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 24th edn., 2025).
19. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (Act 37 of 1967), s. 43D(5).
20. (2021) 3 SCC 713.
21. B.B. Pande, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Advanced Legal Writings 164 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1st edn., 2022).
22. (2012) 1 SCC 40.
23. (2022) 10 SCC 51.
24. 2024 INSC 595.
25. 2024 INSC 637.
26. 2024 INSC 645.
27. 2024 INSC 739.
28. National Crime Records Bureau, “Prison Statistics India 2023” 252 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2025).
29. India Justice Report, “India Justice Report 2025” 114 (2025).
30. Vrinda Bhandari, “Pretrial Detention in India: An Examination of the Causes and Possible Solutions”, 11 Asian Journal of Criminology 83 (2016).
31. Lok Sabha Secretariat, “Undertrial Prisoners and Measures for Expedited Release” (Ministry of Law and Justice, February, 2026).
32. Lok Sabha Secretariat, “Undertrial Prisoners and Measures for Expedited Release” (Ministry of Law and Justice, February, 2026).
33. Lok Sabha Secretariat, “Undertrial Prisoners and Measures for Expedited Release” (Ministry of Law and Justice, February, 2026).
34. Anup Surendranath and Gale Andrew, “State Legal Aid and Undertrials: Are There No Takers?”, 6 Indian Law Review 303 (2022).
35. Prayas, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, “Experiences of Undertrial Prisoners Released on Bail” 21 (2023).
36. Lok Sabha Secretariat, “Undertrial Prisoners and Measures for Expedited Release” (Ministry of Law and Justice, February, 2026).
37. Nitin Kumar Bharti and Sutanuka Roy, “The Early Origins of Judicial Stringency in Bail Decisions: Evidence From Early Childhood Exposure to Hindu-Muslim Riots in India”, 221 Journal of Public Economics 104846 (2023).
38. Law Commission of India, “268th Report on Amendments to Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Provisions Relating to Bail” (May, 2017).
39. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 194 (LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 9th edn., 2025).
40. India Justice Report, “India Justice Report 2025” 116 (2025).
41. The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (Act 15 of 2003), s. 45.
42. Prayas, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, “Experiences of Undertrial Prisoners Released on Bail” 26 (2023).
43. B.B. Pande, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Advanced Legal Writings 171 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1st edn., 2022).
44. K.I. Vibhute, Criminal Justice: A Human Rights Perspective of the Criminal Justice Process in India 187 (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 1st edn., 2004).
45. India Justice Report, “India Justice Report 2025” 118 (2025).
