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Research Paper Volume 5 Issue 2 1206 - 1225 April 16, 2022

On What Grounds can a State be held Responsible and Liable for Genocide?

Lead author · Corresponding
Shrabani Acharya
Ph.D. Scholar cum Faculty of Law at National Law University Odisha, India.
View PDF Full text DOIhttps://doij.org/10.10000/IJLMH.112894
Abstract

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave a comprehensive meaning to the commitment to avert genocide, which is established in Article I of the Genocide Convention, in the Genocide case. According to the Court, this commitment is operational and Non-Preambular in comparison to the other responsibilities enshrined in the Convention. Furthermore, it would imply that nations have a responsibility to refrain from committing genocide. This latter conclusion is less than persuasive since it contradicts the Convention's historic roots and arises from an understanding that, rather than explaining the meaning of a treaty provision, it infers a new responsibility from it. According to the study, violations of the same primary norm do not establish criminal culpability of individuals or state liability for genocide under international law. The alternative perspective is neither supported by state practice nor international case law: although genocide can be committed irrespective of the presence of a state genocidal policy, the state's international accountability necessitates the presence of such a policy. There is also no need to demonstrate that the state as a whole, or one or several of its officials, had genocidal intentions in the criminal sense for the state's inter-national duty to develop. The Court's decision is founded on the idea that a state's global accountability for genocide implies the responsibility of an individual working on the state's behalf. This method is flawed because, in a criminal matter, the presumption of innocent empowers criminal courts to convince themselves that an individual committed a crime. The Court may have limited itself to interpreting Article 1's commitment to avoid and prosecute genocide as having an autonomous element and finding, as it did, that Serbia had breached both of them. It didn't have to embark on a design of the Convention that was significantly hampered by a misunderstanding of the distinction between genocide as an internationally unlawful act of state and genocide as a crime with individual criminal responsibility.

Type
Research Paper
Information
International Journal of Law Management and Humanities, Volume 5, Issue 2, Page 1206 - 1225
DOI: https://doij.org/10.10000/IJLMH.112894
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CC BY-NC 4.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits remixing, adapting, and building upon the work for non-commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Copyright © IJLMH 2026
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The views and opinions expressed in this manuscript are those of the author(s) alone and do not reflect the views, policies, or position of the Journal.

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