Abstract

Originally, private equity was established with the primary goal of optimizing the governance and operations of companies. The leveraged buyout, or the mere threat of it, played a pivotal role in reshaping management practices across a wide spectrum of U.S. companies by reuniting ownership and control. However, as competitive pressures have intensified, private equity is facing challenges in finding a significant number of underperforming companies to enhance. This challenge is particularly pronounced in the case of U.S. public companies, which are constantly under scrutiny from activist hedge funds and empowered shareholders seeking any indications of inefficiency. In response to this shifting landscape, private equity is reorienting its focus away from governance reform. Instead, it is diversifying its strategies across various asset classes, including leveraged buyout funds, credit funds, real estate funds, alternative investments funds, and even hedge funds. The shift is not without its complexities and potential drawbacks. Some of the newly adopted money-making strategies may be less likely to contribute to value enhancement compared to the traditional focus on governance and operational improvements. Furthermore, these diversifications introduce conflicts of interest and complexities that alter the traditional role of private equity in corporate governance. The historical governance advantage of private equity, ensuring that companies serve a single master, is now challenged as the master itself may have divided loyalties and attention. With fewer opportunities for gains through governance reforms, private equity is discreetly distancing itself from the corporate governance revolution it once played a pivotal role in initiating. The industry's evolving strategies and expanding scope raise questions about its continued commitment to the governance principles that were instrumental in its early success.

Keywords