Abstract

In India, judicial nominations first surfaced as a contentious issue in 1973, after more than 20 years of very harmonious ties between the executive branch and the judiciary. The appointment and selection of judges for India's higher courts has long been a sensitive, important, and divisive topic both within and beyond the legal profession. A collegium system was implemented to choose justices for the higher court, but it was criticized for being oppressive and confusing. The NJAC, which was established by the parliament to replace the collegium system, came under fire for allowing executive interference and interfering with the judiciary's complete independence, which led to the Act's repeal and the re-instatement of the collegium system. As the arguments dragged on for years, numerous problems emerged, including delays in the appointment of judges, an increase in the number of openings on the supreme court and in high courts, issues with the promotion and the rise of judges, a rift between the bar and the bench as well as within the bench itself, among other problems. By doing doctrinal research, we were able to pinpoint the shortcomings in the NJAC's and the existing collegium system's methods and make it clear why neither of the two systems should be allowed to choose, relocation, endorse, and appoint judges.

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