Abstract

The concept of One Nation One Election or Simultaneous Elections has been proposed as a significant move towards electoral reforms. While simultaneous elections are a lucrative and desirable move in theory, several constitutional and practical issues arise. This paper examines the 2024 report of the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections and finds that there are several beneficial and strategically sound recommendations for the conduction of simultaneous elections, however, the question of its impact on federalism is sidelined. The report fails to adequately address concerns about undermining federalism and the prospect of regional issues being overshadowed during simultaneous nation elections have been brushed aside by the Committee Report. Considering such uncertainty, the conduction of simultaneous elections at a national scale could be detrimental and lead to further national and regional challenges. To address these concerns, the paper proposes regional clustering by grouping states with similar electoral cycles. This maintains focus on both national and local issues, preserving regional integrity while reducing the burden on the Electoral Commission. Secondly, it recommends allowing governments elected mid-term to continue until the next Lok Sabha elections, if elected more than two and a half years post the initial polls. This ensures stability and effective governance. Lastly, the concept of Constructive Vote of No-Confidence may be adopted, as seen in the German political model. This ensures a smooth transition of power without the disruption or additional costs of polling. In conclusion, while simultaneous elections hold great promise, it is imperative that regional issues and the spirit of federalism is not sidelined. This paper aims to balance efficiency with federal principles.

Keywords